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Abstract (English) 
 
 
One aspect of critical reasoning is the analysis and appraisal of claims and 
arguments. A typical problem, when analysing and appraising arguments, is 
inconsistent statements. Although several inconsistencies may have deleterious 
effects on rationality and action, not all of them do. As educators, we also have an 
obligation to teach this evaluation in a way that does justice to our normal 
reasoning practices and judgements of inconsistency. Thus, there is a need to 
determine the acceptable inconsistencies from those that are not, and to impart 
that information to students.  
 
We might ask: What is the best concept of inconsistency for critical 
reasoning and pedagogy? While the answer might appear obvious to some, the 
history of philosophy shows that there are many concepts of “inconsistency”, the 
most common of which comes from classical logic and its reliance on opposing 
truth-values. The current exemplar of this is the standard truth functional account 
from propositional logic. Initially, this conception is shown to be problematic, 
practically, conceptually and pedagogically speaking. Especially challenging from 
the classical perspective are the concepts of ex contradictione quodlibet and ex 
falso quodlibet. The concepts may poison the well against any notion of 
inconsistency, which is not something that should be done unreflectively. 
Ultimately, the classical account of inconsistency is rejected.  
 
In its place, a semantic conception of inconsistency is argued for and 
demonstrated to handle natural reasoning cases effectively. This novel conception 
utilises the conceptual antonym theory to explain semantic contrast and gradation, 
even in the absence of non-canonical antonym pairs. The semantic conception of 
inconsistency also fits with an interrogative argument model that exploits 
inconsistency to display semantic contrast in reasons and conclusions. A method 
for determining substantive inconsistencies follows from this argument model in a 
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straightforward manner. The conceptual fit is then incorporated into the pedagogy 
of critical reasoning, resulting in a natural approach to reasoning which students 
can apply to practical matters of everyday life, which include inconsistency. Thus, 
the best conception of inconsistency for critical reasoning and its pedagogy is the 
semantic, not the classical.  
 
 
KEYWORDS 
Inconsistency, propositional logic, critical reasoning, semantic, antonymic, 
pedagogy, defeasible, translation 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract (isiZulu) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ingqikithi Yocwaningo mayelana nalokhu: Inzulumcabango nemfundiso 
yencasiselo yamazwi eshintshashintshayo ekucabangeni ngokujulile.  
 
Enye yezinhlangothi zokucabanga ngokujulile ngukuhlaziywa nokubekwa 
kwenani ngokwesilinganiso kokushiwoyo nakulokho okuqophiswna ngako. Inkinga 
evamile ekuhlaziyeni nasekubekeni inani kokuqophiswana ngakho 
ngeyezitatimende ezishintshashintshayo. Lokhu kushintshashintsha kungaba 
nemiphumela emibi ekusetshenzisweni kwengqondo nasekwenziweni kwezinto. 
Nakuba kunjalo, akusikona konke ukushintshashintsha okunaleyo miphumela. 
Njengoba singothisha, sinesibopho sokufundisa lokhu kuhluza ngendlela eyenza 
ubulungiswa ekucabangeni kwethu ngokwenjwayelo kanye nasekwehluleleni 
maqondana nokushintshashintsha. Ngenxa yalokho, kunesidingo sokwehlukanisa 
ukushintshashintsha okwamukelekile kulokho okungemukelekile, nokudlulisela 
lolo lwazi kubafundi.  
 
Singabuza ukuthi, yiwona muphi umqondongqangi ongcono kunayo yonke 
kuleyo emayelana nokushintshashintshayo maqondana nokucabanga ngokujulile 
kanye nemfundiso? Yize impendulo yalo mbuzo ingavela njengesobala 
kwabanye, umlando wefilosofi uveza ukuthi miningi imicabangongqangi 
emayelana “nokushintshashintsha”. Eyimvama kakhulu iqhamuka emqondweni 
wokucabanga okuhlelekile okungashayisani kanye nokuncika kwayo 
ekuphikisaneni nemigomo yeqiniso. Isibonelo samanje salokhu yiqiniso elaziwayo 
lokubili okungamaqiniso okungashayisani okusukela kwizitatimende eziveza 
ukwahlulela noma imibono. Ngasekuqaleni, le micabango ivezwa njengento 
eyinkinga maqondana nokwenza, nemiqondongqangi nemfundiso. Oluyinkinga 
kakhulu ngokombono onqala yimicabangongqangi yemigomo yokuphikisana 
nokungabi nabuqiniso (ex contradictione quodlibet and ex falso quodlibet). Le 
miqondongqangi ingamosha yonke imiqondongqangi ekhona maqondana 
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nokushintshashintsha, nokungasiyo into okumele yenziwe ngokungacabangisisi. 
Ekugcineni, uhlobo lwencazelo yakudala yokushintshashintsha alwamukeleki.  
 
Esikhundleni sencazelo yakudala, ukuba khona kwencasiselo yamagama 
adala ukushintshashintsha kuyaqophiswana ngakho kuphinde kuvezwe 
njengokukwazi ukubhekana nezimo zokucabanga ngokwemvelo ngendlela 
enempumelelo. Le micabango emisha isebenzisa inzulumcabango ephikisa 
kabusha incazelo yokwahluka kwencasiselo yamagama nokuhleleka 
ngokulandelana kobukhulu, ngisho ngabe kuthiwa okunye kwangaphandle 
okuhambisana nokunye okuphikisana nakho akukho lapho. Ukwakhiwa 
kwencasiselo yamagama ashayisanayo kuphinde kungene kuthi khaxa ohlobeni 
lokuphikisana okusakuphenya okuhlolisisa ukushintshashintsha ukuze kuvezwe 
ukwahluka kwencasiselo yamagama ezizathwini ezibekiwe naseziphethweni. 
Indlela yokubona ukushintshashintsha okunqala ilandela lolu hlobo lodaba 
ngokuqondile. Ukungena khaxa komqondongqangi kube sekuhlanganiswa 
nemfundiso yokucabanga ngokujulile nokufinyelela endleleni eyimvelo 
yokucabanga kubafundi maqondana nezindaba ezenzekayo empilweni yansuku 
zonke, nokufaka kukho ukushintshashintsha. Ngakho-ke, okuyiwona 
mqondongqangi omuhle kunayo yonke yokushintshashintsha maqondana 
nokucabanga ngokujulile kanye nemfundiso yakhona ngukuba khona 
kwencasiselo yamagama adala ukushintshashintsha kunaleyo yakudala. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract (seSotho) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Teore le mokgwa wa thuto wa ho se dumellane ha moelelo ka ho beha 
mabaka a bohlokwa 
 
Karolo e nngwe ya mabaka a bohlokwa ke ho hlahloba dingangisano, dipolelo le 
mabaka. Bothata bo tlwaelehileng, mabapi le ho hlahloba le ho qaqisa dikgang, 
ke dipolelo tse sa dumellaneng. Le hoja ho se dumellane ho mmalwa ho ka nna 
ha eba le diphello tse mpe hodima ho nahana le pethahatso ya ketso, ha se 
kaofela ha tsona di leng jwalo. Jwaloka barupelli, re boetse re na le boikarabelo 
ba ho ruta tlhahlobo ena ka tsela e etsang toka ho mekgwa ya rona ya ho nahana 
le kahlolo ya ho se dumellane. Kahoo ho teng tlhokahalo ya ho kgetholla ho se 
dumellane ho amohelehang ho batho bao e seng, le ho fana ka lesedi leo 
baithuting. 
 
Re ka botsa: Ke lereo lefe le molemo ka ho fetisisa le sa dumellaneng tabeng ya 
ho beha mabaka le ho ruta? Le hoja karabo e ka nna ya bonahala e hlakile ho ba 
bang, histori ya filosofi e bontsha hore ho na le mareo a mangata a "ho se 
dumellane", a tlwaelehileng ka ho fetisisa a hlahang mokgweng wa motlolo wa 
kgale o itshetlehileng hodima ho ba kgahlano le metheo ya dinnete tse 
hanyetsanang. Sepheo sa moraorao sa sena ke akhaonto e sebetsang hantle ya 
nnete ho tloha molaong wa tlhahiso-taba. Qalong, monahano ona o bontsha hore 
o na le bothata, mme ha e le hantle, o na le maikutlo a ho nahana le a ho ruta. 
Ntho e thata ka ho qolleha ho latela maikutlo a motlolo wa kgale  ke mareo a ex 
contradictione quodlibet le ex falso quodlibet. Mareo ana a ka nna a silafatsa 
maikutlo kgahlanong le maikutlo leha e le afe kapa afe a ho se lumellane, e seng 
ntho e lokelang ho etswa ka mokgwa o sa lokelang. Qetellong, tlaleho ea motlolo 
wa  kgale ya ho se dumellane e qhelelwa thoko. 
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Sebakeng sa yona, moqapi wa moelelo wa ho se dumellane o phehisana le ho 
bontshwa ho sebetsana ka katleho ya dinyewe tsa ho nahana ka tlhaho. Lereo 
lena la bohlokwa le sebedisa teore ya mahanyetsi ho hlalosa hlalosa phapang ya 
moelelo le ho khetholla, esita le ho ba siyo ha dipara tse hanyetsanang. Moelelo 
wa lereo la ho se dumellane o boetse o dumellana le mokgwa wa dipuisano wa 
dipotso o senyang ho se lumellane ho bontshang phapano ya moelelo ka mabaka 
le diqeto. Mokgwa wa ho kgetholla ho se dumellane ho ka sehloohong o tla ho 
latela mokgwa ona wa papiso ka tsela e tobileng. Mokgwa o nepahetseng o 
kenyelletswa ka mokgwa o tshwanang wa ho beha mabaka, ho fella ka mokgwa 
wa tlhaho wa ho beha mabaka ao baithuti ba  ka a sebedisang dinthong tse 
sebetsang tsa bophelo ba letsatsi le letsatsi, tse kenyelletsang ho se dumellane. 
Ka hona, maikutlo a mabeli a ho se dumellane ha mabaka a tebileng le mokgwa 
wa ona wa ho ruta ke moelelo, eseng motlolo wa kgale. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 
Since Aristotle’s Organon (1941:3–212), formal logic has held the honour 
of upholding the standards of ideal deductive reasoning, and rightly so. Formal 
deductive logic displays necessary connections between ideas and provides 
epistemic certainty. In recent times, formal logicians such as Quine (1980, 1986a 
& 1986b), Quine and Ullian (1978) and Hoyningen-Huene (2004), and formal logic 
textbook writers – including Hurley (2014) and Gensler (2010) – have cherished 
the propositional truth functional account of inconsistency as the ideal. 
Inconsistency in this sense is typically defined as: not all claims in a set are true 
given instances of conflicting claims.1 
 
The propositional truth functional account of inconsistency, as taught, 
disconnects from our ordinary everyday account of semantic inconsistency: 
inconsistency based on the conflict of natural language meaning. This “ideal” 
influence taints critical reasoning theory and pedagogy, where contemporary 
instructors consider formal logic and critical reasoning as similar or even the same 
discipline, as indicated by Poston’s (2012), May’s (2010), Moore’s (2012) and 
Michelfelder’s (2011) syllabi for instance.2  
 
Yet, in the twentieth century, the informal logic movement started turning 
away from the “ideal” and started paying attention to what we do when we reason. 
Groarke writes (2011:§1), “The trends that give rise to informal logic as a unique 
discipline of study coalesce in North America in the late 1960s.” Rarely do we 
naturally argue in the formal deductive sense where the premises necessarily 
entail the conclusion; rarely, if ever, do we need to translate arguments in natural 
                                                          
1 This is my definition.  
2 Moore (2012) is an interesting example as Moore (and Parker) uses an earlier edition of his 
Critical Thinking text [2012-10th ed.] to teach an introduction to logic and a critical thinking course. 
The syllabus follows the structure of his book. 
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language into symbolic form and test them for deductive validity. The practices of 
the ideal and the practical thus became disconnected.  To this end, philosophers 
in the informal logic movement – including Scriven (1976), Toulmin (1958 & 2003), 
Groarke (2011), Hamblin (1970) and Johnson (2000) – view formal logic and 
informal logic as two different disciplines.  
 
Objectives 
 
This thesis comprises six main objectives that roughly correspond to each 
chapter:  
 
1) to provide a limited relevant history of inconsistency;  
2) to accurately represent propositional logic;  
3) to accurately critique propositional logic as a system;  
4) to use a contemporary antonym theory to make sense of semantic 
inconsistency judgements in ordinary language and ordinary language 
arguments;  
5) to critique propositional logic as a system of critical reasoning; and  
6) to detail the relevance of the new semantic theory of inconsistency to 
critical reasoning pedagogy. 
 
Research questions 
 
Corresponding to the six objectives, there are six research questions: 
  
 1) What does the history of inconsistency demonstrate about the concept? 
2) What is a correct representation of propositional logic and propositional 
logic inconsistency? 
 3) What are the essential elements of a substantive critique of propositional 
 logic and propositional logic inconsistency? 
4) How can a contemporary antonym theory articulate inconsistency 
judgements in natural language and reasoning? 
5) Why does propositional logic fall short as a theory of critical reasoning? 
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6) What is the best concept of inconsistency for critical reasoning theory 
and pedagogy? 
 
Aims 
 
To answer the research questions there are several issues that need to be 
addressed. This will be done through exploring three general aims, each is taken 
in turn. The first aim is to correct the identified flawed conception showing that 
critical reasoning in theory and practice is distinct from formal propositional 
deductive logic as an implicative system of rules. In making this distinction, the 
propositional truth functional account of inconsistency does not capture our 
ordinary intuitions, viz. semantic conflict, about inconsistency and should be 
rejected. 
 
What might be the alternative to this standard propositional account? I 
propose that a unique account of semantic inconsistency based on the conceptual 
antonym theory fits with our ordinary reasoning practices. This solution makes use 
of modern linguistics and rejects the canonical antonym theory which operates in 
explicit pairs. It also rejects any truth functional account as truth functions come 
after semantic conflict recognition. 
 
The truth functional account of inconsistency holds a fundamental role in 
propositional logic and by extension in philosophy. After completing a formal 
deductive logic course, students have no contrastive inconsistency concept and 
have reason to believe the truth functional account is the only one. This limited 
conception, I will argue, may result from a lack of serious consideration of other 
alternatives such as those that arise from semantic inconsistency judgements in 
everyday life and our normal practices.  
 
Minimally, the initial chapter of this thesis will reveal a family of 
inconsistency concepts, not just one. The family of concepts has consequences to 
the field of philosophy on a whole where the truth functional concept of 
inconsistency is the standard or regulative concept.  Assessment of inconsistency 
claims could then take on other forms not related to truth-values alone, but to 
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conflicting semantic claims. Recognising semantic conflict requires no exposure to 
the rules and understanding of formal deductive logic; instead, this recognition 
relies on our natural ability to understand conflicting semantic content in natural 
language claims. This acknowledgement occurs before considering the truth-
values of the claims.  By developing this semantic account with sensitivity, this 
priority in judgement develops a philosophical conception of semantic 
inconsistency. This conception reveals when a semantic inconsistency is 
important or not, all without reference to truth-values, so diverting from the 
strictures of formal logic.  
 
This different account of inconsistency, a semantic one, has special 
importance to the pedagogy of critical reasoning wherein I opine that the 
conceptual lines have been blurred between formal deductive logic and informal 
logic.3 The blurring is a case of mistaking implication for inference, where the 
former is the domain of formal logic and the latter, is the domain of critical 
reasoning. The semantic conception of inconsistency naturally aligns with natural 
language arguments and requires no translation into a formal language or 
knowledge of implications of inconsistency. More so, by exposing contrasting 
types of systematic inconsistency, a robust understanding of the whole concept of 
inconsistency is presented. This contrastive influence leads to a broader 
understanding for the discipline of philosophy.  
 
Pedagogically, the propositional truth functional account of inconsistency 
has halting or stopping effects in normal argument situations. This effect is 
deleterious to understanding what has gone wrong or why the inconsistency is not 
substantive. While not immediately clear, the truth functional account guides 
philosophical practice through inconsistency charges. A different account of 
inconsistency might well impact this practice in a positive way by providing an 
alternative to the halting problem through more debate and discussion of the 
contested concepts.      
                                                          
3 I have taught on six campuses, in two different geographical regions for eighteen years. I have 
also taught at two-year colleges and four-year universities. Almost every colleague used 
propositional logic and Aristotelian logic in varying degrees in a critical reasoning course, and 
some even use the same textbook for both critical reasoning and introduction to logic courses.  
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My next aim is to develop and articulate a natural language account of 
semantic inconsistency that captures what we do in practice with inconsistency 
judgements in everyday reasoning. This natural language account rejects the 
standard propositional truth functional account as limited in scope and not rich 
enough to articulate the subtleties of our natural language reasoning practices 
and communicative patterns. The natural language account is largely based on a 
particular antonym theory that relies on contrast, gradation, context, and semantic 
knowledge. Due to the contextual emphasis, the value of the semantic 
inconsistency can be evaluated, where it may be problematic.  
 
By applying a contextual antonym theory to reasoning with semantic 
inconsistencies, a third aim manifests with a novel account of how to handle 
semantic inconsistencies for application in critical reasoning courses. Critical 
reasoning, as such, is just giving and understanding the right contextual reasons, 
which may or may not involve inconsistencies. Applying this account to 
pedagogical conventions in critical reasoning demonstrates a more articulate and 
natural view of inconsistency – a semantic one – that aligns with everyday human 
reasoning and communicative practices.  
 
Unique contributions of the research 
 
Analysis of this research has enabled me to identify three unique 
contributions made by this work to the knowledge economy:  
 
1) propositional logic is demonstrated to have little relevance to reasoning 
in everyday life through a confusion of implication for inference and in 
translation problems between formal and ordinary language;  
2) the conceptual model of antonyms is the basis for a theory of semantic 
inconsistency in critical reasoning; and  
3) the use of semantic inconsistency along with the analytical defeasible 
model of argument in critical reasoning pedagogy as a natural argument 
method. 
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Methodology 
 
The philosophical paradigmatic basis for this research is analytical and 
pragmatic.  The American logician Charles Peirce famously drew the medieval 
logical distinction between logica docens and logica utens (Peirce 1901:891–892). 
Logica docens concerns a theory of formal reasoning according to rules and 
systematic application of those rules (1901:891–892). Logica utens concerns our 
natural practice and habits of reasoning (1901:891–892). Thus, a general analysis 
of types of reasoning reveals two distinct sets of practices. 
 
To build on and understand these practices, this thesis requires at least 
three methods: conceptual analysis, historical/systematic study, and pragmatic 
synthesis. The core idea is confirmed through conceptually analysing 
“inconsistency” explaining how it entails a family of concepts. The truth functional 
account is only part of this family. But the use of conceptual analysis is not limited 
to just the core idea. Logical concepts such as “explosion,” “truth functional,” 
“antonym,” “gradation,” “negation,” and others are also analysed to settle and 
understand the various relevant meanings and applications.  
 
The historical/systematic study situates the concept of “inconsistency” from 
the time of pre-Socratics onwards. Most of the effort is expended on Aristotle’s 
thoughts on contradiction from Metaphysics Gamma (1993). The study creates a 
backdrop of contrast demonstrating the lack of understanding of inconsistency as 
a family of concepts. Arguably, it was not until the time of Wittgenstein and his 
later works that families of concepts were taken seriously (1973:§§244–271). 
Wittgenstein’s influence is here taken seriously as his thoughts and conceptual 
description are inspirational in terms of natural language, contradiction and 
inconsistency.  
 
Pedagogically, the pragmatic focus emphasises what is best for the student 
in ordinary reasoning, not what is best for the academy or its instructors. It will be 
contended that no longer should instructors just teach what they were taught in 
critical reasoning courses themselves, as critical reasoning itself needs to be 
applied to the pedagogy of critical reasoning.   
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Each chosen method has its own shortcoming. Historical analyses typically 
do not provide recommendations for the future and if contexts are not similar 
enough, inferences from the past may not be worthwhile. To this end, any 
recommendations must be carefully thought through. Conceptual analyses are 
limited by usage, which could be wrong or irrelevant. Due to the contextual frame, 
the analysis may be limited and any extrapolations should be done with correct 
applicability to multiple contexts in mind. Lastly, pragmatic analyses suffer from a 
reliance on “agreement” as justification for adopting the result. “Agreement” by 
whom and why can be a legitimate problem, especially if sources are cherry 
picked. To stave off these objections, it suffices to add that no one method takes a 
priority and each is used in a check and balance manner to ensure a triangulation 
of results.  
 
Two alternative methods are rejected. An empirical method of obtaining 
data through experiments would require too many variables to be held constant 
for valid universal results. Experimenting on one population may not be relevant to 
another population (this is discussed in Ch. 5 with bilingual learners). The degree 
to which philosophers should engage in empirical studies is questionable as the 
discipline looks more like a social science if performed. This is not to say results 
cannot be used for philosophical justification, but generating those results may be 
beyond the domain of philosophy.  
 
The second alternative method is rejected for a few reasons. The 
postmodern style of analysis is rejected due to the lack of stability of word 
meanings, even contextually. This style tends to focus on subjective meaning, 
where minimally for reasoning, there must be intersubjective meaning for common 
analysis (Walters 1994:13–14). More so universality and objective application are 
rejected (Walters 1994:1). While I can appreciate the spirit of the style to focus on 
the individual and downplay argumentative conflict (Walters 1994:12), individuals 
are still subject to following norms or the result may be communicative 
unintelligibility. Norms are necessary to reasoning, at least in some minimal sense 
and cannot simply be abandoned for personal preference.    
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Structural outline 
 
Chapter one reviews the systematic and historical understandings of 
inconsistency. Beginning with Aristotle and his work from Metaphysics Gamma 
(1993), three distinct types of inconsistency are articulated. The three are helpful 
because they are not bound to propositional logic. Heraclitus’s (Graham 2011) 
and Protagoras’s (Taylor and Lee 2014) thoughts are considered as well. Their 
views are interesting because they both may be advocating “trivialism”: the view 
that all statements are true. From there a discussion of four main paradoxes sets 
a greater context for semantic and logical considerations: the liar paradox, the 
sorites paradox, heterological paradox, and paradoxes of material implication. 
While most of these are more in tune with the concept of contradiction and formal 
inconsistency; the history still stands as relevant to a broader conception of 
inconsistency. Next, three modern philosophers, Descartes (1984a, 1984b & 
2012) and Arnauld and Nicole (1996) share their additive perspectives on 
inconsistency. Finally, some 19th–20th century thoughts on inconsistency come 
from Hegel (2010), Kierkegaard (1936), Camus (1955), Strawson (1952) and the 
paraconsistent school of Priest and Routley (Sylvan) (1989).  
 
Chapter two presents the formal system of propositional deductive logic. 
Through a detailed discussion of rules, connectives and symbols, the systematic, 
consistent nature of propositional logic is demonstrated. The truth functional 
aspect of propositional logic is revealed to be inherent to the system, based on 
the nature of the connectives used. A logical connective is used in a truth 
functional manner to form a sentence from individual components if and only if 
that sentence's overall truth-value depends only on the truth-value of the 
individual components. Otherwise, the logical connective is used in a non-truth 
functional way. A thorough discussion of the meaning of the connectives and their 
difference from natural language meaning, exhibits the non-intuitive nature of the 
austere meaning of the connectives. The connectives are explained in terms of 
both truth tables and inference rules, both of which have their own concept of 
inconsistency. These concepts are further discussed through logical implication: 
EFQ (ex falso quodlibet), from the false anything follows and ECQ (ex 
contradictione quodlibet), from a contradiction anything follows. Both principles 
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manifest the property of “explosion” showing something rather peculiar about the 
logical system: the conclusion is not restrained by the premises, such that 
“anything” follows from falsity and contradiction. Articulating the property of 
“explosion” in detail is necessary, as it stands to reason that much of the negative 
connotations of inconsistency come from it.  Finally, “anything” following from a 
contradiction is a misnomer. Rules licence moves and acceptable moves were 
made to reach that result. So, the arbitrary nature of “explosion” is much more 
limited than is popularised. 
 
Chapter three critiques the propositional truth functional account of logic. 
Most of this chapter concentrates on the logical property of “explosiveness,” the 
concept of “validity,” and why neither correspond to our everyday reasoning 
practices. Finally, the purported isomorphism between formal language and 
natural language is challenged, especially in translation and in terms of the 
material conditional and exclusive disjunction.  
 
Chapter four develops the semantic conception of inconsistency through 
conceptual analysis and present-day work on antonyms. The lexical-categorical 
model is presented and rejected in favour of the conceptual model. The rejection 
hinges on the problems with assuming stable linguistic properties and a simple 
canon of antonyms. Synonyms share those stable linguistic properties, thus 
synonyms are antonymic-like, too. The premise is challenged, in particular, the 
notion of “sharing.” The premise is shown to be more relevant to the conceptual 
model where antonyms function on gradations, with some being stronger than 
others. In natural language reasoning, canonical pairs of antonyms rarely occur, 
so articulating graded antonyms is more robust and sensitive to context, which is 
what is needed in critical reasoning.  
 
An argument is given showing the temporal priority of semantic 
inconsistency judgements over truth functional judgements and implicative 
judgements. From this temporal priority a conceptual priority manifests. Truth 
conditions factor in to argument evaluation more than argument formation, and 
are often unknown in everyday reasoning. With the semantic conception of 
inconsistency, both formation and evaluation take place before considering the 
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truth conditions. The formation aspect relies on antonymic understanding and 
assessment. The evaluation aspect interprets the truth-values in cases of 
inconsistency.  For example, think about antonymic gradations at the end of the 
continuum, versus gradations much closer together; the former has a greater 
potential impact on truth-values than the latter. In the case of the latter, it may be 
prudent to let the broader context determine the truth-value of the statement 
instead of letting it weakly contrast with the other antonymic claim. Truth-values 
are not discarded completely, they still factor in to the evaluation but much later in 
the process, if they are even known. 
 
Chapter five reviews the pedagogy of propositional logic, the truth 
functional account of inconsistency and relevant informal fallacies. The early 
purpose of this chapter is to show how formal deductive logic substitutes for (or is 
transformed into) critical reasoning in many critical thinking courses. In these 
instances, critical thinking is being taught as a logic course for all intents and 
purposes, with the exception of a paper assignment, which contemporary critical 
reasoning texts such as Moore and Parker (2015), Salmon (2012) and Cederblom 
and Paulsen (2005) demonstrate. More so, reviewing critical thinking syllabi 
available alone confirms this approach, for example May (2010), Michelfelder 
(2011) and Poston (2012).4 Poston (2012) is also an example of an instructor 
using a logic textbook, The Power of Logic (Snyder, Snyder and Wasserman 
2012), for a critical thinking course. The underlying idea is that formal deductive 
logic is the ideal of reasoning and thus, it is what should be taught in critical 
thinking classes, too. Thus, the content substitution practice is real and continuing 
in critical thinking courses.  
 
After demonstrating the content substitution process, the problems with that 
flawed pedagogy follow. There are a handful of major difficulties which include 
justifying, or even making sense of, logical connectives that do not match 
standard natural language meanings. Another problem is attempting to justify the 
results of formal logic proofs about inconsistency and how anything follows from a 
                                                          
4 These syllabi were two taken from the first two pages of a Google search on “critical thinking 
syllabi.” There were others as well.  
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contradiction in natural language. The final issue involves trying to make sense of 
applying fallacies that are not black and white but are presented that way.  
 
 Chapter six applies the semantic conception of inconsistency to the 
pedagogy of critical reasoning. Inconsistency can no longer just be about truth-
values and the results of formal propositional deductive logic. Instead, logical 
inconsistency is one concept that may be taught in critical reasoning courses. 
Learning occurs contrastively. By saying something about the truth functional 
account, the basis is formed for understanding an alternative account, i.e. the 
semantic conception of inconsistency.  
 
 In many ordinary language arguments, the truth of the premises is 
unknown or questionable. The principle of charity requires us to present an 
argument in the strongest possible way and in fairness that requires keeping 
premises that appear to be inconsistent. Students will be taught to look for 
semantic inconsistencies in ordinary language arguments. From there, students 
will assess the inconsistency as an important one or not based on semantic 
conflict of some kind. Minor gradations may not reveal anything problematic; 
major gradations may reveal conceptual problems or factual reporting problems, 
but not necessarily. The context also factors in to the intelligibility and ultimately, 
acceptability or unacceptability of the inconsistency. So, students learn to 
combine the semantic conception of inconsistency with context analysis to provide 
the best answer about how to proceed with the argument.  
 
 The semantic conception of inconsistency stands as part of the general 
concept of inconsistency. Inconsistency itself has no necessary value, positive or 
negative. Students will be introduced to various fallacies that have either an 
explicit or implicit inconsistency in their conception. This broader look at 
inconsistency, informed by the prior practice of noticing semantic inconsistencies 
and context, helps students identify when an inconsistency is substantive and 
when it is not.  
 
 For instance, the tu quoque fallacy depends on recognising the 
inconsistency between what someone says and what someone does. In ordinary 
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idiom, the person is a hypocrite. The problem with this fallacy is that particular 
contexts justify the inconsistency and it is not a fallacy. The attack on the person 
is thus minimised in favour of what is being said. For example, if a drug addict tells 
someone not to use drugs, but is still a user, there is an inconsistency in belief 
and behaviour. An uninformed conception would charge the person with a fallacy 
because the person is still an addict and not following his own suggestion. 
However, rationality tells us that in the case of addiction, the person speaking is 
an authority on the matter, yet does not have the power to stop the behaviour and 
desires. Who is better to speak about it? None, the addict has the floor. So, the 
attack on the person is negated through recognising the value of the person’s 
testimony in context. 
 
 Pedagogically, there is a role for the truth functional account of 
inconsistency as one in a family of inconsistency concepts. However, its role in 
critical reasoning is minimised in favour of the semantic conception and an 
informed general concept of inconsistency where context determines the value of 
inconsistency. Critical reasoning demands as much, if not more from us as 
instructors.  
 
 Chapter seven initially draws out the implications of the previous chapters 
for logic broadly construed, critical reasoning, and the pedagogy of critical 
reasoning. For logic, broadly construed, the propositional truth functional account 
of inconsistency is demonstrated to be systematically limited in meaning and 
application. For intelligibility, it requires a natural language understanding to make 
sense of the formal language understanding; the reverse is not possible because 
all explanations of the formal language would require natural language.  This 
result motivates the implication for critical reasoning as the propositional truth 
functional account does not capture our ordinary practical intuitions about 
inconsistency.  
 
 A different account – the semantic conception – articulates our ordinary 
practical conception and is not systematically limited in meaning and application. 
As natural language comes first, a conception developed from natural language 
will have priority over any formal caricature of it. In short, the semantic conception 
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is necessary for the truth functional propositional account to have any meaning at 
all.  
 
 This priority in order extends into critical reasoning pedagogy. To learn 
about inconsistency, semantic inconsistency must be taught first, demonstrating 
the subtlety of inconsistency judgements and the context-dependency of such 
judgements. The conceptual antonym theory, with its emphasis on linguistic 
gradations and contrast of antonyms comports with our experience as competent 
language users. As students become more capable linguistically, more fidelity can 
be exercised with such judgements. Students are also taught to recognise the 
context of the semantic inconsistency in question, and from there, assign the 
value to the semantic inconsistency. Not all semantic inconsistencies are equal, 
some matter; others do not. If desired and the time warrants, the propositional 
truth functional account may be taught after the semantic account as an example 
of another concept of inconsistency that derives its meaning from the system of 
propositional logic and its rules.   
 
 In the first chapter, the concept of inconsistency is explored in many ways. 
To appreciate the concept of inconsistency, the contrast between the varying 
views must be made apparent. This initial chapter sets the foundation for the 
contrast between the semantic conception and other thoughts about 
inconsistency.  
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Chapter 1: A brief history of inconsistency 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Emerson (1841:7) famously said: “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of 
little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” Emerson is 
touching on something crucial; consistency is not always the desiradatum. 
Philosophers typically prize consistency above all, but there can be good reasons, 
sometimes excellent reasons, for inconsistency. 
 
The history of philosophy is brimming with discussions of inconsistency in 
various forms. Some of these are clarifying; others are not. This chapter focuses 
on some of the major figures and their serious thoughts about inconsistency. 
Inconsistency can be of at least five different types: metaphysical, psychological, 
communicative, linguistic, and logical. The historical material that follows 
addresses each of these although not in a systematic manner. The goal is to 
frame a line of thought that covers the broad philosophical terrain of inconsistency 
showing how it is not just historically a single idea, but a multifaceted one that 
deserves a conceptual explanation. It is also the goal of this chapter to 
demonstrate that attributions of inconsistency are not always accurate and may 
be the source of conceptual and historical confusion. 
 
The pre-Socratics such as Heraclitus (2013) and the Sophists such as 
Protagoras (Plato 1961), and their views on metaphysical inconsistency will be 
explored, setting the following critique by Aristotle (1941,1955 & 1993) in context. 
I will expend a good deal of effort articulating Aristotle’s three different 
formulations of inconsistency or, as it is better known, the law of non-contradiction 
(LNC). The communicative problems with rejecting the LNC in practice are also 
shown. Views in opposition to Aristotle come next and detail that the LNC suffers 
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in various ways as a first principle but also has problems reconciling the three 
different formulations as consistent with one another. 
 
Next, a detailed presentation of the main historical paradoxes follows, 
aiding in understanding the differences among linguistic, logical, and metaphysical 
paradoxes. Solutions to these paradoxes reveal more about how inconsistency is 
generated than how to solve it in each respective case. However, this 
understanding helps form a comprehensive view of inconsistency when 
something is inconsistent and simply when there is an appearance of 
inconsistency. 
 
The chapter closes by considering the views of various philosophers and 
schools that have said something important about inconsistency. These 
philosophers and schools include Arnauld and Nicole (1996), Descartes (1984a, 
1984b & 2012), Hegel (1969 & 2010), existentialist authors Kierkegaard (1936 & 
1986) and Camus (1955), and contemporary analytic philosophers Strawson 
(1952), Priest and Routley (Sylvan) (1989). Given the vast range of analytical 
philosophy, this final group is limited to major representatives of two ways of 
thinking about inconsistency – classical and non-classical thought – that are 
relevant to the overall understanding of the thesis. 
 
In the Philosophical Investigations (1973) and Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics (1994), Wittgenstein wrote extensively about contradiction (i.e. 
logical inconsistency) and paradoxes. In writing about mathematics Wittgenstein 
(1994:256) states: 
 
“The pernicious thing is not: to produce a contradiction in the region in which 
neither the consistent nor the contradictory proposition has any kind of work to 
accomplish; no, what is pernicious is: not to know how one reached the place 
where contradiction no longer does any harm.” 
 
It is the latter claim that encompasses the spirit of the work in this chapter. Many 
supposed historical inconsistencies and contradictions may be neither; some may 
be legitimate yet harmless against traditional historical interpretations. 
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1.2  Pre-Socratics and Sophists 
 
While there is no clear demarcation of a time period of the pre-Socratics 
but approximately 6th and 5th century BCE (Curd 2016) and the Sophists of the 5th 
and 4th century BCE (Struck 2009) , the importance for this thesis is that they both 
predate Aristotle at 384 BCE (Shields 2016). As Aristotle, in Metaphysics Gamma 
(1993) responded strongly to at least two philosophers from this prior period, they 
will form the focus of this initial historical section. However, “historical” might be 
too strong. What this section and others do is analyse perceptions of the 
philosophers and consider what their original intents were or might be on a 
charitable interpretation. Part of the methodological problematic is a lack of 
original source texts coupled with the degree of interpretation apparent in the 
paraphrases. 
 
Heraclitus (2013:1238) is an obvious target given the controversial nature 
of his claim about stepping in the same river twice.  Some characterise his views 
into three separate principles: the theory of flux, the theory of the unity of 
opposites, and his monist ontology (Graham 2011). Our concerns are the first two. 
 
Graham (2011) believes, “… on those stepping into rivers staying the same 
other and other waters flow [Cleanthes from Arius Didymus from Eusebius]”, has 
the appropriate linguistic representation of the work of Heraclitus. This contrasts 
with Plato’s Heraclitus, “I believe, says that all things pass and nothing stays, and 
comparing existing things to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice 
into the same river [Plato Cratylus 402a = A6].” The problematic at stake is that 
the historical influence of Plato’s reading of Heraclitus is likely to have had more of 
an influence on what Heraclitus supposedly wrote than on what Heraclitus actually 
wrote by virtue of his exalted status in Western philosophy.5 
 
There is a radical difference in intent between the two interpretations. 
Graham’s is general and poetic; Plato’s interpretation takes some liberty with the 
                                                          
5 A.N. Whitehead in Process and Reality alluded to this very phenomenon when he wrote, “The 
safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series 
of footnotes to Plato” (1929:39). 
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original passage. Heraclitus (2013:1238) writes in passage LXXXI, “Into the same 
river we both step and do not step. We are and are not.” Scholars, including 
Barnes, use Plato’s interpretation to make adamant claims about Heraclitus, 
including being inconsistent: 
 
“That objection alleges logical inconsistency: Heraclitus’ central contention, the 
Unity thesis, is inconsistent; it flagrantly violates the law of contradiction; hence it 
is false, necessarily false, and false in a trivial and tedious fashion. It is empty to 
praise for his scientific insight a thinker whose main and innovatory tenet is a 
straightforward self- contradiction” (Barnes 1993:6061). 
 
There are two ways of considering this criticism. First, it is arguing against a 
position in general, whether correctly ascribed to the philosopher or not. There is 
something to learn from a charitable interpretation by thinking through the 
concepts themselves and assessing their values. Second, it is a caricature set up 
to defeat and show its weakness. It is easy to set up a straw man, by ascribing a 
view to a philosopher that the philosopher would not agree to and then criticise it 
as his or her view. It is fair to say, the second way is probably more accurate 
because of the stronger, more controversial, claim being made. 
 
In fairness to Heraclitus, the river passage is semantically indeterminate in 
at least one superficial way. The indeterminacy is what creates the confusion. 
“River” is being used in at least two ways metaphysically; as a type and as a 
token. As a general type, the river does not change, so one can step into the 
same river more than once. As a token, however, the river is continuously 
changing in terms of flow, speed, depth, clarity, and other factors. Without 
violating any logical ideas, both can be true, so it is not logically inconsistent. 
 
Heraclitus’s unity of opposites has the same tension as the theory of flux. 
Opposites are joined together. Graham (2011) gives an example of this theory 
from Heraclitus: “Sea is the purest and most polluted water: for fish drinkable and 
healthy, for men undrinkable and harmful [B61].” Despite the hyperbole of “most,” 
Heraclitus is merely showing that with a context shift, the value of something can 
change. On the surface, this looks to be logically inconsistent: both cannot be 
true, at least in terms of “purest” and “most polluted.” However, given the context 
shift based on the differences between humans and fish, both can be true. The 
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more important consideration might be thinking about the semantic inconsistency 
between “purest” and “most polluted” showing a natural tension. These terms 
would be incompatible if the context were the same, but they are not. So, 
Heraclitus’s thoughts form a legitimate example in the history of philosophy where 
apparent inconsistencies of both types – logical and semantic – are dissolved by 
paying attention to the context shift. 
 
Protagoras was a Sophist, one member of the group that were paid 
educators generally understood to be concerned with persuasion (Taylor and Lee 
2014). This distinguished them from philosophers whose focus was on truth. For 
example, Plato’s work is replete with Socrates working in opposition to Sophists, 
including the dialogue with Protagoras (1961:308352). 
 
Historically, Protagoras is singled out for being a relativist of some sort 
(Taylor and Lee 2014). Much like Heraclitus, Protagoras’s philosophy has been 
pared down to a few simple ideas. This is unfortunate because more could be 
learned from his philosophical position on life and morality. Protagoras is famous 
for the idea that “man is the measure of all things”, which reads from Plato’s 
Collected Works at 151e-152 (1961:856): “Man is the measure of all things, alike 
of the being that are and of the not-being of things that are not.” Unfortunately, 
there are no known original surviving manuscripts of Protagoras, so Plato’s 
version must be considered as the most correct interpretation. 
 
The basic idea at work here is that humans determine the value of their 
lives. Arguably, that determination is epistemological about what someone 
believes or not and/or to what someone gives value. However, the “measure 
passage” could be read in a much stronger metaphysical way making ontological 
claims about existence, which would generate a clear inconsistency. However, is 
that what Protagoras had in mind? Protagoras was concerned with morality. Moral 
claims are not categorically of the same type as metaphysical claims. It seems to 
me that on a generous reading, Protagoras’s measure claim is much more akin to 
Ayer as an emotivist (1952:6377). With morality, an individual determines the 
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value of moral claims as they are subject to feelings and reasons specific to the 
person. Ayer (1952:68) wrote: 
 
 “For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any 
factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely 
expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting 
me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in 
asking which of us is in the right.”  
 
Take the case of Steve Biko (SA History 2017), who - like Martin Luther 
King Jr. (King 1963) in the United States – sought to change the race 
consciousness of the largely white society making them examine what they 
actually believed about race relations. Against all odds, Biko held these beliefs 
against the dominant ideology in society. Setting aside the question of objective 
morality for the sake of argument, Biko and King both would have held those 
beliefs as individuals and believed them to be correct. Philosophically, the 
outcome is that beliefs about value are different from metaphysical facts. 
 
If the preceding thoughts are correct about Protagoras, an individual who 
adopts the “measure passage” is not logically inconsistent. Where the logical 
inconsistency can manifest is when other people are placed into the mix, and the 
value of what they say is considered in contrast or agreement with someone else. 
However, that potential inconsistency implies that truth-values hold over moral 
claims, when in theory, moral claims may just be preferences being asserted. If 
they are merely preferences as the emotivists believe, no truth-values hold over 
the assertions. As with Heraclitus, if Protagoras is involved in a context shift where 
morality is not subject to truth claims and is an expression of preference, the 
“measure passage” raises no real logical or semantic concerns. Of course, the 
context can be disregarded as an incorrect one, but that is beyond our 
investigative scope. 
 
One final way that Protagoras can be understood is that he is making a 
dubious claim about objective, universal knowledge. “Man” or humans are the 
measure of all things, as a form of subjective belief. This would include moral 
beliefs. Without objective knowledge, man is the measure of what can be known. 
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This claim is not that controversial. The history of science shows this form of belief 
to be true. The difference between the geocentric and heliocentric models of the 
universe displays that what was thought to be true for humankind for many years 
was taken as knowledge. In addition, if the instrumentalist about the philosophy of 
science is right, the Ptolemaic geocentric model is predictive and usable (e.g., 
Ptolemaic astronomy still allows navigation on the high seas). Is that knowledge? 
Defining it as such would be the task relative to the philosophical model at work. 
 
However, Plato would disagree. In the Theaetetus 201 c-d (1961:908), he 
argues for justified true belief as the measure of knowledge. What that 
metaphysically requires is that appearance and reality are the same thing – what 
we experience and what is there are the same thing – counting as justification for 
the belief. Arguably, in the geocentric versus heliocentric models of the universe, 
the geocentric model is merely an appearance without a corresponding reality, 
whereas in the heliocentric model appearance and reality correspond, thus, 
counting as knowledge in accordance with Plato’s definition. From an objective 
standpoint, this is a reasonable interpretation. But is it a fair interpretation? After 
the fact, knowledge claims prove little when the perspective of the knowledge 
claim is relevant to the value and quality of it. Protagoras recognises that very fact 
of the standpoint. Thus, appearance and reality are the same for him at that time 
until proven differently and then at a later time, something else is proven such as 
the heliocentric model. Plato’s criticism relies on the two metaphysical distinctions 
being true, another theoretical posit which generates potentially inconsistent 
claims. Accordingly, inconsistency can have much deeper roots. 
 
1.3  Aristotle 
 
Aristotle was arguably the first philosopher to seriously consider the 
philosophical aspects of inconsistency and contradiction. In Metaphysics Gamma 
(1993), Aristotle writes at length about contradiction and intelligibility. The initial 
part of this section introduces his three different formulations of the law of non-
contradiction. The latter part of this section considers some responses to 
Aristotle’s thoughts. 
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1.3.1 The law of non-contradiction 
 
In Metaphysics Gamma (1993), Aristotle covers a number of logical and 
metaphysical topics. One of these topics has a unique character. In particular, he 
addresses “… the firmest of all principles …” and a “… principle about which it is 
impossible to be in error …” which is the law of non-contradiction (LNC) (Aristotle 
1993:1421). In Metaphysics Gamma, Aristotle states that this principle can be 
demonstrated through the method of refutation but not directly proven 
(1993:1006a: 1–10). There are three different formulations of the LNC found in 
Metaphysics Gamma: ontological law of non-contradiction, logical law of non-
contradiction, and psychological law of non-contradiction, each is defined in turn:6 
 
From 1005b, the ontological formulation of the LNC (OLNC): “For the same thing 
to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the 
same respect is impossible” (1993:19–21). 
 
From 1011b, the logical formulation of the LNC (LLNC): “It has now been fully 
enough stated that the opinion that opposite assertions are not simultaneously 
true is the firmest of all …” (1993: 13–14). 
 
From 1005 b, the psychological formulation of the LNC (PLNC): “For it is 
impossible for anyone to believe that the same thing is and is not …” (1993: 22–
25). 
 
 
The OLNC is a strong formulation that many hold to be self-evidently true 
given that it deals with the basic constituents of reality. Under any normal 
articulation (i.e. non-quantum physics), it is metaphysically impossible for 
something to be (in the same time and same sense) and not to be (in the same 
time and same sense). At the same time and in the same sense, no one can both 
be in California and not be in California. While some, such as Hegel (2010) and 
Priest & Routley (Sylvan) (1989), might challenge this formulation, these 
philosophers and their ideas will be addressed later. 
 
However, are the other two formulations (i.e. LLNC and PLNC) as strong 
and do they hold in an equally rigorous way? For Aristotle, the LLNC is as strong 
                                                          
6 This tripartite division of the LNC was first thoroughly formulated by Łukasiewicz (1971) in his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics gamma. 
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as the OLNC, as he qualifies that as “the firmest of all” (1993:1314). The 
sentence: “Scott is in California and Scott is not in California”, according to this 
formulation is not true because – as per bivalent logic – the individual conjunctive 
statements are not true at the same time. One statement is true but not the other 
statement because of the function of negation. In fairness to Aristotle, this 
formulation holds true in classical logic, even axiom like, or as a law of thought. 
Aristotle’s thoughts on these matters stood for millennia as the definitive thoughts 
on contradiction, especially logical contradiction. It is only in recent years that non-
standard logics have challenged the LLNC, such as the work of Priest and 
Routley (Sylvan) (1989).  
 
According to Aristotle, the PLNC is equally as strong as the OLNC and the 
LLNC, given the modal language of the “impossibility” of believing “… the same 
thing is and is not …” (1993:2225). The act of believing contradictory 
propositions is impossible for Aristotle, as he puts forth in Metaphysics Gamma, 
1005b (1993:2633): 
 
“But if it is not possible for contraries to hold good of the same thing 
simultaneously … and the opinion contrary to an opinion is that of the 
contradictory, obviously it is impossible for the same person to believe 
simultaneously that the same thing is and is not …” 
 
Note the “hold good” from the OLNC and “believe” from the PLNC as his 
structuring (or isomorphism) of the two formulations. Aristotle is arguing that the 
relationships of things in the world determine the structure of thought. If the OLNC 
holds, then so will the PLNC. For Aristotle, it is important that all three LNC’s align 
and have similar if not the same strength, to keep them the “firmest of all” 
formulations that guide thought (1993:1314). 
 
1.3.2 Aristotle on the Pre-Socratics 
 
In Metaphysics Gamma (1993:611 & 2532), Aristotle considers the 
thoughts of both Heraclitus and Protagoras and finds them lacking in intelligibility. 
This is not surprising because, for Aristotle, both are violating one or more 
formulations of the LNC. 
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Arguably, what grounds Aristotle’s thinking on contradiction is his 
essentialism as manifested in his ontological conception of contradiction 
(1993:19–21). Aristotle believes that things have essential or necessary properties 
that the thing would not be if it did not have those properties.7 Human beings are 
essentially rational for Aristotle such that if a human being is not rational, it is not a 
human being. Essential properties, in the Aristotelian estimation, are to be 
distinguished from accidental properties, such that accidental properties are not 
necessary for a thing to possess, for example, paleness (Cohen 2016:§5–7). 
 
In Metaphysics Gamma, 1005b, Aristotle (1993:2526) attributes the 
following thesis to Heraclitus: “For it is impossible for anyone to believe that the 
same thing is and is not, as some consider Heraclitus said…” Suppose the world 
of essences is true. Things in the world cannot both possess and not possess 
necessary properties. Beliefs about the world should correspond to the world in 
Aristotelian epistemology. So to explicate the above quote: Aristotle claims that 
Heraclitus holds that someone can believe the thing both is and is not. This 
generates a problem for Aristotle (1993: 2930), because he argues that “...the 
opinion contrary to an opinion is that of a contradictory” (1005b). In terms of the 
“river passage” previously discussed, this point would be articulated that someone 
believes both that the river stays the same and does not believe the river stays 
the same. In 1005b (1993:3132), Aristotle continues: “... then obviously it is 
impossible for the same person to believe simultaneously that the same thing is 
and is not.” Thus, you cannot believe the river is both the same and something 
other than a river. 
 
Aristotle’s basic criticism from his LNC broadly construed, is that someone 
cannot hold contradictory beliefs. This manifests from his essentialism, 
augmented by his further belief that PLNC is so basic that it serves as a 
foundation for axioms (i.e. self-evident truths). In Metaphysics Gamma 1005b 
(1993:34), Aristotle writes: “... it is, in the nature of things, principles of all the other 
axioms also.” Before self-evident truths arise, the PLNC is in place for intelligibility. 
                                                          
7 See in particular, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (1941:75a[120-121]). 
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So, while axioms might be the topic of a discussion, the PLNC is not. It can only 
be given the foundational role it serves in guiding our thinking and practices. 
 
In Metaphysics Gamma, Aristotle turns to Protagoras. He writes in 1009 
(1993:611): 
 
“For if everything that is thought or imagined is true, it is necessary that everything 
should be simultaneously true and false; for many people have mutually contrary 
beliefs, and regard those whose opinions are not the same as their own as in 
error, so that it is necessary that the same thing should be and not be.” 
 
Returning to Protagoras’s idea that “man is the measure of all things,” the social 
consequence is that people have opposing beliefs, and they are not in error. 
Thus, something could be and not be based on the opinion of individuals, as the 
opinion logically determines the truth-value, not the world or what it is. 
 
This consequence flies in the face of Aristotle’s PLNC and essentialism. 
Essential properties are identifiable—they constitute what something is: ontology 
is not subject to debate. Accidental or contingent properties may be subject to 
debate, but they are not the focus of Aristotle’s criticism of Protagoras. For 
Aristotle, contrary opinions cannot both be true based on the PLNC and the way 
the world is essentially via the OLNC. The structuring element of both LNCs 
cannot be denied, as they are required for the basic intelligibility of the world. 
Thus, Protagoras’s subjectivist thesis fails to gain any philosophical ground for 
Aristotle. 
 
1.3.3 Contemporary criticisms of Aristotle on the LNC 
 
Aristotle’s influence on logic as a whole still carries on today. In recent 
times, he has been the subject of various criticisms about the LNC. Some of these 
centre on the supposed indubitability of the LNC, e.g. Cohen (1986), and others 
focus on specific problems with Aristotle’s conceptions of the LNCs, e.g. 
Łukasiewicz (1971) and Priest (1998 & 2006). Typically, the attacks on the LNC 
centre on one of two themes; either they object to the foundational principle 
aspect, or they object to one or more of the laws directly. 
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1.3.3.1 Cohen 
 
Cohen’s (1986) discussion of the literature on Aristotle is wide-ranging, 
especially of Code’s (1986) and Irwin’s (1977) works on Aristotle. There he 
debates argument type and Aristotle’s goals. Those will be set aside for our 
purposes. However, Cohen adds two critical points to the overall debate, one 
about the indubitability of the LNC (based on a knowledge distinction) and an 
argument about the success of Aristotle (demonstrating the indubitability of the 
LNC). 
 
Cohen references an earlier Aristotelian work than the Metaphysics, the 
Posterior Analytics (1941:75b[121] & 100b[185–186]), setting up a distinction 
about how first principles can be known. Cohen (1986:360) writes:  
 
“Aristotle’s solution in the Posterior Analytics is to distinguish between episteme 
(i.e., scientific knowledge) and nous (i.e., intuitive intellect). First principles, such 
as PNC [LNC in our terminology], are not objects of scientific knowledge—since 
they are not demonstrable—but are still known, since they are grasped by nous.” 
 
The distinction between episteme and nous fundamentally answers the question 
about how a general principle like the LNC can be known. Scientific knowledge is 
subject to the senses and verification, or empirical methodology. Testing general 
logical principles would be difficult because the example of the principle is not the 
principle itself. However, if general logical principles are known by intuition, it 
explains how we have the principle available to us. Aristotle does not rely on this 
distinction in Metaphysics, instead appealing to a series of elenctic 
demonstrations per Cohen (1986:369). I suspect Aristotle’s intent was to prime 
ordinary intuitions about the LNC, but not to go as far as demonstrating its truth. 
 
The second point found in Cohen’s work is the consequence of an 
argument about the indubitability of the LNC. Cohen (1986:367368) argues, 
supposing G is any arbitrary predicate, and a is any arbitrary object, then: 
 
1. Everyone believes that ~(Ga & ~Ga). From (1) it is legitimate to 
generalise to:  
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2. (x)(F)(everyone believes that ~[Fx & ~Fx]). However, (2) does 
not assert the indubitability of PNC, which would be represented by a 
different formula: 
3. Everyone believes that (x)( F) ~(Fx &~Fx). 
 
Cohen’s strategy is to start with a specific instance (1) of the LNC that everyone 
believes. From there, he generalises to a quantified version (2) wherefore any 
predicate and object and its negation, everyone is going to believe the conjunction 
is not the case. Quantifying over the belief clause does not ensure it is 
undoubtable. To be undoubtable (3), he moves the clause outside of the 
quantification, which changes the scope of belief to any arbitrary predicate and its 
object. However, (3) does not seem to follow any known inference principle. 
Cohen (1986:386) states: “But it is not obvious that 2 entails 3, for it is not evident 
that one may legitimately import external quantifiers into a belief context.” This is a 
subtle logical point because what is at stake are the instantiated beliefs that one 
has that stand as true, but these instances do not necessarily imply that all of 
one’s beliefs with the same logical form are true. This is not necessarily Cohen’s 
point, but this is a generalisation fallacy of sorts where from particular instances of 
a logical form, a universal claim of the same form is made. So, then it seems that 
Cohen’s criticism could directly apply to the PLNC. The criticism raises a concern: 
if everyone does believe that PLNC is true then it might be because particular 
instances (claim 1) do not necessarily entail a universal (claim 3). 
 
To extrapolate from Cohen’s two points, a few things may follow. If the 
nous and episteme distinction holds, the LNC and its variants are not 
demonstrable but known intuitively. This would imply that, potentially, the PLNC is 
the strongest formulation given the nature of belief and its relation to intuition. 
However, this formulation is substantiated by Aristotle’s essentialism. But this 
metaphysical view needs to be justified and this is problematic, because one 
cannot simply assume that there are essences, without verification and 
repeatability. The very phenomena that Aristotle uses to derive essences can be 
explained by non-essentialistic accounts like Wittgenstein’s family resemblances 
(1973:§§244271). The elenctic demonstrations of the Metaphysics seem to go in 
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the other direction for Aristotle, to the episteme category. Cohen’s second point 
supports this direction, as instances of the LNC in everyday life are used to justify 
the general principle LNC (1986:367369). The result of both points is that what 
once looked to be an unshakeable principle is not so firm or clear to justify. 
 
1.3.3.2 Łukasiewicz 
 
Łukasiewicz was a Polish logician who wrote extensively on Aristotle’s 
logic. He was the first to write about the three different versions of Aristotle’s LNC 
wherein he examines each of the LNCs in turn (1971:488). He believes that the 
OLNC and LLNC share some correspondence, as language is representative of 
what is the world (1971:488). The LLNC and the PLNC also share a similar 
correspondence, as the propositions expressed by the LLNC align with the beliefs 
of the PLNC (1971:488). Supposing the principle of correspondence, the OLNC 
and the PLNC can potentially align showing that beliefs correspond to the world, 
and propositions are the vehicle for communicating this correspondence. 
Unfortunately, the PLNC is not on the same philosophical footing as the other two, 
so more needs to be said about why this is the case. 
 
Since our concerns to a great extent in this thesis are inconsistent beliefs, 
the PLNC is of particular interest. Łukasiewicz argues that Aristotle’s proof of the 
PLNC is not complete (Dixon 2000:23). Łukasiewicz writes (1971:491), “Aristotle's 
proof of the psychological principle of contradiction is incomplete because 
Aristotle did not demonstrate that acts of believing which correspond to 
contradictory propositions are incompatible.” Aristotle did not carry out the proof of 
the principle in sufficient detail to justify it. The major hurdle Aristotle faced was 
the incompatibility of contradictory propositions with contradictory beliefs 
(1971:491). Łukasiewicz (1971:489–491) attacks this incompatibility on two fronts, 
resulting in an indictment of the PLNC (Dixon 2000:24). 
 
The first front delves into Aristotle’s account of ordering relations. Consider 
a range of relations; on the ends, the relations are opposed or contradictory. They 
are the farthest from each other in the series. Łukasiewicz (1971:491) states: 
44 
 
 
“Aristotle adopts as the ordering relation of the acts of believing the difference in 
their degree of being true or being false, and even speaks of ‘truer’ and ‘falser’ 
beliefs.” Łukasiewicz (1971:491492) believes this is an error–Aristotle has a 
mistaken notion of what “true” and “false” mean because the terms are not subject 
to differences in degree. More so, Łukasiewicz (1971:491492) does not believe 
that beliefs are true or false, just the same for emotions or feelings. However, 
propositions or those subject to the LLNC are true or false, and they can be 
relative in a range of ordering relations to the world (think about a mixed breed 
dog; it has something of both breeds but not a full representation of those breeds). 
Hence, the first front denies that there are degrees in truth and falsity of beliefs, 
and second, it denies that beliefs have truth-values at all (Dixon 2000:24).8 
 
The second front attacks from a psychological position. Łukasiewicz 
accuses Aristotle of committing the fallacy of “logicism in psychology” or its 
counterpart “psychologism in logic,” which is attempting to explain logic by the 
workings of the mind (1971:491). Per Łukasiewicz (1971:491493), Aristotle’s 
focus is on the relations between propositions, not beliefs. To assume the same 
logical relation holds between beliefs that holds between propositions is to equate 
psychological causality with logical succession (1971:492). Frege (1980:xxii) 
confronts this psychological notion by arguing that the logical must be separated 
from the psychological because of the former being subjective and the latter being 
objective. Thus, the fallacies Aristotle purports to commit share the dubious 
assumption of explaining logic by an appeal to psychology, which is deeply 
problematic according to Łukasiewicz (1971:491), Frege (1980:xxii), and Dixon 
(2000:25). 
 
Łukasiewicz ends his criticism of Aristotle with three final thoughts about 
the PLNC (Dixon 2000:25). First, the PLNC cannot be demonstrated a priori but at 
most can be inferred as a law of experience (1971:492). By considering the 
correspondence between the OLNC and LLNC, a proposition can be verified in 
experience. The LLNC then stands verified, and if it corresponds with the PLNC, 
                                                          
8 Łukasiewicz does not provide any sustained argument about the gradation of beliefs and why 
“true” and “false” cannot be part of the gradation of belief. 
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at best, it is an inference from experience and not something known a priori. This 
has strong ramifications to its justifiability as a necessary principle. A priori 
justifications are generally stronger than inductive justifications due to their 
unchanging nature and lack of reliance on experience (Dixon 2000:25). 
 
Second, Łukasiewicz (1971:493) does not believe the PLNC has been 
empirically demonstrated. Do people hold contradictory beliefs or not? 
Łukasiewicz cites a passage from Husserl (1900:82), where Husserl opined about 
a man holding opposing thoughts that were true at the same time.9 If the PLNC is 
not a principle of nous, it must be empirically demonstrable, and since it has not 
been, it is a principle without proof (Dixon 2000:26). 
 
Finally, Łukasiewicz builds upon the previous point and probes the 
provability of PLNC. By appealing to the history of philosophy, Łukasiewicz 
(1971:492493) cites a passage from Hegel on the paradox of motion. In this 
example, something is both here and not here in a single instance, much like 
moving through a doorway—at one time, it is both in and not in the doorway, and 
vice-versa (Hegel 2010:382).10 The consequence for Łukasiewicz is that there 
have been times, or currently are times, when someone asserts a contradiction 
with full belief and awareness that he/she was completely aware of his or her 
actions (Dixon 2000:26). To have this kind of self-awareness of a living 
contradiction strongly opposes Aristotle’s thoughts on being able to hold 
contradictory beliefs at the same time and in the same sense. If Aristotle desires 
to make the PLNC work, he must adopt an ad hoc measure to understand how 
someone with full awareness can hold this type of belief (Dixon 2006:26). 
Aristotle’s response is that what someone says he or she believes and reports 
                                                          
9 Husserl (1900:82) writes, “In the same individual, or still better, in the same consciousness, 
contrary acts of believing could never persist during even the smallest interval of time. But is this 
really a law? May we really state it with unlimited generality? Where are the psychological 
inductions which justify its adoption? Might there not have been and might there not be men, who 
confused by fallacies for instance, occasionally held opposites to be true simultaneously? Has 
scientific research been conducted as to whether something like this does not occur among the 
insane and perhaps even in plain contradictions? How does the hypothesis fare with the conditions 
of fever delirium, etc.? Is the law also valid for animals?"  
10 I am using a modern English translation of Hegel, Łukasiewicz cited the original German, 
Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke, vol. IV, Berlin, 1834, p. 69. The material is found in the footnote at 
the bottom of pgs. 492 and 493 in Łukasiewicz (1971). 
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through a linguistic expression is different from what that person actually believes 
about the object or thing in question (1971:493). Thus, in the Aristotelian 
conception, a linguistic report does not need to correspond with beliefs. This lack 
of correspondence between beliefs and the linguistic report then negatively affects 
the corresponding LNC formula hypothesis, which further displaces the 
importance of the PLNC (1971:493). 
 
Supposing for a moment that Łukasiewicz is correct then the OLNC and 
LLNC are on different ground than the PLNC. The PLNC is severely weakened by 
Łukasiewicz’s attack and may not be salvageable. Coupling this with Cohen’s 
position on the PLNC, the PLNC is subject to multiple objections and problems in 
formulation and in practice. 
 
1.3.3.3 Dancy 
 
Dancy (1975) provides a detailed interpretation of Aristotle’s thoughts in the 
Metaphysics. This interpretation is wide-ranging and speaks to many aspects of 
the arguments Aristotle marshals in an effort to defend and substantiate the LNC 
in Metaphysics Gamma sections 3 and 4 (1993). For the purposes of this thesis, 
one section of Dancy’s work is particularly relevant on how Aristotle can justify the 
LNC at all. 
 
Dancy (1975:Ch.1) questions the status of the LNC. Is it an axiom of logic 
and argument, an axiom of all thought, or a rule of inference? Starting with the 
latter, it is not like modus ponens; it does not licence any logical moves, so it is not 
a rule of inference (1975:11). Next, he considers the first idea of the LNC as an 
axiom of logic, but he quickly dismisses it as not necessary for every logical proof 
or even validity such as Euclid’s first proposition that is done with just identity.11 
However, what should be made of the second idea of the LNC being an axiom (or 
better, presupposition) of all thought? Is it something that needs to be in place for 
there to be any coherent and logical thought at all? Dancy (1975:9) states: 
 
                                                          
11 See, for instance, Joyce (2010) for the proof from Euclid’s Book I.  
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“The pattern that is supposed to show the priority of the law of contradiction, or of 
whatever law you pick, is close to that of a “transcendental argument”: we are 
supposed to see that there is a certain practice, that of arguing, and that the law of 
non-contradiction is fundamental to that practice. The point here is that if this 
pattern is to be used in support of any particular presumptive law of logic, what 
has to be shown is that particular law is fundamental to the practice.” 
 
 
On one formulation (Stern 2015), transcendental arguments argue from the 
necessary condition X to the possibility of Y but, since Y does take place, X is 
then justified, too. Instantiated, the LNC is a necessary condition for 
communication to take place; communication does occur so the LNC must exist. 
Another way to understand this is that from the very fact that we communicate 
demonstrates that something is ordering that, and the LNC would be a part of 
organising and making communication intelligible. Whether this is a persuasive 
argument or explanation is subject to debate. However, it does provide some 
sense of understanding of how a principle like the LNC gains intelligibility for 
Aristotle, and for many of us as well. 
 
Suppose for a moment that the previous is true; while it is not pointed out 
by Dancy, the practical focus appears to be a red herring of sorts. Roughly, 
humans communicate intelligibly and effectively, because logical laws – like the 
LNC or the law of excluded middle – are in place. The import of that is that there is 
a practical structuring to communication. However, what does this practical result 
have to do with the logical, systematic aspect of the LNC? The LNC is taught in 
contemporary times to be part of a logical system: the system of propositional 
logic.12 The LNC takes on a different role there, and the same communicative 
justification does not hold as strongly. Paraconsistent logics reject the LNC – in 
particular, ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ)  such that anything follows from a 
contradiction. Does ECQ hold in practicality? No, if someone contradicts him or 
herself, no one thinks that anything whatsoever follows from that contradiction. 
So, when the practical aspect is brought in to explain the LNC and its place in a 
logical system is set aside, a red herring results because the focus of the 
                                                          
12 In fairness to Aristotle, propositional logic in the contemporary form taught did not exist during 
his lifetime. However, if the LNC is that foundational of a principle, it should transcend logical 
systems for the classically minded logician.  
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argument or explanation has changed. The context has shifted to a practical point, 
not a formal logical one. 
 
The question to be answered then would be to what extent Aristotle’s 
defences of the LNC are applicable to logical systems and beliefs today. 
Unfortunately, without a deep commitment to essentialism and the corresponding 
aspects of his three LNCs, Aristotle’s thoughts are marginalised, to some degree 
depending on the logical system and commitments. The transcendental point is 
not so easy to bypass unless one grants that the PLNC is the weakest of the three 
formulations and can be doubted or shown to be outright false. Dancy (1975:13) 
takes an interesting position with respect to giving up a practical formulation of the 
LNC: 
 
“Wholesale, or arbitrary, abandonment of the law of non-contradiction might leave 
us without a handle on the notion of intellectual agreement. But, first it is not clear 
how much we need that sort of intellectual agreement, and, second, even allowing 
that we need a good deal of it to cope with things, it is not clear how much of it we 
would be giving up if we let the law of non-contradiction slip now and then.” 
 
It is not too controversial to read Dancy here as undermining the necessity of the 
LNC for practical communication in all cases. The idea of intellectual agreement 
might be a different species of agreement based on ideas alone with limited 
practical application, whereas practical application as the primary focus is more 
empirical. There could be intellectual and practical cases where it is acceptable to 
abandon the LNC without harming the communicative process. Does this 
undermine the transcendental point? Perhaps not, for the point could still stand 
with humans realising when something important hangs on it or not. However, 
Aristotle would have no need to agree with any of it, as his distinction between 
what someone says and what someone believes would stand. 
 
1.3.3.4 Aristotle’s critics: some reflexions 
 
Critical analysis in philosophy occurs after the fact, and in this case, 
thousands of years after Aristotle put forth his philosophical thoughts. With the 
LNC, Aristotle in Gamma 1006b sought to have a firm foundation for basic 
intelligibility (1993:9–10). The practical point mentioned previously shows the 
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communicative difficulty with performative contradictions. Aristotle, it seems, was 
pointing out a fact of our existence as humans. This is the strength of Aristotle’s 
thoughts on the LNC and its variants. But, Cohen, Dancy and Łukasiewicz raise a 
whole host of other problems for the LNC when the LNC is not nested in 
communicative practices.  
 
Are these recent criticisms justified? Philosophically, yes to some degree in 
the right context. If someone were attempting to justify the LNC through Aristotle’s 
arguments, the criticism of the three must be taken into account. I think Cohen’s 
point is right that from particular instances a principle cannot be justified and it 
applies to Aristotle in this case.13 It is a particularly devastating objection if we 
assume Aristotle was a foundationalist with respect to the LNC because the LNC 
is not foundational given his own posits, if the critics are correct. Articulating three 
different versions of the LNC opens further objections about reduction to one 
another and the priority thereof, which were discussed with Dancy and 
Łukasiewicz. Were Aristotle alive and able to respond, maybe the criticisms could 
be handled by further elucidation.  Alternatively, imagine a discussion of 
contradiction without Aristotle’s thoughts. That discussion would be a strawman 
due to not having a seminal logical figure who wrote extensively on it. Aristotle 
must be included and the philosophical consequences are the implications of 
recent scholarship that is technical and demanding.  
 
1.4  Historical paradoxes 
 
Inconsistencies relate to paradoxes – situations that are contradictory or 
inconsistent – wherein there is a conflict of ideas or qualities. This common 
understanding of “paradox,” articulates that inconsistency is philosophically 
problematic and needs resolution. Of course, philosophers have long dealt with 
paradoxes of both logical, and more broadly, philosophical varieties, such as 
Zeno’s multiple paradoxes (Hugget 2010) of motion, and those that arise from 
quantum mechanics, such as “Schrödinger’s cat” (Faye 2014). So, paradoxes 
continue to be part of our philosophical lives. 
                                                          
13 This is supposing the nous/episteme distinction.  
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Sainsbury (1995:1) defines a paradox as inferring an apparently 
unacceptable conclusion from apparently acceptable premises. “Apparently” does 
a great deal of work in the definition, as it leads to diagnosing the problem: either 
the reasoning is bad, one or more of the premises is false or ill-constructed, or the 
conclusion should be accepted without reservation. Most popular paradoxes can 
be articulated this way in terms of failing one (or more) of the three diagnoses. 
 
This section focuses on natural language paradoxes. Both of these types of 
paradoxes – i.e. vagueness and self-reference  result in logical and/or semantic 
inconsistency. The sorites paradox and it variants – such as the “bald man” 
paradox – generally arise because of the vagueness in the application of 
particular predicates such as “heap,” “pile,” “bald,” and many others. The 
predicates clearly apply in some cases but not in others. Yet, the middle or vague 
area of application raises questions. The liar paradox and the heterological 
paradox stem from problems of self-reference in natural language. Self-reference 
generates inconsistency, but the significance of the inconsistency is questionable. 
Finally, the paradoxes of material implication demonstrate how logical principles 
violate our intuitions about inference in ordinary language. The inconsistency is at 
a higher-level between languages, a formal one and an informal or natural one. 
 
1.4.1 The sorites paradox 
 
The sorites paradox rests on minute changes where one of those changes 
is significant. Assume the following: PILE = if we remove one grain of sand from 
the existing pile, then removal of that grain will not change the pile of sand into a 
non-pile of sand. Formalising the argument with modus ponens, 
 
1. Assume a 100,000-grain pile. 
2. PILE is true. 
3. If PILE is true, then pile minus a single grain is still a pile. 
4. Therefore, pile minus a single grain is still a pile. 
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Applying the argument recursively, where the value of PILE in premise 3 
decreases by one on each iteration, eventually, even a single grain remaining is 
still a pile. As the argument is stated, the problematic premise is 3. The 
antecedent “PILE is true” can be true while the consequent “pile minus a single 
grain is still a pile” is false. When this false consequent occurs is up to debate. 
 
Solutions to the sorites paradox are numerous. Some accept the 
conclusion, which is not intuitive (Sainsbury 1995:31). The idea behind it is that 
vague concepts are defective and are not applicable. Sainsbury contends that 
words such as “pile,” “heap,” and “bald” commit us to absurdities demonstrating 
something about them, not the reasoning (1995:31). Arguably, this is not a strong 
solution, but it is an important one because it impugns the linguistic side, not the 
logical side. 
 
A second linguistic solution is the penumbra, or supervaluation, approach. 
There are clearly areas of proper application and not of a vague predicate, but the 
not so clear cases are in a grey area or penumbra (Sainsbury 1995:35). The 
penumbra is a truth-value gap, where the predicate is not true or false. This 
solution ultimately rejects premise 3, because losing a grain does not sustain the 
application of the predicate in the consequent supposing the penumbra. Arguably, 
the weakness of this approach is that it supposes at least a three-valued logic, 
which undermines classical logic sensibilities. 
 
A third linguistic solution is the hard line or epistemic approach. There is a 
definite line or point in the progression of the pile where losing a single grain it is 
no longer a pile (Sainsbury 1995:32). There is no penumbra, no grey area or area 
of indecision. Cargile (1969:193195) uses the imagery of a tadpole becoming a 
frog, with a photo being taken at very small intervals. At some point, there is a 
clear photo of the frog that was once a tadpole, thus, demonstrating the clear 
application of the predicate “is a frog” or “is not a tadpole.” Arguably, the 
weakness of this approach is that clear application of a predicate is not always 
obvious, given that the world is not so finely grained as logic and mathematics, 
especially when minutes can reduce portions of seconds. 
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The final linguistic (and logical) solution accepts the conclusion in the first 
solution but does so in a different way. The paraconsistent approach admits the 
conclusion is both true and false. The conclusion is true that it is a pile, and the 
conclusion is false that it is a pile. This truth-value, “glut,” is the conceptual 
manifestation of a vague predicate.14 Just as in the initial solution, this is not 
intuitive and violates classical logical sensibilities. However, the logical system 
might be what is generating the paradox, thus, by adopting an inconsistency 
tolerant logic, there is a different result. 
 
1.4.2 The liar paradox 
 
The liar paradox is a semantic paradox of self-reference. The paradox is 
generated when bivalent truth-values, combined with self-reference, conflict. 
Assume the following statement (LIAR) = This statement is false: 
. 
1. If (LIAR) is true, then “This statement is false” is true (is false). 
2. If (LIAR) is false, then “This statement is false” is false (is true). 
3. 1 is true (false) if and only if 2 is false (true). 
4. Therefore, the (LIAR) is both true and false. 
 
The argument gains its paradoxical status as 4 is entailed by both 1 and 2. The 
parenthetical truth-value shows the iteration of truth-values in a never-ending 
sequence. Premises 1 and 2 contain contradictions in their conceptions when 
iterated. Premise 3 demonstrates the self-referential nature of 1 and 2 and their 
dependence on each other for intelligibility. There are other versions of the liar 
paradox, which introduce new problems for any solution.15 They tend to be 
stronger and subject to other considerations that are not applicable to the 
purposes here. 
 
                                                          
14 A truth value “glut” means the truth value is overdetermined as it is both true and false. This is to 
be contrasted with a truth value gap, where the truth value is underdetermined as it is neither true 
or false (Cook 2009:119). 
15 For other versions of the paradox see, Beall and Glanzberg (2014).  
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Instead, something much more important about the structure of language is 
called into question by the classical liar. The classical liar is the result of self-
reference illuminating, which is a peculiarity of natural language. The implication is 
that ordinary language is inconsistent. When self-reference is combined with 
bivalent truth-values, inconsistency follows. How then would a solution look and 
how can it address this structural deficiency? 
 
Tarski (1996:6668) recognises this inconsistency about natural language 
and develops a response with a hierarchy of languages (metalanguage and object 
language) that purportedly escapes the inconsistency by moving the truth 
predicate from the object language to the metalanguage. This solution keeps 
classical logic intact but suffers from a different problem; the inconsistency just 
manifests at a higher-level, as Soames (1999:54) demonstrates. If the 
inconsistency of natural language which generates the problem cannot be solved, 
what solutions are available? 
 
There are two basic ways a solution can go. The first solution is a truth-
value gap, where the liar is not true or false because it fails to express a statement 
capable of a truth-value (Beall and Glanzberg 2014). The statement itself is 
subject to a context where truth may or may not be predicated of it. This 
contextual solution then allows an explanation of the classical liar but also of the 
“This sentence is false” in a context such as pointing to a sentence or referring 
indexically in a book that is factually inaccurate. This solution, and others like it, 
keeps classical logic intact but relies on shifting contexts to do so. Whether that is 
desirable or even acceptable is up for discussion. 
 
The second solution is a truth-value glut, where the liar is both true and 
false, which is a contradiction (Beall and Glanzberg 2014). This solution embraces 
the inconsistency of natural language but at the cost of classical logic. It is a 
radical solution logically, but considering the results of Tarski’s (1996:6667) 
investigation on semantically closed languages, the logical solution through 
paraconsistency corresponds to the linguistic inconsistency problem. The bigger 
question here, logically, is the idea that contradictions entail everything, and if an 
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ordinary language has a contradiction like the liar in it, does that mean that the 
language loses its meaning and structure? In practice, words retain their meaning 
and use, so if there is a problem with the contradiction, it must be manifesting 
somewhere else outside of human linguistic practice. 
 
There is an additional solution to the liar paradox that is not prevalent in the 
contemporary literature. Wittgenstein (1994:255) writes: “Let us suppose that a 
contradiction in an order, e.g. produces astonishment and indecision—and now 
we say; that is just the purpose of contradiction in this language game.” 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts are subtle, what he is stating is that a general rule of 
dealing with contradiction is not what we are after. Instead, contradictions can 
serve different functions in different linguistic contexts. The liar paradox might be 
best expressed then as: “Look here … language is on a holiday; do not take it too 
seriously.” Let us not rewrite our logic and practices based on this one sentence. 
This is sage advice from an ordinary perspective, but not often taken. 
 
1.4.3 The heterological paradox 
 
The heterological paradox is a semantic paradox of self-reference. The 
paradox is generated when a term is applied to itself. Assume the following 
definitions: heterological means an adjective that does not describe itself, and 
autological means an adjective that does describe itself. “Long” is heterological 
because it is not a long word. “Short” is autological because it is a short word 
(Sainsbury 1995:147). Consider the following argument: 
 
1. If heterological is heterological, then it is autological. 
2. If heterological is autological, then it is heterological. 
3. 1 is true if and only if 2 is true. 
4. Therefore, heterological is both heterological and autological. 
 
The argument gets its paradoxical status as 4 is the logical consequence of 
premises 1 and 2. Premise 3 demonstrates the self-referential nature of 1 and 2 
and their dependence on each other for intelligibility. 
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This is another self-referential paradox, but it does not use truth-values to 
generate the paradox. Instead, the linguistic meaning produces the semantic 
conflict. A possible solution to the paradox is addressing the conflict in the most 
direct way. Cargile (2009:299) offers a novel solution to the paradox; he states:  
 
“Just as there is no such property as being heterological, there is no property of being a 
property which does not have itself as an instance. Most properties do not have 
themselves as instances.” 
 
Cargile (2009:299) is challenging the antecedents of premises 1 and 2. For 
instance, the property of handsomeness does not itself have “handsomeness” as 
an instance. “Heterological” and “autological” seem to follow suit as they 
themselves do not count as instances of the words. It is the peculiar notion of self-
reference in this case that leads to thinking they themselves need to be instances, 
when, according to Cargile, the words themselves do not have themselves as 
being instances. I think this is a plausible solution to a problem for self-reference 
paradoxes, in particular, the heterological paradox. 
 
1.4.4 Linguistic paradox of material implication 
 
The paradoxes of material implication are logical paradoxes generated by 
the nature of the material conditional in logic. Implication is a general logical 
relation or connection between two or more statements, where one idea follows 
from another idea. The fact that it is raining outside implies that the roads might be 
slippery. Implication, semantically, is thought of as “implies” or “if…then”. It is this 
latter idea that serves the language of material implication in logic. However, our 
ordinary intuitions about “if…then” are seemingly not represented by material 
implication. Typically, “if…then” statements demonstrate a necessary relationship 
between two other statements (e.g., if it is raining, then my car is getting wet). The 
material conditional, which represents material implication in logic, does not seem 
to capture this natural language necessity very well. 
 
There are paradoxes of material implication that originate from the way the 
truth table diagram determines the truth-value for the material conditional. A 
discussion of those will come in a later section in this thesis. Instead, there is a 
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higher-level paradox worth discussing about the relationship between the logical 
language and natural language. 
 
The material conditional in logic has truth conditions that are not well-
represented in natural language, and it is where the higher-level paradox 
originates. Consider the following: 
 
1. Semantic content creates a meaningful relationship between the 
antecedent and the consequent in a conditional statement. 
2. The truth-value of the material conditional is determined by the truth-values 
of its antecedent and consequent. 
3. The truth-value of the material conditional is not determined by the 
semantic content of the antecedent and consequent. 
4. Thus, the meaningful relationship of semantic content is irrelevant to the 
truth of the material conditional. 
 
Conclusion 4 is difficult to accept if we suppose that our arguments should have 
some grounding in the ordinary world of linguistic usage. Premises 1–3 are 
accurate and represent the traditional model of translating ordinary language 
statements into logical language. The interesting thing to note is that without the 
translation process, there is no paradox as the meanings of each language  both 
formal and ordinary – are intact, and thus no conflict arises. So, the higher-level 
paradox arises when the two languages are thought to comport in meaning. 
 
1.5  Other influential ideas and philosophers 
 
In the history of philosophy, numerous philosophers have thought about 
inconsistency. This section of the thesis highlights only a few philosophers who 
had important thoughts on inconsistency and contradiction. These philosophers 
were chosen due to offering something novel about inconsistency and not 
following the status quo. Beginning in the modern period, both Arnauld with Nicole 
(1996), and Descartes (1984a, 1984b & 2012) put forth interesting thoughts on 
contradiction with respect to testimony and God’s omnipotence. Next, the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century philosopher Hegel’s dialectical 
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philosophy (2010) was one of the few to make contradiction the centre of his 
dialectical historicist philosophy. His influence extended to Marx ‘s dialectical 
philosophy (Cooper 1925) and others including contemporary paraconsistent 
philosophers Priest and Routley (Sylvan) (1989). In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the existentialists, including Kierkegaard (1986) and Camus 
(1955) thought that contradiction and inconsistency were a fact of human life. 
Ending in the contemporary period, Strawson (1952) carefully articulates an 
ordinary language understanding of inconsistency, and the Australian school of 
the paraconsistent logic of Priest and Routley (Sylvan) (1989), like Hegel (2010) 
before them, embrace contradiction but do so in a formal systematic manner 
through logical machinery. 
 
1.5.1 Arnauld and Nicole 
 
Arnauld with Nicole (1996) were early modern philosophers whose most 
famous philosophical creation is The Art of Thinking. This work is largely a 
reworking of Aristotle’s logical thoughts along with considerations about the 
relationship between religion and reasoning. In one of the later sections of the 
work, Arnauld and Nicole discuss the role and effectiveness of testimony and 
testing the veracity of what someone says. Arnauld and Nicole separate two types 
of circumstances, internal and external (Arnauld & Nicole 1996:264). Internal 
circumstances are those about the fact itself, such as if a miracle took place or 
not. External circumstances are those about what is said about the fact, such as 
whether to believe someone who says she has witnessed a miracle. 
 
These circumstances lead to a “rule” – as Arnauld and Nicole characterise 
it – about the relationship between believing and the probability of the belief. If a 
belief has false circumstances surrounding it, we are led to believe that the 
improbability of that belief is true, given what we are told. If a belief has true 
circumstances surrounding it, we are led to believe that the probability of that 
belief is true, given what we are told. Normally, however, being probable or 
improbable is not enough to believe what we were told with assurance. However, 
Arnauld and Nicole (1996:265) want to qualify a proper use of probability and 
possibility: 
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“There is, however, an exception to this rule, when we ought to be satisfied with 
possibility and probability. This is when a fact that is otherwise sufficiently 
confirmed is beset by difficulties and apparent contradictions with other stories. In 
that case, it is enough if the solutions brought to these contradictions are possible 
and likely. It is acting against reason to require positive evidence of them, because 
when the fact is sufficiently proved within itself, it is not right to require similar 
proof in all the circumstances.” 
 
 
What Arnauld and Nicole have in mind here is something like the following: 
 
1. Story 1. 
2. Story 1 strongly conflicts with Story 2. 
3. Story 1 weakly conflicts with Story 3. 
4. It can be shown that on (at least) one interpretation Story 1 and Story 2 can 
possibly be consistent. 
5. It can be shown that on (at least) one interpretation Story 1 and Story 3 can 
possibly be consistent. 
6. Proof of 4 and 5 is too high of a demand because there is proof for Story 1. 
7. Thus, the testimony and circumstances of Story 1 are true (and can be 
believed). 
 
Arnauld and Nicole (1996:265) articulate a proper use of contradiction in an 
ordinary circumstance. This is the very kind of thing that takes place in an 
investigation, whether criminal, civil, or even family-related. When competing 
stories conflict with a new one, and there is sufficient evidence for the new one, 
proof of the falsity of the competing stories does not need to be demonstrated. 
Instead, all that needs to be demonstrated is that the new story can be reconciled, 
in terms of possibility, in some sense with the competing stories. However, the 
contradictions do not demand one or the other be true or false, as classical logic 
desires. So, the behaviour of contradiction in ordinary life is much different than in 
classical logic. 
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1.5.2 Descartes 
 
Descartes was an early modern philosopher who is most famous for his 
Meditations on First Philosophy. He was a contemporary of Arnauld and Nicole, 
and even dialogued with Arnauld.16 Descartes was famous for his foundational 
epistemology and incorporating the philosophical aspects of his Roman Catholic 
faith into his philosophy. For example, the third (1984b:28–36) and fifth 
(1984b:43–49) Meditations both have arguments for the existence of God, and 
God’s existence proves foundational for Descartes’ philosophical purposes. In 
Meditation six (1984b:55–56), God’s existence ultimately guarantees that the 
world is the way it is in our experience. More so, in the third Meditation, Descartes 
writes on the perfection of God and how our experience can be truthful. Descartes 
(1984b:35) writes: 
 
“By “God” I mean the very being the idea of whom is within me, that is, the 
possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp, but can somehow reach in 
my thought, who is subject to no defects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this 
he cannot be a deceiver since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud and 
deception depend on some defect.” 
 
 
By having a clear and distinct perception, we are perceiving as God wants us to, 
by necessity. One clear and distinct perception we have, is of God. For Descartes, 
the veracity of this perception of God cannot be questioned; it is incorrigible. Our 
perception of God is also that God is perfect. Perfections for Descartes include 
being the following: eternal, infinite, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent, and 
Creator of all things that exist outside of Himself (Descartes 1984b: 28). 
 
Given Descartes’ conception of a perfect God, the following thoughts on 
God and contradiction are radical, not just for Descartes but for virtually anyone. 
Descartes (2012:168169), in his 1644 Letter to Mesland, writes: 
 
“I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God has been free—with no pull either for 
or against—to make it false that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles, or in general to make it the case that some pair of contradictories are 
both true. It’s easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that (i) God’s power can’t 
have any limits, and that (ii) our mind is finite and created in such a way that it can 
conceive as possible the things God has wanted to be in fact possible, but cannot 
                                                          
16 See Descartes’ Objection Four (1984b:138153). 
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conceive as possible things that God could have made possible but has wanted to 
make impossible. From (i) we learn that nothing could make God make it true that 
contradictories can’t be true together, and therefore that he could have done the 
opposite, i.e. made it false that contradictories can’t be true together. From (ii) we 
learn that even though this is true, we should not try to comprehend it because our 
nature is incapable of doing so.”17 
 
This surprising quote details that, for Descartes, God is without the traditional 
logical limits that Scripture and theologians place on God.18 Descartes clearly 
demarcates that what is possible with God is different from our perceptions of 
what God can and cannot do. Humans place a logical limit on God’s power, 
whereas God has no such limit, according to Descartes. The interesting 
implication of this view is not obvious unless you consider both quotes from 
Descartes: a perfect God could be a God that makes contradictions true. While it 
would be too strong of an implication to think that God’s own being could be 
contradictory, there appears to be no logical restriction on being in this sense, 
unless God self-restricts. 
 
However, Descartes is a philosopher who prizes consistency. In the 
Meditations, Descartes arrives at the Cogito as the one thing not suspect to doubt 
(1984b:19).19 To doubt that one is a thinking thing requires thinking itself, thus, is 
a performative contradiction (1984b:19). In this sense, Descartes uses 
“contradiction” in the classical way as something that is metaphysically 
impossible, or impossible to perform. 
 
The implication is that Descartes has at least two views of contradiction, 
one that is beyond our comprehension if a contradiction involves God, and 
another that contradiction is more along the lines of the classical one as 
something to be avoided. Logical limits are placed on humans that are not placed 
on God. Nevertheless, humans operate within a particular sphere and the second 
sense of contradiction is operative for us, arguably as a measure of intelligibility. 
                                                          
17 Given the controversial nature of the assertion about Descartes, the original quote at length was 
presented. 
18 From the Bible, Malachi 3:6 and James 1:17 both limit God’s ability to change for instance. Clark 
(1980:6) states that God is logic and to violate the law of non-contradiction is a sin. Van Til 
(1974:11–12) holds a similar view as the law of non-contradiction is part of God’s internal nature. 
19 Technically as the Cogito is taught – “I think, therefore I am” – is found to be directly in the 
Principles of Philosophy (1984a:196) but the paraphrased concept is in the Meditations.  
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Contradicting oneself at the same time and same sense has little use for one’s 
communicative and educational practices. 
 
1.5.3 Hegel 
 
Hegel was a German idealist who followed the modern period. Hegel and 
other idealists such as Fichte had the unenviable task of following Kant in the 
chronological progression of philosophy. Kant’s critical philosophy set the stage 
for the years of immediate responses, of which Hegel’s work may be considered a 
contribution, too.20  
 
As with Kant’s philosophy, Hegel’s is equally difficult, if not even more so, 
because of the abstractness and language used to convey his ideas. However, 
Hegel’s philosophy is unique. It utilises contradiction in a way that few had, and 
few have since. To tackle this task of fully explaining his view of contradiction is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but a simplified view is in order. 
 
Hegel’s three main works were the Philosophy of Right (1967), the 
Phenomenology of the Spirit (1976), and the Science of Logic (1969 & 2010). This 
last work is the source for his detailed use of contradiction and his variations of it. 
One variation from the section on contradiction is: 
 
“As this whole, each moment is self-mediated through its other and contains this 
other. But it is also self-mediated through the non-being of its other and is, 
therefore, a unity existing for itself and excluding the other from itself“ (Hegel 
2010:374). 
 
 
Hegel’s view on contradiction can be expressed and drawn from the content of 
this passage. The traditional view on contradiction is that A excludes not A and 
not A excludes A. This exclusionary view of contradiction goes back to, at least, 
Aristotle. Hegel adds another element to this in that contradiction is also 
inclusionary. In the concept of A, A and not A are exclusive, but to understand A, 
                                                          
20 Kant likened his philosophy as the Copernican turn in philosophy for his synthesis of rationalism 
and empiricism (1998:110). His emphasis on synthetic a priori knowledge, transcendental 
idealism, and the active role of the mind set his philosophy apart from his contemporaries and 
became the object of philosophers after him and still today (Rohlf 2016). 
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not A must be understood too, and vice-versa. This contrastive understanding is 
inclusionary, as the opposition creates an additional meaning of the concepts 
together. This additional meaning is something new, additive, and is active and 
dynamic. The exclusionary and inclusionary aspect of contradiction forms the 
basis for Hegel’s use of the dialectical method of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, with 
the synthesis being the additive component. This abstract explanation of 
contradiction can be difficult to understand in application. So, we turn to some 
practical thoughts on contradiction from Hegel (2010:382): 
 
“But ordinary experience itself testifies that there do exist at least a great many 
contradictory things, contradictory dispositions, etc., of which the contradiction is 
present not in any external reflection but right in them. Nor is contradiction to be 
taken as an abnormality which happens only here and there ... External, sensuous 
motion is itself contradiction’s immediate existence. Something moves, not 
because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the 
same now it is here and not here; because in this here it is and is not at the same 
time…” 
  
 
This passage contains many ideas, but the import is the practical application of 
the concept of contradiction. For Hegel, contradictions exist and are part of reality. 
This is a strong break from any philosophical tradition that reality itself is 
consistent in an important sense. Consistency and intelligibility, at least in an 
ordinary sense, are necessary for understanding reality even if contemporary 
science tells us something different.21 Hegel’s conception of human experience is 
different, however, as he sees contradictions in our ordinary experience. Human 
motion is the paradigm of contradiction. Take, for instance, at the same time and 
place someone is both in and not in a doorway; Hegel (2010:382) writes: 
 
“Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but 
because in one and the same now it is here and not here; because in this here it is 
and is not at the same time … contradiction is existent.” 
 
 
This action is a normal everyday activity that we all do numerous times in a day. In 
this sense, we are living contradictions for Hegel. 
 
                                                          
21 Modern quantum mechanics challenges this consistency view. See Gibbins (1987), Particles 
and paradoxes: the limits of quantum logic for more details.  
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Hegel’s views on logical principles put contradiction, not identity, as the 
essential logical concept. Hegel (2010:381) claims: 
 
“… if order of preference were an issue, and the two determinations were to be 
held separate, it would be the principle of contradiction that should be taken as the 
more profound and the more essential … identity is only the determination of 
simple immediacy, of inert being, whereas contradiction is the root of all 
movement and life…” 
  
 
Hegel believes that identity is a dead concept. Two equivalent things display 
nothing in terms of living behaviour. They are simply equivalent. For Hegel, 
contradiction is the motion of life, thus, it is more important conceptually, as it 
articulates the human experience as dynamic and subject to change. 
 
Before moving on to a brief critical assessment of Hegel’s thoughts on 
contradiction, a few positive implications need to be drawn out. Hegel’s bold 
thoughts on contradiction are inspiring, especially considering classical logic and 
its negative connotations of contradiction. This rejection of classical ideas about 
contradiction is historically and philosophically significant because of its challenge 
to the philosophical and logical canon. More so, Hegel’s dialectic has, at its core, 
a synthesis of opposing ideas that become a new idea. One can argue that 
contradiction forms the core of this influential idea, which demonstrates a 
systematic approach to contradiction inclusion in a theory. Instead of avoiding 
contradiction, Hegel embraces it (2010:381). 
 
There are three critical implications to draw from Hegel’s work. First, 
Hegel’s relationship between language and the world needs to be questioned, for 
the way in which language explains something and the structure of physical reality 
can be two different things. Where Hegel articulates contradictions in reality, it 
does not necessarily entail that there are contradictions in physical reality. An 
analogy with infinite numbers might be helpful. There are infinite numbers as 
mathematical constructions, such as transfinite cardinals. However, the 
postulation of transfinite cardinals does not entail that they exist somewhere in 
physical reality. Logical and mathematical constructions may be just that, and if 
so, Hegel has this relationship wrong. 
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This lack of correspondence between language and reality stands 
separately of Hegel’s articulation of contradiction, which leads to the second 
critical point. It is not clear that anything is “additive” to the contradiction as Hegel 
posits. “Additive” is a vague term, which may refer to truth-values – where the 
conjunction is added to true and false – or resolution is added to an idea and its 
negation. While in his overall metaphysical scheme the additive property 
conceptually fits that scheme, the scheme itself is subject to justification, too. 
There is little evidence that the scheme is true and an accurate representation of 
reality. What this implies is that when a metaphysical schema adds a “property” 
such as being “additive” and there is no way objectively to ascertain the relevance 
of that property, the value of the property is questionable. Occam’s razor – 
wherein metaphysical properties are not multiplied beyond what is needed for 
explanation – would eliminate this property in our physical reality.  
 
Finally, if Frege is right (1980:116118), identity is the most basic logical 
concept, not contradiction as per Hegel (2010:381). While it might be “inert” as 
Hegel claims, the concept of identity is enough to be the foundations for 
arithmetic. Even a contradiction must be identical with itself for it to be a 
“contradiction.” Thus, the priority of contradiction over identity is another example 
of Hegel’s systematic influence over concepts. 
 
1.5.4 The existentialists 
 
Existentialism, as a philosophical movement, reached its peak in the mid-
20th century. Iconic figures such as De Beauvoir, Sartre, and Camus all flourished 
and championed the individual and their struggle with living an authentic life. 
Historically, existentialism likely originated with Kierkegaard (Burnham & 
Papandreopoulos 2018). Kierkegaard is an interesting place to start because he 
was a theist and a Christian, whereas most existentialists were not. Regardless, 
what the existentialists share is an attempt to make sense of life in a world that 
does not always make sense. This irrationality of the world leads straight to 
paradoxes and inconsistency. To see this in two different contexts, we look to 
Kierkegaard for a theistic one and then Camus for an atheistic one. 
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1.5.4.1 Kierkegaard 
 
Kierkegaard’s religious background created intellectual and emotional 
conflicts that he sought to resolve (McDonald 2017). He labelled many of these 
“paradoxes”, for instance in the Philosophical Fragments (1936:46) he writes 
about the supreme paradox of all thought that humankind engages in:  
 
“The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that 
thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in all thinking, even in the 
thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in something 
transcending himself. But habit dulls our sensibilities, and prevents us from 
perceiving it.” 
 
In his famous work Fear and Trembling (1986), Kierkegaard thinks through 
the Abraham and Isaac story from Genesis 22, where God calls upon Abraham to 
sacrifice his son, Isaac. The story Kierkegaard tells in the Problemata is one of 
anguish (1986). How can God ask him to do this when he has waited so long for a 
son? How can his love for God and his son be tested at the same time? For 
Abraham, he is being asked to sacrifice his son to God, yet, society will see him 
as a murderer. How can this one act be looked upon in so many conflicting ways? 
Simply, it is a tale of irrationality and one of a man’s anguish. 
 
In the Philosophical Fragments (1936:51), Kierkegaard takes issue with 
Hegel’s thoughts on contradiction. He writes: 
 
“The word ‘contradiction’ must not here be taken in the frothy sense into which 
Hegel has beguiled himself and others and the concept─ that it has the power to 
produce something. As long as nothing has come into existence, the contradiction 
is merely the impulsive power in the passion of wonder, its nisus; but it is not the 
nisus of the process of coming into existence itself.” 
 
Kierkegaard is directly challenging Hegel’s idea (2010:374) that contradiction is 
additive, that is, that it produces something new. Instead, Kierkegaard gives 
contradiction a certain kind of power in the passion it produces, and a sense of 
wonder (1936:51). This understanding of contradiction is insightful, as it 
articulates one of the functions of contradiction. It can produce a feeling in 
someone, yet, be part of the experience of the contradiction, not something new. 
What if the purpose of a contradiction is merely to produce astonishment and 
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puzzlement to require a critical reflection of what is occurring? It seems that this is 
how Kierkegaard uses contradiction and paradox in his writings. 
Additionally, from the Philosophical Fragments (1936:25), Kierkegaard 
questions how human beings can know God. However, it is not that simple 
because God is unlike human beings, and this makes any relationship between 
the two tenuous. Another contradiction is revealed. Kierkegaard (1936:25) opines: 
 
“From this, there would seem to follow the further consequence, that if man is to 
receive any true knowledge about the Unknown (the God) he must be made to 
know that it is unlike him, absolutely unlike him. This knowledge the Reason 
cannot possibly obtain of itself; we have already seen that this would be a self-
contradiction. It will, therefore, have to obtain this knowledge from the God. But 
even if it obtains such knowledge it cannot understand it, and thus is quite unable 
to possess such knowledge. For how should the Reason be able to understand 
what is absolutely different from itself?” 
 
 
To know God, the believer must realise that he or she is completely unlike God, 
but that is a gap that seems to be both bridged and not bridged in some sense. 
The believer is left knowing that there is a God, but knowing nothing about that 
God. That lack of knowledge occurs because God gave the believer only a limited 
amount of knowledge that God is wholly different. However, reason is unable to 
obtain this knowledge of God because reason tells us that reason is the measure 
of all things. If reason by some chance obtains knowledge of God, it is incapable 
of understanding it. This articulation strains comprehending God because humans 
cannot rely on reason to make sense of it. The implication is that the believer both 
knows and does not know God, an apparent contradiction. 
 
The practical consequence of Kierkegaard’s understanding of contradiction 
is that he has two views. There is the one view of contradiction that cannot make 
sense of God, which turns someone toward faith because reason is impotent. The 
incarnation of Jesus Christ is another example: fully God and fully man. Reason 
tells us that is not possible. The second view of contradiction might be a reaction 
to Hegel (2010:374), where the individual is pitted against the collective, but the 
individual is always part of the collective in some sense, so there might be a divine 
contradiction as in the first case and a secular version in the reaction to Hegel. 
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1.5.4.2 Camus 
 
Albert Camus was a Nobel prize winning author and existentialist 
philosopher. His notable books include: The Myth of Sisyphus (1955), The 
Stranger (1989), The Fall (2012b), and The Rebel (2012c). In these works, Camus 
develops the concept of an absurd hero. This is not just any hero. It is a hero who 
struggles against the absurdity of life daily. These heroes live contradictory lives 
as Camus details. For instance, in The Stranger (1989), Meursault only starts 
living once he knows his death is imminent. The same can be said for the 
Mersault character of the Happy Death (2012a).22 To live is to die. 
 
The Myth of Sisyphus (1955) is Camus’ philosophical treatise focusing on 
suicide. While Camus gives no formal definition of “contradiction”, he provides 
many examples and insight into the concept. An ordinary understanding of 
Camus’ general point is that for most people, life goes on with no problems. 
However, for some, along the way they are confronted with a life changing event. 
This event does not make sense, but it changes the way the person looks at the 
world. The world is no longer a rationally ordered place. Instead, it is one of 
irrationality or the absurd. However, some are driven by this absurdity to suicide 
as an answer to life’s meaning. Hence, Camus investigates how the absurd and 
suicide relate to life’s meaning.23 Camus (1955:6) writes: 
 
“On the other hand, it often happens that those who commit suicide were assured 
of the meaning of life. These contradictions are constant. It may even be said that 
they have never been so keen as on this point where, on the contrary, logic seems 
so desirable.” 
 
Camus thinks some people who commit suicide in one sense are certain life has 
no meaning, but in that recognition the meaning of life is certain—it has no 
meaning. A blatant contradiction, or as Camus believes, a moment of the absurd. 
Life, for the person who sees the world in this way, is irrational and contradictory. 
                                                          
22 The spelling of “Mersault” is on purpose as the character differs from the one in The Stranger 
(1989).  
23 A helpful definition of “the absurd” comes from Thomas Nagel’s paper, The absurd (1971: 
719721): paraphrasing Camus, Nagel proposes that the absurd is when the world fails to meet 
our demands for human meaning and a conflict based on self-consciousness arises in ourselves.  
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Moments like these come throughout life but are not necessarily tied to 
suicide. They are moments where the absurd grips the person. Camus (1955:11) 
says: “Likewise the stranger who at certain seconds comes to meet us in a mirror, 
the familiar and yet alarming brother we encounter in our own photographs is also 
the absurd.” Of anyone in the world, a person should recognise oneself in a 
picture. However, for that fleeting moment the question arises, who is that 
person? That is a moment of the absurd for Camus, and a contradictory moment; 
a person both knows and does not know oneself. Camus, like others, sees human 
experience as having contradictions largely generated by the absurd. 
 
Unlike Kierkegaard, Camus is an atheist. Whereas Kierkegaard ultimately 
has a ground for the world to be a particular way in God, Camus does not. In The 
Myth of Sisyphus, he writes (1955:78): “This universe henceforth without a master 
seems to him neither sterile nor futile.” Human beings are the masters of their own 
domain. While contradictions and paradoxes may be resolved for Kierkegaard 
(1936:25) through God, Camus has no such hope. His hope is in humankind and 
not giving into the absurd or letting contradictions end one’s existence through 
giving in to the absurd. 
 
1.5.5 Analytic philosophy 
 
The analytic philosophy movement was one of two main movements in the 
20th century, the other being continental philosophy. The analytic movement had 
two distinct veins: natural language philosophy and ideal language philosophy 
(Beaney 2017). The early part of the century saw a heavy influence of the latter, 
mainly manifesting in the logical positivists and empiricists, and later in Quine. 
They were strongly influenced by science and the use of formal logic to solve 
philosophical problems. The former was represented by: Wittgenstein, Ryle, 
Austin, and Strawson. They tended to be common sense-based and thought the 
problems of philosophy were the result of the misuse of ordinary language. 
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1.5.5.1 Strawson 
 
Strawson was an influential analytic philosopher in the last century. His 
work included an interpretation of The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant 
which he called The Bounds of Sense (1975). He also wrote about the role of free 
will in Freedom and Resentment (1974), personhood in Individuals (1964), and 
extensively on the philosophy of logic (1952). In particular, his Introduction to 
Logical Theory lays out a formal system along with relevant thoughts about the 
relationship between ordinary language and formal logic (1952). He begins this 
work by writing about inconsistency in detail in both respects. 
 
Strawson (1952:15) uses the linguistic distinction of first-order and second-
order languages. Ordinary language is first-order; formal logic is second-order. His 
point is that we construct the ideal of a formal language from an ordinary 
language (1952:15). In one sense, formal logic is a caricature of logic in ordinary 
language because it simplifies and minimises the relationships between ideas 
without the subtleties of ordinary language, particularly in context and use. 
 
For Strawson, inconsistency in ordinary language is truth-value based. 
Inconsistent claims carry opposite truth-values.24 “Scott is in California” and “Scott 
is not in California” carry opposite truth-values; when one is true, the other is false 
and vice-versa. For Strawson then, “true” and “false” are first-order concepts. 
When constructing a formal second-order language, these concepts are carried 
over from the first-order ordinary language to the second-order language, and 
then applied in a different context. The question then arises, do the concepts of 
“true” and “false” have the same meaning in both languages? 
 
Contra Strawson, these concepts do not retain the same meaning. 
Typically, “true” and “false” in ordinary language refer to the world through 
correspondence, or known analytic truths, such as 2 + 2 = 4. In the second-order 
language, “true” and “false” are just binary oppositions, related to the defined truth 
                                                          
24 Strawson (1952) does articulate the notion of predicates that conflict, which would be a first-
order conflict. When logic is brought to bear, albeit incompletely for Strawson, truth-values conflict 
(1952:6669). 
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functions of the logical connectives. They do not reference the world in the same 
way the ordinary language words do. The context of ordinary language 
substantiates a different meaning from the formal language meaning. This 
difference is important, because even if a first-order judgement is made about the 
truth and falsity of a statement, it is not the same in meaning as the logical 
assessment of the second-order statement or logical construction. 
 
Strawson writes at length about contradiction proper, providing more than a 
few examples and definitions. Two of these are the focus here. Strawson (1952:3) 
says: “Contradicting oneself is like writing something down and then erasing it, or 
putting a line through it.” This ordinary explanation reveals what we normally take 
to be problematic about contradiction; it simultaneously gives and it takes away. 
However, in this instance, contradicting oneself is part of an action that occurs in 
human life. In the case of a blatant contradiction, Strawson is correct. It does not 
make a great deal of sense when done. 
 
Linguistically, for Strawson (1952:17), contradiction is about the 
incompatibility of predicates, “… where one statement is inconsistent with another 
because it explicitly rejects (withholds, excludes) the predicate which the other 
applies …” In ordinary language, “not” functions as a rejection of the application of 
a predicate. When a statement and its negation are joined together, the result is 
the predicating of a property and rejecting that predication at the same time. 
Strawson makes an interesting point in that if a conflicting statement is 
incompatible with another statement, it is not necessarily contradictory. For 
instance, if a car is both red and black, it is part red and part black, and there is no 
point that it is both red and black. However, that conflict is not contradictory, as 
the contradictory statement would be it is not the case that the car is both red and 
black. Thus, predicates may conflict without being contradictory for Strawson 
(1952:1718). 
 
1.5.5.2 Paraconsistency 
 
The late 19th and 20th century brought about a logical revolution of sorts—a 
new emphasis on formalism and formal methods in philosophy. Frege’s 
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Foundations of Arithmetic (1980), Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica 
(2011), Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2001) and others such as 
Tarski’s The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Semantics 
(1944) made logical discoveries. The complexion of logic changed from an 
Aristotelian one to a multi-varied one based on particular logical needs, for 
instance, in recent times the development of modal logic (see Cresswell and 
Hughes [1996]), relevance logics (see Routley, Brady, Plumwood, and Meyer 
[2003]), and belief logics (see Hintikka [2005]). However, almost exclusively, these 
foundational authors cherished consistency, with its role in formal logic never 
really having been challenged. In fact, Russell sought to resolve his own paradox 
to remain logically consistent through his introduction of a hierarchy of types 
(1908). 
 
However, in the late 20th century, the last domain of logic was attacked 
and criticised: consistency. From a formal logical sense, paraconsistency is a 
group of logics that are tolerant of inconsistencies. Two predominant 
paraconsistent schools arose: the South American school with Asenjo (1965) and 
De Costa (1974), and the Australian school of Priest and Routley (Sylvan) (1989). 
While they share many similarities, the latter school took paraconsistency into a 
new direction, dialetheism, or the view that there are true contradictions. 
 
1.5.5.2.1 Priest and Routley (Sylvan) 
 
Two philosophers were the major impetus for the paraconsistent movement 
in the English-speaking world: Richard Routley (Sylvan) and Graham Priest. They 
reject the status quo in logic and put forth a rigorous philosophical defence of the 
justification of inconsistency, in particular, inconsistent formal logics (1989:Ch.1). 
Whereas Strawson (1952) primarily looks at the significance of inconsistency in 
ordinary language, the paraconsistent logicians recognise that importance, too, 
but develop a formal logic to handle the purported inconsistencies in ordinary 
language such as the semantic paradoxes. 
 
Paraconsistent logics typically reject two general inference principles: ex 
falso quodlibet and ex contradictione quodlibet (Priest, Routley [Sylvan] and 
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Norman 1989:141142). The first is a rejection of a semantic principle that not 
everything follows from the false. In propositional logic, there is no constraint on 
inference from the false to the true or the false to the false, so anything follows 
from the false. If a contradiction is false, then this principle must be rejected. The 
second is a rejection of a syntactic principle, namely that not everything follows 
from a contradiction. In propositional logic using inference rules, starting with a 
contradiction, one can simplify into each component A, ~A. By the rule of addition, 
B can be added to A, (A V B) for A or B. When (A V B) and ~A are premises, 
using the inference rule disjunctive syllogism, results in B as a conclusion. So, 
from A and ~A, B was inferred. There is no relevance of the premises to the 
conclusion in this case, and effectively B becomes anything at all. So, anything 
follows from a contradiction, and the result is trivial. This principle must be 
rejected, along with disjunctive syllogism in an inconsistency tolerant logic 
because not everything is going to follow from a contradiction. 
 
The rationale for this inconsistency tolerant logic is found in our own 
practices and language (Priest, Routley [Sylvan], and Norman 1989:483528). 
Formal logic and language should mirror each other on this account. The 
semantic paradoxes, in particular, the liar paradox, are read by the strong 
paraconsistent logician as both true and false, a contradiction syntactically and 
false semantically.25 If it is a contradiction and false, then anything should follow, 
and ultimately ordinary language should be trivial. However, it is not. Ordinary 
language is perfectly intelligible, showing that the inconsistency generated by self-
referential paradoxes is not systematically problematic. The inconsistency is 
contained in some sense, and ordinary language does not suffer the illogical 
effects. 
 
The strong view of paraconsistency makes a much bolder claim. 
“Dialetheism” states that there are true (and false) contradictions, and maybe 
there are even in the world (much like Hegel). Priest and Routley (Sylvan) 
reference Hegel’s take on motion being a contradiction as a true contradiction: 
                                                          
25 A weak paraconsistent logician does not have to embrace the idea that triviality is blocked. She 
can maintain it is inconsistent as a feature of language, but is not true. 
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“Hegel’s philosophy was explicitly inconsistent…Hegel’s logic was paraconsistent” 
(1989:496). The debt to Hegel here is obvious. For a dialetheist, the real-world 
and logical world are contradictory worlds. While this view might seem outlandish, 
Priest draws upon quantum mechanics and mathematical examples (naïve set 
theory and the infinitesimal calculus), to justify his point (1989:483500). 
 
The paraconsistent logician uses formal means, like those in the earlier 
part of the 20th century to handle the logical implications of contradictions. The 
upshot of their work and research is that inconsistencies are containable and do 
not necessarily cause systematic disintegration. An inconsistency tolerant logic is 
not a logic where everything goes──in fact, it can be quite conservative. This 
outlook on inconsistency is not only helpful but mature as the world and human 
lives are not always consistent in the way classical logic would have us believe. 
 
The downside of paraconsistency is evident; one must give up classical 
logic. Given the role of classical logic in the philosophical canon, doing so is 
anathema. However, the practical import is that education about inconsistency 
would need to be changed to accommodate the general idea that inconsistency is 
not pernicious in all cases. This change would require a revision of pedagogy and 
a change in the normally negative attitude toward inconsistency. One of the main 
reasons for pursing this thesis is to correct the normally univocal negative attitude 
toward inconsistency. Semantic inconsistency can be a problem, but it is not 
problematic in all cases and may even be helpful in others.  
 
1.6  Synthesis and analysis 
 
This chapter has presented many different thoughts on inconsistency, with 
minimal analysis of each view. The purpose of this section is to analyse the 
similarities and differences of the various thoughts to demonstrate that 
inconsistency is not a univocal concept. But first, a few general thoughts on the 
history of philosophy and inconsistency.  
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The beginning sections of this chapter put forth the thoughts of Heraclitus 
and Protagoras. The conclusion reached in both instances was that a proper 
understanding demonstrated that there were no substantive inconsistencies in 
either. A charge of inconsistency is one of the most substantive charges made in 
philosophy and should not be done lightly. This charge also has the consequence 
that the inconsistency is theory defeating, such that if true, Heraclitus’ and 
Protagoras’ philosophies are undermined, and are probably worth a lesser value 
than a consistent theory (supposing there is one). The harm done to these 
philosophers for generations is uncharitable at best, demeaning at worst. These 
philosophers become targets of the strawman fallacy, where their positions are 
not really what they held. The moral of Heraclitus and Protagoras is that a charge 
of inconsistency takes on a historical life of its own, regardless of its truth.  
 
The five types of inconsistency: metaphysical, psychological, 
communicative, logical and linguistic serve to classify some of the similarities and 
differences in this chapter. While these categories are not exhaustive, they further 
demonstrate that just by classification inconsistency comes in many forms, not 
just ones that are truth-value related. Each of these will be taken in turn. 
 
Metaphysical inconsistency has Aristotle as its main defender due to his 
essentialism and the way reality is for him. Physical contradictions cannot occur in 
reality. Hegel, contrastively, argues that they do occur and in fact, are 
fundamental to experience. Aristotle would reject the “additive” conception of 
contradiction because contradiction adds nothing to experience as Hegel 
believes. The underlying presumption is that reality is consistent for Aristotle but 
not for Hegel. This is important to note, because modern quantum interpretations 
would be much friendlier to Hegel given their inconsistency, such as the status of 
a particle or a wave, or the state of Schrödinger’s cat. Another strong 
metaphysical view of inconsistency comes from dialetheism, such that there can 
be true contradictions in the world. This view has affinities with Hegel and would 
be subject to the same conflict with Aristotle’s views. The polarity between views 
manifests strongly in the metaphysical conception. 
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Aristotle’s psychological conception of inconsistency gives food for thought 
and is not as easily classified as the previous concept as it bleeds over to the 
communicative type as well. Descartes, for instance, holds to some form of 
psychological inconsistency between his views of God and the Cogito. God is not 
subject to contradictions but humankind is subject to them in the application of 
thought. The Cogito itself may be a metaphysical contradiction if we take it as one 
thinks they cannot think in the process of thinking. Kierkegaard is psychologically 
inconsistent too with his discussion of the story of Abraham, murder and/or 
sacrifice of Isaac. One similarity between them is that neither let the concept of 
inconsistency scare them away from embracing inconsistency as an explanation. 
That embrace is to their credit, but is surprising for Descartes given his rationalist 
and mathematical background where inconsistency and outright contradictions 
are avoided. But it is not so surprising for Kierkegaard with his irrational, 
existentialist philosophy.  
 
Camus, like his existentialist counterpart Kierkegaard, uses inconsistency 
to generate the tension of an absurd life. Since the world is what it is, the 
conception of the world as irrational involves beliefs of how it should be and how it 
is. The conflict between those, results in psychological inconsistency. Camus 
furthers his inconsistency with the specific tension between meaning and 
terminating that meaning through suicide. If someone commits suicide, one is 
rationally assured that life is not worth living, yet reason yields a different answer, 
namely that consciousness is terminated and that the world is irrational. The 
concepts of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ chase each other showing their psychological 
dependence on one another for explanation.  
 
Lastly, Arnauld and Nicole share a psychological conception of 
inconsistency and uphold, to some degree, Aristotle’s thoughts on having 
conflicting beliefs about external events. When accounts of something in reality 
differ, other beliefs factor in to fill in the context and help determine which account 
to believe. Contra Aristotle, conflict is not necessarily inconsistent in any keen 
sense, as accounts are more or less probable and that difference in probability 
generates the conflict. Interestingly though, this idea is also found in Aristotle in 
terms of gradations of belief, but without explicit truth-value or truth talk. 
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The communicative sense of inconsistency owes its roots to Aristotle, too, 
as avoiding inconsistency in what we assert is needed for basic intelligibility and 
discourse. Descartes, engaged in the communicative sense with the idea of a 
performative contradiction. This is to deny thought and express that denial, such 
as by arguing that, “I cannot write a sentence in English.” Practically, the 
communicative sense is the most obvious sense of inconsistency in everyday life 
and is a source of conflict. In fairness, Aristotle’s practical rationale of 
contradiction avoidance for communicative intelligibility should be understood as a 
normative principle in daily life. The felicities of communication are not so easily 
surrendered as are the logical or psychological senses of inconsistency. Using 
language correctly aids agreement and promotes understanding but with glaring 
inconsistencies neither of them come through strongly.  
 
Aristotle still stands as the foundation for the logical conception of 
inconsistency and contradiction. Strawson agrees with Aristotle’s basic 
formulation in terms of truth-values, as an example of a contemporary classical 
logician. Priest and Routley (Sylvan) would disagree, showing the concept of 
contradiction impotent when adopting a paraconsistent logic and ultimately 
rejecting the traditional meanings of truth-values. It is important to note that the 
logical issues that Priest and Routley (Sylvan) are interested in exploring, can be 
divorced from communicative and psychological conceptions of inconsistency. 
 
The paradoxes of material implication demonstrate a conflict between 
propositional logic and semantics. The general conflict comes from the meaning of 
a logical connective versus that meaning in natural language. Truth-values, not 
semantic relations between propositions, undermine the relevance of an 
antecedent in a conditional to a consequent in the same conditional. Furthermore, 
while not a direct agreement with or a problem for Aristotle, the systematic issue is 
a logical one. Given propositional truth tables and the results they produce, for 
example, from a material conditional where there is false antecedent and a false 
consequent, the result of the material conditional is a true value. This calculated 
truth-value is foreign to conditional usages in natural language and shows an 
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inconsistency in what the formal system produces as a result and what natural 
language reasoning would produce as a result in the same context.   
 
 With the advent of non-standard logics, in one sense, Priest and Routley 
(Sylvan) are changing the context. To be fair to Aristotle, he was working in a 
different paradigm, and comparing their views might be the proverbial case of 
“apples versus oranges”. Historically, Aristotle’s thoughts are still dominant over 
any of the non-standard logics and their posits about inconsistency and 
contradiction. Whether that dominance is due to reflective thought or authority is 
up for debate, however, authority plays a strong role in the history of logic.  
 
The final area of inconsistency are the linguistic considerations of semantic 
conflict. Strawson, for instance, writes of predicates conflicting as a source of 
inconsistency. One way this happens is through negation proper, “Sia is here” and 
“Sia is not here.” Another way is by noticing the extension of the predicate, where 
“Sean is a man” and “Sean is a woman” conflict through predicate extension to a 
group, but not through negation use–this has interesting consequences in chapter 
four. Arnauld does something similar by noticing semantic conflict in stories, 
where “Bill arrived late” and “Bill arrived on time” conflict without negating claims 
that are exhaustive. Arnauld and Nicole likely had a coherence element to their 
account where internal and external circumstances should cohere as part of a 
story, and that coherence itself may stand as another generalised source of 
inconsistency. The story must make sense of both the fact itself and the testimony 
about that fact to cohere. Coherence is set up against the coherence of another 
story, which generates linguistic conflict at a higher-level than merely internal to 
the story.  
 
In both Heraclitus and Protagoras there is an appearance of semantic 
conflict, but it is a surface one. This is to be distinguished from Strawson’s and 
Arnauld’s ideas, which have much more traction semantically as expressing some 
form of legitimate conflict. This appearance/legitimate distinction is important for 
this thesis as it becomes the impetus for a theory of legitimate semantic conflict as 
inconsistency claims in chapter four  
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1.7 Concluding thoughts 
 
In this literature review, a brief history of inconsistency was provided. The 
research question was posed: what does the history of philosophy show us about 
the concept of inconsistency? The answer is multifaceted. Some attributions of 
inconsistency were found to be questionable and others were not. Some 
philosophers embrace inconsistency, and others do not. However, when thinking 
about inconsistency, it is apparent that it is not a straightforward univocal concept 
outside of it being a conflict of sorts. What conflicts may be include speech acts, 
symbols, predicates, definitions, and other elements of human experience. It is 
important to understand that at its core, inconsistency is contrasted with 
consistency in the appropriate context. These concepts work together. It is also 
important to understand that some do not view inconsistency as particularly 
problematic in the way that others do. It is not that inconsistency is desirable over 
and above consistency, but it does not necessarily need to have a negative 
connotation either. Contradiction and inconsistency can function as part of 
everyday life, showing amazement or even that something might be wrong, or 
needs further explanation. In fairness, this chapter has demonstrated that 
inconsistency is a multifaceted concept, which requires elucidation not only in a 
theoretical manner, but in practical, everyday reasoning, which is the focus of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Propositional deductive logic 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a system of propositional logic for the purposes of 
analysis and criticism in later chapters. First, however, the general notion of a 
formal language is articulated and contrasted with natural language. Elements of 
a formal language are discussed. From there both the semantics and syntax of 
propositional logic are detailed. Finally, the role of inconsistency in propositional 
logic and how the logical system manages it, are explicated. 
 
2.2  Formal systems, logical systems, and languages 
 
Formal systems are abstract ways of presenting and organising ideas. 
Mathematics and computer languages are two examples. Typically, they involve 
symbols, rules, and inference/implication to achieve a purpose or a result. One 
mark of a formal system is that it needs no interpretation; the system stands alone 
(Hunter 1996:4). Logical systems are formal systems; by definition, they involve 
symbols, particular rules of inference/implication or interpretations, and a purpose 
or a result. Formal languages, which are part of formal systems, are constructed 
for purposes such as computer programming (e.g. assembly language). A formal 
logical language is part of a logical system with its precise meanings of rules, 
symbols, and legitimate patterns of inference or interpretations.26 
 
                                                          
26 Strictly, according to Hunter (1996:4), a formal language does not have rules of inference. He 
defines a formal language as one that consists of symbols and rules to properly form formulas. 
Since we are concerned with a logical language, we include rules of inference. And for the 
purposes of this thesis, “inference” is a misnomer in a logical system; it should be “implication,” as 
in rules of implication. Implication is a “must” relation where beliefs about the relation are irrelevant 
to rule following and the symbolic transformation that must follow. Inference is a “might” relation 
where beliefs are relevant and serve to bring about the best conclusion but there is no necessity 
necessarily involved. See Harman (2002) for substantiation of this view of implication and 
inference. 
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Understanding formal and logical systems are critical for this thesis. On the 
surface, one may wonder why, though. They seem to have no obvious 
relationship to critical reasoning in everyday life. That intuition is understandable 
and articulates why it is necessary to explicate the ideas. Formal/logical systems 
underlie many ideas taught in some reasoning courses, especially those relying 
on Aristotelian and propositional logic. While they are rarely presented in a 
systematic manner, the system itself makes whatever is presented meaningful in 
a holistic sense. By having an understanding of formal/logical systems, further 
clarity ensues regarding the difference from ordinary, critical reasoning, which is 
not systematic in the same sense. 
 
An artificial language contrasts with a natural language. Formal languages 
are artificial languages. A natural language is one that is the product of a living 
human, and is human in context of use and application. Languages such as 
English and Spanish are natural languages. Linguistically, natural languages are 
more complex than artificial languages with natural languages containing many 
subtleties of context and relative use. Artificial languages typically have one 
context. If there are any subtleties, these are systematic but not about application 
or use. 
 
Strawson (1952:1524) explained first-order and second-order languages 
in detail. Applying these concepts, natural language is a first-order language; 
artificial language is a second-order language. Ideas of language from the first-
order need to be in place to model another language, a second-order language, 
that only contains limited conceptions of the first-order language. The construction 
of a second-order language is dependent on the first-order language, or an 
artificial language is dependent on a natural language. The direction of 
dependency is important in both, as meaning is drawn from the first-order or 
natural language and given to the second-order or artificial language. 
 
Propositional deductive logic is a second-order artificial language. It draws 
its meaning from a first-order natural language, English. However, second-order 
meanings are different from first-order meanings in some cases. In short, the 
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meanings of the two languages are not the same and create some of the 
confusion about propositional logic. Given that they are two different languages to 
some degree, this confusion should not be surprising. 
 
In summary, propositional logic is a formal logical language that contains 
rules, symbols, interpretations, and transformations. Interpretations are the basis 
for the semantic theory of propositional logic. The semantic ideas of truth and 
falsity for propositions determine the validity of an argument. Transformations are 
the syntactic theory of propositional logic where determining the validity of an 
argument is not according to its truth conditions. Rather the validity is according to 
a proper application of transformation rules, where one set of propositions or 
premises transform into another, i.e. the conclusion.27 Both the semantic and 
syntactic versions of proposition follow in detail. 
 
2.3  Propositional deductive logic (semantic) 
 
This section articulates the semantic side of propositional deductive logic. It 
covers a simplified system of propositional logic through the standard use of truth 
tables. Some additional theoretical ideas are included that are used to evaluate 
truth tables along with the formulation of arguments and their assessment.  
 
2.3.1  System considerations, well-formed formulas, and translations 
 
Flew (1984:117) writes that a formal system is an uninterpreted system of 
symbols consisting of at least four main elements: variables, 
connectives/operators, some form of punctuation, and rules. Symbols represent 
variables (e.g. lowercase letters such as p, q, r, s and uppercase letters P, Q, R, 
S). A variable may either represent something outside the system or represent 
itself based on its own unique shape. In the latter case, the symbol acts in a 
purely formal way through shape differences relative to other symbols in the 
system. Symbols must manifest a usage difference. Connectives and operators 
                                                          
27 This assumes an argument with premises. However, in syntactic propositional logic it is possible 
to prove a premise-less argument as valid. This is a subtlety to the system that is not relevant to 
this material’s explanation. 
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join the variables into some particular relationship or formula. Punctuation 
organises connectives, operators, and variables, especially when there are 
complex relationships or formulas. To this end, symbols such as parentheses and 
brackets limit the range of a connective or variable. Finally, rules govern the 
correct formation of variables, connectives, and punctuation. Rules may also 
prescribe symbol manipulations for the previous three elements. In other words, 
rules tell us what we can do with all the symbols in the system. They are what 
allow us to manipulate, and work in and with, the formal system. 
 
It is possible to understand a formal system in a straightforward, non-
technical manner. There are symbols and rules, and one can manipulate the 
symbols by applying rules, with a result in mind. There is nothing mysterious 
about the formal system at that level, akin as it is to mathematical education and 
its manipulations.28  
 
Classical propositional logic is a formal logical system consisting of the four 
formal language elements. Variables function in the same way in classical 
propositional logic as they do in the basic formal language. The variables are 
merely distinguished by their shape and represent themselves. The variables 
have no properties but those they gain from their functional role in the formal 
system. There are one operator and three main connectives: “~” or tilde 
represents negation, “כ” or horseshoe represents the material conditional, “V” or 
wedge represents the disjunction, and “·” or dot represents the conjunction.29 Each 
connective combines variables whereas the operator reverses truth-values. The 
correct combinatory methods of variables, connectives, operators, and 
punctuation are guided by formation rules. By bringing these logical components 
together into a proper formulation, the components become well-formed formulas 
(WFFs). 
 
One understanding of WFFs comes from Gensler (2010:118120). For 
Gensler, any capital letter is a WFF and so is its negation (e.g. if A is WFF, so is 
                                                          
28 In mathematical education, algebra, calculus, and arithmetic are all formal systems that share 
this sort of manipulation of symbols, which is no different to formal logical systems. 
29 I am classifying negation as a logical operator, not as a connective. 
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~A). The result of joining two WFFs with a defined logical connective and 
enclosing the result with parentheses is a WFF too (e.g. [P V Q]). Consider the 
following, (G כ h) is not a WFF because the “h” is lowercase. Consider as well, (G 
כ H) V K) is not a WFF because – according to the rules – it lacks the same 
number of parentheses on the left and on the right, one on the left and two on the 
right. 
 
Sentences in natural language translate into the language of propositional 
logic.30 Upper case letters represent the sentence or sentence component if it is a 
complex sentence. By definition, a complex sentence is one that contains a logical 
connective. Consider the following sentence, “Bill is happy.” That sentence has a 
truth-value. Basing the translation on the predicate, the result is “H.” Suppose we 
add “Sam is sad” to the sentence in a conjunctive manner. Basing the translation 
on the predicates, the result is (S · H).31 From these simple sentences, complex 
sentences are built with the addition of connectives, variables representing the 
natural language equivalent (if necessary), and parentheses. So, translation is a 
straightforward process if the logical form of the natural language is evident in the 
structure of the formal logical language. 
 
2.3.2 Truth tables for the connectives 
 
Truth tables are logical diagrams that represent the possible truth-value 
combinations for a WFF. In propositional or sentential logic there are two truth-
values: true and false. Representing these two truth-values is practicable in any 
number of ways “T” for true, “F” for false, or the convention used in this thesis “1” 
for true and “0” for false. Consider the sentence, “Scott is tall”, which translates as 
“T.” That sentence is either true or false. The truth table for a single WFF 
demonstrates this binary structure: 
 
                                                          
30 This is the contentious issue against which I will argue in this thesis but is offered here as the 
standard practice of translation. 
31 We are following the convention of Harry Gensler (2010:118119). For every connective, a pair 
of parentheses is necessary to limit the scope of the connective(s).  
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T 
 
0 
1 
 
Consider the negated version of the same sentence, “Scott is not tall,” 
which translates as ~T. The truth table for this negated sentence is: 
 
T       ~T 
0         1 
1         0 
 
In the left column is the original value of “T” and on the right is the negated value 
of “~T”. Represented by the tilde, negation reverses the truth-value of a WFF. 
Thus, in the table there is a vertical, or column, reversal of truth-values under the 
WFF. 
 
Adding a sentence to the previous one, “Bill is small” the resulting 
translation is “S.”  Combining sentences with a conjunction, the sentences 
translate to (T · S). The truth conditions for the conjunction are: 
 
S  T    (T · S) 
0  0        0 
0  1        0 
1  0        0 
1  1        1 
 
The truth conditions for the conjunction reduces to the following: the WFF is true 
only when both conjuncts are true. In all other cases, the conjunctive WFF is false. 
Determining this value involves reading the truth table for the conjunction from left 
to right with only the last row being true under the conjunction connective. 
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Keeping the same sentences in mind, but with a different connective, the 
disjunction, they translate from “Scott is tall or Bill is small” to the WFF, (T V S). 
The truth conditions for the disjunction are: 
 
S  T    (T V S) 
0  0        0 
0  1        1 
1  0        1 
1  1        1 
 
The truth conditions for the disjunction reduce to the following: the WFF is false 
only when both disjuncts are false; in all other cases it is true. Determining this 
value involves reading the truth table for the disjunction from left to right with only 
the first row being false under the disjunction connective. 
 
Logically, there are two options with a disjunction. The exclusive disjunction 
logically reads as the WFF is true when one, but not both, of the disjuncts is true. 
The inclusive disjunction logically reads as the WFF is true when one or both 
disjuncts is true. The disjunction truth table in use is the inclusive disjunction, 
which is the last row being true under the (inclusive) disjunction connective, unlike 
an exclusive disjunction where the last row would be false. 
 
The final connective is the material conditional. In natural language, 
conditional sentences are most commonly “if … then …” sentences. A conditional 
sentence in natural language, “If Scott is tall, then Bill is small” translates to (T כ 
S). The “T” is the “antecedent” and the “S” is the “consequent.” The truth table for 
the material conditional is: 
 
S  T    (T כ S) 
0  0        1 
0  1        0 
1  0        1 
1  1        1 
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The truth conditions for the material conditional reduce to the following single 
condition: the overall material conditional WFF is false only when the antecedent 
variable is true, and the consequent variable is false; in all other cases it is true. 
Determining this involves reading the material conditional truth table from left to 
right with only the second row being false under the material conditional 
connective. 
 
There are two other logically interesting elements of the material 
conditional truth table. When the antecedent variable is false – rows 1 and 3, 
regardless of the value of the consequent variable – the material conditional WFF 
is true. So, the truth-value of the consequent variable does not factor into the 
overall truth-value for the material conditional in this case. Additionally, when the 
consequent variable is true – rows 3 and 4 – the overall truth-value of the material 
conditional is true, irrespective of the truth-value of the antecedent variable. Thus, 
the truth-value of the antecedent variable does not factor into the overall truth-
value for the material conditional in this final case. 
 
Comparing the column under each logical connective, each logical 
connective has different truth conditions. These truth conditions are the definition 
of the logical connective in propositional logic. For instance, in natural language, 
“conjunction” means “true” when both conjuncts are true; in all other cases the 
conjunction is false. In propositional language, pointing to, and understanding, the 
truth-values under the “·” suffices as a definition and meaning of the connective. 
 
The basic truth conditions for the logical connectives form the core of 
propositional logic. Further, WFFs come together by combining connectives and 
operators, along with parentheses. No matter how complex the WFF becomes, 
there is a final connective with definite truth conditions. Theoretically, there is no 
problem with a finite set of sentences in combination with logical connectives and 
determining the truth conditions for that combinatory sentence through a complex 
WFF. Practically, it might be difficult as the complexity of the WFF, and its number 
of variables, has an exponential 2n function. But, given the time and resources, its 
logical determination is possible. 
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2.3.3 WFF evaluation: tautology, contingency, and contradiction 
 
There are three different ways to evaluate a WFF with at least one logical 
connective: tautology, contingent, and contradiction. A tautology, or tautological 
WFF, by definition, has all true values under the main connective in the WFF. For 
example, using the material conditional: 
 
P   (P כ P) 
0       1 
1       1 
 
Using the truth table for the material conditional, when both values are false, the 
conditional is true, and when both values are true, the conditional is true. So 
regardless of the truth conditions, 0 or 1, the material conditional WFF with the 
same variables is always equal to 1. Tautologies are called “necessary truths” 
because they cannot be false under any interpretation. 
 
A contingent WFF, by definition, has mixed truth-values under the main 
connective. There is no requirement or specific pattern of truth-values, just a 
combination of both true and false values. For example: 
 
P  Q    ~(Q כ P) 
0   0     0 
0   1     1 
1   0     0 
1   1     0 
 
The WFF, ~(Q כ P), has mixed values under the final operator. The truth-values 
under the negation are contingent because they are dependent on the truth-
values of the individual variables. Most WFFs in propositional logic are contingent. 
 
       Contradiction, or a contradictory WFF, by definition, has all false values under 
the main connective. For example, using the conjunction: 
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A     (A · ~A) 
0          0 
1          0 
 
Conjunctions are false any time there is a 0 value in the variables. The first row, 
A=0 and the second row, ~A=0, so conjunction WFF is necessarily false. Like a 
tautology, the truth conditions for the variables do not matter, as the result under 
the WFF’s main conjunction connective is the same – false – regardless of their 
value being true or false. 
 
2.3.4 Argument evaluation: validity and invalidity 
 
In the previous section, individual WFFs were evaluated according to three 
different concepts. These evaluations were based on the vertical set of truth-
values under the main connective of a WFF. Validity and invalidity are two 
evaluative concepts for individual WFFs taken as a group or an argument. A valid 
argument, by definition, is one where if all the premises are true the conclusion 
must be true. By definition, an invalid argument is one where if all the premises 
are true, the conclusion is not (necessarily) true. 
 
Consider the following argument, where (P כ Q) and P are the premises 
and Q is the conclusion: 
 
Q  P     (P כ Q),   P   ∴   Q 
0   0          1        0         0 
0   1          0        1         0 
1   0          1        0         1 
1   1          1        1         1 
 
Typically, assessing an argument for invalidity comes first, and if it is not invalid, it 
is, by default, valid. The only possible rows that this argument can be invalid on 
are rows 1 and 2, as they have a 0 in the conclusion. However, each of the first 
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two rows contains a 0 in a premise, so the argument is, by default, valid. However, 
not all arguments are valid, such as the following: 
 
Q  P     (P כ Q),   ~P   ∴   ~Q 
0   0          1        1            1 
0   1          0        0            1 
1   0          1        1            0 
1   1          1        0            0 
 
The third row’s truth-value assignment of 1 to the premises and a 0 to the 
conclusion show an invalid row. Only one row in the truth table is necessary for 
the argument to be invalid. What that one row displays, is a structural flaw in the 
argument such that the premises, when true, can lead to falsity, and this defies 
the necessity of the transfer of truth from the premises to a conclusion in a valid 
deductive argument. 
 
Validity is a hypothetical test, “if …” which by definition means it only 
supposes the values of the premises are true, i.e. if all the premises are true, then 
the conclusion must be true. This test evaluates the structure of the argument. 
This structure is not obvious when doing truth tables or the semantic theory of 
propositional logic. When WFFs are listed in a truth table horizontally, without prior 
instruction one does not know which direction to read the table or which WFFs are 
the premises and which WFF is the conclusion. However, in the next section, this 
notion of structure will be much clearer as arguments are considered valid or 
invalid, not evaluated based on truth-values, but on a proper use of transformation 
rules and reaching the needed result. 
 
2.4  Propositional deductive logic (syntactic) 
 
The formal logical language for the syntactic version of propositional logic 
is the same as the semantic version. WFFs are formed in the same way. The 
general goal of propositional logic is to have valid deductive arguments. However, 
the similarities end there as “validity” means two different things. The goal of 
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propositional deductive logic semantically is to preserve truth from the premises to 
the conclusion. The goal of syntactic propositional deductive logic is to prove the 
conclusion through proper transformation rule application. The difference is the 
former relies on the interpretative aspect of truth and falsity, whereas the latter 
does not. 
 
2.4.1 Propositional proofs 
 
In propositional logic, a proof is a finite set of WFFs that are in a series, 
where the final WFF follows from the previous WFFs through the proper 
application of transformation rules. The transformation rules are of two types: 
simplification rules and inference rules. Simplification rules operate on a single 
WFF and simplify it into its components. Inference rules take two WFFs and infer 
a third WFF from the previous two. Both types of rules are “transformation rules” 
because they change formulas into other formulas.32 Presented below is each type 
of rule and instances thereof along with some extrasystematic rules for future 
consideration. 
 
2.4.2 Simplification rules 
 
Simplification rules reduce a WFF to its individual components. There are 
three examples of simplification rules, one for each connective. 
 
Conjunction simplification starts with two conjunct WFFs and reduces the 
two conjuncts WFF down to one WFF, or the other WFF, or both WFFs. Here is 
an example: 
 
                                                          
32 The propositional system presented here is Harry Gensler’s (2010:118173). Gensler uses the 
reductio proof method along with a small set of simplification and inference rules. Conditional proof 
is not the focus of his text, thus minimizing the WFF equivalencies needed and rules such as 
INTELIM rules for natural deduction that require two for each connective. Most importantly though, 
the reductio method has inconsistency at the heart of it, showing another use of contradiction and 
one that contrasts (by supposing the opposite) with our everyday reasoning practices in some 
contexts.  
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 (A · ~A) 
  
∴ A, ∴ ~A 
 
AND is the label of this rule, for “and.” The rule: bring down the exact WFF 
components that are inside the parentheses, use one, or both. 
 
Negated disjunction simplification starts with two disjunct WFFs and 
reverses the value of the disjunct WFFs to their opposite value. Below are two 
examples to demonstrate the opposite value condition: 
 
~(A V B)                    ~(~A V ~B) 
                                     
∴  ~A, ∴  ~B             ∴   A, ∴  B 
 
NOR is the label for this rule, for “negated or.” The rule: bring down the opposite 
of the component WFFs inside the parentheses, use one or both. 
 
Negated material conditional simplification starts with an antecedent WFF 
and a consequent WFF and keeps the value of the antecedent WFF the same 
and reverses the value for the consequent WFF to its opposite. Below are two 
examples to display the opposite condition: 
 
~(A כ B)                    ~(~A כ ~B) 
      
          ∴  A, ∴ ~B                 ∴ ~A, ∴  B 
 
The label for this rule is “negated if-then” (NIF). The rule: bring down the 
antecedent WFF as it is but make the consequent WFF the opposite value; you 
can use one or both. 
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These three instances of simplification rules demonstrate the general idea 
that simplification takes a single WFF and breaks it down into its component 
WFFs. Component WFFs are used in a proof to reach the final WFF in the series. 
 
2.4.3 Implication rules 
 
Implication rules use two WFFs to obtain a third WFF. There are four 
examples of inference rules, one each for the negated conjunction and 
disjunction, and two for the material conditional. 
 
Negated conjunction implication requires two distinct WFFs to obtain the 
third WFF; a negated conjunction and one of its WFF components yield the 
opposite of the remaining WFF component. Here are two examples: 
 
~(A ·B )                   ~(A · ~B ) 
     A                             ~B 
                                 
   ∴ ~B                          ∴ ~A 
 
CS is the label for this rule, for conjunctive syllogism. The rule: from a negated 
conjunction, from the same WFF component, infers the opposite WFF component. 
 
Disjunction implication requires two distinct WFFs to obtain the third WFF; 
a disjunction WFF and the exact opposite of one of its WFF components yield the 
same remaining WFF component. Here are two examples: 
 
 (A V B)                   (~A V ~B) 
   ~ A                             B 
                                
  ∴ B                           ∴ ~A 
 
Disjunctive syllogism is the name for this rule, which is labelled (DS). The rule: 
from a disjunction, from the opposite WFF component, infers the same WFF 
component. 
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Material conditional implication requires two distinct WFFs to obtain the 
third WFF. The first material condition inference uses the antecedent WFF and the 
same WFF to render the same consequent WFF. Here are two examples: 
 
 (A כ B)                     (~A כ ~B) 
    A                              ~A 
                                  
   ∴ B                          ∴ ~B 
 
Modus ponens is name for this rule, which is the labelled (MP). The rule: from a 
conditional, from the same antecedent component WFF, yields the same WFF 
consequent component. 
 
The second material conditional implication uses the consequent WFF and 
the opposite of the consequent WFF to render the opposite antecedent WFF. 
Here are two examples: 
 
 (A כ B)                   (~A כ ~B) 
    ~B                             B 
 
 ∴  ~A                        ∴  A 
 
Modus tollens is the label for this rule (MT). The rule: from a conditional, from the 
opposite consequent component WFF, yields the opposite WFF antecedent 
component. 
 
The syntactic rules of the logical system are the chosen rules for the 
system to demonstrate the concept of a “proof.” However, there are a few other 
rules relevant to this thesis. 
 
The rule of addition (ADD), adds a WFF component to another WFF 
component through the introduction of a disjunction. Any component WFF can be 
added to any WFF through this rule, simple or complex. Here are two examples of 
a simple and complex use of the rule: 
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       A                                   ~A 
 
  ∴ (A V B)                    ∴   (~A V (~A כ ~B)) 
 
In the first instance, only “B” adds to “A”; in the second instance “(~A כ ~B)” adds 
to “~A”.  The rule is simply that any WFF can be added to any WFF with a 
disjunction combining them. 
 
Another rule of implication is hypothetical syllogism (HS). This rule is best 
understood as chain reasoning, where there are linked premises and the 
conclusion is the initial WFF’s antecedent, and the consequent WFF is the final 
premise’s consequent WFF. 
 
(~A כ ~B) 
(~B כ C) 
 
∴ (~A כ C) 
 
There is no clear application of this syllogism except in instances when there are 
numerous conditional WFFs. Pay attention to the antecedent and consequent 
component WFFs to determine if there is the necessary connection needed for 
HS. 
 
There two final rules of implication share similarities with modus ponens 
and modus tollens. In the constructive dilemma (CD), the conditional WFFs in the 
conjunction WFF have the same consequent WFFs. In the second premise, the 
antecedent WFFs of each conditional form a disjunction WFF and the conclusion 
WFF is the consequent WFF of each conditional. 
 
((A כ C) · (B כ C)) 
(A V B) 
 
 ∴ C 
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There is no clear rule application of this syllogism either, except when there are 
WFFs that fit the proper pattern, or can be generated by the rule of addition, 
adding to an existing single WFF. The pattern looks somewhat similar to modus 
ponens wherein the antecedents match, so the consequent would follow. 
 
In the destructive dilemma (DD), the conditional WFFs in the conjunction 
WFF have the same antecedent WFFs. In the second premise, the opposite 
consequent WFFs of each conditional form a disjunction WFF and the conclusion 
WFF is the opposite antecedent WFF of each conditional. 
 
((A כ B) · (A כ C)) 
(~B V ~C) 
 
 ∴ ~A 
 
There is no clear application of this syllogism except that it can be used when 
there are WFFs that fit the proper pattern or can be generated by the rule of 
addition so adding to an existing single WFF. The pattern looks somewhat like 
modus tollens where the consequents are opposite in the second premise, so the 
opposite of the antecedent would follow as the conclusion. 
 
2.4.4 Proofs 
 
The goal of the syntactic method of propositional logic is to reach or prove 
a conclusion through a proper application of the transformation rules. Consider 
the following argument, a destructive syllogism:  
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1. ((A כ B) · (A כ C)) 
2. (~B V ~C) 
 
[∴ ~A 
3. asm:  A 
4.       (A כ B)  AND 1 
5.       (A כ C)  AND 1 
6.        B         MP 3, 4 
7.        C         MP 3, 5 
8.        ~C       DS  2, 6 
9. ∴  ~A   From 3, 7 and 8 contradict 
 
Is there a way to prove this argument valid without reference to truth-values? Yes. 
Using the reductio method of proof, the conclusion is implied. With the method, an 
assumption that leads to a contradiction must be false. The goal is to get a 
contradiction, which turns the assumption back to the original value of the 
conclusion. There are four basic requirements for a reductio proof:  
 
“a) all the original premises must be used at least once;  
b) the assumption must be the opposite of the conclusion;  
c) a contradiction is generated in one of the three ways: either with the   assumption, 
under the assumption, or with one of the original premises; and  
d) the final line of the proof must list the original conclusion, the assumption line number, 
and the contradiction line numbers” (Gensler 2010:152157).  
 
The previous argument is valid because the proven method, reductio and a 
proper application of the transformation rules, brought about the conclusion. 
However, consider the following argument: 
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1. ((P · Q) כ R) 
 
 [∴ (Q כ R) 
2. asm: ~(Q כ R) 
3.          Q            NIF 2 
4.          ~R          NIF 2 
5.          ~(P · Q)  MT 1,4 
6.          ~P          CS 3,5 
x— 
 
Unlike the previous proof, there was no generation of a contradiction, although the 
transformation rules were exhausted. An argument is invalid on the reductio 
method when there is no generation of a contradiction, i.e. through a proper use 
of the transformation rules. 
 
Proofs are a syntactic way of assessing validity through proper 
transformation rule use and reaching the desired conclusion. The reductio method 
is one of two main proof methods, the other being conditional proof. Either proof 
method produces the same result. When rules are applied properly, they correctly 
assess the argument as valid or invalid if the conclusion can be proven or not. 
The syntactic method makes no mention of truth-values in determining validity and 
systems that typically confuse the semantic basis for propositional logic and the 
syntactic basis.33 
 
2.5  Inconsistency and contradiction in propositional logic 
 
In propositional logic, a general definition of “inconsistency” is that a WFF is 
inconsistent if both component WFFs cannot be true at the same time. The WFF 
(A · ~A) is an example of this, as it is logically impossible for both component 
WFFs to be true at the same time as demonstrated by the WFF’s truth table. In 
propositional logic, by definition, a contradiction is a WFF and its negation in a 
                                                          
33 Gensler (2012:4) for example uses the definition of “validity” as it would be contradictory or 
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. These definitions apply, for him, to 
both the semantic and syntactic versions.  
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conjunctive relationship (A · ~A), or ((A · ~A) · ~(A · ~A)). Contradiction is 
primarily a syntactical concept; inconsistency is primarily a semantical one. 
 
2.5.1 Negation 
 
Expressions of negation in natural language occurs through various 
cognates of “not.” When translating from natural language into propositional 
language “not” is translated as “~.” A formal language needs no interpretation; 
thus, the symbols should express themselves. “~” in semantic propositional 
language means reversing the truth-value of the WFF or component of a WFF. In 
syntactic propositional language “~” means “opposite”. However, both meanings 
determine the nature of negation as exhaustive. Negation in propositional logic 
does not admit any degrees or limited application. It is a robust concept that either 
reverses the truth function or directly opposes another WFF. 
 
2.5.2 Inconsistency in arguments 
 
In the presentation of contradiction and inconsistency, the focus of both 
was on individual WFFs. Both concepts are also operative in proofs and 
arguments, arguably more so, given the broader scope of arguments. Semantic 
inconsistency and syntactic contradiction are subject to problems in propositional 
logic. A discussion of two of these problems follows, ex falso quodlibet or EFQ, 
and ex contradictione quodlibet or ECQ. 
 
2.5.2.1 Semantic: ex falso quodlibet34 
 
Consider the following truth table for the material conditional: 
 
                                                          
34 The literature confuses EFQ and ECQ as the same thing, I am using one as a semantic idea 
and the other as a syntactic idea. Shapiro (2013) uses EFQ instead of ECQ when ECQ (Priest and 
Berto 2017) is what is used by the paraconsistentist, for instance. Those references are to the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a reputable source by philosophy scholars, where the two 
concepts are treated as one.  
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S  T    (T כ S) 
0  0        1 
0  1        0 
1  0        1 
1  1        1 
 
In rows 1 and 3 of the truth table for the material conditional, when the antecedent 
WFF “T” is false, the overall value is true. Thus, when a material conditional has a 
false antecedent WFF component, the WFF is always true. 
 
A formal deductive argument shares a similar structure as a material 
conditional WFF. The semantic definition of validity  i.e. if all the premises are 
true, the conclusion must be true  is in conditional form. Invalidity can only occur 
in a truth table when all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. Yet, this 
is only one truth-value assignment out of many. A simple consequence of the 
semantic definition of validity is that any argument with a false premise is 
automatically valid, as is any argument with a true conclusion. The peculiarities of 
truth and falsity in a material conditional may not make a great deal of sense in an 
ordinary way, but in terms of the logical system they do. Consider the following 
truth table for an argument containing a contradiction and an unrelated result: 
 
B   A       (A · ~A)  ∴  B 
0    0           0             0 
0    1           0             0 
1    0           0             1 
1    1           0             1 
 
By definition, this argument is valid. There is no row where there are all true 
premises and a false conclusion. Thus, by default, the argument is valid. 
 
EFQ means “from the false, anything.” This concept is often taken as the 
same concept as ECQ, “from a contradiction, anything.” However, if the results of 
semantic propositional logic are brought to bear on the concept, the contradiction 
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is secondary to the truth-value assignments, manifesting in an argument with a 
false premise on all assignments leading to a valid argument. So, the falsity, not 
structure or form, is the primary concept such that anything at all follows validly. 
 
When EFQ was formulated in the Middle Ages the propositional logical 
apparatus did not exist in the sense of this thesis.35 However, the intuitive idea 
was in mind, that a contradiction is false and from the false anything can follow. 
This interpretation does so in terms of truth-values clarifying how an 
unconstrained proposition can follow from a contradiction and not violate any 
conception of validity. 
 
2.5.2.2 Syntactic: ex contradictione quodlibet 
 
Consider the following proof sequence in syntactic propositional logic, 
called ECQ: 
 
1. (P ·~P) 
2. P              (AND,1) 
3. ~P            (AND,1) 
4. (P V Q)    (ADD,2) 
 
    ∴   Q       (DS,3,4) 
 
WFF 1, (P ·~P) is the only original premise; all other premises logically follow from 
it by proper rule use. WFF 1 becomes WFF 2, by the transformation rule of 
conjunction simplification. Also reached by conjunction simplification is premise 3 
from premise 1. WFF 4 comes via the transformation rule of addition, with the 
addition of “Q” to “P” from WFF 2. The final WFF, “Q,” is drawn through the 
transformation rule, disjunctive syllogism. The derived transformation rule is a 
formal application of the transformation rules that are used in the following 
sequence: 
                                                          
35 See Wittgenstein for an early formulation semantic truth-tables and propositions (2001) and 
Gentzen (1935a & 1935b) for a method of syntactic proof 
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DS1.   (P V Q) 
DS2.   ~P 
 
  ∴ Q 
 
Thus, ECQ’s final WFF “Q” is transformed from the initial formula, “(P ·~P)” using 
the specific transformation rules under the rubric of a single derived 
transformation rule, ECQ. 
 
On the conception of syntactic propositional language presented here, a 
contradiction results by definition when a WFF is conjoined with that same 
negated WFF, viz., (P ·~P). The sequence of ECQ begins with a formal 
contradiction, proceeds through a few rule-governed transformations, and ends 
with a distinct variable that is not found in the original contradictory premise. ECQ 
derives its awkward result from an explicitly formal contradiction in this sense, by 
an appeal to rule based transformations within a syntactic system. 
 
ECQ displays that from a syntactic contradiction, an unconstrained or 
“open-ended” conclusion is provable. This unconstrained conclusion is the result 
of a logical consequence relationship between the premises and the conclusion. 
This relationship is called “explosive” because any result can follow from a 
contradiction. This is not a good thing for propositional logic, where a conclusion 
should have some WFF component of the original premise. In ECQ, the only 
original premise is “(P ·~P)” and proving a result of “Q” shows no WFF component 
carryover. 
 
2.6 Concluding thoughts 
 
Turning to the second research question, what is a correct representation 
of propositional logic and propositional logic inconsistency, we find the answer in 
dual form. Classical propositional logic exists in two manifestations: semantic and 
syntactic. At the propositional logic level, both manifestations provide the correct 
result through rule usage. Semantic and syntactic metalogical results 
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demonstrating both ways provide the same result, are known as completeness 
and compactness proofs. While the manifestations are different in use and 
application, the results they produce are the same: a valid argument in one will be 
a valid argument in the other. When translated into the language of propositional 
logic, natural language may have its relations understood through the austerity of 
the logical language. Thus, there may be relationships thought of in a different 
and helpful way when engaging in natural language translation to the language of 
propositional logic. 
 
Inconsistency in propositional logic shares the dual form, too, as it is either 
of truth functions or of logical form. On the semantic conception, inconsistency in 
the form of contradiction is false on all rows of the truth table due to the WFF 
structure. On the syntactic conception, it is the structure alone that generates the 
contradictory form. Thus, the research question is answered in two ways. 
 
Classical propositional (with first-order) logic is the dominant logic in use in 
the Western world. While some Aristotelian logic is still taught, most introductory 
logic courses focus on propositional logic, predominantly the semantic side but 
some include the syntactic as well. Propositional logic – one may speculate  
would not have attained its dominance without the support of the universities and 
their belief that formal deductive logic should be taught in both introductory logic 
courses and critical reasoning courses.36 Part of this dominance, I would 
postulate, perhaps comes from the role of the positivists in the 20th century and 
their influence on the English-speaking universities, especially after World War II. 
Another contributor, albeit minor, might be the burgeoning textbook market 
motivating authors to continue the trend that they learned. Still, yet another factor 
is likely due to an appeal to Aristotle and his logical authority, so justifying some 
form of logic in the curriculum. Lastly, logic of any kind was thought to be an ideal 
and the universities might have been wrong about ignoring language based 
arguments for formal logics and systems. More will be said on this issue in a later 
chapter, but it is important to note that propositional logic’s entrenchment in the 
                                                          
36 One would be hard pressed to find a higher educational institution that does not offer 
introduction to logic and/or critical reasoning courses. This pervasiveness may have led to the 
inclusion of propositional logic in these areas of the curriculum.  
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curriculum stands as a strong justification for learning propositional logic and not 
necessarily whether propositional logic is the best logical system to capture formal 
and informal senses of inference. 
 
This chapter has functioned to give a substantive background 
understanding of propositional logic for later analysis and critique in this thesis. 
This will include conceptual problems inherent to propositional logic, especially 
related to inconsistency. Ultimately it will serve to illustrate why propositional logic 
has little relevance to critical thinking generally and that propositional logic 
subverts our ordinary understanding of inconsistency judgements. This 
subversion, among other elements, are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Critiquing propositional deductive logic as a logical system 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter critiques propositional sentential deductive logic as a logical 
system. The first subsection considers classical logic in opposition to non-classical 
logics. The next few sections bring forth some problems for inference rules (in 
particular, modus ponens and modus tollens), and quasi-principles of inference 
(ex contradictione quodlibet and ex falso quodlibet). The final sections challenge 
the role of translation between natural and formal language and draw forth some 
negative consequences. 
 
3.2  Classical and non-classical logics  
 
One major proponent of classical logic is Quine (1980, 1986a & 1986b). 
Quine is famously known for his rejection of non-classical or deviant logics. He 
believes that his version of classical logic (propositional and first-order logic) is 
sufficiently expressive to capture what science needs for an explanation.37 The 
system preserves truth and allows one to analyse relations. These relations are 
both the relations of grammar and formal logic and are manifest in the relationship 
between the two as well. Quine (1986b:11181250) argues against deviant logics, 
with some of his attacks centring on an improper use or understanding of 
negation. Other critiques draw out the lack of bivalence of truth and falsity, and 
problems with quantification. For the purposes of this thesis, the first two are 
relevant. 
 
                                                          
37 Quine’s logical system  in Philosophy of Logic (1986a & 1986b)  uses conjunction, negation 
and existential quantification, and two truth values. It qualifies as a classical propositional system 
with a quantifier. See in particular Chapters 4 and 5. In (1980) Section 10, he supports reduction to 
negation and conjunction. 
105 
 
 
One way to understand Quine’s difficulties with deviant logics is to think 
about perspective. Quine’s criticisms come from his presuppositions and support 
of classical logic.38 Viewing other logics or logical issues through that lens, he is 
engaging in a system versus system debate. This is not surprising given his 
known holism about systems providing intelligibility on a whole rather than a 
system’s components.39  Granted, any criticism is likely to be a criticism of a 
component, but Quine is thinking in systematic terms. For instance, if a logical 
system changes the defined meaning and role of propositional negation in one 
case (e.g. a disjunction [P V ~P]) what is the consequence of that change for the 
whole system? Does (P ·~P) still contradict? Does negation in a contradiction still 
function in a classical propositional fashion? 
 
Quine attacks at least two positions: paraconsistency and intuitionism. On 
the first, he says (1986b:11351138): 
 
“To turn to a popular extravaganza, what if someone were to reject the law of non-
contradiction and so accept an occasional sentence and its negation both as true? 
An answer one hears is that this would vitiate all science. Any conjunction of the 
form ‘p  ~p’ logically implies every sentence whatever; therefore, acceptance of 
one sentence and its negation as true would commit us to accepting every 
sentence as true, and thus forfeiting all distinction between true and false.” 
 
 
Quine is referring to ECQ here ─ anything follows from a contradiction. Quine 
believes that accepting a contradiction as true results in trivialism, the view that all 
sentences are true. If all sentences are true, it can be logically inferred, then, that 
no sentences are false, and the distinction between the two truth-values fails. 
Quine sees this as a problem for science because science requires truth and 
falsity to describe theories and even the world accurately. So, accepting a 
contradiction as true undermines the intelligibility needed for a successful 
scientific and even practical enterprise. 
 
                                                          
38 Quine in 1986a (Ch.7) demonstrates this indirectly by critiquing deviant logics and doing so from 
the standpoint of classical logic. His take on elementary logic (1980) further supports his 
identification as a classical logician. 
39 Quine’s holism develops from belief, to observation, and then to self-evident truths, each of 
which have a place in his holistic “web” (1979:Chs. 24). 
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Quine proceeds to discuss the role of negation in paraconsistency. He 
writes (1986b:11391142): 
 
“My view of this dialogue is that neither party knows what he is talking about. They 
think they are talking about negation, ‘~’, ‘not’; but surely the notation ceased to be 
recognisable as negation when they took to regarding some conjunctions of the 
form ‘p  ~p’ as true and stopped regarding such sentences as implying all others. 
Here, evidently, is the deviant logician’s predicament: when he tries to deny the 
doctrine he only changes the subject.” 
 
Quine’s position is straightforward, accepting a contradiction would be disastrous. 
Logically, negation loses its classical propositional meaning. Systematically, the 
opposition necessary is arbitrary. Some paraconsistent logicians, such as Priest 
(1979:326331) in his logic of paradox (LP), explain how to contain a contradiction 
with the rest of the system being minimally inconsistent. Quine (1986b:1139–
1142) believes this position fails as well, because of the same issues with 
negation. Negation has different meanings in the system, and the structural, 
systematic integrity fails unlike in classical logic where the meaning of negation 
stays the same. So, according to Quine, whether accepting a contradiction as true 
or attempting to limit a contradiction’s negative effect, results in neither group 
knowing what negation means. 
 
The import of this critique of paraconsistency is that Quine’s thoughts come 
directly from his support of classical logic, and to the same extent, its relationship 
to grammar. Quine states (1986a:101), “So, the logical truths being tied to the 
grammar and not the lexicon, will be among the truths on which all speakers are 
likeliest to agree.” Quine (1986a:9597) believes this interconnectedness of the 
two justifies using classical logic and supporting its expressivity. This is an 
important point for Quine; classical logic is sufficiently expressive to do what 
science and the rest of us need to do in potential logical application. If that 
sufficient expressivity is true, Quine may be right in considering other non-
classical logics as changing the subject. 
 
On the second point about intuitionist logic, Quine has equally strong 
thoughts, although the critique is not as clear given the tenets of this non-classical 
logic. He writes (1986b:12211224):  
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“We had been picturing the rejection of the law of excluded middle, “p or -p”, 
mainly as rejection of classical negation. I have now directed the intuitionist’s case 
rather at the alternation. Actually, the distinction is unreal; once you upset the 
interrelations of the logical operators, you may be said to have revised any or all. 
Anyway, the intuitionist’s negation is deviant also on its own account: the law of 
double negation lapses.” 
 
In intuitionistic logic, proof functions as the essential principle, not truth-values or 
truth. If one can prove ~A, then A has no proof. Consider the law of excluded 
middle (LEM), (X V ~X). Intuitionistic logic differs from classical logic with respect 
to the disjunction. In classical logic, it does not matter which disjunct is true for the 
whole formula to be true. Intuitionistic logic requires proof of the disjunct. A 
disjunction of (X V ~X) makes no systematic sense to the intuitionistic logician 
because both disjuncts cannot be proven, only one can. In a normal disjunction in 
intuitionistic logic (A V B), both can potentially be proven, as they are different 
propositions, unlike the LEM. Assume for indirect proof that the LEM cannot be 
proven, or ~(X V ~X). Using transformation rules acceptable in intuitionist logic: 
 
1. Asm: ~(X V ~X) 
2.    ~X      NOR 1 
3.    ~~X    NOR 1 
 
∴ ~~(X V ~X) from 1, 2 and 3 contradict. 
 
The proof progresses as follows: it is not the case that X or not X; that disjunctive 
WFF is simplified into its two WFF components and a contradiction results. In 
intuitionistic logic, double negation can be introduced but not eliminated. Since 
there is no double negation elimination in intuitionistic logic, the conclusion is 
double negated. What this demonstrates is two things: first, a weaker form of the 
LEM is proven (whatever that means) and by contrast, there is no proof for the 
LEM, so the LEM in its classic form is rejected. However, disjunction still functions 
in intuitionistic logic when the variables are distinct. The implication is the 
disjunction in the LEM WFF is functioning differently, as it conflicts with the notion 
of proof as justification. Second, negation in the propositional sense is different 
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from intuitionistic negation as (X V ~X) is not provable but ~~(X V ~X) is, and they 
are not equivalent logically.40 
 
A few more thoughts about intuitionistic negation are needed. Suppose that 
numerically 1 = 0 is a contradiction. To define negation in intuitionistic logic, (~X = 
(X ⊃ (1=0))) requires understanding that proof, not truth, is what justifies a WFF. 
~X means that X results in a contradiction, so X is not provable. Notice this 
definition does not use truth-values but uses provability as the justifying element. 
This definition of negation has obvious ramifications for Quine’s bivalent 
propositional logic base, as systematically, grammar and classical logic do not 
relate in the same way to the concept of “proof” or not as they do with “true” and 
“false.” 
 
While the presentation here is in no way a comprehensive treatment of 
intuitionistic logic, the material demonstrates what Quine believes to be the issue. 
The systematic sense of classical logic disintegrates when the disjunction fails to 
function like it normally would and negation much the same. Quine’s holism about 
the relationship between grammar and language would even be called into 
question, as translatability would be specious in cases of the disjunction and 
negation for intuitionistic logic. Thus, it seems this ripple effect is disastrous for 
Quine, as the price of adopting a non-classical logic is too high to overall 
conceptual and logical intelligibility. 
 
3.3  Contra Quine  
 
Quine’s passion for classical logic – as his defence considering non-
standard logics – is commendable. It is difficult to disagree with his systematic 
points and the relationship between classical logic and grammar. Yet, there are a 
few problems with his critique of deviant or non-standard logics and his support for 
classical logic that need to come to light. 
                                                          
40 Fisher (2007:127) clarifies the difference between an indirect proof and a reductio proof in 
intuitionist logic. The former adds a negation operator to the conclusion; the latter takes away the 
negation operator, which is not an acceptable move. So, an indirect proof and a reductio proof are 
not the same in intuitionist logic as they are in classical logic.  
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Taking Quine as an exemplar of a classical logician, and those who hold a 
similar position, there is a supposition made that needs to be argued for. Quine’s 
reference point is classical logic and his critique issues from that foundation. All 
other views are considered in relation to it. This supposition structures his thought 
and his critique. However, where is the argument for that supposition? The 
argument appears to be that grammar and classical logic work well together 
(1986a:9597). Therefore, the latter is correct. However, this supposes that no 
other grammar and logic work well together. In his paper on semantic closure, 
Priest (1984:121123) argues for the inconsistency of natural language.41 If 
natural language is inconsistent, the resulting logic should be too. Priest’s logic of 
paradox or LP (1979:326331) contains or limits the effects of logical 
inconsistencies such as the liar paradox, yet, retains systematic, logical integrity. 
The containment justifies connectives and logical operators functioning differently 
in those contexts; yet, the expressiveness of classical logic is largely maintained. 
If Priest is correct, his logic and grammar are expressive in a wider range of cases 
than Quine’s and simply cannot be dismissed as not fitting the standard mould. 
 
This leads to the next point; Quine’s use of “deviant” is an example of 
poisoning the well (1986a:81). A deviant logic is one that rejects one or more of 
the basic rules of logic: the law of excluded middle or the law of non-
contradiction.42 “Deviant” can be read in two ways: as deviating from the norm or 
being bad. Quine initially uses the former, where he writes, “Here, evidently, is the 
deviant logician’s predicament: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only 
changes the subject” (1986a:81). In this sense, Quine’s use of “deviant” is correct; 
deviating from the norm is like changing the subject in a charitable sense. 
However, the second conception of “deviant” follows from his presupposition of 
classical logic being correct. An argument can be made of Quine’s set up in the 
early part of the chapter on deviant logics. He states “It would seem that such an 
                                                          
41 “Semantic closure” is a phenomenon found in Tarski (1944) and his work on object languages 
and metalanguages. Priest uses the results of Tarski’s (1944) work and instead of adopting 
Tarski’s object/meta language distinction to avoid inconsistency, embraces the inconsistency and 
corresponds it to a paraconsistent logic (1979:326–331).  
42 This is my definition given the context of Quine’s rejection of paraconsistency (1986a:81) and 
intuitionism (1986a:83) based on logical law rejection,. 
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idea of deviation in logic is absurd on the face of it. If sheer logic is not conclusive, 
what is?” (1986a:81).43 This attitude takes classical logic as the only logic that is 
acceptable. Quine (1986a:83) continues this attitude in his discussion of the law of 
the excluded middle:  
 
“(1) Every closed sentence is true or false. 
(2) Every closed sentence or its negation is true. 
(3) Every closed sentence is true or not true.”  
 
Quine (1986a:83) believes 1 reduces to 2 by supposing falsity as the truth of 
negation, or false = true negation. Quine (1986a:83) also believes that 3 reduces 
to 2 by supposing that if a sentence is not true, then its negation is true, or if a 
sentence is true, its negation is false. By transitive extension then from 3 to 1, a 
sentence that is not true is false on Quine’s view. He concludes (1986a:83) by 
asserting “These trivial latter lucubrations well illustrate the inanity of trying to 
discern equivalence in some sense within the domain of logical truth. Logical 
equivalence…hold indiscriminately between all logical truths.” Note the use of 
“inanity,” which is value laden and poisons the well against someone who holds a 
competing view.  
 
What is this competing view? A “deviant” logician would not grant the move 
from 3 to 2. “Not true” is not thought to mean just “false.” “Not true” can mean 
“indeterminate” and “true and false,” depending on the logic, where the former is 
in a three-valued logic (Priest 1999a:141148), and the latter is in a 
paraconsistent logic (Priest 1999b:104107). Given this usage of “deviant” by 
Quine, “non-standard” has been used in its place here, as it is not loaded with a 
normative value and is charitable. 
 
On the acceptance of contradictions, Quine’s quick dismissal of logics 
(1986a:81) that tolerate inconsistency, like Priest’s logic of paradox or LP (1979), 
is unfair. Priest’s logic blocks ECQ, so not everything follows from a contradiction. 
In fairness to Quine, there may be a time issue with Priest’s work appearing in 
1979. However, to his detriment, Quine references no paraconsistent source in 
                                                          
43 “This only begins to illustrate the handicap of having to think within a deviant logic” (Quine 
1986a:86) 
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1986a or 1986b, but lists numerous sources for the intuitionist critique. It seems 
rather simple to state that negation functions normally, except where it does not in 
contradiction and paradoxes. There, negation does not behave classically and a 
logical system that can make sense of that inconsistent behaviour and of the 
classical behaviour is more robust than one that simply does not. 
 
On the problems with intuitionistic logic, Quine (1986a:87) rightly notes the 
systematic problem of having negation function in different ways and arguably, 
disjunction, too. However, this is only an issue if the conception of classical 
propositional logic is the norm. If a system defines the role of the connectives and 
negation, the issue is not one intrasystematically, at least for Quine’s critique. In 
fairness to the intuitionistic logician, the primary emphasis of this logic and its 
mathematics is formal mathematics and gets a handle on the finite versus the 
infinite through the role of experience. This has very little to do with grammar and 
the broader issues Quine posits about meaning being part of an integrated holistic 
system.44 So negation does not need to function in a way that retains meaning or 
understanding, and the same can be said for disjunction, with respect to grammar 
and broader systematic considerations. A formal system stands on its own and 
interprets itself by definition. Now, if intuitionistic logic is not expressive in the right 
sort of way as a formal system, that is a different issue and fodder for critique. 
 
The reason for choosing Quine as a sounding board is broader in one 
sense. While there is no obvious empirical data to cite, only anecdotal, it is fair, 
but with reservations to posit that Quine is representative of the general attitude 
toward non-standard logics. Logical education at the graduate level, especially for 
non-specialists in logic, rarely considers non-standard logics seriously, and, in 
fact, might not even be exposed to them.45 However, this group becomes the logic 
teachers of tomorrow and the justification of classical logic as part of the 
curriculum goes unchallenged. The lines of Quine are repeated that classical logic 
is sufficiently expressive, is the best available logic, and propositional logic is 
                                                          
44 See Quine (1978:Chs.24). 
45 I think the exception is probably modal logic, especially if a contemporary analytic metaphysics 
seminar or a philosophy or religion course is taken. Normally, however, this only involves 
symbolized WFFs and very little actual use of a modal system, say S5.  
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taught as the ideal. Maybe it is the ideal, but that should be critically considered 
and evaluated to ensure students get the best logical education possible, not 
simply one that is passed down because it is passed down.46 
 
3.4  Propositional logic  
 
The critique of propositional logic consists of five different areas. The first 
area concentrates on a problem with taking principles of inference and 
transformation rules as the same thing. Two examples of this are found in modus 
ponens and modus tollens. The second area details problems with EFQ as a 
principle of inference; the third area does the same thing with ECQ as a principle 
of inference. The fourth area introduces a new logical consequence relationship 
and compares it with the one found in propositional logic. The final area considers 
some thoughts on translation between classical propositional logic and natural 
language, which questions the expressiveness of the former in relation to the 
latter. 
 
3.4.1 Principles of inference versus implicative transformation rules 
 
Implicative transformation rules are logical rules that transform one set of 
symbols into another set of symbols. This is a formal manipulation of the symbols 
according to rules prescribed by the system. By definition, the implicative 
transformation rules are intrasystematic and rely on the system for intelligibility 
and justification. Principles of inference are patterns of reasoning that display 
relations of ideas and are normally thought to be correct forms of reasoning. They 
also involve beliefs about the premises, such that the premises support belief in 
the conclusion. Consider modus ponens: 
 
                                                          
46 It is important to recognize that classical logic – propositional and first-order – is taught not just 
for future teaching but also for reading and interpreting the philosophical literature. In this way it 
becomes self-justifying: you must learn classical logic to read the literature which contains 
classical logic, so it must be important.  
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1. (A ⊃ B) 
2. A 
 
∴ B 
 
This proof is an implicative transformation of symbols in syntactic propositional 
logic. There is no belief needed in the premises or conclusion, only an 
understanding of the rules, which if a belief, is separate from the belief in the 
premises. However, it is not a stretch to believe that someone can look at the 
pattern and believe that the conclusion “B” results from the two premises. In this 
sense, it is a principle of inference because it is taken as an argument not a proof, 
or better yet, a derivation. Principles of inference are extrasystematic because 
their use takes place outside of a formal logical system. Think through the 
following argument: 
 
1. If Scott weighs 100 kgs. then Cancun is in Mexico. 
2. Scott weighs 100 kgs. 
 
∴ Cancun is in Mexico. 
 
This instance of the principle of inference, modus ponens, consists of no WFFs 
nor formal symbol manipulation according to transformation rules. Belief in the 
conclusion follows from belief in the premises and the pattern aids in confirming 
the concluding belief. 
 
There has been little critical reflection on this tenuous relationship between 
transformation rules and principles of inference. In fact, to many, they are the 
same thing in principle if not in form. However, even with modus ponens and 
modus tollens, they can be shown to be different, which is the goal of the next 
subsection. 
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3.4.1.1 Problems with modus ponens and modus tollens 
 
Reflect on the following argument from Vann McGee (1985) on modus 
ponens: 
 
“1. If a Republican wins the election, then if it is not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson. 
2. A Republican will win the election. 
 
∴ If it is not Reagan who wins it, it will be Anderson.” 
 
McGee asserts that someone can believe the premises but not believe the 
conclusion (1985:463). Anderson was the third-place Republican candidate, with 
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, the second-place candidate. Believing the first two 
premises, given the context, is not controversial. However, believing the 
conclusion is problematic because if Reagan does not win, it would be Carter, not 
Anderson. 
 
McGee uses the standard pattern of modus ponens, but with a twist on the 
content in the consequent in the first premise. He uses another conditional 
statement in the consequent; there is no obvious prohibition in natural language in 
doing that, as the basic pattern is satisfied. It is an invalid argument by truth 
functional assessment, with true premises together with a false conclusion. 
 
However, consider the syntactic equivalent of modus ponens with 
transformation rules. As an implicative transformation rule, modus ponens is a 
valid propositional deductive sequence, which is shown by the derivation of the 
logical form of this proof with a nested conditional. 
 
1. (R ⊃ (~E ⊃ A)) 
2.  R 
[∴ (~E ⊃ A) 
3. asm: ~(~E⊃ A) 
           4.    ~R    MT, 1,3 
           ∴    (~E ⊃ A) from 3, 2 and 4 contradict 
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The final result is the logical consequence of a proper application of the 
transformation rules; the argument is syntactically valid. 
Thus, as a principle of inference, it is invalid as an argument and as a 
propositional proof, it is valid. This illuminates a conflict between the semantic and 
syntactic account of modus ponens and, as McGee notes, the indicative 
conditional in English and the material conditional of logic are different (1985:463). 
 
Modus tollens suffers a similar fate. Consider the following argument in the 
modus tollens pattern from Gauker (1994:140): 
 
“1. If I am going to be in Cincinnati on Friday, then it is necessarily possible that I 
will be in Cincinnati on Friday. 
2. It is not the case it is necessarily possible that I will be in Cincinnati on Friday. 
__________________________________________________________ 
∴ It is not the case I am going to be in Cincinnati on Friday.” 
 
Gauker explains that the first premise is a logical truth. In the antecedent is an 
actuality claim, whereas the consequent is a possibility claim. How is it possible 
that the antecedent could be true and the weaker claim could not? It is not, so the 
conclusion must then follow from the second premise alone. Paraphrasing the 
second premise for easier understanding, it is possibly necessary that I will not be 
in Cincinnati on Friday, and it does not follow from that premise that I am not 
going to be in Cincinnati on Friday.47 The second premise attempts to infer from 
possibility to actuality in the conclusion, and that is illicit. The argument is invalid, 
as the premises are true but the conclusion is false. 
 
Gauker’s argument works by taking the normal pattern of modus tollens 
and substituting in modal language of possibility and necessity. Some might find 
that objectionable because although the argument form is valid, the semantics 
make it invalid after the fact. However, if modus tollens as a principle of inference 
is sufficiently expressive and truth conducive, there should be no issue with that 
form of the argument. The argument is invalid as it sits with the modal language 
calling into question its pattern of inference. 
 
                                                          
47 This paragraph is largely a paraphrase of Gauker’s explanation of the argument, but shortened 
(1994:140). 
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However, consider the syntactic equivalent of modus tollens with 
transformation rules. As an implicative transformation rule, modus tollens is a valid 
propositional deductive sequence, which is shown by the derivation of the logical 
form of this proof: 
 
1. (C ⊃ N) 
2.  ~N 
 
[∴ ~C 
3. asm: C 
           4.    N    MP, 1,3 
           ∴  ~C from 3, 2 and 4 contradict 
 
The final result is the logical consequence of a proper application of the 
transformation rules; the argument is syntactically valid. 
 
Thus, as a principle of inference modus tollens is invalid in the argument 
with modal language and as a propositional proof, it is valid. This demonstrates a 
conflict between the semantic and syntactic account of modus tollens, and one 
between a principle of inference and an implicative transformation rule.48 
 
3.4.2 Contra EFQ  
 
Let us begin with a brief review of the logical concepts to be considered. 
Consider the following truth table for a semantic argument containing a 
contradiction and an unrelated result: 
 
                                                          
48 Montague (1970:222) is another who sees the relationship between the two as the same. He 
writes: “There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural languages and 
the artificial languages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and 
semantics of both kinds of languages within a single natural and mathematically precise theory.”  
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B   A       (A · ~A)  ∴   B 
0    0           0             0 
0    1           0             0 
1    0           0             1 
1    1           0             1 
 
By definition, this argument is valid. There is no row where all the premises are 
true together with a false conclusion, thus by default, the argument is valid. 
 
Ex falso quodlibet means “from the false, anything.” It is important to note 
the language of EFQ, “false” in particular, as it is a semantic notion. On the 
interpretation of this thesis, the medieval principle was reinterpreted with the 
propositional truth table. When the results of semantic propositional logic are 
brought to bear on the concept, the contradictory form is secondary to the truth-
value assignments, manifesting in an argument with a false premise on all 
assignments leading to a valid argument. So, the falsity, not structure or form, is 
the primary concept such that anything at all follows validly. 
 
Contradictions are not the only false WFFs in propositional logic, consider 
the following: 
 
B   A          ~(A ⊃ A)  ∴   B 
0    0           0                 0 
0    1           0                 0 
1    0           0                 1 
1    1           0                 1 
 
False implies truth and falsity but it does not necessarily need to be a 
contradiction as the WFF “~(A ⊃ A)” is truth functionally false on all accounts. It is 
not a contradiction, by definition, as it does not contain a component WFF and its 
negation brought together in a logical relation with a conjunction. 
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The WFFs “~(A ⊃ A)” and “(A ·~A)” are truth functionally equivalent, which 
means according to the values in the truth table they are equal. Semantically, 
there is no difference between the two WFFs, as the meaning of the formula is its 
truth conditions. Yet, there are no objections to ~(A ⊃ A) as a WFF or a 
constructed principle of inference about a negated conditional with the same 
variables and that anything can follow. 
 
One may be tempted to bring in formula equivalencies and argue “~(A ⊃ 
A)” and “(A ·~A)” are equivalent formulas. Yes, in the sense of truth conditions, 
they are the same. However, in the sense of a definition of “contradiction,” they 
are not the same. The classical logician wants these workarounds to the formulas 
that are semantically false on all truth-value assignments, and they are not 
entitled to it.  
 
Consider an objection that the critique of EFQ here misses the point: EFQ 
is just about contradictory logical form and not its semantics or truth conditions. 
However, contradictory logical form is the domain of ECQ, which is explicitly about 
a formal contradiction and the implication of the “anything” conclusion. EFQ illicitly 
supposes that a contradiction is the only problematic notion in logic such that 
anything follows from it and by definition; it is because the contradictory WFF is 
false. The logical fact of the material conditional and conditional inference in 
general, support that – in terms of truth-values – any value follows from the false. 
The use of “anything” is an “open-ended” characterisation with respect to truth-
values. One might even define EFQ as: from the false any truth-value in classical 
propositional logic follows. That definition seems much more appropriate given the 
semantic basis for it. 
 
There is one final point to make about EFQ or the negated conditional 
argument. Both are valid arguments. The semantic definition of validity is, if all the 
premises are true, the conclusion must be true, too. An argument with all false 
truth conditions in the premises is automatically valid. This set of truth conditions 
meets the structural requirements of a valid deductive argument where truth would 
be transferred to the conclusion were the premise truth conditions different. 
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It is an interesting consequence of classical propositional semantic logic 
that any supposed problem with EFQ is extrasystematic. The assessment that 
anything following from the false as a principle of inference is not an internal 
systematic logical problem. Semantic propositional logic evaluates EFQ as valid; 
there is nothing illicit about it or its result. Anything illicit is brought in by the 
conception of EFQ as a principle of inference and by the logical form of the 
contradictory WFF alone. The logical form is secondary to the truth-value of the 
contradictory WFF, as the truth-values, in particular, any value following from the 
false. 
 
3.4.3 Contra ECQ 
 
The transformation rules used in propositional logic change one WFF into 
another WFF. Eventually, the transformational sequence ends with a result. 
Another name for the implicative transformational sequence is derivation. In a 
derivation in a formal system, one moves from WFFs to other WFFs through 
proper rule use. A derivation, taken as a whole, shows what can count as the final 
WFF in the transformational sequence, viz., the derivation shows what the rules 
allow to count as a final WFF. To underwrite this concept, consider a standard 
direct derivation: 
 
 1. (A · B) 
           2. (~A V C) 
          ________________ 
 3.   A        (AND 1) 
            ∴  C        (DS, 2,3) 
 
From the two initial WFFs, 1 and 2, WFF 3 is derived by the rule of conjunction 
simplification. The final WFF is implied by the rule of a disjunctive syllogism from 
premises 2 and 3. Both rules used are part of the system of propositional logic, so 
“C” as a final WFF was reached by their application in that derivation. 
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One should pay attention to the intrasystematic nature of a derivation. The 
logical system limits, defines, and licences accepted moves; any deviation violates 
the integrity of the logical system. The rules work together to produce unique 
WFFs. One might even think of a derivation as a transformational game. The 
purpose of the game is to reach a particular WFF (or a result) from one or more 
initial WFFs. Much like a puzzle, one uses different strategies and combinations of 
rules to obtain the result. The rules are applied ad hoc; one choses the ones that 
work just because they work. The only general constraint is that the result must be 
derived from the initial WFFs by the formal system’s stipulated transformation 
rules. 
 
As a syntactic derivation, ECQ starts with initial WFF and reaches the 
result through rule following. The derivation is a legitimate one. “Legitimate” is 
merely shorthand for using rules in a proper manner according to their systematic 
definition. In other words, one obtains ECQ’s result through a proper implicative 
transformational sequence.49 
 
However, some classical logicians (Quine 1986b:11351138; Gamut 
1990:139; Kneale & Kneale 1962:542; & Lewis & Langford 1932: 250252), 
believe something very different about ECQ.50 For them, ECQ shows a flaw about 
a unique kind of WFF. The original WFF, “(P · P),” licences a transformational 
sequence that results in “Q.” They identify “Q” as an awkward result, which is 
                                                          
49 It bears making an obvious point, a contradiction directly entails its components through 
conjunction simplification. That is the direct result of a contradiction. ECQ adds disjunctive 
syllogism in the derivation and that is the source of the “open-ended” characterization. 
Systematically this is an important point that it takes more than a contradiction to generate the 
“open-ended” result: 
1. (A ·~A)                       1. (A ·~A) 
             _____________            ____________ 
∴    A      AND, 1            ∴  ~A    AND, 1 
50 It is worth noting that ECQ and EFQ are run together in the literature. When a logician provides 
a proof that anything follows from a contradiction, that is done without reference to truth-values 
and should be called “ECQ”. Gamut’s textbook (1990:137139) justifies a minimal logic, adds EFQ 
– which is the same as ECQ for us – and double negation to end up with classical logic. Thus, for 
him, EFQ as ECQ is integral to classical logic.  Lewis and Langford’s famous proof of ECQ, I 
surmise brought this “problem” of logic back into relevance. Kneale and Kneale (1962:542), as part 
of the discussion of Gentzen’s natural deduction system demonstrate the concept of ECQ through 
rule 6, without naming it as such. These are but a few examples of ECQ or EFQ (depending on 
how it is characterized) found in the literature. Woods (2003:Ch.1) contains a wide ranging 
discussion of EFQ (ECQ for us) showing the effects of the Lewis-Langford proof on subsequent 
logical development and how logics, like relevant logic, rejected EFQ.  
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“open-ended.” What “open-ended” means at this point is not clear given the 
presentation thus far. However, one can surmise something about it. Whatever it 
means, it does not have anything to do with the formal nature of the system as 
articulated through applications of the transformation rules and the posits of 
syntactic propositional logic. Instead, it appears that ECQ is purportedly saying 
something about the formal system that the formal system itself would not licence, 
much like the previous critique of EFQ. 
 
Nevertheless, something needs to be said about what ECQ is doing for 
these philosophers and logicians. For that, it is important to discover that the 
“open-ended” characterisation comes from modelling a principle of inference on 
the implicative transformation rules. Variables have propositional significance and 
represent themselves in the system. Transformation rules change these variables 
into other variables and ultimately a result. At each step or each line in a 
transformation, there are premises that support a conclusion. Notice the modelling 
of the premises onto the variables and conclusion onto a result. At this initial 
stage, the modelling of the two seems relatively straightforward and 
uncontentious. 
 
However, the final part of the modelling is not so straightforward. The 
classical propositional logician must show how a principle of inference captures 
the same significance that the implicative transformation rules have for a formal 
system. A principle of inference is a way to draw conclusion(s) based upon the 
belief(s) about the premise(s). These principles are found in deductive arguments, 
where a deductive argument has a conclusion with some premises supporting that 
conclusion over other ones. When viewing ECQ as a deductive argument and 
taking the contradiction as the sole premise, the belief that the contradiction is 
flawed supports the belief that the conclusion is flawed too. In other words, when 
beginning with a flaw, you may end up with one, too. 
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What is this flaw exactly? One principle of inference used says that in a 
deductive argument a variable or what that variable represents in your original 
premise(s) must be found in the conclusion, too.51 For example: 
 
1. Los Angeles is in Arizona, or El Guero Canelo is in Tucson, Arizona. 
2. Los Angeles is not in Arizona. 
_________________________________________________ 
 El Guero Canelo is in Tucson, Arizona. 
 
Notice that we find some of the content of premise 1 in the conclusion (i.e. “El 
Guero Canelo is in Tucson, Arizona”). If some (or all) of the content from the 
original premises is not found in the conclusion, the conclusion is “open-ended”: 
 
1. Los Angeles is in Arizona, and Los Angeles is not in Arizona. 
___________________________________________________ 
 El Guero Canelo is in Tucson, Arizona. 
 
ECQ, as a principle of inference, is captured by this deductive argument: from a 
contradiction as a premise, any conclusion follows.52 Thus, taken as a principle of 
inference, ECQ supports the belief that in a deductive argument what is in a 
contradictory premise is not in the conclusion, thus, the conclusion is flawed. 
 
If the previous thoughts are correct, two pictures of ECQ follow. The first is 
an implicative transformation game where the nature of propositional logic allows 
one to move from a WFF to a result via the legitimate application of the system’s 
transformation rules. The second is a principle of inference where belief in a 
contradiction as a premise leads to a belief in a flawed conclusion. These 
conceptions are very different in origin, and the classical propositional logician 
supposes that they are isomorphic. For them, ECQ – as an implicative 
transformational sequence – is the model of ECQ as a principle of inference. 
                                                          
51 A disjunctive syllogism is employed here as an example of how a variable – or what it represents 
– is also found in the conclusion. 
52 Later, I argue that ECQ and EFQ are not principles of inference, instead they are principles of 
implication. 
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However, it is in our interests to question the legitimacy of this attempt at 
modelling the latter on the former. If they are not isomorphic, an explanation must 
follow. 
 
In questioning the modelling, one needs to pay attention to the 
intrasystematic/extrasystematic distinction. What is said, can be said in terms of, 
and in definitions of, the logical system. The first conception of ECQ uses the 
logical language of the system to talk about ECQ. There is nothing illicit about the 
transformation from one WFF into another. Nor is there anything illicit about the 
WFF that we call a “contradiction”. There is no evaluative language in the formal 
system. Thus, any “flaw” will need to be found elsewhere. 
 
The second picture shows a genuine concern with what might be called the 
extrasystematic element doing the work here. As previously mentioned, principles 
of inference use the concepts of premises and conclusion, and as stated, these 
function in particular ways filling out the concept of an argument. Premises model 
the WFFs and the conclusion models of the final WFF (or result) in the implicative 
transformational sequence. However, this modelling begs the question at a 
higher-level for it supposes that a derivation and an argument are the same thing. 
Since a derivation is an implicative transformational game of WFFs into other 
WFFs, one needs to explain the isomorphism by way of the language of 
argument. At the core of the explanation is the supposition that implicative 
transformation rules are principles of inference. The belief in WFFs as premises, 
transformed through rules into a WFF as a conclusion, purportedly models 
argument onto derivation. We then have an apparent isomorphism, viz., ECQ as a 
principle of inference just paraphrases ECQ as a derivation. 
 
It is time to consider the legitimacy of supposing that a deductive argument 
says the same thing that a derivation does; especially given the fact that a 
derivation stands on its own, as one residing in a formal logical system. Coming 
with the extrasystematic deductive argument picture, are additional semantic 
notions and inferential moves not licensed by what is formally intrasystematic to 
propositional logic. While classical logicians may support the isomorphism put 
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forth here, one must question whether the language of argument is a legitimate 
way to articulate the language of derivation. 
 
Does ECQ as a principle of inference correctly articulate ECQ as an 
implicative derivation? Setting aside the generalities about argument and 
derivation for now, simply consider ECQ’s result (as a principle of inference), 
“anything follows from a contradiction.” Even granting the semantic notion of 
“contradiction” that we have defined for our formal system, the derivation begins 
with a WFF and ends with another WFF as a result. The symbols in the final WFF 
are uninterpreted just like those leading up to it. The moment the classical 
propositional logician forgets that the symbols in WFFs are uninterpreted in the 
formal system of classical logic, illegitimate characterisations result. 
 
Specifically, propositional significance is given to the WFFs making them 
interpreted. As an example, consider the difference in significance between 
“anything” in ECQ as an argument and the final WFF in ECQ as a derivation. 
There is no obvious similarity in meaning between “anything” and the final 
uninterpreted WFF. It is only when beliefs about the derivation are applied as a 
principle of inference that we gain the similarity in meaning. That meaning is 
clearly extrasystematic and not part of the derivational, syntactic conception. 
 
Moreover, supposing a priority on the intrasystematicity of classical 
propositional logic as the source of significance for the lack of isomorphism, the 
formal system stands on its own as a representation of itself. The skill being 
pressed upon becomes one of noticing what the formal system sanctions and 
what it does not. This skill draws out a vital distinction of formal transformations as 
reasoning intrasystematically in classical logic and everyday or naïve reasoning, 
which is extrasystematic to classical propositional logic. 
 
If all of this is right, it implies two things. First, the classical logician’s view 
of contradiction is incorrect even within one’s own theoretical assumptions. A 
formal contradiction is just a WFF based upon the formation rules of the formal 
system of classical logic. There is nothing illicit about its formation. More so, there 
is nothing illicit about applying the transformation rules to a formal contradiction 
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and getting any number of results. The transformation game helps us to 
understand why someone would use the rules and apply them to any WFF (i.e. 
doing it for symbol manipulation). Thus, ECQ as a transformation game registers 
nothing illicit about a contradiction and any of its transformational results. 
 
Second, classical logicians view ECQ as a principle of inference that reads 
a particular characterisation from the derivation, which takes the implicative 
transformational sequence as an ideal case of inference. However, one must 
question that characterisation because what is being read off the implicative 
transformational sequence may not be ideal or even relevant to human practice. 
For example, consider the rule of addition, where any variable is joined with 
another via disjunction. So, from “P”, we derive “(P V Q).” Formally, that move is 
acceptable. However, put in an ordinary language argument, an unintuitive result 
follows: 
 
1. The New Zealand All Blacks are the best team in rugby. 
___________________________________________________________ 
 The New Zealand All Blacks are the best team in rugby or London is hot. 
 
We do not reason like this implicative pattern in everyday life as Wright (1999: 
203206) asserts. However, with classical propositional logic as the ideal and 
implicative symbolic transformations as the ideal basis for inference, we get these 
kinds of – what many think are – paradigmatic cases of proper inference. The 
intrasystematic implicative nature of the formal system makes possible certain 
moves that appear to be significant in more than one way when read in a 
particular way. However, that very significance is not one necessarily expressed 
by a principle of inference such as ECQ or ADD. Thus, taking the significance of 
ECQ as a principle of inference from the transformational game as an ideal, 
results in a failed isomorphism. As a syntactic derivation, ECQ stands as a proper 
application of implication rule. Yet, ECQ’s standing as a principle of inference is 
questionable at best, false at worst. The extrasystemic use of ECQ as a principle 
of inference is different in scope and application from ECQ as an implicative 
pattern. There is also a confusion of derivation with argument. Thus, ECQ’s 
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inferential role and its awkward result should be challenged as to its practical 
significance in the broader concept of argument, especially natural language 
arguments.53 
 
3.4.4 Monotonicity, non-monotonicity, and constrained conclusions 
 
The logical consequence is a relation between premises and conclusion(s). 
The deductive logical consequence has two formulations, semantic and syntactic. 
The semantic formulation is defined as: α⊧β, where α is a group of true premises 
and β is the conclusion, and there is no instance where α is true as well as β is 
false. The syntactic formulation is defined as: α⊢β, where α is a group of WFF 
premises and β is the conclusion WFF, and there is no instance where α does not 
result in β through proper transformation rule application or derivation.54 Suppose 
on both formulations, α⊧β, and α⊢β, that an additional group of premises or WFFs 
are added resulting in α·γ⊧β and α·γ ⊢β; the fact that γ is added to the existing 
premise group and the conclusion or resulting WFF does not change shows that 
both relations are monotonic.55 
 
However, imagine a different scenario where α· γ⊧β v θ and α· γ ⊢ β v θ. 
The additional premises or WFFs can bring about a revision of the conclusion or 
the transformational result, and the result is the relations are non-monotonic. 
However, the problem with non-monotonicity is that it is not normally 
characterised as a deductive relationship, especially a syntactic one as presented 
here. Typically, both abductive and inductive arguments exhibit the non-
monotonic consequence relationship, as additional information to the premises 
leads to new conclusions. 
 
                                                          
53 Wittgenstein in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1994:123) concludes that 
contradictions are senseless. ECQ as implication has sense, given the holistic nature of system 
meaning. ECQ as a principle of inference, may be senseless. I do not offer an argument for that 
here, but the lack of sense of connection between premises and conclusion in ECQ would 
certainly substantiate for this view.  
54 These are my definitions of the two types of logical consequence; there are stricter versions. 
These were purposely formed to avoid model-theoretic language and proof language, ambiguous 
to the presented logical system. 
55 I have purposely avoided set theoretic language for ease of explanation and to continue using 
the already defined logical symbols.  
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The discussion of monotonicity and non-monotonicity is helpful for 
understanding logical consequence relations, but it is not clear how it relates to a 
propositional logic and a critique thereof. In the previous discussions of EFQ and 
ECQ as principles of inference, both raised questions about the “open-ended” 
characterisation of the conclusion. Both conclusions were systematically 
acceptable, whether in terms of truth-values or transformation rules. As principles 
of inference, the “open-ended” characterisation was specious because it did not 
represent what the formal logical system sanctions. 
 
As principles of inference, both EFQ and ECQ have monotonic 
consequence relations in the logical system itself, whether syntactic or semantic. 
In this way, all four share this specific logical consequence relation. If additional 
premises were added to EFQ or ECQ as principles of inference, the contradiction 
would be the only thing that matters to the arguments, as it takes a significance 
based on its form and the other premises would be disregarded. Most likely the 
“open-ended” conclusion would remain with no change. However, imagine a valid 
argument where a contradiction is added to it; unlike the previous case where the 
same conclusion would be drawn, a different one would likely be, an “open-
ended” one. This looks a great deal like a non-monotonic argument, where the 
revision of premises, or addition in this case of a single premise, ends up 
changing the conclusion. The import of this is a bias toward contradictions in a 
monotonic system, when, by definition, if a contradiction is added to an argument, 
it should not change the conclusion. 
 
One final thought is important on the relation of contradictions and 
monotonicity. The monotonic logical consequence relation in classical logic is part 
of the reason that an “open-ended” conclusion results. Once a contradiction 
manifests in an argument, the principle of inference takes over, and provides the 
“open-ended” result. Reconsider the definition of a non-monotonic consequence 
relation, both semantic and syntactic, α· γ⊧β v θ and α· γ ⊢ β v θ. The conclusion 
can be the original one or one drawn from the new premise(s) added to the 
argument. However, in both cases, it is constrained to something that is relevant 
to the premises. Even with this additional option, the conclusion cannot be simply 
anything one desires, if the argument is a serious one. Case in point, because of 
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semantic closure where a language has self-reference of predicates, a 
contradiction results (e.g. the liar paradox). Once a contradiction results, the 
language should lose its meaning because of the trivial effect of a contradiction in 
a system. However, it does not. Like the non-monotonic consequence relation, 
one could accept the “open-ended” result or accept something relevant to the 
premises that the contradiction does not have that effect on language. However, 
even with this option, the conclusion is still constrained and not “open-ended”. 
 
What one can learn from monotonicity and non-monotonicity is that when a 
contradiction is added to the argument, it is the choice of the one evaluating the 
argument to let the contradiction dictate a result or not. Humans interact with logic 
to produce results, and a contradiction does not necessitate an “open-ended” 
conclusion, especially when other premises are in the argument. As principles of 
inference EFQ and ECQ prioritise the role of contradictions, especially when their 
role in classical logic is taken as disruptive and infectious. However, adopting a 
non-monotonic mind-set in a monotonic world might be the mature thing to do with 
contradictions. Thus, one could determine what they are actually doing, before a 
principle of inference is blindly followed to its logical result. 
 
3.4.5 Contra-translations as representative of natural language arguments  
 
Translation from natural language into propositional language has, as its 
main function, the detailing of the logical relations of the sentence or argument. 
The logical relations are supposedly more clearly analysed in the translated form 
of WFFs and symbols. In this sense, going from a robust natural language to a 
simplified logical language should provide clarity. 
 
The underlying assumptions of the translation process is that there is a 
correspondence between the two languages, and that the formal language 
expresses the natural language in a relevant way. Translation is typically one 
directional: from the natural language to the propositional logical language. The 
representation of the natural language sentence or argument is manifest in the 
propositional language’s symbolic interpretation as the final word on the relevant 
logical relations. 
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At least one logical connective accurately represents the natural language 
counterpart: conjunction. The logical relations of the conjunction in propositional 
logic and in English are similar enough not to warrant any discussion of problems. 
Conjunction in translation is found in its natural language equivalents of the 
coordinating conjunctions “and” and “but.” 
 
The other logical connectives and operator do not fare as well in this 
translation schema. The inclusive disjunction, represented by “or” in a natural 
language, has truth conditions that are not intuitive. Typically, “or” means “one or 
the other,” but not both. Classical propositional logic uses the inclusive 
disjunction, which does not capture the typical usage of “or” and the inclusive 
sense then has truth conditions that do not align with common intuitions, where 
the WFF is true when both disjuncts are true. A conclusion in an argument where 
both disjuncts are true in natural language, is difficult to find. Examples can be 
constructed, but that does not mean they are relevant to human linguistic practice. 
 
The material conditional of classical propositional logic derives its meaning 
from its truth conditions. When the antecedent is false irrespective of the truth-
value of the consequent, or the consequent is true irrespective of the value of the 
antecedent, the overall value for the material conditional is true. These results are 
not intuitive and do not have a clear carry over to natural language. Most 
examples of these in natural language suppose a relevance between the 
antecedent and consequent, which poisons the well in understanding how the 
material conditional functions.56 In natural language, ordinary conditional 
statements in use imply a relationship between the antecedent and the 
consequent, such that they are relevant to each other. Typically, the strict 
conditional is defined as it is impossible for the consequent to be false and the 
                                                          
56 Gensler (2010:122) uses semantically relevant antecedents and consequents in his translation 
exercises. When he gets to truth tables, the first example is: “If I went to Paris, then I went to 
Quebec.” A discerning geographic mind realizes these two are far apart on the globe, however 
there is relevance in travelling. His second example shows no connection between the antecedent 
and consequent: “If I had eggs for breakfast, then the world will end at noon”, which shows the 
material conditional as a propositional connective based on truth values of the components. 
Students, may stumble at that part of the chapter, though, as questions arise about relevance and 
why the antecedent and consequent do not need to be connected as they are in ordinary usage.  
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antecedent true. (Bacon, Detlefsen & McCarty 1999:79–80). Modal logicians have 
defined the strict conditional with the necessity operator, ⧠ (A→B), but that 
requires a non-standard logic. However, the modal operator makes the necessity 
between the antecedent and consequent apparent, necessarily if A then B. 
Arguably, this necessity underlies the natural language conception of the 
conditional, and that is not found in the material conditional. 
 
A brief tangent is necessary on the material conditional in modus ponens 
and modus tollens. The semantic material conditional is truth functionally based. 
However, the syntactic material conditional is not. The meaning of the syntactic 
material conditional is the rules that manipulate it, in this case, modus ponens and 
modus tollens. This use is much different from the truth functional use. The 
unintuitive truth conditions of the material conditional dissolve in the syntactic 
transformation. Taking the two rules, the material conditional’s logical behaviour is 
much more like a strict conditional in the transformation rules; it affirms a 
necessity with the antecedent in modus ponens and denies a connection with the 
consequent in modus tollens. This bifurcation of use leads, at least minimally, to a 
different sense of translational agreement with the natural language when 
translating into a syntactic version of derivation versus a semantic argument. 
 
There are sustained arguments in the literature that the material conditional 
is not truth functional and is best characterised as probabilistic (Edgington 1986, 
Adams 1975, Stalnaker 1970 & Lewis 1976). In this view, the translation woes 
seem to be further complicated, as natural language conditionals may not be truth 
functional. Thus, any translation into classical propositional logic is an expressive 
failure if the translation is supposed to capture the natural language meaning. 
 
The logical connectives, save one, suffer from translation problems when 
translating natural language into the logical language of propositional logic. In one 
sense this is systematic because the logical language is a different language, 
something not always made clear, and so it will have issues. However, the 
question arises, whether it best expresses what goes on in natural language. The 
cases of the inclusive disjunction and the material conditional are questionable. 
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However, the more important issue is a pedagogical one that is addressed in a 
future chapter: are students being taught that this is the best expression of natural 
language in a formal system? Perception versus reality is different in the case of 
classical propositional logic aligning in the way it is often taught. 
 
3.5 Negation, translation, and WFFs  
 
In natural language English, “not” functions as negation. It is then 
translated into the propositional logical language as a symbol “~.” When “~” is 
affixed to any WFF in semantic propositional logic, it reverses the truth-value of 
the WFF. When “~” is affixed to any WFF in syntactic propositional logic, a 
different transformation rule applies to the WFF. In this sense, “~” functions in two 
ways and has two meanings in propositional logic.57 
 
Consider two sentence forms, “x is bald” and “x is not bald” where “x” is a 
variable.58 On the surface reading, this pair appears contradictory given the 
negation of the predicate. Substituting “Scott” for the “x”, the two sentences are 
contradictory. However, substituting “An adverb” for the “x”, the two sentences are 
contrary, as they are both false; an adverb is not the kind of thing that is bald or 
not (Horn 1989:268269).59 This subtlety between the contrary and the 
contradictory is not expressed by “not,” let alone accurately translated into 
propositional logic language. 
 
Drawing upon Aristotle, Horn (1989:1921) clarifies how to distinguish 
between contraries and contradictories. Contrary sentences hold to the LNC, and 
contradictory sentences hold to the LNC and LEM. The addition of the LEM to the 
requirement for a contradiction necessitates one sentence being true, unlike in a 
contrary where both can be false. 
 
                                                          
57 The claim here is not that both systems, semantic and syntactic, do not produce the same result; 
there is no contesting the soundness and completeness of propositional logic at the metalogical 
level.  
58 “Bald” is to be understood as a non-vague term in this case, there is no philosophical point being 
made about its fine-grained or sorites-like application. 
59 To be fair, Horn (1989:268269) makes a different point here; the view supported is that of 
Aristotle and his views of contraries (De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics, [1984]). 
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If Aristotle is right – via Horn (1989) – about the logical distinction between 
the two logical concepts, the logical judgement necessary to ascertain the 
difference comes secondary to logical form and requires someone versed in basic 
logical laws. If the sentence is judged as a contrary, it is not clear how that should 
be translated into propositional logic language instead of a contradiction, other 
than some ad hoc means of not negating the same formula. So, instead of (A ·~A) 
for a contradiction, the translation is (A ·~B), which is distinct and meets the 
logical requirement that both WFFs can be false.60 This translation violates the 
LNC condition though, so the other option is ((A ·~A) V B), which is not a 
translation that comes easily to basic translation competency and the reason why 
it is done that way.61 The interpretation of this WFF is one of “A” or “~A” can be 
true, or B is true, which represents that position that they are both false. Another 
option in propositional logic formulation, not Aristotelian influenced, is the 
exclusive disjunction.62 Contraries meet the exact truth conditions of an exclusive 
disjunction, with two WFF: 
 
B   A       (A V B) 
0   0            0 
0   1            1 
1   0            1 
1   1            0 
 
The problem with this interpretation is that it is not intuitive in natural language 
unless one has been instructed to do this with a contrary formula. To not negate 
the formula and instead offer a distinct variable is not intuitive. To be clear, 
negation is not translated which is an ad hoc rule and the result is a WFF as a 
distinct variable in its place. All these differences between contraries and 
contradictories in natural language, which itself requires some logical education, 
                                                          
60 An obvious point, both WFFs in a contradiction cannot be false, so this seems to be either just 
an issue of form without truth values, or truth values that do not apply to the form, or it is the wrong 
logical form. 
61 Aristotle’s syllogistic logic and its square of opposition has definite translations for contrary 
statements. However, the statements of propositional logic do not fit that linguistic structure.  
62 Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (2001:§5.1), uses exclusive disjunction.  
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implies that translating the difference between the two requires even more 
education, especially because there is no clear answer. 
 
One final area of negation needs more refinement. “Not” or “no” in a 
contrary does not have the opposite truth-value function, when they are both 
false, supposing the contradictory logical form. Arguably, the contradictory form is 
establishing the conflict, when the form overstates the function of “not”, both 
conjuncts are a false case. If one conjunct is true, the appearance is that the 
opposite truth-value function holds classically, but that is distinct from the both 
false use of negation. This is a suppressed sense of negation in natural language 
different from the opposing concept of negation. “Not” then functions in at least 
two different ways just based on its logical character in a contrary. Thus, “not” in 
natural language simply resists being captured by a bivalent relation of classical 
propositional logic.63 
 
3.6 Concluding thoughts 
 
Let us reconsider the third research question, what are the essential 
elements of a substantive critique of propositional logic and propositional logic 
inconsistency? Propositional logic suffers from translation problems, connective 
problems, inference problems, and operator problems. These form the basis of 
the substantive critique. While no single problem is devastating to the logical 
system as a whole, the problems do lead one to believe that it is far from ideal, 
especially when trying to capture the complexity of natural language. The very fact 
that propositional logic stands up so well to systematic criticism displays its overall 
strength. But, is propositional logic the ideal or best logic to capture the meaning 
and relations of natural language?  
                                                          
63 Horn (2001:97153) details other ways that negation – as “not” in natural language -- is different 
between predicate negation and whole sentence negation. For instance, Horn writes (1989: 
142143) writes there are at least eight different ways that negation functions. One in particular is 
that negation can both function as a truth-function of proposition, but also not as a truth-function 
when multiple values are involved. How the former is expressed, ~P is true iff P is false and ~P is 
false iff P is true, and the latter as ~P is true if P is true, false, or neither true or false. The contrast 
between the former and latter show how negation functions differently even than in the contrary 
example.   
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Systematically, as a symbolic logical system of relations and meaning, 
propositional logic stands in a much stronger light than it does as a system to 
inform about natural language meaning and relations. However, the larger 
problem is that propositional logic is used for that informative reason, which then 
places it in a position that its limited expressiveness and relevance is apparent. As 
this research concerns critical reasoning, the supposition that propositional logic is 
expressive enough, is undermined as the ideal tool for critical reasoning.  
 
Propositional logic, through ECQ and EFQ, does not capture what is 
important about propositional logic inconsistency (contradiction) for critical 
reasoning: i.e. the detection of semantic inconsistencies and their relevance to the 
greater context. Pedagogically, using propositional logic confuses inference with 
implication. Inference is fundamental to critical reasoning courses; not so much for 
implication. While inference and implication are not mutually exclusive concepts, 
this chapter demonstrates that some have not understood the difference and in 
the process have failed to understand the importance of teaching inferential 
relations in natural language.64 Critical reasoning demands emphasising this 
importance if practical reasoning skills are to be improved. It is trite, but true, but 
hypothetical syllogism and ECQ, are but two deductive implicative patterns that 
are taught and are limited in usefulness in everyday life. The results also confuse 
derivation for argument, which are distinct sets of relations. Why then take 
propositional logic seriously as a system of reasoning for everyday life? I submit 
that we should not, as this chapter has demonstrated the inherent flaws of 
propositional logic in this theoretical and ultimately practical capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 The word “some” here refers to those who teach propositional logic as critical thinking, with no or 
little reference to informal reasoning and natural language emphasis.  
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Chapter 4: The theory and justification of the semantic conception of 
inconsistency 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, problems were noted with propositional logic and 
its relation to natural language. Judgements of logical inconsistency, viz. 
propositional logic, draw their strength from formal contradictions. A statement 
and its negation fit a formal pattern that signals inconsistency. If the formal pattern 
is not present, another judgement follows from the opposing truth-values of a 
statement and of an opposing statement. Judgements of logical inconsistency 
then come from at least two sources, logical form or truth-values. Notice, however, 
the semantic notion of inconsistency, where semantic conflict between statements 
generates the inconsistency, is nowhere to be found in propositional logic.   
 
This chapter will argue that both typical ways of judging logical 
inconsistency are not the primary determination of inconsistency in natural 
language. The primary determination is neither logical form nor truth-values but 
semantic, which is the primitive and natural way of assessing semantic conflict. 
This chapter articulates a novel theory of semantic inconsistency that gives due 
regard to ordinary inconsistency judgements. However, to demonstrate this 
theory, a detour through several concepts sets the stage for the understanding of 
semantic inconsistency in ordinary language arguments beginning, with some 
thoughts on logica docens and logica utens. 
 
4.2  Logica docens versus logica utens  
 
Peirce was an American philosopher, mathematician, and logician. While 
being famous for the pragmatist movement, later called “pragmaticism,” his work 
on logic and reasoning is comprehensive and still relevant today. Not only did 
Peirce develop systems of formal logic, he also thought about reasoning in 
everyday life and its relation to theory. Peirce (1901:891-892) writes: 
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“Every time a man really reasons, in that sense, he is clearly or obscurely 
conscious that his present inference belongs to a general class of cases in which 
an analogous conclusion might be drawn; and his approval of this reasoning 
consists in a belief that by acting on the same principle in all cases he will on the 
whole be advancing his knowledge more than by not drawing such conclusions. If 
this be true, as the reader’s self-observation may satisfy him that it is, a man 
cannot truly reason without having some notions about the classification of 
arguments. But the classification of arguments is the chief business of the science 
of logic; so that every man who reasons (in the above sense) has necessarily a 
rudimentary science of logic, good or bad. The slang of the medieval universities 
called this his logica utens, - his “logic in possession”, - in contradistinction to 
logica docens, or the legitimate doctrine that is to be learned by study.“ 
 
From the quoted paragraph, Peirce drew strongly on the medieval logical 
formulations of logica docens and logica utens. Logica docens concerns a theory 
of reasoning per rules and systematic application of those rules, which is taught 
through formal education, for example introduction to logic courses, critical 
reasoning courses, etc. Logica utens concerns our natural practice and habits of 
reasoning. As Peirce stated in the quoted paragraph, “… logic in possession …,” 
or what a human has in natural reasoning abilities (1981:892). In my opinion, the 
ordinary reasoning practices with natural language are the best representative of 
this concept.  
 
One goal of this research is to extend the basic insights of logica utens to 
logica docens. But, in this extension, the former must inform the latter and content 
must be relevant and not suffer from the problems of propositional logic where the 
concepts do not carry over in a way that robustly makes sense of our natural 
reasoning practices. Thus, logica docens only tries to structure or inform logica 
utens to the degree it is an accurate representation of it. If formal logic has a role 
in critical reasoning, then this may be all there is to it in practice. 
 
Returning to Peirce from the quoted paragraph, he is clear: reasoning 
should advance knowledge where drawing conclusions from reasons shows this 
practice (1901:891892). It is not something that should be overlooked lightly. 
Reasoning is how one learns about the world and makes new knowledge claims 
about that world and human experience. Reasoning is also how one learns to 
critique the world. It is only on reflection and through education that one starts 
thinking about a theory of reasoning and why inferences lead to knowledge. The 
abstraction does not have to take one too far away from human reasoning 
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practice. All it requires is that it can structure something about the practice to see 
if that structure holds in other cases. But structure must never dictate semantic 
content in ordinary reasoning as, the semantics are the conceptual connection 
between the basic structure of reasons and conclusions. So, a theory of reasoning 
(and not a theory of logic) must contain an articulation of the priority of semantics 
over syntax, and something about argument structures of connections that 
support this priority.65  
 
4.3  What is critical reasoning?  
 
A simple search of “critical reasoning”, yields many complex definitions that 
try to cover all relevant cases, and if the search extends to its American form, 
“critical thinking,” even more definitions follow. Consideration of a few definitions 
show the range of the concepts: 
 
a) “Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully 
conceptualising, applying, analysing, synthesising, and/or evaluating information 
gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or 
communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based 
on universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, 
accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, 
depth, breadth, and fairness” (Scriven and Paul 1987). 
 
b) ”… we have focused on the two arms of critical thinking: assessing others’ 
reasoning and presenting reasoning of our own” (Groarke and Tindale 2012:340). 
 
c) “Critical thinking may be taken as the art of assessing truth claims according to 
certain general principles or canons” (Dauer 1989:3). 
 
d) “Critical reasoning is active, reflective, and informed thinking that involves the 
ability to deliberately and skillfully question, analyse, interpret, and evaluate ideas 
and beliefs in the light of the reasons, or evidence, which support them” (Van den 
Berg 2010:3). 
 
                                                          
65 Peirce (1901:891–892) is important to the conceptual foundations of this thesis by way of his 
articulation of logica docens and logica utens. By making this distinction, he opens it for 
consideration of which one should inform the other, if at all. Reasoning may have little to do with 
formal logic in the sense of logica utens, for what reasoning skills do we possess naturally and 
how can we utilize them most efficiently? This thesis takes logica utens as the primary concept 
from which logica docens is derived. Of course, this is a limited view and Peirce may be wrong, for 
instance, there may be a hybrid of the two that functions effectively, which seems to be what 
philosophers like Poston (2011) try to do. Finally, intuitively, it seems to me that Peirce is just 
denoting the very distinction between implication and inference that Harman (2002) makes and 
this thesis utilizes, i.e. logica utens is inference and logica docens is implication. 
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e) “The first thing to get straight in thinking about thinking is the difference 
between questions about validity and questions about truth. But in getting this 
straight we shall find that we are sorting out every other really fundamental notion” 
(Flew 1989:11). 
 
f) “… the evaluation of ideas (critical thinking) accomplished by narrowing your 
focus, sorting out the ideas you’ve generated, and identifying the almost 
reasonable ones” (Ruggerio 2009:16).  
 
g) “Critical reasoning as we conceive it is both active and open to alternative 
points of view. We can describe our approach more clearly by contrasting it with 
two other kinds of activity: (1) passive reading or listening (as in the case of 
students who expect a lecturer to fill them with information) and (2) mere 
disagreement (as in the case of a combative person who is not willing to take 
seriously the reasons and opinions offered by other people)” (Cederblom and 
Paulsen 2005:2). 
 
Definitions (a) and (b) highlight the vast difference in conceptions of critical 
thinking. Neither is inaccurate, especially if the focus of critical thinking is 
reasoning, particularly the practice of giving and considering reasons of others. 
The problem with definition (a) is that it stands in need of an explanation itself 
given its vast detail. Students without a background in critical reasoning would 
likely have problems understanding the proper intent of the definition. Consider 
“clarity” and its use in the definition. What is “clarity?” How does it relate to 
“precision” and “accuracy?” Clear concepts are typically precise and accurate, in 
fact, it is opaque as to how a clear concept could not be precise and in the 
process still be accurate, supposing precision and accuracy both have the same 
normative component of application. Definition (b), while austere, is more likely 
intuitive to the student of critical thinking because it focuses on the practice of 
giving and receiving reasons for a view, something done in everyday life. From 
that basic definition, other concepts like “evidence” and “fairness” make more 
sense when brought in, as they work in a suitable context.  
 
Definition (c) highlights a typical confusion with critical thinking. It places 
truth-values at the centre of dispute. If the goal of critical thinking is ascertaining 
truth-values, it supposes that knowing truth-values for all claims and adopting the 
right reasoning practice, leads to truth. Critical thinking in practice may not yield 
truth-values; all it may yield is understanding of an issue. The normative 
component of truth-value assessment comes after understanding an issue. Even 
the typical deductive picture of validity and soundness supports this order, where 
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structural assessment comes first and may never reach the semantic assessment 
of the relationship to the world or other ideas. This is not to say that truth is 
unimportant and should not be sought, as it obviously is important. The point, 
however, is that a project of critical thinking that compels truth determination and 
not understanding will fall short in practice and is likely too lofty.  
 
Definition (d) includes the very important concept of “reflection.” Critical 
thinking involves reflecting on one’s own situation toward others, and their 
relations to each other as well. The concept of reflection, largely due to self-
consciousness, enables us to ponder our individual views as one of many views in 
life. The tendency to abstract and isolate one’s own views is only valuable when 
those views are set in a broader context of multiple views. The concepts of 
“evidence” and “reasons” gain traction from their shared understanding, as does 
the content of the concepts in the appropriate contexts.  
 
Definition (e) places critical reasoning into the domain of traditional logical 
evaluative concepts. Flew holds that structure (validity) and semantics 
(soundness) taken together properly sort out the domain of thinking (1989:11). 
The difficulty with his approach is that it sets aside a whole domain of arguments 
that are deductively invalid, yet can still be true, justified and persuasive as 
Russell (2009:71) argues.66 This definition has a similar tone as definition (c), 
relying on structure or general principles to transfer the truth from the premises to 
the conclusion. In contrast to definitions (a) and (d), definition (e) is seriously 
limited and does not have the necessary scope for the practice of critical 
reasoning.  
 
Definition (f) is a practical definition that does not allude to argument 
structure like definition (e) or truth like definition (c). Figuring out which ideas are 
reasonable in the current context are extremely important in everyday life. We 
naturally narrow down ideas into two sets; reasonable ideas and those that are 
not. There may be grey areas where more work needs to be done, but on the fly, 
                                                          
66 Russell writes in The Problems of Philosophy, “Hence we shall reach the conclusion that 
Socrates is mortal with a greater approach to certainty if we make our argument purely inductive 
than if we go by way of 'all men are mortal' and then use deduction” (2009:71). 
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when assessing ideas, reasonable ideas are extremely important. In our day, with 
the onslaught of information at our fingertips, what counts as “reasonable” has 
been under attack, which also relates to narrowing down ideas. While this 
definition lacks important components found in (a) and (d), it articulates a practical 
view of the daily practice of critical reasoning.  
 
The final definition (g), uses contrast to help understand the domain of 
critical reasoning. Critical reasoning is an active process that is open-minded to 
alternative views. This definition implies reflective engagement of the views of 
others, with the potential and willingness to adopt another view. This definition 
also contrasts with passive processes of reading and simple disagreement, where 
one fails to resolve or attempt to resolve the contention. What the definition 
misses is that passive processes, typically, are unreflective and both reading and 
simple disagreement show a lack of reflection. The missing grounding of both, 
thus, is reflection and must be part of any critical reasoning, as definition (d) made 
clear. Active engagement requires reflection. 
 
It may be better to say, for the purposes of focusing on the activity of what 
we do, that “critical reasoning” is an activity where reasons are given and 
understood for a precise purpose to achieve some particular argumentative or 
evidential end. Reasons can be given to oneself in an internal dialogue; reasons 
can also be given to other people in an external dialogue. In both cases, the 
purpose might be to understand, both for oneself and to others. The purpose 
could also be to demonstrate the degree of evidence one has for a belief. And, 
there are many others bound up in this activity including truth-value determination.  
 
It is common to associate critical reasoning with persuasion, or trying to 
motivate someone to believe the way that you do about an issue or situation. 
Persuasion may lead to fallacious reasoning in an effort to be successful without 
respect for truth. One example of using fallacious reasoning to persuade is in the 
legal field, as Saunders (1993) details. In particular, Saunders gives examples of 
the ad hominem fallacy (1993:346 & 348), the appeal to pity (1993:348 & 349), 
and the appeal to authority (1993:353—354). Saunders is fair in his assessment 
as sometimes fallacies are noted by the court and the argument rejected 
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(1993:347,352 & 355). In the cases referenced, fallacies were allowed. One might 
then question whether the outcome would have been different in terms of truth 
had the fallacies been halted? 
 
But, persuasion is not the only significant element about critical thinking, 
and frankly, it may not be as important as “understanding.” Persuasion is tricky 
and may not be achievable with controversial topics like abortion, gay rights, and 
other complicated political issues. Fundamental differences in worldviews may be 
too much for any reasoning to bridge. So, it may be that understanding the 
contentious issue is all that is achievable: understanding should always be the 
primary goal, with persuasion secondary. 
 
The focus on “understanding” is a key point and serves as a basis for a 
general line of thought of this thesis. In critical reasoning, little may be known 
about the truth-value of claims at the time of reasoning, and may never be known. 
For instance, one cannot know if Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole shooter of 
President John F. Kennedy. However, one can understand that a “sole shooter” 
contrasts with “multiple shooters” and that would matter to evidence found for 
either claim.67 The truth of the claim “Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole shooter of 
John F. Kennedy” may never be known. Critical reasoning about this issue would 
not be a failure if the truth was never known as there may be a greater general 
understanding(s) of the event, but those who place truth determination as the 
most significant component of critical reasoning might surmise it a failure.   
 
Critical reasoning is something that we do as humans. It is not a passive 
process where it happens to you; you must initiate it when the need is plain, and a 
comprehensive education emphasising critical reasoning can make the process 
more effective and rewarding. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
67 This is one example of gradation, which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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4.4  Natural language arguments  
 
In chapter two on propositional logic, logical implications were symbolised 
from natural language into the logical language, and manipulated per learned 
systematic rules. To achieve the correct implicative result, the proper rules must 
be used competently. Thus, in using propositional logic, one must be reasonably 
well versed to use it effectively.  
 
Natural language arguments, on the other hand, do not require any special 
competency for effective use. In fact, we use these arguments from a relatively 
early age and do so effortlessly. The limits of natural language arguments and 
reasoning skills are usually only tested when we reach our competency limits in 
controversial cases where basic worldviews are not shared. In fairness, it may be 
too much to ask of any argument to settle such cases, as they likely have little to 
do with the argument itself. Instead, the presuppositions involved control the 
direction(s) of the argument and are likely irreconcilable without someone giving 
up fundamental beliefs. Thus, the effective reach of natural language arguments 
is suitable for areas where a direct challenge to presuppositions do not manifest.68 
 
4.4.1 Structure  
 
Natural language arguments consist of a basic structure where one or more 
ideas follow from a group of other ideas. “Conclusions” are the ideas that follow 
from “reasons.”  Putting reasons and conclusions into a vertical structure shows 
the inferential relationship between the two groups of ideas, such as: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 A recent study by Kaplan, Gimbel and Harris (2016) demonstrates that deep-seated political 
beliefs are likely tied to the emotional aspect of the brain and its processing. Whether this will be 
borne out as fact, in time, it does explain the impotence of reasoning in such cases, where deep 
disagreement cannot be bridged.  
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The car did not start. 
The lights did not turn on. 
 
Thus, I think the battery is dead.69 
 
The ideas above the line are the reasons and the idea below the line is the 
conclusion. The line marks a separation of ideas and in a sense, indicates that 
inference is going on. “Inference” simply means that from believing one group of 
ideas, then believing another idea(s) follow. About a car problem, when a car 
does not start and the lights do not work, it is likely the battery is dead. These are 
beliefs generated by the context. However, given the argument is not a valid 
deductive argument where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the 
conclusion, believing other ideas or conclusions can follow. For instance, there is 
an electrical short in the system. So, the argument would be: 
 
The car did not start 
The lights did not turn on. 
 
Thus, I think the battery is dead. 
-or- 
Thus, I think the car’s electrical system has a short in it.  
 
Given the limited scope of the reasons, no single conclusion is decidable without 
more evidence provided through more reasons. Imagine, after opening the hood 
of the car, discovering the battery is a 72–month battery with no change in 80 
months. The argument would then be: 
 
The car did not start 
The lights did not turn on. 
The battery is eight months overdue for replacement. 
 
                                                          
69 I am not using “∴” here on purpose. The triple dot symbol is used in the previous chapter and 
elsewhere to indicate implication, not inference. So, arguments without “∴” are inferential, not 
implicative. 
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Thus, I think the battery is dead. 
-or- 
Thus, I think the car’s electrical system has a short in it.  
 
The basic structure of argument and inference in everyday life is a relationship 
between reasons and conclusions, and the plausibility of the relationship between 
them given the context. A change of context might impact the plausibility of the 
relationship. Suppose, the car model has a known electrical defect that mimics the 
problems the car is having. More investigation would be in order potentially 
minimising the battery replacement. To this end, argument and inference in 
everyday life are dynamic.  
 
However, that dynamic nature is often static when considering the written 
word, and a good deal of our argumentative education focuses on constructing 
arguments from this source. The argument is a snapshot in time. Critical 
reasoning courses by their nature emphasise the written word and textual 
analysis. And, to slide back to the slippery road of propositional logic, it would be 
the rare case where someone translated an argument into symbols in an ordinary 
context outside of a logic course or philosophy course. Thus, the written word is 
foundational to learning about argument formation and schematisation.  
 
There is something that is likely inarticulable in a robust fashion but is worth 
mentioning. Teaching inference is difficult, but students typically have that ability 
in varying degrees, coming into any course.70 There is a basic inference ability 
such that a student must have to even get to class through figuring out a map of 
the campus, time to be there in the schedule, room location, and where to park, to 
list a few. This ability is probably due to complex factors including history, 
comparing and contrasting past instances to the present one, general 
understanding of how the world works, and competency in one’s primary 
language. The more difficult kind of inference to teach is from complicated 
                                                          
70 A lot of “showing” goes on in courses with arguments, as students see the relationship through 
examples. Thus, they do not learn inference in any real sense. What students see are examples of 
inference and apply that to their lives. Even the vocabulary is a visual one, as the following 
example illustrates: “seeing the connection between the reasons and conclusions.” 
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scenarios where the student does not understand what to infer from what, in 
short, they lack among other things, the ideas of relevance, what counts as a 
“reason,” and context. The inference tends to be subtle in many instances. Thus, 
what follows about identifying reasons and conclusions should be set in that 
context. 
 
4.4.1.1 Identifying reasons and conclusions  
 
What is a “reason?” It would be helpful if there were a simple answer to that 
question. The problem with identifying a straightforward answer is that the concept 
of a “reason” does not stand by itself. A reason only makes sense in the offering 
for another claim, a conclusion. In this relationship, a reason is something that 
helps one believe, understand, explain, and/or accept a conclusion. In the 
previous example of a car not starting, the reasons support the conclusion that the 
battery is the problem. More reasons, taken together as a group, would potentially 
support the conclusion even more strongly, which then manifests in a better 
overall argument. A reason is also part of human intentionality: it is something that 
is part of human life and works in simple and complicated ways. Humans, would 
not be who we are without the reason giving process, which allows questioning 
and learning more about the world. So, what a “reason” is, is not so 
straightforward to define, but we use them daily as part of our form of living. 
 
 Nevertheless, while there is not a clear definition of a “reason,” there are 
ways to identify reasons within a text. One basic formulation uses the 
subordinating conjunction of “because.” Consider the form “x because y”, “x” is the 
conclusion, “y” is the reason. Schematised in a structured argument form this 
becomes:  
 
y 
        
x 
 
This structural element only displays when one schematise’s the argument; 
however, in reading a text, the important aspect is that which follows the word 
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“because”, which may be a reason. There are some cases where the “y” position 
is a cause, for instance: “The ground is wet because it rained”, “y” is the cause 
and “x” is the effect. Structurally, however, it provides students with a detector 
when the reasons are not clear during the schematisation process. Other words 
that may signal a reason include: “for,” “after all,” “due to,” and “in as much as.” 
 
If the reason indicator words are not present in the text, and one has a 
good idea of what the conclusion(s) might be, those relevant reasons that impact 
that conclusion should be included in the argument schematisation. Simply, a 
reason must manifest in some inferential relationship with a conclusion to be 
relevant to the argument. In the previous argument, the car not starting is relevant 
to the battery being dead, as is being beyond the effective date of battery usage. 
The car not starting is also relevant to there being a short in the electrical system, 
but the effective date of battery usage is not. In this way, the reason is connected 
to one conclusion but not another, which still shows it is relevant to the argument 
and should be part of the schematised argument. It is worth noting that reasons 
are not thought about without relation to a conclusion, so the latter concept needs 
some attention as well. 
 
 Conclusions are easier to identify due to the way texts are written. Like the 
reason structure found in the word “because”, the conjunction “so” functions for 
conclusions. Consider the form “x so y” where “x” is the reason and “y” is the 
conclusion. Schematized into a structural form this becomes: 
 
x 
 
y 
 
Not all cases of the structure have “x” as a reason. “X” can be a causal element in 
a ramification, such that “The car is on fire so we must walk home.” “The car is on 
fire” is the cause of them walking home. Structurally, however, it provides students 
with a detector when the conclusion(s) are not clear during the schematisation 
process. Other words that may indicate a structural conclusion include: “thus,” 
“therefore,” “since,” and “hence.” 
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There is another group of words that when found in a text might indicate a 
conclusion, words such as “may,” “might,” “must,” “probably,” “implies,” “thinks,” 
“believes”, and “suspects” to name just a few. Other words that can indicate a 
conclusion are normative terms such as “should,” “ought,” “duty,” and 
“permissible.” These words, and others, may occur in the conclusion itself and 
indicate inference. For example:  
 
Wreckage from a Boeing 757 was found on beaches in Mauritius and 
Mozambique. 
Flight 370 is missing.  
Flight 370 is a Boeing 757.  
No other Boeing 757s are missing. 
_______________________________________________________ 
Thus, I believe the wreckage is from Flight 370.  
 
Note the structural conclusion indicator of “thus” and the conclusion indicator of 
“believe.” This is an argument because of the indirect nature of the conclusion. 
The only reason we know the person believes the wreckage is from Flight 370 is 
through the reasons; otherwise there is no basis for believing in the conclusion. 
Indirectness is a clear sign of inference. 
 
The previous argument includes two conclusions as possible inferences 
from the reasons. Multiple conclusions, whether explicitly stated or not, are 
common to our ordinary reasoning practices. Rarely, as in the car argument, do 
we think there is absolutely one thing wrong with the car from the outset. Another 
example is going to the doctor. While we might have an idea of what is wrong, we 
are open to other possible diagnoses that follow from our symptoms. It is only 
when we use the propositional (or syllogistic) model of argument that we think that 
entailing one conclusion is necessary. 
 
In our ordinary reasoning practices, we use comparison and contrast to 
help us figure out what conclusion to believe and why. One of the easiest ways to 
understand what counts as the right conclusion to an argument is to also 
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understand what counts as the wrong conclusion to the same argument. 
Sometimes the contrastive conclusions are in the text itself, but at other times, we 
might have to create them on our own to display the necessary contrast for 
understanding. What is interesting is how this contrastive conclusion 
understanding is tacitly in place when reasoning in ordinary, non-textual, contexts. 
Often, the contrasting conclusions are thought of and not brought up until the right 
time, but they likely work in the same way for us.  
 
 To this end, finding contrasting conclusions in the text at hand through the 
indicators mentioned above, or conclusions needing to be generated from the 
context issues from what counts as a plausible conclusion from the context. If the 
generated contrasting conclusions meet the requirement of having one or more 
reason(s) relevant to them, they are acceptable to demonstrate the contrast. For 
example, in the car argument, almost any generated conclusion that is a car 
problem may be relevant in the right way. This relevancy of reasons to 
conclusions, grounds the inference process. 
 
 Identifying ordinary language arguments, in texts, occurs in a few ways by 
noticing relationships between supporting ideas and concluding ideas, and reason 
and conclusion indicating words. This identification, however, does not stand 
alone as reasoning is part of one’s life, where history, education, and context all 
influence forming and understanding arguments. 
 
4.4.2 Lack of logical vocabulary: if-then, all, some, and no  
 
In the propositional logic section, the logical vocabulary of conjunction 
(and), disjunction (or), conditional (if…then) and negation (not) was manifest in the 
particular symbols chosen. The translation from natural language to the logical 
language was the first step in assessing the argument in propositional form. 
Syllogistic logic, like propositional logic, has its own vocabulary too, where “all,” 
“some,” and “no” function in relating groups. Between these two systems of logic, 
there is a “definite logical vocabulary” at play in natural language translation and 
the subsequent argument formation. 
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When performing textual analysis to schematize arguments, it becomes 
apparent to the trained eye that the “definite logical vocabulary” is not found in any 
robust form. Most natural language arguments involve sentences without logical 
connectives. For instance, reasons are often stated in a single sentence and not 
conjoined with “and” or other conjunctions. The same holds for disjunctions, as 
they are usually separate sentences. Of course, there are examples of 
conjunction and disjunction in natural language arguments but they are not the 
norm. The conditional might be more common, but the question would be if the 
hypothetical is relevant to the argument. The conclusion entailed by the 
conditional may have more promise as a reason or conclusion, but the conditional 
not so much. The syllogistic language of “all,” “some,” and “no” is equally fleeting 
in textual analysis as exclusive terms, namely, “all” and “no,” do not articulate our 
much less rigid human experience. “Some” occurs more frequently, but there is a 
further problem with syllogistic statements: they are of a logical form. For 
example, all A is B, some B is C, no A is B. There is minimal common usage of 
these forms as sentences in English. Instead they are logically constructed 
sentences suitable for logical manipulation. 
 
Once again, this is not to conclude the terms do not occur, but their 
instance is occasional and not enough around which to build a theory of critical 
reasoning. In a typical investigation, “Some of the witnesses saw…” is a common 
use of “some” or “no further information was given…” is a common use of “no.” 
“If—then” can be used in causal contexts where the antecedent is a necessary 
condition of the consequent, “If he shows up, then he will be fed.” But, these 
cases and others like them are limited and cannot justify building a theory of 
reasoning around them. 
 
If the thoughts on the “definite logical vocabulary” are correct, they imply at 
least one main thing. The “definite logical vocabulary” is not common in textual 
analysis, and thus constructing natural language arguments in a straightforward 
way with that vocabulary is not done with any regularity, if at all. The “definite 
logical vocabulary” is a caricature of the vocabulary of reasons and conclusions in 
natural language not only in the written word, but with the spoken word as well. 
Instances of syllogisms in ordinary life are rare, as are propositional arguments. 
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The practical disconnect between the “definite logical vocabulary” and forming 
natural language arguments is substantial. 
 
4.4.3 Erotetic and interrogative context  
 
Erotetic logic focuses on the relationship between questions and answers 
in a formal context, they lead from reasons to questions or questions that need an 
answer. Harrah (1961:4046) and Wiśniewski (1991:261263) are two notable 
logicians with substantive thoughts on the matter. While there are differences 
between these approaches, what is worth noting is that both prioritise the role of 
questions in reasoning. In critical reasoning, the general idea of interrogative 
context aligns with the ordinary language approach to reasoning. Interrogative 
arguments are those based on a question and answer model without translation 
and symbolic formation of the argument. Thus, the interrogative context is the one 
important to the concepts here.  
 
Wright (2001:139233) uses an interrogative approach to critical reasoning.  
Dixon (2017:3239 & 8689) follows Wright’s basic interrogative structure, but 
modifies the apparatus to make it more accessible and effective for students.71 
Neither Wright nor Dixon work from reasons to questions, but instead use 
questions with reasons to reach the correct conclusion. Dixon (2017:32) calls this 
the “ADM” for “analytical defeasible model of argument.” This model integrates 
questions and answers into the basic argument structure. The ADM in form is: 
 
Reasons 
 
Context Question 
Competing Conclusions 
 
                                                          
71 I make no claims to be the originator of the interrogative model of argument in Dixon (2017). I 
use Wright’s ideas and conceptual structure, but simplify it by changing vocabulary, reworking the 
structure, and setting it in the proper context of erotetic logic and inference to the best explanation. 
Wright’s ideas arguably owe their intellectual heritage to Scriven (1976). 
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The reasons recommend the best conclusion as the right answer to the context 
question. The competing conclusions must answer the context question directly. 
For instance: 
 
        R1: The car did not start 
R2: The lights did not turn on. 
R3: The battery is eight months overdue for replacement. 
________________________________________________ 
CQ: What is wrong with the car? 
CC1: I think the battery is dead. 
CC2: I think the car’s electrical system has a short in it.  
 
CC1 directly answers the CQ, as does CC2. However, in looking at the reasons, 
the reasons support CC1 being the right answer. So, the reasons, R1R3, directly 
relate to the likelihood that CC1 is the right answer to the CQ. In ordinary use the 
conclusion is just the answer to the question asked.  
 
Formulating the context question in the right sort of way is important. 
Interrogative words such as “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” 
broaden the range of answers. Words such as “did,” “is,” and “was” limit the range 
of answers to two or three, and that is not desirable. Instead, all legitimate 
answers should be available to the question, even those that do not appear in the 
text or are not a part of the initial conversation. To see a clear case of a context 
question that opens up multiple answers, consider a criminal investigation into a 
murder case. An obvious start is the asking of: “Who killed this person?” Anyone 
who was in the area is technically a suspect, even those whose involvement is 
questionable. Reasons through evidence like eyewitness testimony, DNA, and 
other means eventually narrow down the list of suspects and if the investigation 
goes properly, it leaves one suspect as the right answer to the context question. 
Sometimes, however, new evidence emerges allowing the release of the initial 
suspect and another person on the list becomes the primary suspect. By choosing 
the appropriate interrogative word, no suspect was excluded and the investigation 
was fruitful.  
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Natural language arguments in practical contexts are part of a questioning 
and answering process. Something comes up missing, “Where is my phone?” and 
an inquiry starts. I start thinking through where I had my phone last, ask my wife if 
she has seen it, etc. This questioning gives me reasons to conclude I either left it 
at my office or it is in my vehicle. A developmental point must be made as well. 
Children are taught to question as a part of growing up. Early questions – for 
example, “where is mother?”, “what are we eating for dinner?”, the basic yes/no 
questions “can I stay up late?”, etc. – form a major part of the discourse and 
instruction of a child. This natural part of our reasoning activity, thus, should be 
one that is not only recognised but exploited in our critical reasoning practices 
throughout life. 
 
4.4.3.1 Using questions to set context and relevance  
 
It is crucial to understand that in critical reasoning, context and relevance 
take on a hyper-significant role. It is a shame not more is said about these 
concepts, but that is probably because they are a “given” and obvious to some 
people. Sadly, it is not that obvious to all involved in discourse. One way to correct 
some of these contextual and relevancy issues is to focus on questioning. When 
questioning correctly, it sets the proper context for argument and relevance of 
reasons to conclusions. Learning to question correctly is a skill that can be taught 
to some degree, but even it relies on one understanding the relevance of the 
argument to the specific and general contexts. 
 
When arguments do not have a context question, they implicitly rely on 
one, as the argument schematisation itself is significant. The person putting forth 
the argument assumes the argument is worth considering, but this is another 
example of argument abstraction from the specific context. This abstraction is 
likely the result of a misguided pedagogy where abstraction aids understanding.  
 
Using context questions allows for two senses of evaluation: internal and 
external. An internal sense of evaluation allows for the questioning of proper 
reasons and their relationship to the conclusions:  
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 Have the right reasons been chosen to plausibly support the 
conclusion(s)?  
 Do the conclusion(s) make sense given the argumentative context and 
are they related to the reasons?   
 
An external sense of evaluation allows for questioning whether the context 
question is the right question for the inquiry, and if the context question and 
resulting argument make sense with the general understanding of the way the 
world works. The external sense of evaluation continues emphasis on the role of 
context and relevance through grounding the argument in our ordinary reasoning 
practices and life. 
 
4.5  Identifying inconsistency in natural language arguments  
 
Natural language arguments can be consistent or inconsistent. 
“Inconsistent” means that there is some sort of conflict between the reasons or the 
reasons and the conclusions. The conflict makes accepting the argument not as 
straightforward as if it were consistent, but it is not necessarily problematic either.  
 
Consider an article about a controversial death (Milanes 2016): 
 
“SAN DIEGO -- A Federal judge will decide next week whether one of San Diego 
County’s most infamous cases deserves a civil trial.   
 
On July 13, 2011, 32-year-old Rebecca Zahau was found naked and hanging from 
the second-story balcony of the Spreckels Mansion in Coronado.   
Two days prior, on July 11, Max Shacknai, the six-year-old son of Zahau’s 
millionaire boyfriend Jonah Shacknai, fell down some stairs. He died three days 
later in what was considered a freak accident. At the time, he was under Zahau’s 
care.  
 
After a months-long investigation, the San Diego County Medical Examiner and 
San Diego County Sheriff’s Department ruled Zahau’s death a suicide. Zahau was 
found with her hands and feet bound behind her back with red rope. Her mouth 
had been gagged. Investigators said she then hopped over a balcony and hung 
herself.  But Zahau’s family refuses to believe she took her own life. They hired 
attorney Keith Greer to prove she was murdered.   
Greer believes that Adam Shacknai, Dina Shacknai and Nina Romano were 
behind Zahau’s death. Adam is Jonah Shacknai’s brother. Jonah is a wealthy 
Arizona businessman who was dating Rebecca. Dina is Jonah’s ex-wife. Nina is 
Dina’s twin sister. Max was Jonah and Dina’s son.  
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In July 2013, Zahau’s family filed a $10 million wrongful death lawsuit in Federal 
court against Dina. Also named in the lawsuit were Nina and Adam. Jonah was 
not named.  
 
Greer alleges their motive for killing Shacknai was revenge for the accident in the 
mansion that killed Max, on Rebecca’s watch. Greer believes that Rebecca was 
strangled to death before she went over the balcony.  
  
 “When a person is hung, the rope is up here, on the upper part of the neck,” 
Greer told 10News. “That cartilage was down here, at the base of the neck. So, 
that cartilage is more consistent with a strangling type of death.”   
Police investigators said Rebecca wrote a cryptic suicide note on a door with a 
paint brush and black paint that said, “She saved him can you save her?”   
Greer hired a handwriting expert. According to Greer, the expert determined the 
note was likely written by a right-handed male. Based on how high the door was, 
the person was probably six-feet-tall.  Rebecca was only 5-foot-3. Greer said he 
discovered that that Adam Shacknai was the only man at the mansion at the time 
of Rebecca’s death.   
 
A hearing in the civil suit was scheduled for Friday afternoon in U.S. District Court 
in San Diego. However, the hearing was delayed to Feb. 26. At the hearing, a 
judge will decide whether there is enough evidence to send the lawsuit to trial.”  
 
This article has a wide-ranging argument in it, which the ADM schematises as: 
 
R1: Investigators say RZ bound her own hands behind her back and legs, 
and gagged her mouth.  
R2: Investigators say RZ wrote “She saved him, can you save her?” 
R3: Investigators say RZ jumped over the rail on the balcony and hung 
herself. 
R4: Zahau’s family lawyer says what was written in R2 is at the wrong 
height for RZ. 
R5: Zahau’s family lawyer says male at the home was the right height for 
what written in R2. 
R6: Zahau’s family lawyer says handwriting analysis indicates what was 
written in R2 was written by a male.  
R7: Zahau’s family lawyer says damage to RZ’s neck was due to 
strangulation given the location on the neck of cartilage damage.   
R8: Max Shacknai (MS) died while under RZ’s supervision. 
R9: The family was very distraught including MS’s mother, her sister, MS’s 
father, and his brother, the male who was at home.  
__________________________________________ 
 
CQ: What happened to Rebecca Zahau (RZ)? 
155 
 
 
CC1: RZ committed suicide.  
CC2: RZ was murdered (strangled).  
CC3: RZ died of natural causes.72 
 
Schematizing the totality of reasons includes two accounts that produce the 
conflict, which manifests in conflicting conclusions.  
 
A few things to note about this article and argument schematisation.  
 
1) The inconsistencies in the story are not formal contradictions. There is 
no explicit negation of a claim, nor is there a conjunction of them. The 
only way you generate that sort of inconsistency is by doing “two-step” 
translation where, for instance, suicide means “not murdered,” and thus 
forming the contradiction of “murdered” and “not murdered.” But this 
“two-step” translation is an improvised move to fit concepts of an 
argument into concepts of a logical system, which may be a specious 
move. 
An analysis of the reasons in the RZ argument demonstrates that R1 
and R3 conflict, it is hard to jump over a balcony rail when your feet are 
bound. R2 and R4 clash due to RZ’s height; R2 also conflicts with R6 
because of the difference in sex. R3 and R7 diverge greatly due to the 
type of damage. All the conclusions are semantically incompatible, 
which, when formed properly also exhibits the logical property of being 
mutually exclusive. 
 
2) A further analysis of the reasons and their relationships to the 
conclusions reveals two different accounts. The overlapping reasons 
R1, R2, R8, and R9 are consistent with both accounts. R3 is consistent 
with CC1 but inconsistent with CC2. R4R7 are consistent with CC2 but 
inconsistent with CC1. CC3 has no relationships with the reasons but 
does contrast with CC1 and CC2.  
 
                                                          
72 The numbering of the conclusions is not a ranking; CC1–CC3 are labels to allow discussion of 
them. CC3 was added to show contrast, but will be dropped in further uses of this argument. 
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Given the ADM’s structure, inconsistency is at the heart of an inquiry. 
Understanding the right answer to the context question also involves 
understanding the wrong answer. Understanding how particular reasons support 
one conclusion over another includes understanding those reasons that do not 
support a different conclusion and conflict in varying degrees. It is important to 
grant that the article provides here as an exemplar is not a caricature found in a 
critical reasoning textbook, rather it is an actual article containing an argument 
challenging the “official” story. The article works well with the ADM due to being 
an inquiry.  
 
4.5.1 Order of recognition  
 
In the RZ article, and consequent schematising of the argument and 
analysis of its relations, there was no mention of truth-values, as those values are 
the contentious issue in need of resolution. Unfortunately, the argument presented 
in the article only went some ways toward resolution but not far enough.  
 
 Recognising semantic conflict takes priority over knowing truth-values in 
most critical reasoning arguments, because understanding the semantic conflict 
precedes evaluating that content for a logical truth-value. This order of recognition 
might seem like much ado about nothing or an obvious point, but it is foundational 
to my argument. Teaching inconsistency judgements, from the perspective of 
formal logic, relies on truth-value recognition, such that both claims cannot be true 
at the same time and in the same sense, i.e. the LNC from Aristotle. This 
“idealised” form of inconsistency supervenes on the natural language conflict. One 
has an idea of the ideal form and forces the semantic inconsistency into the form, 
regardless of its natural fit. But that is not the only problem. This direction of 
understanding seems to put the proverbial cart before the horse by supposing it is 
a precise form or type of inconsistency, which is likely the result of assuming a 
flawed pedagogical attempt in a critical reasoning course.  
 
In the next section, further semantic conflict types are articulated, which 
demonstrates, from the perspective of this section, that forcing logical form on 
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semantic inconsistency is done ad hoc and without contextual sensitivity to the 
semantic conflict.  
 
4.5.2 Conflict types in natural language 
 
There are at least three different conflict types in natural language: explicit 
negation, implicit negation, and contextual mismatching.  
 
Explicit negation is a direct conflict with the same sentence or idea 
purposely negated. For example, “The Earth is a planet” and “The Earth is not a 
planet.” As the label indicates, there is an obvious use of “not.” The actual amount 
of explicit negation that occurs in natural contexts is minimal at best, except with 
someone denying a claim in a “…that’s not true” type of interaction.73  
 
Implicit negation is more common but not as transparent.  An example of 
implicit negation from the RZ article is the conflict between the conclusions of 
“suicide” and “murder.” Previously the “two-step” translation was put forth. Implicit 
negation in recognising the first step leads to, or entails the second step but the 
second step is not put forth in translation. Competent language users know that 
“suicide” and “murder” are inconsistent with one another without changing 
“suicide” into “self-murder.”74  
 
Contextual misalignment is another source of plain conflict. When either 
implicit or explicit negation is present, for it to be that respective type, it must be in 
the same context. However, if either form of negation is present and the context is 
different, it is not obvious that there is a legitimate conflict between the claims. 
This type of conflict can be subtle, but the point is that on further analysis the 
conflict is not a legitimate one. An example of this conflict can be found in 
Williams’ (1993:2025) work on relativism, where he argues:  
 
                                                          
73 Depending on the number of truth-values, “not true” is not an explicit negation in a three-valued 
logic where “not true” can also mean “indeterminate.” 
74 “Self-murder” is one interpretation of “suicide,” which would still conflict in the right way with 
“murder by another person(s)” if someone wants to reinterpret “suicide” in that way. But that is still 
a “two-step” move and undermines the original language. 
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1. “‘Right’ means “right for a given society.” 
2. ‘Right for a given society’ works in practice for that society. 
           
            
Therefore, it is not right for one society to criticize or involve themselves in the 
values of another society because it is how that society functions.” 
 
Williams argues for the presence of the fallacy of equivocation: “right” in the 
premises is being used differently than “right” in the conclusion (1993:20). “Right” 
in the premises is being used as relative to a society; “right” in the conclusion 
functions in a general sense, not in the relative sense of the premises. 
(1993:2021). This shows a contextual mismatch between the two senses in a 
standard schematised argument. The same thing may occur in a dialogue about 
relativism without the schematisation. 
 
There are other conflicts in natural language; however, they prioritise truth-
values over semantic content for understanding: contradiction, contrary, and 
subcontrary.75 These conflicts manifest in Aristotle’s square of opposition from De 
Interpretatione (1963:4768), which aids in the explanation of these concepts. A 
contradictory pair of statements is “all men are mortal” and “some (not all) men 
are not mortal.” Only one of these statements can be true. A contrary pair of 
statements is where both statements can be false but both cannot be true. “All 
men are mortal” and “no men are mortal” demonstrates the pair can be false, 
supposing “some men are mortal” is true. Finally, a subcontrary pair of statements 
is where both statements can be true but both cannot be false. “Some men are 
mortal” and “some men are not mortal” displays that the pair can be true.  
 
 In fairness to Aristotle, he had logical reasons for the square of opposition 
and working out logical statements in particular ways because of the broader 
context of syllogistic logic (1963:4768). But, setting that aside, there are a few 
things to ponder about the relationships put forth. In a previous section, it was 
contested that “all,” “some,” and “none” occur with regularity in natural language 
arguments that are subject to critical reasoning standards. In syllogistic logic, 
                                                          
75 “Contradiction” here is different in meaning than under propositional logic where there is a 
conjunction of two opposing statements. It is not clear what Aristotle had in mind in conjoining the 
statements; instead, semantic conflict is explained in terms of different truth-conditions for 
statements.  
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these terms are foundational; in everyday reasoning, they are not. More so, at 
least for this thesis, the statements show varying types of conflict, such that “all” 
and “some,” and “none” and “some”, conflict in a way to draw attention to the 
tension, regardless of the truth-value. Contradiction, contrary, and subcontrary, as 
set up by the square of opposition, already have the truth-values determined in 
one sense. But, as it goes in critical reasoning, this set truth-value determination is 
often not the case.  
 
Normally, the statements in the square of opposition have an ordinary 
understanding, but what about the following subcontrary pair: “some Martians are 
blue” and “some Martians are not blue?” Subcontrary statements can both be 
true, but not both false. Both statements are false, however, because Martians do 
not exist to have any predicated property, “blue” or otherwise.76 The lack of 
carryover from the semantic conflict to the truth-values is revealing about the 
applicability of the square of opposition to all types of statements, both those 
implying existence and those that do not. Nevertheless, the two statements’ 
logical forms imply some form of conflict.  This formal conflict is important in 
assessing inconsistency in any sense because of its basic conflicting relationship 
that is easily recognised as a non-implicit form of negation. This recognition even 
when a hypothetical one, such that Martians are blue, might be the only way these 
two statements make sense together. How do they make sense? They make 
sense in contrast to each other since neither exist or refer in the ordinary sense. 
 
In this section, types of semantic conflict were noted and articulated. These 
ideas of conflict relied on recognising the difference between implicit and explicit 
negation. Contextual mismatches which appear to give rise to conflict were also 
noted. In the next section, a robust theory of semantic inconsistency detailing 
conflict is articulated.  
 
 
 
                                                          
76 I am aware of the idea of “existential import” where a claim has to refer to an existing class of 
things, but as Russell (1905:398–401) notes “existence” has different meanings. A theory of logic 
should handle all kinds of existence, if existence is universal.  
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4.6  Semantic account of inconsistency in ordinary language  
 
In this section, the theoretical underpinnings of semantically inconsistent 
judgements are put forth. After beginning with a definition of “semantic 
inconsistency,” a conceptual theory of antonym function follows explaining how 
many semantic inconsistencies arise. After explaining the standard lexical-
categorical approach, it is rejected. From there, applying the resulting supported 
antonymic concepts from the conceptual theory results in a different 
understanding of inconsistency in practice, by way of natural language arguments.  
 
4.6.1 Defining “semantic inconsistency”  
 
To this point, “inconsistency” has been approached in many ways. A good 
deal of effort has been spent on the logical side including both formal, e.g. 
propositional logic, and informal accounts, for example, square of opposition and 
its three concepts. In some of the discussion, the notion of “conflict” was put forth 
to articulate an initial attempt at focusing on what is apparent and important. 
Dictionary.com (2016b) defines “inconsistency” as: “1. lacking in harmony 
between the different parts or elements: … 2. lacking agreement, as one thing 
with another or two or more things in relation to each other; at variance ...” Two 
important concepts emerge from these definitions, “harmony” and “agreement”. 
Consistency is a harmonious relationship bearing agreement among ideas. 
Inconsistency, then, is a relationship that lacks harmony and/or agreement among 
ideas. The formulation and use of a definition of “inconsistency” from common 
usage is very important. If critical reasoning uses ideas and reasons grounded in 
everyday experience, a definition that issues from that set of ideas is desirable for 
practical sake.  
 
 For this thesis, “semantic inconsistency” means “a semantic relationship 
that lacks harmony and/or agreement.” “Harmony” is how well the concepts 
cohere and make sense together. “Agreement” means several things but can 
include how the conceptual fits with the way the world works, interpersonal 
161 
 
 
acknowledgement, and even truth-values.77  “Weak semantic inconsistency” is the 
exclusive disjunction in “lacking harmony or agreement” whereas “strong semantic 
inconsistency” is the conjunction in “lacking harmony and agreement.” 
 
 In the RZ article, the cartilage damage to the neck is an example of “weak 
semantic inconsistency.” The damage does not agree with damage from hanging, 
however, it is harmonious with the general idea of hanging by suicide. It is 
plausible that the damage is still from the hanging (hanging generally affects the 
neck), which is why it is harmonious, but in terms of location on the body (lower 
neck), it does not agree with hanging but agrees with strangulation.78 Also in the 
same article, the writing – “Can you save her…” – is another example of “weak 
semantic inconsistency.” RZ’s purported writing of the note is in harmony with the 
official suicide story; however, it lacks agreement with the facts due to height and 
gender specific writing style.  
 
In the RZ article, the fact that she supposedly bound her own feet, her arms 
behind her back, and gagged herself, all while naked, and then jumped over a rail 
in a suicide attempt is an example of “strong semantic inconsistency.” Bound feet 
and arms and jumping over a rail, for instance, are not harmonious with our 
general conception of suicide nor is it in agreement with what is physically likely.79 
80  
  
 “Weak” and “strong” semantic inconsistency articulates a subtle distinction 
that in some cases may not clearly apply. Nothing important hangs on this in 
                                                          
77 We define “harmony” as relating to coherence; “agreement,” refers to correspondence. 
78 An interesting side note. In the autopsy report on RZ, her neck was not broken, which is 
normally the cause of death in a hanging, especially from a nine–foot rope and jumping over a 
balcony in free fall (Autopsyfiles.org 2011). But without this additional information in the argument, 
it cannot be classified as “strong semantic inconsistency.” 
79 Our “general understanding” is a background from which we make and judge beliefs. It is the 
material we make inferences from. Statistics show that women, for instance, rarely engage in 
violent suicides, but men do (Albrecht 2011). The fact here that she supposedly chose a violent 
means and had to accomplish quite a feat to do it undermines that it is a “conventional” suicide. 
80 In a strange turn of events, the man who found her, Adam Shacknai, is also the main suspect in 
the writing on the wall (10 News Digital Team 2017). He cut her down, placing her where her body 
laid for news helicopters to view (Davis and Baker 2011). His fingerprints on the rope can be 
explained away after the fact as being there due to cutting her down. According to her 
Asian/Burmese heritage, she would have never committed suicide naked, another strong semantic 
inconsistency (Albrecht 2011). Finally, “agreement” is a plausibility judgement in this case, it may 
be possible to do this, but not likely.  
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those cases if the general concept applies and is useful. Please note, there was 
no discussion of truth-values or the truth of either account, suicide or murder. 
While the evidence may lend support to a stronger belief in one or the other, there 
is not a definitive answer to assign truth or falsity to either account with certainty.  
 
4.6.2 Antonyms  
 
Dictionary.com (2016a) defines “antonym” as “a word opposite in meaning 
to another.” “Black” is an antonym to “white,” for example. “Opposite” refers to the 
difference in meaning, in this case, one excludes the other. This ordinary 
understanding of “antonym” is what many of us are taught early on in our 
language education with exposure to relational terms like “thick” and “thin” (Owens 
2012: 257258). With our early exposure to antonyms, we likely had our first 
exposure to inconsistency, through linguistic inconsistency. Opposition of ideas is 
taught relatively early in development roughly 35 years old, where we begin to 
form our “canonical” understanding of antonyms (2012:257). Canonical antonyms 
are the word pairs, which are, exemplars of antonyms, for example, black/white, 
alive/dead, new/old, etc. (Jones, Murphy, Paradis & Willners 2012:22). 
 
To better understand the function and nature of antonyms, a more detailed 
version is helpful. Jones, Murphy, Paradis, and Willners (2012:134) define 
“antonymy” as:  
 
“… as binary opposition in language, a Relation-by-Contrast on the basis of 
minimal difference and maximal comparability in a given context. Such a relation 
holds among members of a pair if and only if they have the same contextually 
relevant properties but one.”  
 
Beginning with “binary opposition,” antonyms are pairs of words.  Each word is 
opposite such that it cancels out the other word in the pair in some way. For 
example, “tall” and “short” function in this way and are “unbound” antonyms. 
“Unbound” pairs typically use a qualifier of some sort, like “very”, as in “very tall” 
and “very short”. In contrast, “alive” and “dead” are “bound” antonyms and do not 
have a qualifier; one cannot be “more dead” than “dead”.  While the pair 
163 
 
 
“tall/short” do not cancel each other out in the same way as “dead/alive,” the 
concepts are still in binary opposition. 
 
 A very important definition introduced by Murphy is “Relation-by-Contrast” 
(2003:44). This is a stipulative definition, which notes similarities and one 
difference. Murphy (2003:44) defines “Relation-by-Contrast,” as a contrastive 
relationship that holds among all members of a set if they have the same 
contextually relevant properties but one. So, there are ways they are similar 
(“maximal comparability”) and dissimilar (“minimal difference”). 
 
 The idea of “minimal difference” is reduced to one difference per the 
definition, whereas “maximal comparability” are the remaining properties in the 
appropriate context. These concepts are a bit abstract until put into a normal 
context.  The pair “black/white” shares that they are the only two basic colours that 
are unmixed and achromatic. However, they are incompatible because they 
cannot refer to the same colour, the one difference (Jones, Murphy, Paradis and 
Willners 2012:3). 
 
With a better idea of what “antonymy” entails, a theoretical discussion 
follows that aids in understanding a broader conception of the theory of how 
antonyms work in everyday life.  
 
4.6.2.1 Antonym theory: lexical-categorical versus conceptual  
 
There are two general antonym theories. The traditional theory is the 
lexical- categorical theory (or the canonical model). According to Jones, Murphy, 
Paradis and Willners (2012:4445), this theory has two distinguishing elements: 
“… antonym relations are represented as part of the lexical entries of the opposed 
words; and consequently that such relations are stable properties of words.” To 
simplify the theory, antonyms are either direct or indirect. A direct antonym is the 
exemplar of a set and it stands in opposition to another direct antonym, which is 
an exemplar too, “wet/dry” for instance. An indirect antonym is part of that set of 
the direct antonym and is synonymous in meaning. For example, “moist,” is part of 
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the set and synonymous in meaning with the exemplar “wet” (2012:44). Members 
of the indirect set, still oppose in meaning, such as in “moist/dry” or “moist/arid.” A 
summary of the lexical-categorical theory centres on two points: lexical pairs of 
words that are in opposition, either directly or indirectly, and those words that have 
set, stable meanings. 
 
The conceptual theory does not deny word pairs expressing opposition. 
However, “antonymy” is not a fixed, black and white, phenomenon with respect to 
meaning and use. The canonical antonyms still hold, but they are but one of many 
antonymic phenomena. Many antonyms in human experience tend to be scalar 
and gradable, but these explanations are contextual. Whereas the lexical-
categorical approach has strong affinities with a stable lexicon of word 
relationships, where the conceptual theory does not. The conceptual theory uses 
the Lexical Meaning as Ontologies and Construal (LOC hereafter) use theory of 
antonymy (Jones, Murphy, Paradis & Willners 2012:127):  
 
“The basic assumption of the LOC framework … is grounded in how we as 
humans perceive and understand the world around us. Meanings of lexical items 
are dynamic and sensitive to contextual demands, rather than being fixed and 
stable, and lexical items evoke meanings, rather than “have” meanings …” 
(2012:129) 
 
Consider the pair “weak/strong,” which is an unbound antonymic pairing. If this 
pair has a fixed meaning, it is hard to understand what a “weak/strong” alcoholic 
drink, a “weak/strong” person, and a “weak/strong” argument all have in common 
with meaning, outside of opposition. Rather, it is the context that gives or “evokes” 
these pairs’ meanings, which seems to undermine the notion of a stable meaning.  
 
Furthermore, on the LOC framework, not all words have an obvious pair, 
but instead function contextually within a complicated meaning structure (Jones, 
Murphy, Paradis & Willners 2012:138). For instance, “She prefers plastic surgery 
to dental surgery” takes “plastic/dental” as a pair in the given context. Take the 
pair out of this context and it is hard to determine what single property they share; 
however, in the context it is clear. Antonymy is not limited to particular words, 
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word structures or word classes, it ranges, potentially, over the whole lexicon 
(2012:132).  
 
Three additional theoretical elements of LOC need more elucidation: 
ontology, construal, and the linguistic ontological structure. Jones, Murphy, 
Paradis and Willners state (2012:130):  
 
“Ontologies are conceptual structures that may be lexicalised and Construals are 
cognitive processes that operate on those ontological structures when we use 
language to create meaning in communication with other people.”  
 
In this sense, “Ontologies as conceptual structures” are “pre-meanings” of the 
words in use that set a basic linguistic context or frame, yet are completed through 
discourse and context, i.e. through the Construal (2012:130).  For example, in the 
“weak/strong” pair, there is a basic understanding without context of the binary 
opposition. Furthermore, the pair’s meaning is completed based on the discursive 
context, for example, a context of argument versus a context of drinking 
completes the meaning of the pair. 
 
Per Jones, Murphy, Paradis and Willners (2012:135) the linguistic 
ontological structure is an “… ontological structure divided into two antonymic 
parts.” It is a structure “… that comes about through comparison and dimensional 
alignment along a contentful dimension.” This is a rather wordy way of explaining 
that there is a pattern of binary paired words that make sense as an opposing pair 
given a context. The authors (2012:134 & 136) use “Gestalt” to give a visual 
representation to the antonymic phenomena but also to reinforce the structural 
integrity of the pair (or pattern). In “Gestalt” the definitive structure not only 
expresses the binary opposition; it also limits the context to one relevant to the 
structure. This visual theory may or may not clarify the antonymic phenomena, 
more importantly though, it has the essential elements of contrast in a context 
which LOC needs. 
 
To bring this all together, as humans, we use words for a purpose, which is 
to communicate. Antonym use is for special purposes to express contrast. Instead 
of a strict canon of opposing words, we use words in diverse ways to express this 
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contrast. Some of these ways use obvious pairs, like “dead/alive,” and others use 
pairs that are only obvious in a precise context, like “plastic/dental.” The LOC 
supports a way to understand these phenomena through Ontology and Construal, 
which provides the basis for understanding the meaning of pairs and the 
extension of that basic meaning to the relevant context issuing in a robust 
contextual meaning.  
 
 Much of this stands in opposition to the standard lexical-categorical theory 
that supports direct pairs (and the synonyms) of opposition as part of a lexicon, 
with stable word meanings. The lexical-categorical theory is not contextually fluid 
nor does it easily allow for paired instances that are not part of the antonym canon 
and related words to those canonical pairings. These limitations harm its potential 
use as an explanatory means for what we do when we express contrast, not just 
in obvious constructions, but those that are not so obvious as well. Human 
communication can be subtle and a theory of opposition needs to be equally as 
subtle to give due credit to what we do in human discourse with semantic contrast. 
 
4.6.3 Natural language arguments and semantic inconsistency 
 
In this section, the conceptual antonym theory is applied to natural 
language arguments. This application demonstrates that judgements of semantic 
conflict are based in context and application. Within critical reasoning, the truth-
values of premises and conclusions may or may not be known, so they have 
limited relevance to understanding or even addressing the plausibility of the 
argument. This plausibility assessment must come from somewhere else, and that 
is context, or agreement with the general understanding of the way the world 
works.81 If this application is correct, it undermines the rationale for using 
propositional or any formal method to assess the truth-value determination or 
implicative rule use in an argument. 
 
                                                          
81 Context is situated in the general understanding. Thus, the context is a subset of it. Our general 
understanding of education is that students sit at desks. However, in a basketball class, there are 
no desks, just a gymnasium. The context shift makes sense given the difference in activities in a 
classroom and gym.  And the shift between the two rests on our general understanding of 
education. 
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4.6.3.1 Conflicting reasons  
 
Natural language arguments, when taking place in the context of ordinary 
or controversial issues may have reasons that conflict. This conflict can take on a 
few different forms, but the difference in forms may be only a difference in 
degrees. Bound antonyms are going to be strongly binary, whereas unbound 
antonyms will be lesser in degree. But more needs to be said about the degree 
and how it impacts an argument, which is where we now begin.  
 
4.6.3.1.1 Degree of conflict and contextual judgement  
 
Considering the RZ argument, think through the following reasons. Dying 
from hanging is an upper neck asphyxiation injury; dying from strangulation is a 
lower neck cartilage asphyxiation injury. These two reasons conflict but given the 
same general location of the neck, it is not implausible to think cartilage injury was 
the result of the hanging too. These reasons, conflict, but not strongly so. On the 
other hand, with respect to the analysis of “She saved him …” writing on the wall, 
female handwriting strongly conflicts with male handwriting in this context. 
“Male/female” is a canonical pair of antonyms, whereas “upper neck/lower neck” is 
not.  
 
But, as the conceptual theory of antonyms supports, rarely are single ideas 
understood in isolation. The “male” designation links with the other person in the 
house, and his relationship to the deceased boy. The “lower neck” injury works 
with the note on the wall not being written by RZ, her being bound, and thrown 
over the railing to cover up a murder as payback by those related to the son’s 
death.  
 
The general context makes both the suicide and murder intelligible and 
plausible. The specific contexts of her death being a murder or her death being a 
suicide make each explanation intelligible and plausible as well. But to settle the 
specific contexts, more information in the form of reasons, is needed to sway the 
plausibility of one context over the other context. For instance, if RZ were left-
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handed or if one of the relatives of the boy confessed to RZ’s murder, the 
plausibility of a particular conclusion would be moved in a particular direction.  
 
4.6.3.1.2 Differences to conclusions   
 
With the ADM, reasons must be semantically and inferentially relevant to 
their respective conclusions. Reasons that conflict are highly likely to be relevant 
to different conclusions, which are conclusions that compete as the right answer 
to the context question. In the RZ argument, both conclusions mentioned in the 
argument have some distinct reasons associated with them, and they also have 
some reasons in common. The reasons in common typically are not going to have 
or display the same relevance as those specific to the unique conclusions. Let us 
revisit the RZ argument: 
 
R1: Investigators say RZ bound her own hands behind her back and legs, 
and gagged her mouth.  
R2: Investigators say RZ wrote “She saved him, can you save her?” 
R3: Investigators say RZ jumped over the rail on the balcony and hung 
herself. 
R4: Zahau’s family lawyer says what was written in R2 is at the wrong 
height for RZ. 
R5: Zahau’s family lawyer says male at the home was the right height for 
what was written in R2. 
R6: Zahau’s family lawyer says handwriting analysis indicates what was 
written in R2 was written by a male.  
R7: Zahau’s family lawyer says damage to RZ’s neck was due to 
strangulation given the location on the neck of cartilage damage.   
R8: Max Shacknai (MS) died while under RZ’s supervision. 
R9: The family was very distraught including MS’s mother, her sister, MS’s 
father, and his brother, the male who was at home.  
___________________________________________________________ 
CQ: What happened to Rebecca Zahau (RZ)? 
CC1: RZ committed suicide.  
CC2: RZ was murdered (strangled).  
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The main way to detail the relevance of conflicting reasons is through relevance 
articulations. The robust way of doing this is to do a relevance articulation for each 
reason, which would be: 
 
R1 is relevant because it helps CC1 (and hurts CC2).  
R2 is relevant because it helps CC1 (and hurts CC2). 
R3 is relevant because it helps CC1 (and hurts CC2). 
R4 is relevant because it helps CC2 (and hurts CC1). 
R5 is relevant because it helps CC2 (and hurts CC1). 
R6 is relevant because it helps CC2 (and hurts CC1). 
R7 is relevant because it helps CC2 (and hurts CC1). 
R8 is relevant because it helps CC1 and CC2. 
R9 is relevant because it helps CC1 and CC2. 
 
By formulating the relevance articulations in this manner, the relationship of 
reasons to particular conclusions is clear. R1R3 and R8R9 are relevant to CC1, 
and R4R9 are relevant to CC2. The articulations show the inconsistency of 
reasons, manifest in different, competing conclusions. The ultimate step to 
establish the relevance of the conflicting premises involves ranking the 
conclusions. Suppose we take the strength of the additional information about her 
murder as more plausible, the conclusion ranking would be: 
 
R1: Investigators say RZ bound her own hands behind her back and legs, 
and gagged her mouth.  
R2: Investigators say RZ wrote “She saved him, can you save her?” 
R3: Investigators say RZ jumped over the rail on the balcony and hung 
herself. 
R4: Zahau’s family lawyer says what was written in R2 is at the wrong 
height for RZ. 
R5: Zahau’s family lawyer says male at the home was the right height for 
what was written in R2. 
R6: Zahau’s family lawyer says handwriting analysis indicates what was 
written in R2 was written by a male.  
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R7: Zahau’s family lawyer says damage to RZ’s neck was due to 
strangulation given the location on the neck of cartilage damage.   
R8: Max Shacknai (MS) died while under RZ’s supervision. 
R9: The family was very distraught including MS’s mother, her sister, MS’s 
father, and his brother, the male who was at home.  
__________________________________________________________ 
CQ: What happened to Rebecca Zahau (RZ)? 
1. CC2: RZ was murdered (strangled).  
2. CC1: RZ committed suicide. 
 
The top ranked conclusion, CC2 is justified by the strength and number of 
reasons, and the degree to which the conflict between the reasons swayed the 
plausibility of the alternative story, that is, murder.  
    
In a natural language argument, the ADM uses inconsistency, especially 
antonymic conflict, to highlight the contentious reasons. These reasons are not 
evaluated in isolation, instead their relevance is assessed in their relationships to 
the conclusions. This structure is a natural model of inquiry where information 
rarely meets the ideal of consistency but it provides a way to make sense of the 
inconsistency, all without reference to truth-values and formal logical implication. 
 
4.6.3.2 Conflicting conclusions  
 
Natural language arguments, when taking place in the context of ordinary 
or controversial issues will have conclusions that conflict. This conflict can be 
articulated as the conclusions need to be mutually exclusive, however, this relies 
on truth-values, and those values have not yet been determined. Conclusions 
need to express a strong semantic inconsistency with one another, similar to 
canonical antonymy in an ideal case.  
 
4.6.3.2.1 Degree of conflict and contextual judgement 
 
Conclusions should be strongly inconsistent with each other in the most 
arguments. They should lack harmony with each other and disagree with the 
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interpretation of some of the facts and reasons in the argument. If the conclusions 
are inferences from a unique set of reasons, that particular set should inferentially 
support or justify one conclusion over another.  
 
In the RZ argument, the conclusions, “She committed suicide” and “She 
was murdered” display the antonymic property necessary for contrast. In a 
linguistically same sentence type, “Rebecca Zahua’s death was the result of 
murder” and “Rebecca Zahua’s death was the result of suicide.” “Murder” and 
“suicide” both involve the death of a person; however, the means differs; other-
inflicted versus self-inflicted. The consequences of this antonymic pair are 
different too: with “murder” someone needs to be punished according to law; with 
“suicide” no one needs to be punished.82 While the consequence aspect has not 
been examined, it follows from the antonymic pairing in this case, and provides 
another basis for conflict. Thus, the implications to the broader context are directly 
relevant to the conclusions and their contrast. 
 
4.6.3.2.2 Differences to reasons   
 
The general concept of argument is unidirectional, where inference goes 
from premises to conclusions. Most arguments work in this manner and do so 
effectively. But, in complex inquiry, what someone is seeking is an explanation of 
what happened, and how the information all fits together. Simple inquiry normally 
does not require the same degree of explanation because of its normally practical 
context. 
 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) might be our most basic form of 
argument.83 IBE arguments are about explanation, conclusions in particular, which 
explain some of the reasons that are facts of the event. Peirce introduced the 
concept of IBE as “abduction,” distinguishing it from both deduction and induction. 
Peirce’s abductive argument schema is as follows (1903:188189):  
                                                          
82 The notion of “punishment” is a strong contrast that may show “self-murder” is not a good 
interpretation of suicide.  
83 Wright (2001:199) makes this claim, given the nature of justification and explanation in many 
arguments. Explanation serves a strong purpose in our understanding of how the world works in a 
way that justification does not.   
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“The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of  
course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” 
 
With ideas and a context from a typical criminal investigation:  
 
We observe blood on the floor, a kicked in door, a bullet casing, and a 
lifeless body. We call these observed facts, C in Peirce’s schema.  
Hypothesis: the person was murdered. We call this supposition A in 
Peirce’s schema. 
If it is the case that the person was murdered, all of C follows.  
Therefore, there is good reason to suspect that the person was murdered is 
true. 
 
Unfortunately, the structure of Peirce’s schema does not clearly reveal the two-
directional nature of the argument. However, the ADM can handle the two-
directional nature of the abductive or IBE argument. But let us briefly review the 
ADM and then add to it.  
 
The complete model of ADM has a Context Question, Reasons and 
Competing Conclusions: 
 
R1–R? 
_____________ 
CQ 
CC1 
CC2… 
The structured form with content and something familiar to most people: 
 
R1: The ground is shaking. 
R2: We are in California. 
 
CQ: What is going on? 
CC1: There is an earthquake. 
CC2: There is a natural gas explosion. 
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In the previous section where reasons were relevant to conclusions, the ADM has 
reasons that justify the conclusions. So, the direction is from the reasons to the 
conclusions. In an IBE argument, there is an additional direction where the 
conclusions explain some of the reasons. The reasons that are explained are 
“event facts.” An event fact is a part of the event, or evidence, which is explained 
by a conclusion. So, consider the argument now in two-directions: 
 
R1: The ground is shaking. 
R2: We are in California. 
R3: There is a big ground crack. 
 
CQ: What is going on? 
CC1: There is an earthquake. 
CC2: There is a natural gas explosion.84 
 
The event fact(s), reasons, are determined by analysing whether a conclusion 
explains the fact. “There is an earthquake,” explains why “the ground is shaking,” 
and “there is a natural gas explosion,” explains why “the ground is shaking,” as 
well. So, all conclusions explain R1. When all conclusions explain an event fact, 
we call it a “necessary event fact (NEF).” When one but not all the conclusions 
explain an event fact, we call it a “contingent event fact (CEF).”85 CC1 explains 
R3, but CC2 does not, so R3 is a CEF.  
 
Notice, however, that R2 is not explained by any conclusion, that there is 
an earthquake or natural gas explosion does not explain why we are in California. 
When a reason is not explained by a conclusion it is labelled as a “subsidiary fact 
(SF).” Subsidiary facts add information to the argument and aid our explanation of 
                                                          
84 As far as is determinable, Wright (2001:206213) is the only one to articulate the two-directional 
nature of IBE arguments in this manner.  
85 This formulation is similar to Wright’s work on trace-data and non-trace data (2001:206213). I 
prefer the idea of “facts” to “data” for ease of student understanding because students often 
associate “data” with information technology, and thus oftentimes do not understand the general 
meaning of “data”, which contains the idea of “facts”. Hence, the usage of the term “facts” may just 
make for easier explication. The material on ADM-IBE comes from Dixon (2017:8689). 
Explains 
Reasons 
Justifies 
Conclusions 
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event facts, such that R2 works with CC1 in explaining R1, and in contrast, R2 
does not work with CC2 in explaining R1.  
 
Another way to determine event facts is to look at the event window, which 
this is particularly relevant to this argument. Evidence and event facts occur in the 
event window; SF’s largely occur outside of the event window and act as 
explanatory means for understanding the event facts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the ADM-IBE, with the RZ argument and two-directions in mind: 
 
R1: Investigators say RZ bound her own hands behind her back and legs, 
and gagged her mouth.  
R2: Investigators say RZ wrote “She saved him, can you save her?” 
R3: Investigators say RZ jumped over the rail on the balcony and hung 
herself. 
R4: Zahau’s family lawyer says what was written in R2 is at the wrong 
height for RZ. 
R5: Zahau’s family lawyer says male at the home was the right height for 
what was written in R2. 
R6: Zahau’s family lawyer says handwriting analysis indicates what was 
written in R2 was written by a male.  
R7: Zahau’s family lawyer says damage to RZ’s neck was due to 
strangulation given the location on the neck of cartilage damage.   
R8: Max Shacknai (MS) died while under RZ’s supervision. 
R9: The family was very distraught including MS’s mother, her sister, MS’s 
father, and his brother, the male who was at home.  
___________________________________________________________ 
 CQ: What happened to Rebecca Zahau (RZ)? 
PRE-EVENT 
(SF) 
EVENT WINDOW  
(NEF AND CEF) 
POST-EVENT 
(SF) 
175 
 
 
 CC1: RZ committed suicide. 
 CC2: RZ was murdered (strangled).  
              
To see the relationship from the conclusions back to the reasons in the 
explanation direction, IBE articulations follow: 
 
CC1 explains R1, R2 and R3. (CEF) 
CC2 explains R4, R5, R6, and R7 (CEF) 
R8 and R9 work with CC1 and CC2 in explaining R1R7. (SF) 
 
R1R7 are in the event window and require explanation, for they are event facts. 
R8 and R9 are outside the event window and provide explanatory resources. 
“Explanatory resources” might also be thought of as the information that pieces 
together the facts of the event into a coherent story. The explanatory articulations 
divide into those of CC1 and CC2 and their related reasons. The division in the 
conclusions, leads to a division of reasons and these divisions manifest conflict.  
 
4.6.3.3 Rationality and inconsistency  
 
“Rationality” is a buzzword of sorts, not only in philosophy but in everyday 
life. It is a concept that most people think they understand. But it seems to share 
the same fate as was ascribed to “critical thinking”, namely that multiple definitions 
abound. For our purposes, the working definition will be from Cherniak’s work 
(1981:164174) on minimal rationality. Cherniak’s work is chosen because he 
incorporates two other principles – namely, minimal consistency and basic 
inference ability – into a complete theory of rationality, wherein the three elements 
function together holistically. Cherniak has three principles, the first of which is the 
basic rationality principle: i.e. if a person has a particular group of beliefs and 
desires, the person would undertake some, but not necessarily all, of those 
actions that are appropriate in the context (1981:166).86 
 
                                                          
86 The other two principles are presented in the next chapter in a discussion of non-monotonicity. 
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The basic rationality principle ensures that a person operates from a belief 
set (Cherniak 1981:166). To understand someone’s belief set, is to determine 
what actions that person might perform in that context. Considering a shared 
worldview, we understand that most of us make sense of each other’s actions and 
what we might do in specific contexts. However, imagine someone who acts 
outside one’s belief set, or does not perform any of the actions that are fitting in 
the context: the person’s rationality might be challenged. Taking into account this 
basic structure of shared worldview, reasons can be added to arguments resulting 
in new conclusions as part of ordinary reasoning practices. 
 
For example, imagine being in a classroom and the fire alarm sounds. 
Being on campus for extended lengths of time, one realises that sometimes these 
are false alarms and at other times they are drills. A suitable action might be to 
check the hallway for smoke, or call the department office for more information, or 
check the alert system on the computer. Given the belief set of an instructor on 
that campus, these would be proper or rational actions. In short, one would be 
acting rationally. But what if one told the students: “Run, we are all going to die!” 
or “Everyone drop to your knees and pray we do not all burn to death!”? The 
students might initially think that the instructor was joking, but if one were serious, 
they would think one was being irrational given the nature and frequency of known 
false alarms on the campus. Neither of those exclamations properly follow from 
the instructor’s belief set, so one would be acting irrationally.   
 
The basic rationality requirement also takes seriously dissimilar cultures 
and groups of people. “Rationality” is defined by a certain group of beliefs, and is 
commonly known, for diverse cultures have different beliefs. This is a very 
important point. The basic rationality requirement permits distinct, intercultural 
understanding of beliefs and the resultant actions, and make adjustments that 
hopefully facilitate better understanding.  
 
In the following subsections, there is a discussion of the relationship 
between rationality and two types of inconsistency: substantive and non-
substantive. This discussion clarifies when rationality is in jeopardy and the apt 
response to it. 
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4.6.3.4 Substantive inconsistency: inconsistency negatively influences the 
rationality of the argument  
 
The context of a natural language argument is rich and meaningful 
because it aids in understanding the scope and nature of reasons and 
conclusions. Previously, “strongly inconsistent” was defined as “a semantic 
relationship that lacks harmony and agreement.” Basic rationality works from a 
belief set to undertaking some relevant action which is appropriate in the context. 
When a belief set is strongly inconsistent, the appropriate action in the context 
may or may not have the right kind of traction to instantiate. This is a fact of 
strongly inconsistent belief sets: they can paralyse any potential action.  
 
 Since arguments interact with belief sets, it may be the case that a person 
has a belief set that is reasonably consistent.  Yet, this person asserts in an 
argument a claim that is strongly inconsistent with their belief set. Resolving this 
inconsistency matters, because predictable action is desirable and makes the 
action intelligible to others and oneself.  
 
 But we have digressed. Let us refocus on the discussion of rationality and 
arguments. What if a text or passage has an argument that is strongly 
inconsistent? What should be done then? The simple but not always obvious 
answer is that the general context needs to be consulted about the inconsistency. 
Does the general context support one side of the inconsistency more than 
another? From a broader perspective, is there more evidence or reason to believe 
one side of the inconsistency than the other? In the RZ case, the height of the 
handwriting and likely being a male is strongly inconsistent with RZ’s height and 
gender. There is no obvious resolution of these two conflicts, so being rational will 
involve looking at other reasons, like binding her own feet and arms and jumping 
a railing with other reasons. This holistic method situates a context so the 
inconsistencies make more sense as part of an overall account. What if we did 
some research and found out that a noted forensic pathologist determined 
through a second autopsy that RZ had a mark on her scalp that indicated she had 
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been hit on the head prior to her death?87 The strong conflict is now weaker with 
additional evidence and believing that RZ was murdered becomes more plausible. 
Plausibility and rationality go hand in hand. So, when semantic inconsistencies 
affect the rationality of an argument, one way is to look at the broader context for 
believing one side of the conflict over the other one. More evidence will likely help 
this along too, and eventually lead to action, which in this case might well be 
murder charges against a suspect. 
 
But what of those cases where strong semantic inconsistency cannot be 
resolved or at least moved in the direction of improving plausibility? What is the 
rational thing to do? The unsatisfying answer is recognising the limit and scope of 
natural language arguments. It is too much of a demand to place on the concept 
of natural language argument to resolve these instances of flawed arguments.88 
“Flawed” just means “the normal function of argument is impotent.” Thus, the 
argument content is the problem, not the argument form or use of it. It is 
“impotent” because of special reasons that are not fertile for rational action. 
 
More can be stipulated considering this type of flawed argument and 
rationality. For instance, several relationships are possible:  
 
i. a person’s belief set may be inconsistent;  
ii. an argument may be inconsistent in the reasons;  
iii. a person’s inconsistent belief set may be consistent with an inconsistent 
argument;  
iv. a person’s inconsistent belief set may be inconsistent with an 
inconsistent argument;  
v. a person’s consistent belief set may be inconsistent with part of the 
general context; 
vi. an argument may be inconsistent in the reasons and inconsistent with 
the general context. 
                                                          
87 This is exactly what happened when the Dr. Phil television show hired Dr. Cyril Wecht, a noted 
forensic pathologist, to do a second autopsy on Zahau’s body (Dr. Phil Show 2011). 
88 Not all arguments can be resolved and it may be a function of this type of argument that some 
are beyond hope and saving. 
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Each of these (ivi) has its own problems and shows how quickly inconsistency 
can get viciously complicated. To detail each of these would be of limited value to 
this research, but if inconsistencies are problematic they reflect our complicated 
lives and belief patterns. More so, accurately diagnosing the impact and relevance 
of multiple inconsistencies is a subtle skill but it all starts with deciding whether an 
inconsistency is substantive or not. Still, the importance of each is that each can 
affect rationality in their own way and may result in a lack of action. This is the true 
danger of inconsistency’s influence on rationality that may leave one paralysed 
and unable to act.  
 
4.6.3.5 Non-substantive inconsistency: inconsistency does not negatively 
influence the rationality of the argument  
 
Previously, “weakly inconsistent” was defined as “a semantic relationship 
that lacks harmony or agreement.” Furthermore, basic rationality works from a 
belief set to undertaking some relevant action that is appropriate in the context. 
When a belief set is weakly inconsistent, the appropriate action in the context will 
likely have the traction to instantiate action. This is a fact of weakly inconsistent 
belief sets; they are unlikely to disrupt any potential action. As “weakly 
inconsistent” is a stronger concept than “non-substantive inconsistency,” the 
impact of the inconsistency is unlikely to be disruptive to the whole argument. 
 
One way to understand a non-substantive inconsistency is as a “surface” 
phenomenon. The inconsistency itself may be tangential to the point being proven 
or its resolution does not influence the inference structure, such that another 
conclusion becomes much stronger. In the RZ argument, the conflict between the 
locations on the neck is a sign for more investigation; however, a definitive answer 
outside a confession from someone strangling RZ is doubtful. One might question 
why, so let us think through this scenario. Imagine that RZ did commit suicide. 
However, instead of just simply jumping over the balcony, she jumped very hard 
away from the balcony with her chin down holding the rope at a much lower 
location on her neck. The arc of the fall with the rope attached to the neck might 
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have been closer to the base of her neck causing the cartilage damage, and then 
she died from asphyxiation.89 The arc might also explain why her neck was not 
broken due to a lack of abrupt motion change. 
 
Rationally, the reasons support neck damage, which is what we act on, if 
we choose to. The damage to the neck is explainable on both accounts, which 
makes believing in one side of the conflict problematic. The significance of the 
location on the neck may never be resolved. But what might aid is further related 
information that fills in a greater picture. For example, the supposed suicide note, 
the only male in the house having motive – as his nephew is the one who 
ultimately died – and the physical problems with a bound person of short stature 
going over a balcony railing. The theoretical point is that reasons do not exist in 
isolation, an argument works as a whole structure, which is another holistic 
judgement of rationality not just related to the rationality of a conflicting belief set.  
 
4.7 Concluding thoughts 
 
The associated research question for this section was, how can a 
contemporary antonym theory articulate inconsistency judgements in natural 
language and reasoning? Throughout this chapter, many concepts and their 
delineations were put forth to show how semantic inconsistency functions in 
natural language arguments. Using the ADM and the ADM-IBE, inconsistency was 
shown to be part of our ordinary argument structure when questions and answers 
are part of an inquiry. The ADM/ADM-IBE argument structure consisting of 
questions, answers/conclusions, and reasons differs from traditional arguments 
where there are just reasons and a single conclusion. The significance and use of 
the traditional argument model is likely a carryover from Aristotle’s syllogism 
(1984), where premises support a single conclusion, without a broader context. 
Rarely, are conflicting reasons apparent in a traditional argument. The traditional 
argument model, when used with inconsistencies, attempts to resolve or prefer 
one of the inconsistent reasons of the inconsistent pair before the argument is 
                                                          
89 The County of San Diego autopsy report (Autopsyfiles.org 2011) on Zahau does not indicate her 
neck was broken, which may have been the causal result of a direct, non-swinging, nine-foot fall. A 
105lb. body generates a lot of force over nine feet, which is another curious part of this story.  
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schematised. This resolution of the inconsistency pre-schematisation is an ad hoc 
move, which does not allow the general context to settle through related content – 
through argument – which reason should be given up (if at all).  
 
Using an antonymic understanding of conflict and an ever-changing world, 
especially in the scope of inquiry, the ADM/ADM-IBE uses semantic inconsistency 
as a part of its structure. While there is no necessity in reasons conflicting, the 
conclusions will, which gives due regard to our practical understanding that there 
are competing answers to a question. While this section is not a defence of the 
ADM/ADMIBE, it must be understood as an integral part of a semantic 
conception of inconsistency that can be embraced to provide plausible arguments.  
 
 A semantic conception of inconsistency works by noting a lack of harmony 
and/or agreement. While appeals to psychology and studies may be marshalled 
for this conception, another direction will be pursued. David Hume (1983:1516) 
wrote about the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, or approval and 
disapproval. Hume, in The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1983:44), 
stated that in the biggest or smallest judgements, these sentiments were 
operative and take place rather quickly. In short, a person gets a feeling one way 
or another about something. While it may be by experience, part of our education, 
innate, or by some other means, these feelings guide our judgement. Hume, 
however, warned us that reason should be brought in to justify or reject these 
feelings, or as he said to “examine” them (1983:15).  
 
If Hume is right and the extrapolation to argument is correct, one 
approaches an argument, and gets a feeling about it. While this may be read as a 
simple emotional reaction (and surely that is part of it), it is more likely a complex 
relationship founded on one’s knowledge, experience, inference abilities, and the 
argument context. If the context has semantic conflict, but the argument does not, 
as in the traditional argument form, a feeling of disapproval results as the 
argument does not properly articulate the situation. However, if the argument and 
context align, and the semantic conflict is properly articulated, at least the initial 
sentiment about the argument is approval. The semantic conflict itself does not 
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bring about an initial sentiment of disapproval. The normal reaction to semantic 
conflict, I suspect, only gets warped when one has a formal logical education 
where contradictions and inconsistency are bad.  The evidence for this claim rests 
on inconsistency in everyday life being a notion of conflict, without a necessary 
negative value. Where then does the negative value come from? Seemingly from 
outside of the conflict and through a perception of formal logic and how it dictates 
thought. Semantic conflict, when warped, then takes a different significance and 
arguments are schematised to purposely avoid this conflict.  
 
A theory of semantic inconsistency does justice to our ordinary perceptions 
of conflict. This conflict is often antonymic and relies on our basic linguistic 
competencies. Any logical inconsistency comes secondary to the semantic 
judgement. Indeed, as truth-values are not always known, a logical judgement 
founded on them is impotent. But truth matters, and is a focus of reasoning, so it 
is not completely done away with in this proposed model. Understanding, 
especially with natural language arguments, matters more as it does little good to 
know if something is true or false, but not to understand the argument. 
Understanding always precedes evaluation. By focusing on semantic 
inconsistency in an argument, one can ascertain whether the conflict affects the 
rationality of the argument, and if it does not, the value of the inconsistency is 
minimised. However, if the conflict does affect the rationality of the argument, one 
can look for contextual support to enable further understanding and potentially 
follow a direction in choosing one side of the conflict. In the rare cases where 
rationality is undermined through paralysis, the semantic conflict signals that it is 
time to start over. But this is the alternative at the end of the process, not the 
beginning where inconsistency may have the same paralysis for those not fully 
engaged in necessary analysis of semantic conflict. 
 
In this chapter, a theory of semantic inconsistency was put forth as 
representative of inconsistency judgements in everyday life. These judgements 
are based on semantic conflict, which is taken as prior to truth-values or logical 
form. These latter two concepts, as demonstrated in chapter two come from 
formal logic, most likely propositional logic given its incorporation into critical 
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reasoning courses.90  This incorporation of a formal logical system is questioned 
and criticised from a pedagogical perspective in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 See Dohman (2017), Heis (2016), May (2010), Michelfelder (2011), Monge (2015), Morton 
(2009), Price (2011), Poston (2012), Sun (2011), and Wallis (2017). 
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Chapter 5: Critiquing the pedagogy of propositional logic as critical 
reasoning 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
There is a pedagogical issue of whether the content of critical reasoning 
courses should overlap or even contain the same material as introduction to logic 
courses. One may argue that critical reasoning courses and introduction to logic 
courses should not be the same, or even a somewhat similar course. However, 
after a survey of textbooks on the market, it is hard to distinguish them in many 
cases – supposing the textbook and course align in name.91 Salmon (2012) 
confirms this attitude with its title Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking as a 
combination of both. The common difference is that critical reasoning texts include 
more about natural language but doing this with the taught logical system in mind 
– Aristotelian and/or propositional – and usually translation between natural 
language and the formal logical language.  
 
This chapter embraces a cautionary stance about the distinction between 
critical reasoning and introduction to logic courses. The distinction begins by 
considering the role of propositional logic in critical reasoning courses. 
Propositional logic is central to introduction to logic courses and no argument is 
being made to the contrary. When done properly, a progression from syllogistic 
logic to propositional logic displays a logical continuum and informs students on 
different systems of logic. This greater understanding is an integral part of 
introduction to logic courses, as the naïve conception is that there is only one 
logical system, whatever that may be.  
 
 
                                                          
91 Among those surveyed are: Bennett (2004), Cavendar and Kahane (2010), Cederblom and 
Paulsen (2005), Epstein and Rooney (2012), Gensler (2010), Groarke and Tindale (2012), Hurley 
(2014), Moore and Parker (2015), and Salmon (2012). 
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5.2 Critical reasoning v. introduction to logic 
 
The inspiration for this section comes from the informal reasoning 
movement.92 The informal reasoning movement began in North America in the 
1970’s (Groarke 2011:§1). This movement sought to distinguish formal reasoning 
from informal reasoning, and in doing so brought new thoughts on reasoning to 
the table. Critical reasoning courses are informal reasoning ideas in practical life. 
Groarke (2011:§10) writes that informal reasoning’s domain is at least the 
following: 
 
1. “an explanation of the rules of communication which argumentative exchange 
depends on; 
2. a distinction between different kinds of dialogue in which argument may occur, 
and the ways in which they control appropriate and inappropriate moves in 
argument (e.g. the difference between scientific discussion and the 
negotiation that characterises collective bargaining); 
3. an account of logical consequence, which explains when it can be said (and 
what it means to say) that one sentence is a logical consequence of another; 
4. general criteria for good argument, which may be associated with a theory of 
logical consequence, and which specify general criteria for deductive, 
inductive, and conductive arguments; 
5. definitions of positive argument schema which define good patterns of 
reasoning (reasonable appeals to authority, reasonable attacks against the 
person; etc.); 
6. some theoretical account of fallacies and the role they can (and cannot) play 
in understanding and assessing informal arguments; 
7. an account of the role that audience (pathos) and ethos and other rhetorical 
notions should play in analysing and assessing argument; 
8. an explanation of the dialectical obligations that attach to arguments in 
particular kinds of contexts.” 
 
Numbers 1 and 2 are communicative measures that set the context of argument in 
everyday life (2011:§10). We might ask, however if the curriculum design of 
introduction to logic courses allows enough emphasis on the communicative 
components such as communication rules, arguments in context, and informal 
argumentative moves? For example, imagine doing a predicate logic proof in the 
presence of the logically uninformed. What can you expect them to understand 
about it and its significance? Would this be the best argument to capture an 
argumentative context to the person without logical training? Probably not, as it is 
a misguided argument choice given its formal and technical nature in an ordinary 
                                                          
92 Of particular influence, Scriven’s (1976) seminal work on reasoning and one of his progenitors, 
Wright’s (1999) and (2001). Fogelin’s (1985) and (2003) are of substantial influence, too.  
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argumentative context. The same is said for someone who does not appeal to 
evidence in a scientific argument, instead appealing to emotion and questionable 
personal experience and expecting there is agreement on their reasons. Critical 
reasoning courses instruct on the relevance of context to argument and what 
counts as acceptable moves in that context. 
 
Number 3 in introduction to logic courses normally consists of the contrast 
between deductive validity and inductive strength (2011:§10). However, in critical 
reasoning, the important contrast is more likely the differences between 
monotonic and non-monotonic consequence relations (this is developed later in 
this chapter in detail), as the latter is more relevant to everyday reasoning 
practices, especially in a question and answer context where questions add or 
subtract reasons in support of a conclusion. This relation to everyday reasoning 
practice is important to the curriculum because students must have a connection 
to what we do when we reason in everyday circumstances, and that that form of 
reasoning is illuminating. So, there is a difference in what should be taught in 
each, and spending an undue amount of time teaching deductive validity misses 
the mark to ordinary reasoning and its application.  
 
Number 4 is immediately relevant to the course distinction (2011:§10). If all 
three types of arguments are important to informal reasoning, it seems that equal 
time should be spent on teaching all three and more importantly, the context of 
each justified. If argument is to be a tool for use, different tools perform different 
functions, and simply giving any argument type a priority over others a priori is 
misguided. From chapter two on propositional logic, the general criteria for a 
deductive argument is taught with validity and soundness, but the technical logical 
machinery of formal logic is not necessary. The same is said for general criteria of 
inductive arguments with strength, weak and strong, but the subtleties of 
mathematical statistical induction are not necessary. Both kinds of arguments 
have their place in a critical reasoning curriculum, but as contrasts to demonstrate 
distinct types of reasoning to students, and more importantly to aid them in 
coming to know how different it is from successful daily reasoning practices in 
natural language.  
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Conductive arguments have non-decisive premises but can be taken 
cumulatively (or not), to lead to a conclusion(s) (Govier 2009:353–373).93 In 
everyday reasoning, most arguments are conductive arguments, they are not 
deductively valid or inductively strong. Conductive arguments also may make a 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons, where the former have 
a truth-value and the latter do not (Adler 2013:6). Truth-values of reasons may not 
be known, so an argument type that works with non-epistemic reasons may be of 
noteworthy value to particular contexts. Conductive arguments have little said 
about them, in general, as they are not “paradigmatic” cases of argument, which 
are the subject of introduction to logic courses. So, by including them in a critical 
reasoning course, students have a nuanced view of argument types and their 
applications which are not found in introduction to logic courses. 
 
Number 5 illustrates content that should be in every critical reasoning 
course (2011:§10). This material delineates when a fallacy is not a fallacy, and the 
contextual subtlety of natural language arguments. Contextual use of argument 
with argument schemas give students the basis for applying the argument in 
everyday life. Students should not simply be given a logical tool and be expected 
to figure out how to use it. However, teaching contextual use and subtlety takes 
time and as a curricula issue, time management is imperative. Arguably this 
amount of time on context and use has a small place in an introduction to logic 
course, where logical formal systems and their generality should be the 
pedagogical emphasis as opposed to the development of contextual sensitivity. 
But the opposite holds for critical reasoning courses, where contextual sensitivity 
and its relation to argument take priority over formal systems and their concerns. 
Thus, critical reasoning courses have a unique role in fallacy comprehension and 
application, when considered contextually and not simply as a label of an 
apparent sentence type simpliciter.94  
                                                          
93 Conductive arguments typically include counter considerations, which demonstrate a limitation 
on the connection strength between reasons and conclusions (Wellman 1971:52). 
94 The point being made here is not an obvious one. It is my contention that students recognise 
precise elements about fallacy examples and look for those similarities in other sentences. For 
some, it may be the logical form, e.g. appeal to ignorance may have wording like “No one 
believes…” or the semantic content e.g. hyperbolic claims, such as, “She is a brain-dead 
blonde….”. That is part of the assessment, but without the context, the form and content alone are 
not enough to determine the fallacious nature of the position being put forth. 
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Number 6, unfortunately takes place in both introduction to logic courses 
and critical reasoning courses, but without any theoretical basis for fallacies 
(2011:§10). Fallacies may be taught in both courses in a universalistic sense that 
overrides contextual grounding, so the relevant situation linking details to settling 
whether the fallacy applies are left out. Introduction to logic courses that do not 
spend an adequate amount of time on natural language use, can result in the 
teaching of formal logic, which students are subsequently supposed to somehow 
attach to informal fallacies. The result is that the introduction to logic class is 
disjointed in content and conceptually misguided. The contrast to the universalistic 
theory of fallacies is the contextual one, where context fixes the value of the 
fallacy. Students in both formal and informal logic courses work through contrived 
fallacy exercises, however, the critical reasoning students at least have something 
to connect the theory to, namely with ordinary reasoning practices and context. If 
arguments in critical reasoning courses are taught contextually, then the proper 
ground for fallacies is in place for a robust understanding of fallacies in context. 
 
Number 7 is normally a function of argument and rhetoric courses in 
communications, psychology, and speech (2011:§10). Yet adequate attention 
should be given to the way emotion and psychology influences argument and how 
credibility matters to argument. Traditionally, this material is not covered in 
introduction to logic courses, but critical reasoning courses must make use of 
these concepts as they are relevant to argument context, especially a dialogical 
form of argument. Critical reasoning is not limited to formal relations and their 
evaluations. Instead the whole person and context are integrated in terms of 
understanding, feeling, and existing. Curricula demands a holistic approach 
showing how psychology and reasoning impact each other and how to make the 
most of each. 
 
Number 8 is exclusively the domain of critical reasoning courses where 
“premise ∴ conclusion”-type arguments do not exemplify arguments in ordinary 
discourse (2011:§10). There should be some understanding of how to incorporate 
typical argument forms into dialogue and not violate the rules of the dialogue. One 
for instance, a reductio, incorporates easily into a context where someone has an 
idea of proof and contradiction. But to verbally put forth a reductio in the wrong 
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audience, violates discourse norms, it is a potential context mismatch, and may be 
offensive, as it is not understood as it should or was meant to be. Historically, the 
obvious case of this dialectical consideration is Socrates, for instance in the 
Euthyphro in Plato’s Collected Works, (1961:169–185), and his use of the 
elenchus (Vlastos 1982:711–712). Reading Plato for argument strategy is but one 
means to practically see the importance of taking the norms of dialogue and 
argument seriously. It is a curricula stretch to envision how incorporating dialogical 
arguments into an introduction to logic course would be done effectively. Once 
again, concepts require connection to experience and students need practical 
examples. Students need to perform it to appreciate the benefits for refining 
personal reasoning skills. Thus, a critical reasoning course is the pedagogical and 
practical choice. 
 
Before moving forward, I want to minimise any confusion about the 
previous point(s) made, so I will bring them together. First, pedagogically, the 
content, both textbook and lecture, between some critical reasoning courses and 
introduction to logic courses overlap.95 This overlap may include both syllogistic 
and propositional logic. In terms of syllogistic logic, two sets of concepts include 
the square of opposition and the basic syllogistic formulation of a major and minor 
premise. Venn diagrams, as an extension of syllogistic logic, are also taught in 
both courses. In terms of propositional logic, truth tables are taught and some 
rules of implication like modus ponens and modus tollens, too. If the goal of a 
critical reasoning course is to use principles of informal reasoning, the overlap 
should be minimal as the formalisation undermines the natural semantic meanings 
and connections. 
 
 Second, as demonstrated in the Introduction, the use of introduction to 
logic textbooks is not uncommon in critical reasoning courses (Poston 2012, 
Farmer 2017, Berger 2017 and Dieveney 2017).96 Without supplemental material 
                                                          
95 See May (2010), Michelfelder (2011) and Poston (2012). 
96 See footnotes 9 and 10 for the specifics of the last three. 
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emphasising natural language reasoning, critical reasoning and introduction to 
logic courses become the same thing as far as content.97  
 
Third, we might question how sources are chosen and why. Unlike other 
philosophy courses that are conceptually based, competency based courses – 
like introduction to logic and critical reasoning – contain problems that must be 
solved. It is not uncommon for these sources to have solution manuals unlike 
other philosophy sources. Because of this problem-solving aspect, instructors may 
not be inclined to seek out new sources as that requires additional preparation 
effort and time. One explanation for this is that graduate students, who have 
worked through the problems with their professors, may be less inclined to adopt 
sources different from their professors when becoming the sole instructor of a 
course. If a graduate student, while functioning as a teaching assistant, uses an 
introduction to logic text for a critical reasoning course, the student may be less 
likely to change that text for the previously mentioned reasons about preparation. 
Another aspect of this may be that a graduate student, who becomes the sole 
instructor of a critical reasoning course, may not have a sufficiently rounded 
education to appreciate the differences between an introduction to logic course 
and a critical reasoning course. Thus, adopting the worked through sources 
becomes rote and part of the profession for some instructors. 
 
Finally, passing down the paradigm of syllogistic and propositional logic 
being the ideal forms of reasoning, is pernicious to developing students’ skill with 
natural language arguments. Some instructors of critical reasoning and 
introduction to logic courses do so because it is part of their teaching load, not 
because they are specialists in it. This lack of specialisation is likely masked by 
the assumption that professors, in general, are experts in critical reasoning by 
virtue of their advanced education and experience. When critical reasoning is 
understood as a field of specialisation its epistemic credibility takes on a new 
                                                          
97 A search of California State University Fullerton’s bookstore for Fall 2017, PHL 106 Introduction 
to Logic has instructor Farmer (2017) using Hurley’s Concise Introduction to Logic, which is the 
same text being used for PHIL 105 Critical Thinking by another instructor McFee (2017) 
(http://www.titanbookstore.com/CourseMaterials.aspx). At California State University Long Beach’s 
bookstore for Fall 2017, PHL 170 Critical Reasoning has instructors Berger (2017) and Dieveney 
(2017) using the same Hurley Concise Introduction to Logic text. 
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significance, which may decrease a conflation of the two courses. Arguably, when 
critical reasoning courses are taught with the focus on natural language 
arguments, they have a greater potential impact on one’s future educational 
success than many other undergraduate courses because they are competency, 
not knowledge, based. Critical reasoning courses impart a set of skills that will not 
only carry over to academia but across to everyday life, too. Introduction to logic 
courses also impart a set of skills, but it is not obvious that they are better for 
overall student success and carry over to other courses and life, especially when 
symbolisation and translation are the focus of the course. 
 
So much then for the difference between the two courses and textbooks. 
The common problematic element is propositional logic and its use as a 
fundamental part of critical reasoning courses. The material that follows critiques 
this approach as flawed and varies in applicability to students seeking to learn 
something about ordinary reasoning and improving one’s life with it. 
 
5.3 Translation problems undermine system application credibility  
 
As the previous section noted, translation from natural language into formal 
language is a part of the problem with logic texts. More so, in chapter three, 
examples of translation complications were detailed, which would also stem from 
logic texts and problems generated for student use. But to the extent to which 
these complications influence system credibility in application have not been 
addressed. So, a similar critique will follow, but first, the theoretical issue with 
natural language translation, even within itself, addresses a general problem with 
translation. From there, questions arise about the project of natural language 
translation into propositional logic, with few solutions, especially as far as 
pedagogy goes. 
 
Teaching at Rio Hondo College in Southern California, U.S.A., a two-year 
community college, is a diverse cultural experience. Over eighty percent of the 
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students are Hispanic.98 While there is no formal statistics regarding their fluency 
in various languages, many students are bilingual, to varying degrees, in Spanish 
and English. When these students take introduction to logic, their prior exposure 
to translation between natural language and logical formal language is minimal.99 
However, any bilingual student is at an advantage being bilingual because their 
ordinary understanding is that languages, which they are familiar with, do not 
always clearly translate or are isomorphic.100  
 
Translation for bilinguals, like monolinguals, becomes rule following, as the 
semantic content of the sentences is secondary to logical form. However, knowing 
two languages requires knowing two sets of rules, so following different linguistic 
rules is part of their human experience unlike the monolingual. When 
Spanish/English bilinguals have difficulty understanding how the material 
conditional and the indicative conditional in English are different, the use of 
translation examples between Spanish and English, is helpful. Or, understanding 
the mood difference may be easier in Spanish than English if one is a native 
Spanish speaker. Bilinguals understand, to that end, indeterminacy of translation, 
which paraphrased means “I don’t know the translation of that from language ‘x’ to 
language ‘y’, so I will do ‘z’”, is a practical everyday phenomenon.101 
 
The bilingual students may be at an early advantage in an introduction to 
logic course because of their everyday experience with translation. Grosjean 
(1989:6) notes:  
                                                          
98 For statistical verification of the student population, refer to: 
http://www.riohondo.edu/marketing/wp-
content/uploads/sites/23/2017/05/3RioFactsSheet22May2017.pdf.  
99 Approximately, 100 students take PHIL 112 Introduction to Logic every year. An initial 
assessment exercise on translation is given through an in-class assignment and then again on 
each exam. Outside of students versed in mathematics, translation into symbols is a foreign 
concept.   
100 One justification for this might be Grosjean (1989:6) where bilinguals are not represented as 
two monolinguals, but instead as integrated lingual, “The coexistence and constant interaction of 
the two languages in the bilingual has produced a different but complete linguistic entity.” The 
implication is that an integrated lingual will have a holistic understanding, which might make 
integrating logical translation easier due to familiarity with translation. It also implies that the “two 
monolingual” picture may set up a barrier due to the lack of holistic connection in use and 
meaning. 
101 Grosjean (1989:6) writes, “He or she has developed competencies (in the two languages and 
possibly in a third system that is a combination of the first two) to the extent required by his or her 
needs and those of the environment.” The parenthetical is of special interest because the third 
system seems to be what the logicians, through translation, desire.  
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“Because the bilingual is a human communicator, he or she has developed a 
communicative competence that is sufficient for everyday life. This competence 
will make use of one language, of the other language, or of the two together (in 
the form of mixed speech) depending on the situation, the topic, the interlocutor, 
etc.”  
 
However, monolingual students, especially highly competent language users, may 
suffer the most as the primacy of their natural language and contextual sensitivity 
leads them astray in the symbolic translation process. This is especially so when 
connective meaning in the natural language is different from connective meaning 
in the logical formal language. The material conditional may provide the most 
frustration in translation because monolingual students have difficulty 
understanding the logical connection in the sense of their natural language 
abilities.102  
 
This broader context of language use is rarely thought about for systematic 
understanding of propositional logic. Consider a student who is trilingual versus a 
student who is monolingual. The trilingual student will have more exposure to 
translations, differences in linguistic meanings, and varieties of uses in different 
contexts. Having a greater general understanding of language, the trilingual 
student might be better prepared. Thus, diverse students coming into a logic 
course are not on the same linguistic and conceptual level, especially those who 
are bilingual and trilingual versus monolingual. Monolingual students may have 
conceptual and practical difficulties – in ways that bilingual students do not – with 
a translation project nested in propositional logic.  
 
But a problem manifests for both groups. In a critical reasoning course, 
where propositional logic serves a foundational role about reasoning and 
inference, there is a subtle confusion that arises. Using the material conditional, 
as an example, students are taught that the material conditional and the indicative 
                                                          
102 Berlin (1990:79–80) writes, “Words mean, not by pinning down bits of reality, but by having a 
recognised use, i.e. when their users know how and in what situations to use them in order to 
communicate whatever they may wish to communicate; and for this there are no exhaustive formal 
rules. But because there is no single criterion of meaning and no single method or set of rules for 
testing it, it does not follow that there are in principle no criteria at all, no methods and no rules 
which may apply in differing types of context and situation.” The monolingual’s competency is 
holistic, if Berlin is right, and picking apart reality in a correspondence sense according to 
translation rules may be difficult and inaccurate.  
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or strict conditional are not the same thing. However, the material conditional is 
taught, and its truth conditions are held to be systematically correct, regardless of 
warnings that the material conditional means something different than the 
conditional in natural language. If students do not have a clear understanding of 
the differences they may then write essays containing conditional statements, 
think back to their translations into propositional logic, and assume they are using 
a material conditional. From a student’s perspective, why else would the material 
conditional be taught? In introduction to logic at Rio Hondo College, this confusion 
occurs more often in the bilingual group, who are following the rules of what they 
were taught and develop a misconception about the truth conditions of a material 
conditional in natural language.103 To this end, translation from natural language 
into the language of propositional logic harms understanding of natural language 
and its proper use. Berlin (1999:80) confirms these thoughts, “… logical 
translation continues to be misused, particularly when attempts are made to force 
propositions, on pain of degradation or even elimination, to conform to some 
uniform model, and so to rob them of their most important uses and differences.” 
 
Simply, if translating the natural language into the language of propositional 
logic, and its truth conditions for the material conditional had not been part of the 
critical reasoning course, it is likely that this confusion would have never gained 
traction. Students, rightly so, believe there is relevance of material in the class and 
that it is taught for a reason, not simply to be taught because it has been that way 
in the past. Further, the time spent teaching translation and propositional logic in 
general, in the overall scope of a critical reasoning course, gives the impression of 
its importance to students when that importance does not connect with its 
practical relevance to ordinary reasoning. Thus, the inclusion of translation into 
propositional logic can have unintended consequences when it is a significant part 
of a critical reasoning course.  
 
                                                          
103 An informal survey of participation denotes that the number of hands that go up and questions 
asked, is related to the use of the material conditional and why it is taught if it is not the same 
meaning as in natural language. The previous quote by Berlin demonstrates the issue with the 
correspondence view of language, which is what propositional logic translation relies on. The lack 
of correspondence is confusing to students with the material conditional and especially those whose 
primary language is not English.  
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Gensler (2010:118–21), LeBlanc and Wisdom (1993:1–17), Howson 
(1997:5–7), and Nolt (1997:31–35) for instance, teach translation by starting with 
simple sentences, progressing to compound sentences with the logical 
connectives obvious. From there, more difficult translations confront the student 
without the clear logical vocabulary of the defined connectives. Students typically 
model what their instructor teaches, and follow the same moves. Some instructors 
translate the subject; others the predicate and both use the corresponding 
symbol; “Bill is happy” translates as either “B” or “H.” The chosen letters in some 
sense identify the sentence.104 But this is the specious move in one sense. As 
syntactic propositional logic is an uninterpreted system (and semantic is only 
interpreted with truth-values), the only relevant difference is symbol shape 
difference. Students, however, take that connection as meaningful as a place 
holder of content, not as a substantive representative of the robust semantic 
content of the sentence.  
 
While it is difficult to articulate the following, an attempt follows. 
Ostensively, instructors point to the symbols on the board or overhead, and 
equate the meaning of the sentence to them. This presentation happens swiftly, 
with precision. The implication is the symbols have the same meaning as the 
sentence. Students see the correspondence and the practice is solidified. Little do 
the students know that the sentence and symbols cannot, however, have the 
same meaning because the logical system is uninterpreted and any meaning is 
intrasystematically justified. At best, the instructor is highlighting a paraphrase of 
some component of inference. There is not much more to it. 
 
The lack of correspondence leads to another problematic point about 
translation and propositional logic. Syntactic and semantic propositional logic are 
intrasystematic in meaning. They define themselves in terms of the meaning of 
symbols and connectives; they define acceptable moves through rule use. If it is a 
formal system, it stands uninterpreted. When translating natural language into the 
                                                          
104 Klenk (2008:28) offers a slightly different translation suggestion: “We will generally use the first 
letter of the sentence being symbolized, or at least some letter that reminds us of the meaning of 
the sentence.” How does a letter remind us of a meaning of a sentence? The equivalency 
relationship is an odd one because what is on one side of the equality sign (A = “Alan is home”.) is 
completely different in meaning and seems an odd use of both “meaning” and “equals.” 
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language of propositional language, an interpreted system is thought of in terms 
of an uninterpreted system–and we have to question if that is correct.  
 
An analogy might be helpful. A spreadsheet is an electronic means of 
organising data. It does so per rules and symbols. Put accounting data into it, 
such as a balance sheet, it organises the data one way. Enter student grades into 
it, such as a grade book for a semester, it organises the data in another way. The 
organisational aspect varies on use. The spreadsheet licences particular moves, 
but it does not licence all moves. The programming controls the content. 
Propositional logic, in general, does something very similar, it controls the content 
in a way that determines particular results. If, for instance, the translation is from 
an argument on science, ultimately science does not matter. If the translation is 
from an argument on familial relationships, ultimately the family does not matter. 
What matters are the intrasystematic moves in syntactic propositional logic, not 
relevance of content (among premises when relational), not natural language 
meaning, and not the intent of the argument.  
 
That last phrase might be surprising. The intent of the argument is to 
provide truth (and/or understanding) but not based on some ad hoc translation 
into a logical system. Propositional logic translations – either semantic or syntactic 
– do not capture the extrasystematic context of arguments. When the connectives 
do not have the same meaning as natural language – in particular, the disjunction 
and material conditional – there is a gap in translation of logical structure and 
associated truth-values. Thus, representation lacks for both propositional and 
natural languages.  
 
Truth conditions have connection with the normal world of discourse and 
thus retain some relevance in translation and practice. But what about the 
syntactic side of propositional logic? The well-formed formulas or WFFs have 
different meanings in syntactic propositional logic, that is, they are merely defined 
by their rule use, not truth conditions. This thesis explains the syntactic rules in 
terms of natural language, but that alone is an interpretation of an uninterpreted 
system. The meaning of the WFFs is their transformational role into other 
symbols, that is, the transformation game. This is a subtle point. Is the basis for 
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natural language meaning its transformation into other symbols? No, natural 
language meaning is much more complex, as it is extrasystematic. It relies on 
linguistic relations, context, and use. Syntactic WFFs do not represent these three 
ideas well at all, if at all, with their own intrasystematic meaning. An objection to 
this line of thinking is that they do not have to, all they should do is model the 
inference and learn something from that sequence. How is the inference from 
natural language modelled, or translated through WFFs and their manipulation? 
There is not only a translation issue with natural language and WFFs, there is also 
a translation issue from natural language inference meaning and transformational 
meaning in propositional logic.  
 
Pedagogically, a crisis may result for the instructor. Does the instructor tell 
students that translation in propositional meaning captures natural language 
meaning? If the instructor does, it is more likely due to incompetency or lack of 
critical reflection than being devious. The instructor is following a pattern of 
instruction and doing what they were taught or told.105 Or, does the instructor do 
the honest thing and point out the differences between the two and accept the 
consequences of a lack of credibility? If propositional logic is taught as the best or 
acceptable form of reasoning in a critical reasoning course, an instructor is left 
with a credibility challenge. Students quickly catch on that natural language 
reasoning and propositional logic reasoning are different. Once they are taught 
the propositional system in a course, its use is minimal. The system, more or less, 
stands alone for further use, if at all.  
 
Course context defines course content and critical reasoning courses differ 
in context dealing with the nuances of everyday reasoning in natural language, so 
the content should be different reflecting this priority on natural language.  But that 
is of natural language as it is; without the translation, the dismissed context, and 
the formal caricature of ordinary reasoning manifested in propositional logic. 
                                                          
105 There is another explanation. “Course outline of records” are official documents that document 
and prescribe the content that must be taught in a course. Introduction to logic outlines were 
written by faculty, as were critical reasoning outlines. In one sense, this is a higher-level problem 
as anyone teaching the courses has to incorporate that content. So, the instructor is being “told” 
what to teach through the course outline of record, which owes it origin to faculty members in the 
past. 
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5.4 Formalism is distinct from human reasoning practices  
 
Students’ exposure to formal symbol manipulation happens through 
elementary algebra and geometry. Mathematical systems, by their nature, are the 
paradigms of formal systems. When done properly students can see the 
connection between symbolic mathematical and algebraic subjects and the world. 
But there is always a disconnect. Astute students can solve natural language 
algebraic problems without appealing to the formal system. With normal reasoning 
tools and simple logic, the same result is obtainable. Translation problems, like 
those between formal logic and natural language, manifest in mathematics 
education, too.  
 
Human beings, being self-conscious, can abstract from their immediate 
experience and think about that experience, as an experience. The experience 
can be compared and contrasted with other experiences. Thomas Nagel (1989:4–
5) designates this as the subjective/objective distinction. Through self-
consciousness, humans individually, have personal subjective experiences but 
also objective experience. That is to say, humans consider their own personal 
view in relation not only to other views, but in relation to views abstract from all 
individual views, such as the view of science, or even further, the view from 
eternity (1986:4–5).  
 
This ability to abstract is the source of formalism. In one sense, the concept 
of propositions – ideas that are not bound to any particular language – abstract 
content from any one particular language. A more objective standpoint justifies 
that languages have the “same” ideas, so a logic of those propositions is what is 
in order. The next step is to further represent through symbols another abstraction 
from propositions, particular forms, and relationships. So, there are two potential 
steps of abstraction at work. 
 
In contemporary propositional logic, the intermediate step, is left out. The 
idea of a logic of “propositions” is controversial, so understanding the language 
itself in terms of specific forms and symbols results. In one sense, the propositions 
add intelligibility to the picture as the intermediate step in translation, as what one 
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is doing is just a general logic of ideas. But the structuring is that a higher-order 
abstraction represents a lower order abstraction, which then represents natural 
language. 
 
In either case, whether sentences lead to propositions, which lead to 
logical form, or sentences without propositions lead to logical form, the result is 
the same. The abstraction leads to formalism, which is devoid of the content of the 
original sentences. Nagel (1971:722) writes: “Consequently, the absurdity of our 
situation derives not from a collision between our expectations and the world, but 
from a collision within ourselves.” This formalism is the result of the application of 
self-consciousness to human practice. As humans, this abstraction is taken far 
more seriously than it should be at times. It may be that abstraction and formalism 
are just arrogance, personified in the scheme of living things.  
 
However, it is in the nature of education to teach abstraction. Humans 
seem to value it. And, yes, there are uses for it. Structural engineering relies on 
the ability to understand higher-order mathematics like calculus. Much of our 
abstract processes are now automated or calculations done through complex 
programmes that minimise human error. One way to understand this is that the 
abstraction no longer matters like it once did, but what matters is the result. The 
result is grounded in human practice, for instance, whether a building’s floor can 
support the load.  
 
In the practice of everyday reasoning, the content of the argument is 
understood in that context. Abstraction producing formalism is an unnecessary 
step for most everyday arguments, as the context does not dictate this move. 
Introducing formalism, in the logical sense in this type of context, can lead one 
astray from the semantic point. Formalism makes sense in mathematical 
reasoning even in those discussions as the context gives licence to that use. But 
that context is, typically, radically different than what takes place in our ordinary 
reasoning practices. Therefore, students need to be taught the limits and scope of 
formalism and the bias toward formalism as ideal. It is not that formalism 
simpliciter is bad; it is but a tool and tools have appropriate uses. But, formalism 
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and critical reasoning do not share a lot of common uses, especially as formal 
articulations of ordinary language arguments.  
 
5.5 Formalised deductive reasoning is rarely done naturally  
 
Someone can live a whole lifetime and never formally translate and 
symbolise an argument. More so, this same person can reason effectively, 
provide good arguments, and live a good life without propositional logic. This fact 
should be disturbing to classical logicians as it demonstrates something about the 
nature of argument in everyday life versus the formal caricatures of propositional 
logic. It should be equally disturbing to those who teach critical reasoning and 
include propositional logic as the deductive standard of reasoning.  
 
Consider the following argument:  
 
1. Jane’s mom has been sick with the flu. 
2. Jane has a fever.  
3. Jane missed work.  
_________________________________ 
Thus, Jane probably has the flu.  
 
An attempt to put this in propositional argument form might be:  
 
1. S 
2. F 
3. M 
_______ 
 Thus, P 
 
The argument is not a typical deductive argument given the lack of logical 
language and does not easily translate into propositional logical form. Students 
who have been taught the deductive propositional apparatus see that it is not a 
deductive argument, and might conclude it is not a good argument, because it is 
not deductively valid. Little do they know, however, that the reasoning is almost 
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the same as a medical doctor would use to diagnose someone with an illness like 
influenza. Looking at symptoms and context, the medical doctor’s argument 
makes for a reasonable inference. Yes, the medical doctor could be wrong, as the 
truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed by the truth of the combined premises. 
But would the argument be better if its characterisation (among others) were 
deductively valid?106  Such as this formulation?  
 
1. If Jane’s mother had the flu, Jane has a fever.  
2. If Jane has a fever, Jane missed work.  
3. If Jane missed work, Jane has the flu. 
______________________________________ 
If Jane’s mother had the flu, Jane has the flu.  
 
Judge the two arguments for contextual relevance. Does the propositional 
argument in valid deductive argument form have the same meaning as the non-
deductive version? Does it capture the same intent? Arguably, they are different 
arguments and it is not clear that the deductively valid one is better than the non-
deductive one in terms of plausibility and accuracy.  
 
Many academics across the behavioural and social sciences, mathematics 
and sciences, and career and technical education would concur that they have 
never come across any instance of formal, symbolic logical reasoning outside of 
school or higher education courses. Every semester – upon concluding my 
introduction to formal logic course (not in my critical reasoning course), students 
are asked whether they will use propositional logic again? Normally, only 
philosophy or mathematics majors answer in the affirmative.107 The future holds, 
but the impression that the application of propositional logic is limited, if at all, it is 
substantive. That perception underwrites a legitimate pedagogical concern with 
                                                          
106 Part of the issue here is what counts as an adequate translation from a non-deductive argument 
into a valid deductive argument form. The reasons are offered as a group in the first argument and 
that sets the context for judging the plausibility of the conclusion. The valid argument has a chain of 
reasoning, but all valid arguments – to some extent – link the premises and conclusion. There are 
other ways to deductively characterise the argument, and this leads to another translation issue. 
What is the best semantic characterisation of a non-deductive argument in valid deductive form? 
There are no obvious rules for that characterisation. 
107 While anecdotal, I’ve had over 1200 students in that course or a similar one in 18 years of 
teaching.  
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the inclusion of propositional logic into a critical reasoning course, especially when 
the concern is answered in a course just focusing on logical systems and 
translation like introduction to logic. 
 
The fact that the practice of deductive, formalised propositional logic does 
not reveal a change in academic or practical behaviour of even those in the 
academy should be indicative of its veracity as a practical form of reasoning. This 
is not to say it could not be used if necessary as philosophers do as part of their 
professional practice, but it does not appear to be necessary for a good life of a 
competent reasoner. Is this simply a utilitarian concern, such that the argument is 
only concerned with the practical and not the theoretical? In scope, propositional 
logic has use in philosophy, as the literature contains the use of the concepts. But 
critical reasoning courses are general education courses, where students learn 
skills that transfer not only to their education but to life. Thus, pedagogically, one 
should question why propositional logic is taught in critical reasoning courses as 
the correct way to reason. 
 
5.5.1 Pre-propositional logic education versus post-propositional logic 
education  
 
Pre-propositional logic education students reason effectively. 
Demonstrating this is straightforward as they function in the world and perform 
basic logical tasks of inferring such as:  
 
1. The classroom door is locked. 
2. No one is in the hallway.  
3. Knocking on the door produced no results. 
4. It is 20 minutes after the starting time. 
____________________________________ 
Thus, class must be cancelled.  
 
Students have basic inference abilities that are the product of many years of 
experience with the world, education, and facts of science about how the body 
works. These natural reasoning practices are sufficient for everyday use. They are 
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not perfect and do not guarantee certainty. But the world is a changing place and 
ideas must change to fit the world and its changing context, especially when 
human behaviour is a large part of the equation.  
 
Suppose students take a critical reasoning class that draws a three–way 
distinction between reasoning: presumptive or defeasible, inductive, and 
deductive. Presumptive is like the classroom example above, there is a plausibility 
assessment of the conclusion related to the relevance of the reasons.108 
Inductivism has a logical consequence relation where the truth of the premises 
does not necessarily entail the truth of the conclusion. Premises vary on strength; 
stronger premises lead to a greater likelihood of the conclusion being true than 
weaker premises. Deductivism has the logical consequence relation where true 
premises must entail a true conclusion. This three–way distinction is important to 
compare and contrast distinct kinds of reasoning. However, a bias may enter the 
picture, as an example, Walton (2006:53) writes:  
 
“If an inference to a conclusion can be supported or refuted very effectively by 
inductive methods, then the need or usefulness of judging it as plausible or not as 
a presumptive inference falls away. In general, if an argument can be evaluated 
on a basis of probability, then evaluating it as plausible or implausible becomes 
less useful. Methods of plausible reasoning give way to inductive evidence, if it is 
available. Similarly, inductive evaluation gives way to deductive logic, if it can be 
usefully applied to a case.”109 
 
Walton’s argument hierarchy of strength runs from defeasible to inductive to 
deductive, where all can be applied appropriately. With a logical consequence 
relation, this hierarchy of strength runs in the right direction. But, the question 
arises about the hierarchy and its role in pedagogy: does this capture what the 
content should be in a critical reasoning class?  
 
                                                          
108 Walton (2006:18) writes, “Presumptive defeasible generalizations are the least strict, because 
they are based on what is assumed to be a familiar or typical situation, but one where there is 
inexact and incomplete knowledge on how things might go.” 
109 Walton (2006:71) notes the difference between plausibility and probability. He writes, “Plausibility 
is different from probability. Probability is determined by collecting data on the statistical chances of 
what happened, and then using that data to judge how likely a statement is to be true. Plausibility is 
a matter of whether a statement appears to be true in a normal type of situation that is familiar both 
to the participants and the onlookers.” 
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Suppose students are taught deductive propositional logic as the proper 
way to reason by the hierarchy. They learn truth tables and the values of the 
connectives/operator, and maybe proofs. They are taught principles of inference 
like conjunctive syllogism, disjunctive syllogism, modus ponens, and modus 
tollens. They are also taught the formal fallacies of denying the antecedent and 
affirming the consequent, and Walton’s hierarchy for application purposes and 
they have obtained a new set of tools and understanding. 
 
Accordingly, with the hierarchy in mind, students evaluate arguments, 
remembering that deductive arguments are the “best” in the hierarchy. They were 
also taught that propositional logic is the proper expression of that type of 
argument. As arguments go in everyday life, they realise that the argument does 
not fit the deductive structure, nor is it inductive as probability or likelihood is not 
part of the calculation. So, the students characterise the argument as a defeasible 
argument. But in the back of their minds, they think that the argument is not a 
good one because it falls last on the hierarchy. This pattern repeats for ordinary 
arguments.  
 
In ordinary experience, there are inductive arguments, but rarely are there 
deductive arguments that can be put in propositional form and evaluated for either 
semantic or syntactic validity. Eventually students cognise that propositional 
logic’s deductive arguments are rare. They may begin to wonder if they are doing 
something wrong, surely, they must be more common as their critical reasoning 
instructors spent a great deal of time teaching this form of argument. No, the 
reality is that propositional logic does not have a lot of import to their ordinary 
reasoning experiences and they seem to get along fine without it. But, they also 
recognise that they cannot get away from their ordinary reasoning and its own 
importance.  
 
Pedagogically then, what should the response be of the critical reasoning 
instructor? Post-propositional logic education did not benefit the student 
practically as it did not give a skill set that is effective in daily life. The hierarchy 
sets students up for anticipating that propositional logic—especially when taught 
as the exemplar of deductive logic, is useful, when particular conditions hold, and 
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the result will be stronger than the other two types of arguments. In contrast, the 
response should be that while the logical consequence relationship is different, 
different contexts need different arguments. There should be no argument 
hierarchy in the pedagogy of critical reasoning, so the application of concepts for 
the student is bias free. More so, propositional logic, is likely further to the “strong” 
side of the hierarchy than simple valid deductive arguments in natural language or 
even syllogistic arguments. From the critical reasoning perspective, propositional 
logic is a caricature of deductive reasoning with its symbolic form and connectives 
that differ from natural language meaning. Hence, in a critical reasoning course 
teaching something about deductive and inductive arguments is necessary. But, 
the context of use should be the message driven home to students and without a 
bias toward arguments based on the difference in a logical consequence relation. 
This effectively orients students’ post-propositional logic education. Practically, 
students will then use the argument type needed to provide good reasons for a 
conclusion in the appropriate context, which I propose to be reasoning in 
everyday life.  
 
5.6 The ideal of formal reasoning is not the “ideal” for critical reasoning  
 
Reasoning abstracted from human experience might reveal an ideal along 
the thoughts of Plato’s simile of the line in the Republic (1961:509d–511a), where 
the physical world is secondary to the intelligible world, which is accessible 
through the mind alone. Mathematics is part of the intelligible world, as is formal 
logic. The roots of an ideal, especially as it relates to mathematics and the forms 
comes from Plato and his influence is still being felt through this emphasis on the 
abstract being “pure” instead of “clouded” by reality. This “cloudy” nature is an 
unfortunate consequence of an idealistic metaphysic.  
 
Critical reasoning is, by its nature, “clouded” by human practices and a 
changing practical reality. The argument that follows in this section exposes 
various problems with propositional logic as an “ideal” with respect to critical 
reasoning and its pedagogy. This includes the tension with two types of validity, 
informal and formal. More so, truth functions in practice follow validity judgements, 
which the latter seem disconnected from in ordinary arguments. The two-step 
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procedure of assessing validity and then soundness complicates argument 
evaluation unnecessarily. 
  
5.6.1 Validity and truth functions in practice  
 
Students who are taught a typical definition of deductive validity – if all the 
premise(s) are true, the conclusion must be true – should understand the 
hypothetical nature of the definition. The “if” aspect of the definition of deductive 
validity functions to test the structure or form of the argument. In a practical sense, 
this logical deductive structure guarantees the transfer of truth from the premises 
to the conclusion. So, the validity test is one logical structure or form, and not the 
semantic content of the premises. But this conception of “validity” is overstated 
and carries two conceptualisations thereof.  
 
There is a subtle move that goes with an appeal to formal deductive 
validity. Those learning propositional logic still considers the content of the natural 
language sentences in form. But the semantic content is irrelevant to addressing 
the structure of the argument in a valid formal deductive argument. What might be 
a better definition would be along the lines of: if the logical form(s) of the 
sentence(s) is true, the logical form of the conclusion must be true.  Thinking 
about modus ponens, the structural form is: a conditional, affirming the 
antecedent of the conditional and then affirming the consequent of the conditional. 
In other words, when there is a conditional, its antecedent, the consequent 
follows, regardless of content. This is a structural interpretation of formal validity, 
or propositional logic validity. 
 
This interpretation of propositional validity is distinguished from an appeal 
to “informal” validity. A simple argument:  
 
1. Scott is 6 feet tall.  
2. Bill is 7 feet tall.  
3. 6 is less than 7. 
 
Bill is taller than Scott.  
207 
 
 
This argument has no obvious logical or structural form like modus ponens. 
However, the argument is deductively valid. Without the obvious logical form that 
guarantees the transfer of truth from the premises to the conclusion, the content 
of the premises must do the logical work to secure validity. Informal validity looks 
much more like the initial definition, where if the content is true in the premises, 
the content in the conclusion must be true as well.  Therefore, validity with 
deductive arguments appears to be of two kinds: formal and informal.  
 
Informal validity has a place in critical reasoning as it considers the 
semantic content of the premises in determinations of validity, in some degree not 
found in the formal sense of validity, which is only about logical structure. The 
semantic content is important, as critical reasoning is not entirely abstract and 
provides traction for understanding. This is where logica utens informs logica 
docens. 
 
But both kinds of validity, however, suffer from another problem with 
abstraction: the role of hypothetical judgements in everyday life. On any definition 
of deductive “validity” a hypothetical judgement is made about an argument, 
whether to assess a semantic or syntactic necessary connection. How often are 
hypothetical judgements in use in everyday life? Take the earlier argument about 
“class being cancelled.” Would taking that argument hypothetically to test for 
deductive validity add anything to the argument making it a better argument? 
Hypothetical argument tests distract from the relevant issue of the value of the 
argument, whether it is good or bad. “Good” or “bad” here concern the relevance 
of the premises to the conclusion, and their relationship to the world and common 
knowledge. This is a very important point because a formal or informal valid 
deductive argument can be a bad argument. For example:  
 
1. Bill weighs 100 kgs. or Barack Obama is Russian. 
2. Bill does not weigh 100 kgs. 
 
          Barack Obama is Russian. 
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The argument form is disjunctive syllogism, which is valid under the formal 
definition of “validity.” By an ordinary assessment, it is a bad argument because 
the content of the argument is false and it is irrelevant to almost any context.  
 
On the paradigm of propositional deductive validity being the ideal standard 
for articulating the relationship between the premises and conclusion, “validity” is 
an evaluative concept. “Soundness” is as well, ascertaining the truth of the 
premises. But it is a two-step model that is inefficient with ordinary natural 
language arguments where judgements of semantic and truth relevance are made 
rather quickly. Validity judgements might be a waste of time supposing someone 
concludes it is not a valid argument. Does one then try to force it into a different 
deductive form and reassess? Or does one think of it in a defeasible way and 
continue with assessment? In either case, simply skipping the validity test would 
allow a relevance judgement about the argument that for practical purposes may 
be all that is needed.110  
 
As Walton (2006:52–53) writes about the hierarchy of arguments, one 
should try, when available, to use the deductive form of argument given its 
necessary consequence relation. Walton (2006:52–53) is correct in one sense of 
the hierarchy: do not use logical machinery until you need to, and this should be 
taught to students. If evaluating an argument follows from just assessing its 
premise and conclusion relationship in terms of plausibility, why even consider 
using formal or informal validity, or even inductive strength? This strategy could 
allow room for the hierarchy but in the way of assessing what is most common in 
argument, in the most straightforward way from everyday human experience. 
Using hypothetical tests in contexts that do not warrant it defies the effectiveness 
of everyday argument in providing understanding and even persuasion in the 
world.  Those learning the concepts then use what they are most familiar with and 
may confidently assess the argument unless there is a reason not to.  
 
                                                          
110 Throughout chapters four through six, I use “may” and “might” and other words to qualify 
statements. Some may see this as waffling; however, the thesis itself takes into account that 
context matters and exclusive statements just repeat the problem of using propositional logic as a 
way of critical reasoning. Context matters to relevance and is not subject to definitive rules of 
structure or content.  
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Philosophers often use abstract thought experiments, such as in ethics and 
metaphysics. The trolley problem (Thomson 1985:1395), for instance, where one 
considers the appropriate action of whether hitting one person or five people with 
a runaway trolley relies on thought experiment and hypothetical situation. The 
value of these hypothetical abstractions to the philosophical enterprise has 
significance; but to critical reasoning the value is questionable. The latter must 
have traction in the world of human relations and improve real-world argument 
articulation and evaluation. Pedagogically, addressing this traction early in a 
critical reasoning class, keeps students focused upon relevant arguments from 
everyday life in contrast to mental exercises generated by hypotheticals.  
 
Hypothetical assessments, like formal and informal validity, miss the mark 
in most ordinary reasoning contexts except in cases of assuming counterfactual 
conditions. Suppose most evidence points to “Person A” as the person who 
committed a crime. “Person B” has some evidence but not enough to convince, 
given what holds for “Person A.” Supposing a counterfactual condition, as well as 
the current evidence against “Person B,” may demonstrate the relevance of that 
piece of evidence to the situation, or if “Person B” should be taken more or less 
seriously. So, hypothetical assessments are a tool having a context for use, but 
whether they are necessary for argument in general through validity justifications 
does not follow. 
 
Pedagogically then, care must be taken when entertaining any definition of 
“validity” in a critical reasoning course, as both introduce a hypothetical abstract 
situation, with the argument suspended from the practical world of human 
experience. Consequently, instructors must be on guard for the bias toward 
validity, as if it has something important to claim about everyday arguments 
related to human experience. This is even more so when using propositional 
validity as articulating something about normal reasoning practices, when there is 
no clear connection. While deductive validity is an extremely important concept in 
introduction to logic courses, it does not retain that significance in critical 
reasoning courses, and introduces potential hazards into the curriculum. 
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One such hazard is the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. By 
propositional logic, this argument is invalid: 
 
1. (P ⊃ Q) 
2.  Q 
 
∴ P 
 
Either through semantic and syntactic assessment, the argument is invalid. This is 
a general judgement of its formal logical relations alone. Deductively, through the 
“invalidity” label, students believe this argument form is deeply flawed.111 Yes, in 
propositional logic, the result is a flawed structure. Consider the following natural 
language argument in affirming the consequent form: 
 
1. If h pylori is bacteria, then antibiotics kill h pylori.  
2. Antibiotics kill h pylori. 
 
 H pylori is bacteria. 
 
This is a singular instance of the problematic form and logical relations. The 
argument is a good inference in terms of relevance and rationality. The general 
logical implicative form and a singular semantic inferential instance conflict in 
logical evaluation, as the general logical form is invalid but the singular instance is 
rational in terms of semantic inference. The question arises, should this argument 
be simply labelled “invalid” due to its problematic propositional logical form, or 
should the argument’s assessment consist of its semantic content connection 
(and its truth-values) without regard to form? More importantly, the singular 
instance is one instance of many with the use of this argument form in ordinary 
reasoning, where a causal relation exists (or appears to), the effect is known to be 
true, so the cause must be true as well. The reasoning is from effect to cause. 
                                                          
111 But, pedagogically the assessment of “invalidity” is only clear if one understands the truth table 
or system of implication. It is not obvious to someone who does not have a formal logical 
education.  
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Semantic content links the effect to the cause regardless of the logical structure. 
Thus, the conflict is one of semantics versus syntax.  
 
Pedagogically, students must understand the charge of “invalidity” and how 
it applies in the context of propositional logic and is limited elsewhere. Implication 
and inference are different. Even the notion of “fallacy” here poisons the well 
against singular instances of the form with rational semantic content and 
inferences. Invalid implications in propositional logic may be good inferences in 
other contexts and it is the job of the critical reasoning instructor to present 
various arguments as acceptable, given contextual considerations. Most ordinary 
language arguments have semantic content that links the premises to the 
conclusion, so criticisms of logical form are not always appropriate. These 
subtleties of reasoning and application are the domain of critical reasoning 
pedagogy and should not be eschewed for generality via the concepts of “valid” 
and “invalid.” Life is general, living is not, so singular applicative instances matter.  
 
5.6.2 Monotonicity v. non-monotonicity  
 
The traditional logical consequence relationship is monotonic (Strasser and 
Antonelli 2016). A monotonic relationship between premises and conclusion is 
when additional premises do not change the conclusion. In contrast, a non-
monotonic relationship between premises and a conclusion is when additional 
premises can change the conclusion (Strasser and Antonelli 2016). 
 
Suppose both consequence relations, α⊧β and α⊢β. With the addition of 
premises to the existing premises results in α· γ⊧β and α· γ ⊢β.  The fact that γ is 
added to the existing premises and the conclusion or result does not change 
shows that both relations are monotonic. Contrastively, suppose both 
consequence relations, α· γ⊧β v θ and α· γ⊢β v θ. The fact that γ is added to the 
existing premises and θ is added to the conclusion indicates that both relations 
are non-monotonic. While the consequence symbols remain the same, the non-
monotonic consequence relation is different given how the additional premise(s) 
manifest in a different conclusion. 
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Propositional logic implications and “arguments” are monotonic. Additional 
information still entails the same conclusion. In this sense, a single argument is 
not subject to revision if additional information is available; instead, a new 
argument must be made to include the additional information and possibly new 
conclusion. This process is different from how humans naturally reason when 
additional information is available.  Non-monotonic arguments are defeasible 
arguments where additional information added to the premises may lead to a 
different conclusion(s). This form of argument is dynamic and ever-changing with 
additional information, as new conclusions can follow. Monotonic arguments are 
implicative, rules determine the result; non-monotonic arguments are not, they are 
inferential where beliefs determine the result or results. 
 
In the context of critical reasoning, non-monotonic arguments fit a bigger 
picture of inquiry. An argument model is only as effective as the person using it 
competently and for its proper purpose. Someone engaging in an inquiry is an 
inquirer who should possess a few basic characteristics. There are three 
characteristics that are important to delineate. If someone were to fail on any one 
of these, communicative disruptions like disagreement, misunderstanding, and/or 
alienation may take place. All three come from Cherniak’s (1981) work on minimal 
rationality. The first one is the basic rationality principle: if a person has a 
particular group of beliefs and desires, the person would undertake some, but not 
necessarily all, of those actions that are appropriate in the context (1981:166). 
 
The basic rationality requirement ensures that a person operates from a 
belief set. To understand someone’s belief set, is to determine what actions that 
person might perform in that context. Owing to a shared worldview, we 
understand that most of us make sense of each other’s actions and what we 
might do in particular contexts. However, imagine someone who acts outside of 
one’s belief set, or does not perform any of the actions that are appropriate in the 
context. The person’s rationality might be challenged. Considering this basic 
structure of shared worldview, reasons can be added to arguments resulting in 
new conclusions as part of ordinary reasoning practices. 
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The basic rationality requirement also is considerate of diverse cultures and 
groups. Rationality is defined by a particular group of beliefs, and, as is commonly 
known, diverse cultures believe different things. This is a very important point. The 
basic rationality requirement permits us to understand their beliefs as something 
distinct from ours, understand their actions, and make adjustments that hopefully 
facilitate understanding, which is another example of non-monotonicity.  
 
The second requirement is the basic consistency principle: if a person has 
a specific group of beliefs and desires, then if any inconsistencies arose in that 
group of beliefs, the person would sometimes eliminate some of them given the 
context (Cherniak 1981:172–173). 
 
The basic consistency requirement ensures that a person does not adopt 
radically inconsistent beliefs and seek to maintain them. Sexism is a belief that is 
inconsistent in many people. A person might have a general position of being a 
sexist; yet, knowing someone from another gender/sex, the person may exclude 
them from the category of derision. So, the person believes a particular sex is 
inferior, but not this one representative of it. The basic consistency requirement 
would challenge one of those beliefs and require revision for consistency’s sake, 
which is another example of non-monotonicity in belief and argument revision. 
 
The third requirement is a basic inference ability such that: if a person has 
a particular group of beliefs and desires, the person would make some, but not 
necessarily all, of the correct inferences from that belief group that are appropriate 
in the context (Cherniak 1981:167). 
 
The basic inference ability requirement ensures that when someone is 
operating from a belief set, the person makes appropriate inferences. Someone 
may not make the best inferences but can make appropriate inferences. 
Rethinking the “class is cancelled” argument from 5.4.1, another inference is that 
the class has gone to the library or another classroom due to computer problems. 
With additional information added to the current belief set, remembering that the 
instructor mentioned something about the library, leads to a different conclusion, 
which is an example of a non-monotonic argument. 
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How do these characteristics function together? Someone who is rational 
will make appropriate inferences and minimise inconsistency. Imagine someone is 
at work, smells smoke and hears an alarm. The person will infer that there is a fire 
and that leaving the building might be an excellent idea. Another inference might 
be to call the fire department. Someone who is irrational might make inappropriate 
inferences and not care about inconsistency. Consider a person who is at work 
and smells smoke. The person knows that smoking in the building is not permitted 
but attributes it to someone smoking. The smoke gets heavier and heavier so the 
person infers more people must be smoking. That inference given the situation is 
irrational. While an example of irrationality, it does not necessarily mean the 
person is irrational in all areas of life. Some people are more irrational than not, 
and they may be mentally ill or children.  Children normally do not have a large 
enough belief set from which to make appropriate inferences, so they make 
inferences outside of the belief set and infer incorrectly. The same can be said for 
mentally ill persons who infer irrationally from a limited belief set. Consistency is 
the last thing to be worried about along with correct inferences for these kind of 
latter cases as personal safety matters more. 
 
Pedagogically, for critical reasoning courses, inquiry and the traits of an 
inquirer, form a relationship with the world. Non-monotonic arguments best 
express this relationship and the ways that an inquirer uses information and draws 
consequences that may require additional information, and different conclusions. 
This whole picture of inquiry and non-monotonic logic integrate in a way that is not 
so obvious for monotonic logic with static premises and no consequential change, 
with the addition of premises to the argument. Critical reasoning does not take 
place in isolation like propositional logic and its monotonic variants. Without a 
pedagogical emphasis on non-monotonicity, students are not given expressive 
tools focusing on natural language arguments, the relevance of their reasons, 
explanations available, types of arguments, for example, testimony and 
analogical, and plausibility judgements.   
 
 
 
 
215 
 
 
5.6.3 “Explosiveness” in ordinary and natural inconsistencies  
 
The taught propositional logical results of ECQ and EFQ lead students to 
believe that a contradiction leads to disastrous results in systematic integrity. The 
characterisation of ECQ and EFQ as something to be avoided is taught through 
logic textbooks, such as Nolt (1987:66), but it is not obvious to students why it is 
bad. Both ECQ and EFQ are explosive, i.e. that from a contradictory premise 
which is false, anything follows from the contradiction in classical propositional 
logic. Thus, students are taught that ECQ and EFQ result from a contradiction, so 
they should avoid contradictions.  
 
Students are typically unreflective on explosiveness. They may believe the 
results in formal logic but do not necessarily carry that conception over to their 
own practices.112 But the seed is sown that contradictions are bad. To be clear, in 
propositional logic, contradictions have a result that may or may not be 
problematic. Contradictions are WFF’s and follow the rules, so any 
characterisation of them as “bad” arises, extrasystematically.  
  
As Tarski (1944) and Priest (1984) both demonstrate, semantic closure of 
natural language causes natural language to be inconsistent. The obvious 
manifestation of this linguistic phenomenon is the liar paradox, or linguistic 
paradoxes of self-reference (Priest 1984:126). It is a logical feature of natural 
language where predicates and self-reference interrelate and produce a confusing 
result. But this is the logical consequence of natural language meaning, in 
particular in the English language (1984:128).  
 
Pedagogically, a discussion of the liar paradox, e.g. “This sentence is false” 
– if the sentence is false it is true and if it is true it is false – might consist of the 
paradox and some solutions to it. But articulating the larger linguistic picture is not 
a priority for most instructors. The lack of presentation of the context is 
unfortunate because the liar shows that explosiveness, at least in natural 
language, is not relevant to every context. Natural language retains its intelligibility 
                                                          
112 Woods (2003:12) notes the counterintuitive nature of the results of ECQ.  
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even with a demonstrable contradiction. The proof for this is that this very 
sentence makes sense, for if the contradiction infected the linguistic system, we 
would not be able to understand what is being written. As Priest (1984:126) also 
notes, “Moreover any adequate account of the semantics of English will have to 
face semantic closure and the existence of contradictory truths.” Instructors 
should point out that the limit of explosiveness is system related and English 
remains intelligible regardless of the logical results of EFQ or ECQ. 
 
Another ordinary example of inconsistencies in everyday life is the law. 
Amit (2006:275–300) details how interrogation becomes torture through various 
physical, emotional and psychological means. Torture is forbidden by law; 
interrogation is not. The same actions, to some degree, are used in each. The 
higher court reaffirmed that torture as a general principle was forbidden, yet no 
specific instances were acknowledged to fall under that general principle. 
However, no one believes that those inconsistencies make the whole body of law 
flawed, which would be “explosiveness” in practical effect.  
 
Pedagogically, instructors need to be cautious when teaching both 
“explosiveness” and that anything necessarily follows from a contradiction. 
Nevertheless, for propositional logic, the awkward result which follows is damning: 
propositional logic is not the structural model of natural language, and its results 
should not be taught as applicable universally where a contradiction exists. More 
so, if propositional logic is not taught in a critical reasoning course, students may 
not be exposed to formal logical results that have little bearing on practical 
reasoning in everyday life. This is probably the more crucial point that chosen 
content should not develop misconceptions about inconsistency. There are plenty 
of practical problems with inconsistency and what follows from it, without 
introducing caricatures of reasoning that have results that empower confusion, 
rather than resolving it. 
 
5.6.4 ECQ and EFQ are not principles of inference  
 
Consider two examples of logical implication, modus ponens and modus 
tollens. From their modelling as implicative transformation rules to principles of 
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inference, they are taught as valid deductive ways through which – supposing 
particular premises – a certain conclusion can be reached. The belief in the 
premises and the intent of reaching a certain conclusion underlies the use of 
principles of inference. The use of modus ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) 
does not rely on propositional logic, and thus they are general principles of 
inference.113  
 
The conception of ECQ and EFQ in this thesis, explains that both 
conceptions are relative to propositional logic. The former from the syntactic side, 
the latter from the semantic side. Neither contains any flaw in terms of 
intrasystematic meaning. Any flaw is extrasystematic in meaning, which 
supervenes on the propositional logic result.  
 
Both ECQ and EFQ are taught as “quasi” principles of inference, such that 
from a contradictory sentence, any sentence can follow. The use of “quasi” is on 
purpose because neither fits any general principle of inference conception. 
Principles of inference bring about a desired conclusion. This use is intentional. 
However, it is hard to imagine why anyone would want to obtain the proverbial 
“flawed” result in an intentional way. Another use may be that somewhere in an 
argument, a contradictory sentence arises, and the person uses the contradictory 
sentence and ECQ/EFQ to demonstrate that something has gone wrong and 
leads to an absurd result. The problem with this use is that it violates 
monotonicity. A contradictory sentence added to an existing proof should not 
change the logical result, unless one discards the monotonic consequence 
relation or gives an unwarranted priority to the logical effect of a contradiction. 
 
MP and MT, for instance, are positive uses of implication rules. Through 
implication, both manifest a desirable result that is rationale based, on the proper 
application of rules. As implication patterns ECQ and EFQ do not bring about a 
desirable result, in fact, they highlight an undesirable result for the classical 
logician. Even more so then when ECQ and EFQ are understood as principles of 
                                                          
113 To be clearer, MP and MT are implicative rules (transformations, propositional logic dependent) 
and general principles of inference (arguments, ordinary language).  
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inference; there is no reason to use them in this manner, for the intent is different: 
one is positive, the other negative.114  
 
Pedagogically, instructors who teach ECQ and EFQ should understand the 
hazards of taking an implicative transformation in formal language as indicative of 
reasoning in general.115 When ECQ and EFQ are thought of in terms of argument, 
the “flawed” conception exhibits an interpretation of the transformation from formal 
language. This is but one conception. Remember that from a contradiction, 
through conjunctive simplification, either conjunct is inferable, so no “flawed” 
result. The same move is available in argument, if one chooses to use it. 
Instructors must make a clear distinction between the direct results of a 
contradiction, and the indirect results when a contradiction is put into a sequence 
along with a disjunctive syllogism. The latter is equally “guilty” in some sense in 
generating the “flawed” conclusion. Instructors, who teach these concepts must 
also take care in presenting ECQ and EFQ in a critical reasoning course without 
saying more about the interconnections of contradictions, intent, and context.  
 
Wittgenstein’s sage advice (1973:§125) about not being so much 
concerned with the contradiction, but the procedure that led someone to a 
contradiction falls on deaf ears. If an instructor chooses to present ECQ and EFQ 
in a critical reasoning course, the articulation of the logical background is 
necessary. Trying to demonstrate ECQ or EFQ as a “quasi” principle of inference 
from ordinary language does not make a lot of sense because the explosive 
nature of the logical consequence relation is not apparent. It is only when the 
formal logical results are known that the context is right for student understanding 
of part of the issue but not the whole issue as a principle of inference.  
 
One must question, however, any pedagogical emphasis on ECQ or EFQ 
in a critical reasoning course. A more important conception of contradiction comes 
                                                          
114 Previously, I asserted that formal systems are value neutral. This paragraph highlights the 
problem with thinking that they are not. Contradictions are not bad or good; they are just WFFs 
and any derivation using them is only applying rules of the system.  
115 Harman (1986:16) is an example of this when he states: “The danger is that, since inconsistent 
beliefs logically imply anything, if one is not careful, one will be able to use this fact to infer 
anything whatsoever.” 
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from Aristotle (1971) in Metaphysics Gamma. Supposing that one accepts that 
ECQ or EFQ demonstrates a formal flaw in the contradictory pattern, one needs to 
see that this flawed property is not responsible for the communicative difficulty 
Aristotle (1971:23–25) offers in Metaphysics Gamma 1011–1023 as the practical 
rationale of contradiction avoidance. He asserts:  
 
“It has been now fully enough stated that the opinion opposite assertions are not 
simultaneously true is the firmest of all...”(1971:23).  
 
Avoiding a contradiction in a formal system simply means not using it or getting rid 
of it, if one arises. But, supposing someone uses it and reaches the “open-ended” 
or “flawed” characterisation, is this the same problem as Aristotle had in mind? 
Aristotle's main concern was communicative intelligibility and contradicting oneself 
in speech pushes the boundaries of intelligibility (1971:23–26). This is the 
everyday conception of contradiction.  If the classical logician thinks ECQ or EFQ 
represents this communicative property about contradiction, one is returning to the 
confusion of ECQ and EFQ as principles of inference. So, what then is there to 
say about this other conception of contradiction and why it is different?  
 
With pedagogical considerations in mind, Aristotle’s genuine insight about 
contradiction is that a general idea of contrast, or antonymic meaning, goes hand 
in hand with human linguistic competency (Aristotle 1971:24). For instance, by 
being able to discern where “dog” is used versus “cat,” requires the ability to 
contrast only what the two words mean and where they might be used correctly. 
Asserting “dog” and “not-dog” in the same instance and sense does not have a 
correct usage, nor does it have any clear meaning. Contrast only works when the 
users understand the lexicon. For example, a child can read the words, “wax 
paper” and “tissue paper” but not understand the significance of each, which 
entails the child cannot correctly contrast them. Meaning, contrast, and linguistic 
competency all go together, which is just a broad restatement of Aristotle’s point. 
Since these three are arguably dependent upon one another, breaking the circle 
with a contradiction harms our communicative process. This communicative 
enterprise is fundamental to critical reasoning and should serve students well in 
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informing them of the problem with contradiction without confusing them with ECQ 
and EFQ. 
 
5.6.5 The incoherence of teaching formal logic (propositional) and informal 
fallacies  
 
Cederblom and Paulsen’s textbook Critical Reasoning (2005) details 
propositional and syllogistic logic in chapter 5. In chapter 6, they provide their 
account of fallacies (2005:154–190). To their benefit they are consistent and 
attempt to carry over formal concepts to fallacy explanations, such that fallacies 
are bad arguments, with bad logical form or untrue premises (2005:154–190). By 
showing an underlying logical structure to fallacies, both formal and informal, they 
link to the previous concepts of propositional and syllogistic argument.  
 
This raises the question of the relationship between informal fallacies and 
argument. In one sense, argument and fallacies are interrelated in a strong way 
with semantic content being the cause of most informal fallacies. In another way, 
when an argument is construed in a formal way with symbols, truth functions and 
inference rules, the structural significance takes precedence over the semantic 
content.   
 
Natural language argument form (versus content) is going to say little about 
fallacies unless they are formal fallacies. Denying the antecedent and affirming 
the consequent are two formal fallacies that receive the most attention. A previous 
discussion displayed how the logical form of affirming the consequent can result in 
a good argument while being an invalid proof. This basic tension between 
implicative forms and argument in everyday life exploits the syntactic/semantic 
distinction. It seems the same would hold for most, if not all explanations of 
fallacies in terms of argument form: they would fall short of explaining the 
relationship and context of semantic content. Typically, fallacies are not 
necessarily deductive in form unless they are formal fallacies. To characterise 
them in a deductive sense, when that form is dubitable, does not do justice to 
most of them given their semantic basis. A minor side point, is that it is not that 
interpreting fallacies as deductive argument forms is not doable, but rather 
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whether interpreting them in that way represents the semantic content issues in a 
robust manner. The same problems for translation manifest again as to whether 
an informal fallacy could be correctly schematised into formal language. 
 
There is, however, a much larger pedagogical issue looming over fallacies. 
When propositional logic is taught in a critical reasoning course, students are sent 
the message that formalism leads to clarity and truth. Teaching this particular 
deductive system shows students how reasoning “should” be done. Outside of 
translation, not much is in the offering in natural language. Usually there is some 
additional content about persuasion, inductive arguments, and fallacies. Fallacies 
oftentimes tend to be the natural language part of the course. The implication is 
that if the student uses propositional logic correctly, fallacies should not be of 
much concern, for the focus is to be on learning the ideal of reasoning.  
 
Students must be constantly reminded that fallacies are contextual; they 
are not universal. Teaching this in relation to formal propositional logic leads to 
the idea that the form and content together produce a fallacy. But, it is not so 
simple. There are two general views on fallacies: universal and contextual. A 
universalist about fallacies believes that no matter the context, a fallacy is a 
fallacy.116 Reducing them to logical form and deductive patterns reinforces this 
interpretation. A contextualist about fallacies believes the context (and other 
factors) can determine whether something is a fallacy or not. Consider the fallacy 
of appeal to force; when someone uses physical intimidation to get another 
person to accept a conclusion or a position, the person is guilty of the fallacy. 
Think about the following example, and the two interpretations that follow to see 
the difference between the two general views.  
 
Scott: Stay out of the street Julie! 
Julie: Why? 
Scott: Because I said so! 
Julie: So… 
                                                          
116 An example of this would be Cederblom and Paulsen (2005:154–190) with their linking of 
deductive arguments to informal fallacies. The very nature of deductive argument forms makes 
logical fallacies universal. 
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Scott: If you go in the street again, you will be punished.  
 
The universalist asserts that Scott has committed the fallacy of appeal to force, 
because, instead of giving reasons to Julie to stay out of the street, he sought to 
intimidate her into a particular behaviour instead. The contextualist asserts that 
Scott has not committed the fallacy of appeal to force. Since Julie is his daughter, 
and Scott is responsible for her wellbeing, he does not have to give her reasons; 
but instead can appeal to authority and force to keep her safe. The universalist 
about fallacies is worried about pure inquiry and the persuasive effect of reasons. 
The contextualist about fallacies has a broader concern in mind, that is, to take 
into account relevant social and physical dimensions of human experience. The 
contextualist also believes that reason is not always persuasive due to other 
factors, including context, emotions, and other elements of the human condition.  
 
The important thing that students need to learn about fallacies is not so 
much about being a fallacy hunter; but, recognising that something has gone 
wrong with the reasoning. Forcing informal fallacies into propositional deductive 
form mischaracterises the semantic content and likely the intent of the person 
making the claims. It is more important to that end to remember the content of the 
fallacy, much more than the labelling or even of the argument type.117 And, that is 
the goal: not to get into the informal fallacy landscape at all.  This is accomplished 
by demonstrating multiple examples of good reasoning in ordinary language. In 
contrast to the good reasoning examples, students notice when reasoning is not 
quite right, and articulate it in terms of the language of argument.  
 
A final pedagogical problem arises when propositional logic is taught as the 
ideal of reasoning and fallacies are the non-ideal of reasoning:  a gap exists in the 
practical psychology of everyday reasoning. It is the rare case that the human 
cause of fallacies receives much attention but students need to be aware of how 
they originate. A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning or argument, occurring through 
                                                          
117 While I can appreciate the attempt to characterize informal fallacies as flawed deductive or 
inductive arguments, both characterizations miss the fallacious element, which are the natural 
language semantic errors. Often, to address a fallacy, claims are reworded to change the semantic 
content and make them less objectionable. It is because of the content that fallacies can be 
persuasive, not the argument form, thus addressing the form misses the mark. 
223 
 
 
insincerity or incompetency.118 The word “mistake” was chosen intentionally: 
people commit mistakes for assorted reasons, some known, and some unknown. 
So, fallacies can be motivated purposely or not.   
 
One cause of a fallacy is “insincerity,” i.e., when someone is consciously 
trying to be deceptive through reasoning. This motivation is psychological and 
practical. The overarching reason is normally something like wanting to win or be 
successful in the argument. An example may be attorneys who reason fallaciously 
to convince a jury in order that they may win a court case. Another cause of 
fallacies is incompetence, which manifests when someone goes beyond, or tries 
to extend, normal, everyday reasoning competency into an unknown area. This 
commonly occurs when someone has a gap of varying degrees between what 
someone knows and what someone believes. There is a temptation, given the 
nature of reasoning, to extend that reasoning into irrelevant contexts. 
 
“Incompetency” is of special interest to pedagogy. On the model where, 
informal fallacies are translated into deductive propositional argument forms, an 
additional level of competency is needed. Students not only have to understand 
the appropriate informal fallacy; they also must understand how that informal 
fallacy translates into deductive argumentative form. The relationship between the 
form, the fallacy, and the semantic content, requires a special competency, that is 
likely unnecessary for fallacy understanding. Instructors who adopt this 
explanatory approach to fallacies burden students with logical machinery that 
does not aid in understanding the semantic problems leading to the fallacy or the 
overall conception of the fallacy. 
 
Pedagogically, when propositional logic is taught as the ideal form of 
reasoning, its extension into explaining informal fallacies lacks the focus on the 
semantic content. Even when the extension does not take place, and informal 
fallacies are the ordinary language component of a critical reasoning course, the 
contrast between formal logic and informal fallacies shows little conceptual 
                                                          
118 This is my own definition of “fallacy.” I used the concepts from Wright’s (2001:267–285) on 
testimony arguments, and applied them to fallacies. 
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continuity of the course content, which proper pedagogy demands. Instructors 
who choose to use propositional logic in a critical reasoning course must make 
every attempt to incorporate the formal system into everyday practical 
argumentation, which includes fallacies. Note, however, that in an introduction to 
logic course, the conceptual continuity is easier to maintain given the transitive 
nature of formalism. Critical reasoning courses have no such conceptual 
transitivity with formal logic, and informal fallacies, for being contextually sensitive, 
they are conceptually undermined when associated with propositional logic in 
content. The hazards of pedagogy manifest in student confusion and are 
avoidable with conceptual continuity and forethought about practical relevance. 
 
5.7 Teaching the wrong direction of understanding  
 
Languages are means of thinking and communicating. Natural languages 
are among the common communicating medium for humans. Competency in 
natural language varies, with a basic competency that allows communication and 
an advanced competency that allows refined communication. In one sense, 
competency is related to time, but in a separate way, it is the years using the 
language that matters (or language age) and not one’s chronological age. 
Language age when combined with self-consciousness allows abstraction and 
reflection on linguistic content and logical form. Formal languages originate from 
this abstraction and reflection on natural language. They do not simply come from 
nothing. 
 
Critical reasoning courses assume the robustness of natural language. The 
subtlety and fine-grained distinction of natural language contains its own unique 
set of issues. Instructors, whose linguistic competency is usually greater than their 
students, already have a language gap of sorts, and must bridge the gap between 
basic and advanced competency. Part of the pedagogy of any higher education 
course is to raise the linguistic competency of the students, especially in discipline 
specific language. Accordingly, there are a myriad of issues, basic and advanced 
competency in natural language, and discipline specific language that varies from 
basic to advanced, too. Discipline specific language is both natural and formal. 
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One supposition with the use of propositional logic is that it is discipline 
specific to critical reasoning. Students learn the language of propositional logic 
and achieve a basic competency. Students who continue with predicate logic and 
metalogic acquire an advanced competency. The value of this for students is a 
thorough understanding of propositional logic and an application of a formal 
language. Students should do the work of translations, truth tables, and proofs to 
achieve competency.  
 
However, the problem with believing propositional logic is discipline specific 
to critical reasoning is that students can achieve proficiency in propositional logic 
and yet not improve their critical reasoning skills, such as informal inference and 
relevance judgements. Learning to ascertain the relevance of semantic content 
and context to reasoning practices is divorced from the intrasystematic 
propositional reasoning practices. The truth functional and implicative moves that 
take place in a formal logical system are different from those in everyday life, or by 
way of ordinary reasoning practices. But there are two bigger issues at work here, 
especially with respect to formal and natural languages. 
 
Formal logical languages are limited in meaning and application. They are 
caricatures of natural language in varying degrees. Their goal is to express 
something about relational elements in natural language. While that alone is not 
necessarily bad, what is bad is when the expressiveness of natural language is 
thought of to be contained by the formal language. This is where the error lies for 
critical reasoning. Formalisation of arguments into symbolic form can never 
capture natural language meaning in principle or practice. This is further 
confounded by logical connectives that are different in meaning from their natural 
language counterparts. Thus, there is a general translation issue from meaning in 
natural language to formal logical language and a specific one for natural 
language meaning to propositional logic and its logical connectives. The formal 
language is never fully expressive, and not expressive in the right sort of way for 
critical reasoning practices. 
 
Another issue, which is obvious in one sense, but not seriously thought 
about in another is the direction of meaning. The only way a formal language 
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obtains meaning is through a natural language. The intrasystematic moves are 
understood through natural language first, and then as logical moves second. This 
is a direct challenge to the idea that formal logical systems stand uninterpreted. 
One uncomplicated way to see this necessary direction of understanding is by 
considering the definitions of the system itself: symbols, operators, connectives, 
rules, and punctuation. None of these components of a formal language are 
defined in an intrasystematic sense and for them to be understood as such, a 
higher-level explanation is in order. Consider the definition of a well-formed 
formula: a component and its negation are well-formed formulas, along with any 
two component well-formed formulas brought together with a connective and pair 
of parenthesis is a well-formed formula, too. That explanation is in natural 
language, not formal language. In every discussion – outside of using obvious 
ostensive measures – the formal language is through natural language and its 
concepts.  
 
If the previous thoughts are correct, the pedagogical role of propositional 
logic in critical reasoning courses is questionable at best. Teaching a formal 
system of logic as critical reasoning interprets a formal system through the 
broader natural language concepts. It then uses natural language to show the 
difference in meaning in the formal language, ultimately demonstrating that the 
formal language and natural language have different meanings. These different 
meanings – for example, connectives  do not correspond to natural language-
usage or meaning. More so, even the evaluative concepts of the logical formal 
system, namely “validity” and “deductive,” are natural language explanations of 
logical formal language concepts. The substantive interconnection between the 
two cannot be denied, which leads to a further question: why teach a system of 
reasoning that is different in meaning and requires learning more concepts that 
are irrelevant, than simply focusing on natural language reasoning? In terms of 
conceptual economy, it is pedagogically faulty, as the formal system of logic is not 
necessary for understanding natural language arguments. 
 
One final consideration should be noted with respect to natural and formal 
languages. Scriven (1976:141–142) articulates a problem with the translation 
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between languages, if they are expressively equivalent, translation should work 
bidirectionally. In the context of propositional logic as a formal language, 
translating formal language into natural language makes little sense. It is only 
because of the original natural language that any translation into propositional 
language makes sense. There is a conceptual dependency of logical formal 
language on natural language, but not in the other direction. This unidirectional 
translation functions because of the limited meaning of the formal language being 
drawn from a much richer language, natural language. But this makes the 
relationship more peculiar still, due to the meanings of the connectives, the 
definition of “validity” and of formally deductive arguments. A particular set of 
ideas drawn from natural language exhibits a particular result in propositional 
logic, which can only say so much. With human reasoning being a complicated 
activity, propositional logic – as a system of reasoning in a critical reasoning 
course – simply cannot say enough about the practice of giving and providing 
reasons in everyday life. 
 
Pedagogically, instructors should realise the conceptual extent of a logical 
formal language and its dependence on a natural language for intelligibility. It is 
their duty to present logical ideas that are practical in use, represent normal 
reasoning practices, and do not rely on a formal language to say something about 
natural language, when the formal language is not expressing the right ideas that 
are relevant to the practice of ordinary reasoning. An instructor who teaches the 
system of propositional logic as the ideal of reasoning, misunderstands the 
direction of intelligibility, which fails in theory and in application, leaving students’ 
critical reasoning education incomplete.  
 
5.8 The possibility of deductive formal reasoning as a part of critical 
reasoning  
 
So, what might the role of deductive formal reasoning be in a critical 
reasoning class? There are at least three uses. The first is constructive: students 
should have an idea of deductive validity. They would then be aware of the formal 
definition and its implications. If all the premises are true, the conclusion must be 
true and the necessary connection between the premises and conclusion for 
228 
 
 
contrastive understanding is extant. Contrasting deductive validity and its 
necessary logical consequence relation with inference to the best explanation and 
conductive arguments, students can appreciate their limited logical consequence 
relations. A greater understanding arises, then, of the difference between formal 
and informal reasoning. But teaching deductive validity does not entail that 
students should be taught propositional logic as a system.  
 
Walton (2006:62), for instance, uses principles of implication like modus 
ponens to express necessary deductive relationships. This can be useful as the 
logical form is clear and students can understand the basic idea of logical 
relations from their uses. Modus ponens, depending on how it is taught, does not 
necessarily need any explanation of the material conditional, and in fact, can be 
taken as representative of a strict or indicative conditional from English. If the 
previous is true, deductive implication principles such as modus ponens and 
modus tollens can be taught and used effectively without teaching the complete 
system of propositional logic, or even just the semantic side, as some critical 
reasoning instructors do. 
 
An example may help with understanding why modus tollens, for instance, 
might be a good principle of implication to teach. Imagine an archaeologist is 
brought in to assess the natural state of a piece of property before purchase. If the 
property is native (undisturbed), a further legal permit will have to be applied for 
and granted, making the property a bad purchase. However, if the property is non-
native – meaning it has already been disturbed significantly – a permit does not 
have to applied for and the property is a good purchase. The archaeologist 
surveys the property and finds that it has been disturbed.119  
 
If the property is native, it has not been disturbed.  
The property has been disturbed. 
_______________________________________ 
Thus, the property is not native.  
                                                          
119 Thanks to my colleague Mark Deering for a discussion of this example from his experience as 
an archaeologist.  
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The use of modus tollens in this example makes the inference clear and sets the 
basis for a course of action, i.e. buying the property. This is one persuasive use, 
but it should not be assumed that the argument could not be cast otherwise 
without the conditional. 
 
Another use of deductive formal reasoning is critical. Students in a critical 
reasoning course should understand why propositional deductive validity does not 
capture our normal practices of consequence drawing. If students are taught the 
difference in logical consequence relations, they will understand the difference 
between monotonic and non-monotonic relations. From there, they understand 
the static nature of propositional deductive validity, in contrast to arguments in 
ordinary language, especially arguments that are part of an inquiry. 
 
The final use of propositional logic is character building. In one’s 
educational experience, specific courses test one’s perseverance and resolve. 
Propositional logic is character building, especially for those who have limited 
success with formal reasoning of any kind. But, to build character in this way, the 
system of propositional logic needs to be taught and that is something that is not 
justifiable given time and content constraints in a critical reasoning course. It is, 
however, perfect for an introduction to logic course. Rigid rules, following them to 
achieve results, is a model in one sense for everyday life. Critical reasoning 
courses that do not include some form of formal reasoning miss out on this 
benefit, as natural language is not as rule based nor is it as bivalent in content. 
So, the consequence needs consideration, but it is probably not a serious one 
given that students may be able to take an introduction to logic class, or increased 
rigour of another sort may likely be taught in a critical reasoning course.  
 
Before concluding, one view needs discussion about teaching formal logic 
in general. Geach (1979:14) discusses a “master-apprentice” relationship 
between an instructor of logic and students. He wants to think of this as a 
pedigree of sorts (1979:15).  One apparent justification for teaching formal logic – 
syllogistic and then propositional – is this passing down of knowledge and practice 
from teacher to student, which Geach (1979:15–16) calls a “self-perpetuating 
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skill.” Good logic teachers are exemplars for future generations of logic teachers. 
Even if one does not become a logic teacher, the skill continues because it was 
taught well. But, this type of relationship where ideas are handed down to younger 
generations as justification for the practice and content is misguided. It divorces 
the context, as many students are not philosophy majors. More so, it assumes 
that the prior chain of logic professors and their pedagogy was effective. Geach 
(1979:12–14) claims that he does not care about the certificate but the lineage of 
a teacher as part of a justification, at least in part, of one’s competence. Of 
course, something is correct about that in terms of professional relationships, but 
in the general teacher-student context, it does not have the same relevance. 
There is no obvious need to self-perpetuate formal logic from a student’s point of 
view, especially in a critical reasoning course.  
 
Given what has been written in this chapter, the very fact that some critical 
reasoning instructors teach what their “masters” taught, namely propositional 
logic, is evidence for rejecting this “master-apprentice” view of competency and 
material justification. In fact, this relationship might be part of the problem where 
the “master” taught the unquestionable significance of propositional logic to critical 
reasoning practices. But if this relationship is part of the problem, it can also be 
part of the solution. Should new “masters” start teaching critical reasoning without 
propositional logic, a new “master-apprentice” relationship will develop and so will 
the improvement of the critical reasoning field? When critical reasoning 
instructors, critically reason about the role of propositional logic and its 
relationship to everyday inference, a new self-perpetuation will unfold. Ultimately 
this may manifest in students who self-perpetuate the relevant ordinary language 
aspects and defeasible inference of critical reasoning.  
 
5.9 Concluding thoughts 
 
Propositional logic has taken on a role in some critical reasoning courses 
that is unwarranted to a large degree. It also takes on a general role of reasoning 
in introduction to logic courses, where it is the standard formal reasoning practice. 
This chapter lays out various problems with the inclusion of propositional logic into 
a critical reasoning course. This chapter has also made a cautious claim that 
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introduction to logic courses and critical reasoning courses should be different 
courses for the benefit of the student. The confusion between the courses comes 
from many directions, including textbooks that are used in both, graduate 
education that does not make a clear difference between the two, and confusing 
the role of implication versus inference. If instructors are going to take critical 
reasoning as its own discipline, it should stand on its own based on inference, not 
implication. Otherwise, if instructors are not cautious natural language argument 
will be held to a logical standard based on a formal logical system and its 
relations, which itself is a caricature of reasoning in everyday practice.  
 
Reconsider the fifth research question, why does propositional logic fall 
short as a theory of critical reasoning? In this chapter, propositional logic was 
shown to be of suspect value for a critical reasoning course. There are a myriad of 
problems including: translation problems, formal reasoning is not a natural 
process (it must be taught), and a confusion of implication and inference. One 
particular part of propositional logic that was questionable was formal 
inconsistency and the logical results of ECQ and EFQ. Both ECQ and EFQ are 
understood as principles of inference when they are not. More so, a greater 
confusion manifests about argument types, monotonic v. non-monotonic. If most 
critical reasoning arguments are non-monotonic, then ECQ and EFQ being 
monotonic arguments are a category mistake in applications of inconsistency. 
Propositional logic falls short as a theory of reasoning and as a pedagogical 
choice. 
 
A question then arises, what should be taught about inconsistency in a 
critical reasoning course? In chapter four, the semantic conception of 
inconsistency was developed as an alternative to standard formal conceptions of 
inconsistency. But, one cannot suppose that a new conception is valuable just 
because it is new; it must also be practically and theoretically worthwhile. The link 
between the conception and the practicality rests on how it is incorporated into the 
curricula and why. To go further, however, is warranted, as one must be self-
reflexive and consider the worthwhileness of the incorporation into the curriculum 
and answer possible objections to it. Thus, the next chapter tackles incorporating 
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the semantic conception of inconsistency into the curricula and developing a 
reflexive account of its strengths and weaknesses 
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Chapter 6: Applying the semantic conception of inconsistency to the 
pedagogy of critical reasoning 
 
 
This chapter applies the semantic conception of inconsistency to teaching 
critical reasoning. There are eight subsections in this chapter with the first six 
using the ideas from chapter four displaying their incorporation into pedagogy. 
The next subsection tackles the broader philosophical issue of assertability 
conditions and its relation to critical reasoning. The final subsection considers a 
handful of present-day critical reasoning texts and critiques their pedagogical 
thoughts on inconsistency. 
 
6.1 The role of natural language in critical reasoning pedagogy  
 
It might seem odd to justify the use of natural or ordinary language in 
critical reasoning pedagogy. But, given the confusion between introduction to logic 
courses and critical reasoning courses, the justification is apt. Critical reasoning 
courses are not introduction to logic courses. One fundamental area of difference 
is between inference and implication. Critical reasoning courses should have 
inference as their main concept not implication. In one sense, the confusion 
between inference and implication is understandable. This confusion may lead to 
incorporating propositional or syllogistic logic into a critical reasoning course as a 
theory of inference. But correcting this pedagogical flaw allows students to focus 
on reasoning within language that they use daily.  
 
Corcoran (1973:74) identifies no fewer than twelve different uses of 
“implies,” which is the logical sense of implication. Three of these uses include: 
truth functional, logical consequence, and logical deducibility (1973 59–61). Truth 
functional implication follows from the truth table for the material conditional, 
where “α implies β” means α= 0 or β =1. Logical consequence implication, where 
“α implies β,” is one of containment where β is already conceptually contained in α.  
For example, the interior angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees implies the 
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interior angles of a right triangle sum to 180 degrees as well. Corcoran (1973:60) 
adds that logical consequence implication is independent of truth-values and 
displays the property of logical impossibility, it is impossible for α=1 and β=0. 
Logical deducibility implication, where “α implies β,” is one of derivation where β 
follows from α through logical steps, namely transformation rules or mathematical 
rules. Corcoran (1973: 61) states with this sense of implication “To say that [β] is 
logically deducible from [α] is to say that it is theoretically possible to carry out 
step-by-step, in a logically correct way, a process of deduction leading from [α] to 
[β].” So, there are at least three main senses of “implication.”  
 
Three pedagogical points follow from the types of implication. On the first 
point, the second use of implication might have some carry over to natural 
language reasoning with conceptual containment, but the other two do not in any 
clear manner. But the second use is trivial and of little value to ordinary language 
arguments that do not have any conceptual containment. “Conceptual 
containment” is typically a property of deductive arguments, not other argument 
types normally associated with natural language reasoning. On the second point, 
not only are “inference” and “implication” confused, but what about types of 
implication? If implication simpliciter is that valuable for students, should not the 
various meanings of “implies” be taught as well? It seems that pedagogically, if 
one is going to teach implication through formal logic of some kind in a critical 
reasoning course, then the various meanings should be taught, too, for a 
comprehensive understanding of the term. Yet, when the various meanings of 
“implication” come forth, its multifaceted meanings are even plainer because they 
have little to do with natural language argumentation. On the third point, 
implication is a formal logical property that must be satisified, whether truth-values 
are in a unique sequence, conceptual containment, or a deducible pattern. Natural 
language arguments typically do not involve any orderly sequence of reasons, 
there are conceptual relations not containment, and outside a basic argument 
structure, there are no rule licensed moves to transform premises into a 
conclusion. Thus, natural language arguments share little with these three senses 
of implication, which by contrast, demonstrates their use of inference. 
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Natural language is also more robust, and, as a focus of reasoning, needs 
more time in the pedagogical queue. Formal logic is typically not as time 
consuming because of its reliance on understanding a handful of rules and 
applications. Translation can take more time to teach, however, this makes the 
point about natural language even from the perspective of formal logic. This 
translation project may even take on a life of its own for the instructor, as it may 
become a justification for using the formal system. But that activity is largely due 
to the conflict between more complex natural language sentences and the formal 
language. Spending this time detailing how to schematise arguments in natural 
language keeping their meaning and structure intact, is more productive. 
Improving one’s linguistic skill carries over to all areas of life, not just reasoning. 
The practical import, is that focusing on natural language in a critical reasoning 
course not only benefits the student with reasoning, but also with gaining and 
using a diverse vocabulary. 
 
Building on the previous idea, in a critical reasoning course, there is a finite 
amount of time to teach students the necessary content. If one focuses on 
learning a logical system and all that involves (translation, rules, solving problems, 
etc.), that time is lost. Instead of focusing on natural language and inference, 
students learn something that has limited applicability to everyday reasoning. This 
raises an ethical question about curriculum issues: what should be taught? 
Consider a typical three-unit semester course in the United States. A semester 
course meets 54 hours over eighteen weeks, or three hours a week. In my 
introduction to logic course, it takes about ten class sessions from start to finish 
with propositional logic moving from translations to simple WFF tables, to complex 
WFF tables, to truth table arguments and finally to refutations. Ten class sessions 
are five weeks or fifteen hours, almost a third of the course. If I were to include 
that logical content in my critical reasoning course, I would have to drop a paper 
assignment and fundamentally change the focus of the course to a bare-bones 
informal reasoning course harming students’ learning of CR in the process.  
 
One fundamental difference between critical reasoning and introduction to 
logic courses is the focus on writing. Students do not become better writers by 
learning and manipulating formal symbols. It is unclear if there is even a 
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relationship between the two – writing and symbol manipulation – in practice. 
Students must learn to recognise the context of an argument and its formation in 
natural language from life examples. They can use that information to pattern their 
own arguments in the future. Seeing and examining natural language arguments 
gives students a resource to draw on for their own writing. Argumentative writing 
is a skill that benefits a student at every educational level, and in life.  
 
Pedagogically, then, natural language must be the emphasis of a critical 
reasoning course to benefit the student through refined exposure to content, 
conceptual delineation, inferential improvement, persuasive argument 
construction, and improved reading and comprehension skills. Thus, the role of 
natural language is fundamental in critical reasoning pedagogy. 
 
6.2 Antonyms and their role in inconsistency judgements  
 
Pedagogically, antonyms are an uncomplicated way to open a discussion 
of inconsistency. A critical reasoning course focusing on language use and 
argument formation may point out how antonyms function and inform the practice 
of conflict detection. After a brief review of synonyms and antonyms, students can 
extend that understanding to reading passages and consequently schematising 
arguments. There is no need to avoid the antonymic conflict in schematising if the 
conflict is part of the argument. Typically, we are not taught to resolve antonyms, 
which leads to a more open-minded attitude toward the conflict and whether it is 
important or not.  
 
By further emphasising the role of antonyms, students learn the non-
canonical antonyms that result from adopting the conceptual model. For instance, 
“Jim prefers to eat meat rather than vegetables” does not contain any typical 
antonymic pair. However, given the context, “meat” and “vegetables” conflict. This 
conflict may be substantial or not, which is determinable in context. Creating 
exercises and assignments to recognise the non-canonical antonymic content, 
cues students for further conflict detection into different contexts. The RZ article’s 
non-canonical antonyms include “suicide” and “murder,” “hanging” and 
“strangulation.” By showing examples of increased subtlety and reinforcing 
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through exercises of equal subtlety, students develop a refined technique for 
identifying conflict.  
 
Relying on antonyms and semantic conflict to introduce students into a 
broader discussion of inconsistency, truth-value conditions and assertability 
conditions may build on that foundation. Truth-value conditions make little sense 
without understanding the conflict in the context. In fact, without understanding the 
context first, truth-value assessment is without warrant. Assertability conditions 
are a bit different and deal with the problem of the conditions that it is fitting to say 
something. Understanding the conflict can lead to what linguistic and pragmatic 
conditions hold for the assertion. In the RZ argument, there are multiple conditions 
of assertion: with the official suicide account; the alternative murder account; and 
the overall controversy of both accounts together. So, understanding the conflict 
can lead to further evaluation through truth conditions and/or assertability 
conditions. 
 
6.3 Recognise semantic conflicts before logical conflicts 
 
One traditional logical account (Walton 2006:44 &181) defines 
“inconsistency” as all claims cannot be true. Any false claim in conjunction with 
the other true claims would be inconsistent in truth-values. This is an example of 
logical conflict, where there are true and false values in a set of claims. In this type 
of conflict, the truth-values are the standard of evaluation, not the semantic 
content of the claims. Consider the following set of claims from Quine’s Web of 
Belief (1978:17–18):  
 
“1. Abbott, Babbitt, and Cabot are the only suspects in a murder case. 
2. Abbott has an alibi (registered in a hotel away from the murder). 
3. Babbitt has an alibi (brother-in-law says he was with him away from the murder). 
4. Cabot has an alibi (shown on TV).” 
 
According to Quine, 1–4 cannot all be true (1978:18). In other words, this set of 
claims 1–4, is logically inconsistent, as at least one of them is false. All three 
suspects have alibis. An initial assessment defies the semantic conflict idea and 
leads one to believe that assessing truth-values leads to a resolution. However, 
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the way the set of claims is set up leads to that conception. Let us recast that set 
of claims in ADM form:  
 
R1: Abbott, Babbitt, and Cabot are the only suspects in a murder case. 
R2: Abbott has an alibi (registered in a hotel away from the murder). 
R3: Babbitt has an alibi (brother-in-law says he was with him away from the 
murder). 
R4: Cabot has an alibi (shown on TV). 
_____________________________________________________ 
CQ: Who killed the person? 
CC1: Abbott did. 
CC2: Babbitt did. 
CC3: Cabot did. 
CC4: Someone else did. 
 
R1 and CC4 conflict, Quine said that one way out of the argument is to deny the 
truth of R1 (1978:18). However, that assumes knowing the truth of R1. To make 
any headway on this argument, there is a need for the assessment of the content 
of R2R4. There is an unstated idea lurking in the background that draws 
contrast, the murder location. This contrast with the reasons is: “registered in a 
hotel” conflicts with “the location of the murder;” “with the brother-in-law” conflicts 
with “the location of the murder:” and “shown on TV” conflicts with the “location of 
the murder.” So, there are three pairs of conflicting ideas.  
 
The next step is to assess both the strongest conflict and the weakest 
conflict. Cabot’s alibi expresses the strongest conflict; it is rather difficult to murder 
someone while being on TV doing something else. Abbott’s is the next strongest 
conflict; a hotel register typically involves some form of official verifiable 
identification. Babbitt’s conflict is the weakest, unless his brother is someone 
whose testimony would be authoritative. The lack of strong conflict points to 
Babbitt as being the likely suspect, so “Babbitt did it” conflicts with R3, Babbitt’s 
alibi.  
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Pedagogically, students can be taught to semantically analyse a set of 
claims in the context of an argument using the ADM without knowing the truth-
values of the reasons, much like what was done with the Quine argument. The 
same answer of “Babbitt” comes from semantic conflict analysis or truth-value 
analysis, whereas the former leads to the latter, the same cannot be said in 
reverse as there would be no basis for the truth-value determination without the 
semantic content.  
 
To suppose truth-values, as Quine did (1978:17–18), misleads the actual 
context of an argument, as even on the propositional model, a hypothetical validity 
assessment precedes a soundness evaluation. The natural progression is from 
understanding to truth, with understanding being the only information that is 
available in many cases. Students benefit from instruction in semantic conflict 
analysis much more so than truth-value analysis given the changing world, where 
contexts shift and so do truth-values. 
 
6.4 Semantic conflicts as another level of assessment and evaluation  
 
“Valid” and “sound” are deductive argument evaluations; “weak” and 
“strong” are inductive argument evaluations. Deductive argument evaluations 
consist of a structural element, validity, and a truth functional element, soundness. 
Inductive argument evaluations use the plausibility of the premises and their 
degree of connectedness to the conclusion to evaluate the argument. In a strong 
inductive argument, the premises are highly plausible and their connection to 
conclusion is substantive. In contrast, a weak inductive argument may have 
premises that suffer from implausibility and/or the connection to the conclusion is 
questionable.  
 
Pedagogically, “valid” might be the hardest to teach because students 
confuse formal structure evaluation with truth-assessment evaluation. Valid 
arguments do not have to make semantic sense, they just require the right 
structure, a necessary relationship between the premises and conclusion. 
Inductive arguments, when trying to teach “weak” and “strong” benefit from 
contrasting examples, showing how context affects the evaluation.  
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Students are typically taught these four evaluative concepts for two 
different types of arguments. But neither kind of argument has any specific 
assessment or evaluation for inconsistent arguments. Instead, an ad hoc initial 
assessment attempts to resolve or minimise the inconsistency before 
schematising the argument. A logic professor might instruct her students that it is 
a waste of time to form an argument with inconsistent premises. But, while that 
advice may be true in some cases of deductive arguments, it is not true in all 
arguments. So, pedagogically, there is a need to give students a way to assess 
those arguments for substantive and non-substantive inconsistencies.  
 
In chapter four, a distinction was drawn between “substantive” and “non-
substantive” inconsistency. “Substantive” was linked to “strongly inconsistent”; 
“non-substantive” was linked to “weakly inconsistent.” The major difference 
between “substantive” and “non-substantive” is the impact on human action. A 
substantive inconsistency results in paralysis of action, whereas non-substantive 
does not. So, the following six steps could be a guide to where a conflict exists:  
 
1. Schematise the argument including the conflicting reasons and 
competing conclusions. 
2. Is the inconsistency weak or strong? If “weak,” stop and continue with 
the argument. 
3. If strong, does the inconsistency result in inaction? If “no,” continue with 
the argument. 
4. If the answer to 3 is “yes” then consider the broader context and attempt 
to understand a way that action can follow.  
5. Does the broader context allow for action? If “no,” stop, the argument is 
intractable.  
6. If “yes,” use that context and move forward with the argument.  
 
If 5 is the case, then label the argument IRINCON for “irrational 
inconsistency.” If 2, 3, or 6 is the case, then label the argument RATINCON for 
“rational inconsistency.”  
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By labelling in this way, the inconsistency is acknowledged and further 
action may be warranted. The acknowledgement of inconsistency saves one from 
the typical halting criticism where someone points out the inconsistency and uses 
that to end the conversation.120 This halting effect of inconsistency is unfortunate 
and is common. But, what the halting effect displays is someone being 
unreflective on inconsistency and pedagogically. Students need to be warned that 
a halting response is not the appropriate response without critical reflexion on the 
inconsistency. Using the six steps necessitates that someone is reflective on the 
inconsistency. 
 
The six steps give a general progression for sorting out substantive 
inconsistencies from non-substantive inconsistencies. The notion of “action” is a 
bit vague but that is acceptable because the paralysis aspect contrasts with it, 
namely, someone no longer knows what to do with the argument. The following is 
a more robust articulation of a way to sort them out in more difficult cases, which 
could follow this progression: 
 
1a. Schematise the argument for the conflicting reasons and competing 
conclusions. 
2a. Determine which reason is relevant to which conclusion.  
3a. If a conflicting reason is not relevant to at least one conclusion, then 
either consider adding a conclusion that it would be relevant to or get rid of 
the reason.  
4a. Do the relevance articulations for all the reasons.  
5a. Determine which conclusion is the best conclusion, if possible. If two or 
more conclusions are equally ranked as the best, the argument is 
RATINCON: for rational inconsistency. If there is a single conclusion at the 
top of the rankings, the argument is SINCON: for single conclusion.  
 
RATINCON and SINCON are different in conception and application. 
RATINCON admits the inconsistency has not been resolved in terms of argument 
                                                          
120 This seems to occur more often when someone has been taught that “inconsistency” is a 
fallacy, and with those who have received instruction in rhetoric and persuasion.  
242 
 
 
as the conclusions are still manifesting the inconsistency. SINCON indicates the 
inconsistency has been resolved to some degree as the argument supports a 
single conclusion. So, RATINCON can function in two ways. First, it works as a 
general label that the argument contains an inconsistency that necessitates some 
action is needed (probably more reasons to strengthen a particular conclusion). 
Second, it functions as a contrast to SINCON, which is a further evaluative idea 
with stronger action associated with it being a single conclusion. SINCON 
provides more grounding for belief in a single conclusion than with the competing 
conclusions RATINCON.  
 
A straightforward way to demonstrate these concepts is to consider a 
criminal investigation where there is justification to believe a single suspect 
committed the crime versus two suspects, supposing it is a one suspect crime. 
Yes, in the two-suspect ranking, at least it has been narrowed down to two 
(RATINCON), but there is still no definitive belief in the one suspect that did the 
crime (SINCON). More evidence may justify a single suspect (SINCON). 
 
Pedagogically, both progressions can be used and should be taught 
allowing students to properly assess and evaluate arguments with inconsistent 
reasons. In the context of teaching the ADM, to incorporate this content is easy 
and takes minimal time. While some may worry that this becomes overly 
technical, it provides a decision procedure for inconsistent arguments, which 
typical critical reasoning pedagogy has remained silent on. Students will 
encounter inconsistent arguments in their lives, so critical reasoning pedagogy 
demands this type of content inclusion in the curriculum. 
 
6.5 Rethinking informal fallacies  
 
For some critical reasoning courses, fallacies form most of the content. The 
influence of Hamblin’s (1970) seminal work on fallacies manifests this approach. 
Historically, Hamblin’s work is the first detailed contemporary work on fallacies 
and thus may be part, if not the impetus, of the informal logic movement (Groarke 
2011:§1). Students who inherit this fallacy priority are taught to be fallacy 
detectors to make them more effective reasoners. More so, it is common in 
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English composition and rhetoric courses to spend time on informal fallacies to 
improve one’s writing and speaking.121 This approach may benefit students if they 
are prone to writing and arguing fallaciously, and are taught the correct application 
of the labels. 
In my estimation, fallacies are over taught and take on an unwarranted 
significance. Reviewing textbooks – Moore and Parker (2015) and Engel (1999), 
for instance – most fallacy examples are contrived and not from actual sources. 
Even when actual sources are used, students may or may not understand the 
greater context, which can affect the application of the fallacy label. Yes, fallacies 
do occur, but it takes more skill to figure them out in many cases, a skill most 
students do not have or it is not sufficiently developed yet. But with a false 
confidence, they may believe they do resulting from a superficial pedagogical 
approach in English and Speech courses. Students learn some labels and apply 
them to the generated instances in abstraction. For instance, from an English 
composition 1 source:  
“Poisoning the well: undermining an opponent’s credibility before he or she gets a 
chance to speak. Example: “The prosecution is going to bring up a series of so-
called experts who are getting a lot of money to testify here today.” (Lumen 2018) 
 
Note the italicised portion of the example. Without an understanding of the greater 
context, it is not clear that this claim is a fallacy. If they are professional witnesses, 
they are getting paid to testify. If their professional expertise is limited, they may 
be “so-called” experts. The way the fallacy is defined, attacking someone’s 
credibility before one speaks is not necessarily a fallacy if you have prior 
knowledge of the person and their background. The supposition here is that in 
order not to commit the fallacy, someone should listen to the person regardless of 
their background, but in this context of a courtroom and professional witnesses no 
one would take that seriously. 
 
                                                          
121 For instance, at Rio Hondo College fallacies are covered in ENGL 101—College Composition 
and Research; ENGL 201—Advanced Composition and Critical Thinking; SPCH 101—Public 
Speaking; SPCH 140—Argumentation and Debate, and SPCH 240—Argumentation and 
Discussion. http://riohondo.curricunet.com  
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Imagine in this case, the defence attorney knows the professional 
witnesses and the claim is accurate, they are getting paid a lot of money and they 
are not experts in the area. The supposition for the fallacy is that the claim the 
defence attorney is making is inaccurate and that looks dangerously close to 
another fallacy, begging the question—assuming what needs to be proven. Or, if 
the prosecutors know that the professional witnesses are “so-called” experts, have 
they not poisoned the well against the defence attorney’s claim by questioning it? 
The point of all of this is that simply labelling fallacies outside of their context is not 
a skill we should want our students to develop. They may not understand the 
contextual subtlety of accurately labelling fallacies. The pedagogical result is a 
practical confusion and avoidable.  
 
One significant problem with the fallacy labelling approach is that it is 
potentially disruptive to argumentation. Built into this approach is a destructive 
aspect that is rarely addressed. In a dialogue where someone thinks there is a 
fallacy and charges the other person with that fallacy, the argument stops. It 
assumes both sides are competent and understand the fallacy. It may very well be 
the person being charged with reasoning fallaciously has no knowledge of the 
fallacy label. But, if the problem were articulated, an understanding might be 
possible. Fallacy labelling introduces an elitism into reasoning, creating an 
unnecessary disparity between two or more parties.  
 
Pedagogically, this fallacy elitism can be highlighted by asking the person 
to explain the fallacy and to then explain how the fallacy applies in this situation. 
Not surprisingly, explanations are thin because one’s understanding is extremely 
limited to the examples used in class. But it does not end there. When using 
fallacy labels in an argument, someone, the opposition, may be too embarrassed 
to ask what they mean. Fallacy labelling then halts the argument with someone 
appearing as if they have successfully reasoned, when the real situation is more 
complicated. Students must be taught to set their egos aside when engaging in 
honest inquiry.  
 
Instead of stressing learning various fallacy labels, the ADM proffers a way 
to talk about bad arguments. Simply, the relevance articulations show reasons 
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and their relationships to conclusions. In this relationship analysis, reasons that 
lack connections or have suspicious connections, are excluded from the 
argument. No labels are needed just a basic understanding of relevance. This 
requires a change in pedagogy and reorientation away from the unwarranted 
significance that fallacies play in the critical reasoning curriculum.  
 
This is not to say, however, that all fallacy education should be avoided. 
Instead, a pedagogical approach that emphasises the context of fallacies and a 
few common ones that students are more likely to experience should be put forth. 
These fallacies could be tailored to specific disciplines, for example the ad 
hominem to communication students, or causal fallacies, like the questionable 
cause, to social science students.  An unreflective approach to fallacy education is 
not the best choice for students to get something out of their fallacy education. 
 
To further explain how semantic inconsistency is a relevant topic to 
fallacies, a selection of fallacies is now shown to have a semantically inconsistent 
element in them. The context, however, settles the value of the inconsistency and 
then by extension, the value of the fallacy. Other fallacies could be used, so this 
list of fallacies is not exhaustive.  
 
6.5.1 Tu quoque 
 
The tu quoque fallacy depends on recognising the inconsistency between 
what someone says and what someone does. So, there is an inconsistency 
between belief and action. In ordinary terminology, the person is a “hypocrite.” 
The problem with this fallacy is that particular contexts justify the inconsistency 
and it is not a fallacy. The attack on the person is thus minimised in favour of what 
is being said. For example, if a drug addict tells someone not to use drugs, but is 
still a user, there is an inconsistency in belief and behaviour. An uninformed 
conception would charge the person with a fallacy because the person is still an 
addict and not following his own suggestion. However, rationality tells us that with 
addiction, the person speaking is an authority on the matter, yet does not have the 
power to stop the behaviour and desires. Who is better to speak about it? None, 
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the addict has the floor. So, the attack on the person, or fallacy, is negated 
through recognising the value of the person’s testimony in context. 
 
6.5.2 False analogy  
 
An analogy is the idea that if something is alike in one respect, it should be 
alike in another respect. Men are like women in terms of need, so, as men need 
food, so do women. The false analogy fallacy works on the idea that instead of 
things being alike, they are different. This fallacy brings out a natural tension 
between “alike” and “different”, a conceptual antonymic conflict. For instance, 
education is like business, so just as business is about profit, so education is 
about profit too.  
 
The false analogy fallacy rests on recognising that two things are not alike 
in some sense. To the degree they are dissimilar, the stronger the fallacy. 
However, are all analogies that are dissimilar, fallacious? Probably so because 
the unique nature of an analogy works on similarity and if there are substantive 
differences, something has gone wrong. So, with this fallacy, the inconsistency 
undermines the very nature of the argument type.  
 
6.5.3 Hasty generalisation 
 
The hasty generalisation fallacy occurs when from a limited sample size, an 
unsupported general claim is inferred. The inconsistency is between the specific 
claim and the general claim. For instance, on a television news show a claim may 
be made: “An attack on Hillary Clinton is an attack on all women.” The women on 
the subsequent panel discussion could state that it was not true and an attack on 
Hillary Clinton is just that, an attack on her.  
 
But this fallacy, can be questioned with the following kind of claim “a rotten 
apple made me sick, so all rotten apples will make me sick.” Of course, someone 
may not get sick, but with different content the fallacy does not look as obvious. 
Consider a stronger claim, “Socrates ate a lot of hemlock and died, so anyone 
who eats a lot of hemlock will die.” This version does not appear to be fallacious at 
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all. The definition of “unsupported general claim” may be invoked that the “rotten 
apple” and “hemlock” are supported through empirical science. True, but the basic 
idea of the relationship between a limited claim and a specific claim is being 
challenged. Do we know that everyone who eats a substantive amount of hemlock 
will die? Science would demonstrate that such people would die and it is a 
reasonable inference.  
 
Pedagogically, pointing out the relevance of the extension from limited to 
the general, allows assessment of the potential flaw. The Hillary Clinton case is a 
clear fallacy. The rotten apple situation is not a clear fallacy, nor is the hemlock 
instance. Someone’s motivation for this fallacy might be incompetence or 
insincerity. Students should think about the broader context, and if someone is 
incompetent, discuss why it is a problem. Insincerity does not deserve the same 
pedagogical respect because understanding is already in place before the 
deception. 
 
6.5.4 Quibbling 
 
The fallacy of quibbling is interesting because it involves distraction, that is 
a conscious agent’s detraction from the main issue by focusing on a minor one. 
The inference is that since the minor issue is undermined, so is the main issue. 
The inconsistency is between the significance or relevance of the minor issue and 
the main issue. In the RZ case, quibbling occurs if someone were to argue that 
since the damage to the neck cannot be settled, it still must be a suicide. The 
main issue is that there is evidence for murder and focusing on the neck alone 
undermines and is inconsistent with that key evidence.  
 
Pedagogically, quibbling is easy to address. Students do not take the 
fallacy route but instead ask, “which issue do you want to focus on, the neck or 
the suicide/murder?” Students must be taught to be actively engaged and critically 
reflective of the dialogic process. They might also ask, “what is the motivation for 
this?” Does the person not know any better or is the person trying to distract me 
on purpose? While the suggested response of not taking the fallacy route holds in 
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both cases, understanding one’s motivation may make more sense of how the 
rest of the argument may go.  
 
6.5.5 Suppressed evidence  
 
The fallacy of suppressed evidence occurs when someone does not 
include all the relevant evidence to an argument. Typically, someone withholds 
evidence that discounts or harms the plausibility of a particular conclusion. The 
inconsistency is between two arguments: the defective schematised argument 
and the robust schematised argument.  In the RZ case, had the height of the “She 
saved him …” message not been schematised, evidence would have been 
suppressed relevant to the murder conclusion.  
 
Pedagogically, this fallacy poses an interesting problem. Schematisation 
issues are not semantic issues like the previous fallacies. Was the evidence left 
out on purpose or was it done through incompetency? A different assessment is 
needed to determine why someone did this. If it is incompetence, it is not clear it is 
a fallacy. But if it is insincerity, it is a fallacy due to the purposive behaviour. 
Students should be taught that incompetency is the default position, as it allows 
one a graceful exit from the argument or the ability to include the relevant 
information.  
 
6.5.6 Concluding thoughts about fallacies and inconsistency 
 
A survey of a handful of fallacies reveals that they contain semantic 
inconsistencies. Sometimes these inconsistencies can be resolved, other times 
they cannot. The motivation for a fallacy also needs to be part of the fallacy 
assessment, and students should be taught that the motivation sets a broader 
context for understanding the argument and what direction it may go next. 
Fallacies and arguments in general are commonly based around the truth of 
claims being made. However, in critical reasoning, the truth of claims is not often 
known, so we now turn to understanding how claims can be thought of without 
truth conditions. 
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6.6 Understanding assertability conditions as non-truth functional    
 
Throughout this thesis, the importance of truth conditions for critical 
reasoning has been downplayed. Truth conditions are more a function of formal 
logical systems. They perform a particular role in that system, especially with truth 
tables. With no formal evidence for the following claim, it is likely the case that 
propositional logic’s truth tables and truth-values were co-opted for generalised 
reasoning. Students, through an emphasis on truth tables, were taught that 
arguments were no longer about the reasons themselves, but about truth and 
falsity.122 The problem, with respect to natural language arguments, is that truth-
values of reasons may be unknown. This problem of truth-values runs even 
deeper because any discussion of inconsistency is commonly done with truth-
values. Thus, one may argue that truth-values and truth conditions have deeply 
infected the practice and pedagogy of critical reasoning.  
 
What might be an alternative to truth-values? In the following paragraphs, 
the concept of “warranted assertability” is developed in combination with having 
good reasons. This combination comports to some degree with our natural 
practice of considering reasons as good reasons regardless of their known truth-
values. Gilbert Harman’s work is seminal with respect to reasoning in this sense, 
so a discussion of it follows. 
 
Harman (1986:46) defines the “principle of conservativism” as “One is 
justified in continuing fully to accept something in the absence of a special reason 
not to.” For Harman (1986:47), fully accepting something means that the inquiry 
has ceased and the only way to reopen it is with a substantive reason to the 
contrary. But it is important to understand the crucial distinction for Harman 
between (1986:46) “full beliefs” and a “working hypothesis,” he writes: 
 
“This is not to say there is a sharp line between full beliefs and working 
hypotheses. One's acceptance of a working hypothesis can gradually become 
more than tentative, so that eventually one is no longer investigating that 
                                                          
122 In the pedagogy of using truth tables, students learn that a truth table is a logical diagram 
demonstrating all the possible truth value combinations for a WFF, and then by extension to 
multiple WFFs in an argument. Because the translation into symbolic language is the first step, the 
semantics of the sentences turned into WFFs is downplayed in favour of truth conditions.  
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hypothesis but has fully accepted it. Things can go the other way, too. If 
"anomalies" arise with respect to a view, one can pass from fully accepting it to 
accepting it more tentatively and merely as a working hypothesis.” 
 
This short paragraph shows the nature of inquiry, which is two-directional varying 
on relevant information. A hypothesis can move from the tentative stage to being 
fully accepted. Should a conflict arise with a fully accepted belief, it can move in 
the other direction to a working hypothesis. The RZ argument started out as an 
argument for suicide with some fully accepting that conclusion. However, the 
additional information provided in the new article conflicts with the prior 
information moving the fully accepted belief to a working hypothesis.  
 
To make Harman’s thoughts particularly relevant to this thesis and the 
concept of “warranted assertability,” consider a rearticulation of the principle of 
conservatism into two separate principles, strong and weak. Let us call Harman’s 
principle of conservatism, “strong conservatism.” In contrast, let us define “weak 
conservatism” as “one is justified in continuing to provisionally accept something 
in the absence of a relevant reason not to.” In this sense, weak can move to 
strong and strong can move to weak in relation to conflicting or additional 
evidentiary reasons.  
 
“Warranted assertability” found its earliest articulation in Dewey (1941:169–
170). The general idea of warranted assertability is that the reasons provided in a 
context of inquiry provide sufficient support to believe something (Dewey 
1941:172). One strong feature of this view is that reasons are contextually 
motivated and situated in time. So, a claim can be asserted with warrant at time “t” 
but with further information, not asserted later at time “y” with warrant. To this end, 
truth or proof is not part of the process or concept, as both are normally 
atemporal.  
 
Imagine the following scenario. You are at the airport on your way home 
from a long trip. You look up your flight on the monitor and it is flashing “Delayed.” 
What do you believe in terms of conservatism, weak or strong? Pragmatically, you 
act on this information because it is important you want to get home. Without 
consulting a broader context, it is unlikely a decision between “weak” and “strong” 
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is obvious. Consider two different contexts around the delay. You fly often on this 
airline and it is regularly delayed. Strong conservativism might be in order in this 
context. There is no compelling reason to not believe the monitor. In contrast, 
suppose you have never flown on this airline and there are no other fights on 
delay per the monitor. Weak conservatism might be in order in this context, as the 
need to investigate further is reasonable, as you do not want to miss your flight.  
 
A reasonable assessment of the RZ argument would be that someone is 
weakly conservative in believing it reaches a plausible conclusion. There are 
reasons to believe each conclusion, but those reasons conflict with each other. As 
time goes on, more evidence might move someone to believe in a strongly 
conservative way, where the inquiry has ended. In both instances, however, there 
is warranted assertability given the content and connection of the reasons to their 
relevant conclusions.  
 
Before moving on to the next section, it is important to limit the scope of 
warranted assertability, as it is can be abused. In contemporary times, many 
conspiracy theories exist. The concept of “warranted assertability” is ripe for 
abuse by this group, as an argument can appear reasonable when it is not: the 
“special reason” qualification counts against the argument. Arguments can cohere 
and make sense as a story of sorts in that this coherence lends itself to perceived 
plausibility. However, introducing a “special reason” damages this coherence, 
usually fatally. The John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) assassination is fodder for 
conspiracy theorists. One famous theory is the “magic bullet theory,” where the 
bullet that was shot from the rear would have had to turn in mid-air to hit Texas 
governor John Connally in the front seat. This theory has been repeated ad 
nauseam, so much so, that many in the public believe it.123 The inference from the 
“magic bullet theory”, normally made is that since a bullet cannot turn in mid-air, a 
second gun shooting another bullet must have done the additional damage. So, 
there were at least two people shooting JFK and there is a great conspiracy not 
just involving Lee Harvey Oswald.  
                                                          
123 In 2013, a Gallup poll (Swift 2013) demonstrated that over 60% of all Americans believe there 
were two shooters, and not just Oswald alone. http://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-
believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx 
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The special reason that destroys the “magic bullet theory” is simple: the 
“magic bullet theory” supposes that Connally was sitting directly in front of 
Kennedy. However, carefully viewing the Zapruder film shows he was not. 
Connally was sitting offset to the left. When that seating location is incorporated 
into understanding the events of the day, a single bullet that hit Kennedy could 
have hit Connally given the angle—in fact, it lines up directly. Bullets do over 
penetrate, leaving one body and hitting another. One special reason, namely the 
offset seating arrangement, destroys the warranted assertability of the “magic 
bullet theory.” No further inquiry is needed at least with this theory as the seating 
position defeats the theory.  
 
In fairness, and not to overstate the importance of the special reason here, 
it defeats the “magic bullet theory” but it does not defeat the idea of a second 
shooter involved with the assassination. To defeat that idea, something like a 
bullet(s) analysis showing rifling marks would indicate there was only a single gun, 
would work. Thus, the scope of the special reason must be specific and carry 
argumentative weight. 
 
Pedagogically, teaching students the difference between assertability 
conditions and truth conditions is fundamental to understanding inquiry. With the 
right reasons, an argument shuts off further inquiry unless a defeating reason 
comes along, which then may or may not require additional inquiry. By delineating 
two types of conservatism, students learn about arguments in a way that does not 
necessarily have a truth determination for the premises. Students learn the 
concept of a reason and the role of conflicting reasons to an argument’s 
assertability. This is a natural process for most but needs some articulation tools 
to make it manifestly robust. While it may not be a popular view, and it is clearly 
the dream of philosophers, truth does not always motivate someone.  
 
6.7 Inconsistencies in critical reasoning texts: critical reflexions 
 
Over the last forty years, critical thinking textbooks bloomed in numbers of 
available texts. Not only are there a substantial number of texts, there are 
numerous editions of many texts showing the marketing and economic aspect to 
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the field. With multiple sections of critical thinking or critical reasoning being 
offered on many college campuses, instructor textbook choice impacts teaching. 
Reviewing textbooks and their content on inconsistency shows a lack of diversity 
of their thought. Very few textbooks offer anything novel on inconsistency and in 
general, support the common conception of inconsistency being about truth-
values. The texts chosen to critique represent the main ways inconsistency is 
thought about and ultimately, if the textbook is the guide, how it is taught to 
students.  
 
This section begins with a critical analysis of inconsistency in the selected 
textbooks. This analysis raises a few questions. Why was the concept included? 
What conception of inconsistency is put forth? What are the critical problems with 
the conception offered? The first question can be answered now. The concept of 
inconsistency is a standard topic due to its ability to create problems with 
reasoning. It is part of the typical concepts covered. But the other two questions, 
need specific articulation considering each authors’ basis for inclusion. 
 
To this end the textbooks speak for themselves, and a critique follows. The 
critique is two-fold: an analysis of the content itself and a breakdown of the impact 
of the content on students’ learning about inconsistency. Taken dialectically, 
following each critique is a critical reflexion from the perspective of this thesis and 
its position on semantic inconsistency. These dialectic interplays of how the 
concepts of the thesis hold up to scrutiny in the face of competing theories may 
stand for at least part of the justification for adopting the semantic inconsistency 
theory from chapter four. 
 
6.7.1 Moore and Parker  
 
Moore and Parker’s (2015), Critical Thinking, is in its 11th edition. This text 
is very popular in the United States, some twenty years after first publication, it 
continues to be a standard text in the field. This wide-ranging text brings elements 
of rhetoric, fallacies, and formal logic together.  
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The authors’ (2015:230) section on fallacies, discusses the difference 
between “contradictories” and “contraries.” They write:  
 
“Here is how contraries and contradictories can be confused. 
Visitor: I understand that all fish in this pond are carp. 
Curator: No, quite the opposite, in fact.  
Visitor: What? No carp? 
 
The visitor’s conclusion does not follow. “None are carp” is not the opposite of “All 
are carp.” A pair of claims that are exact opposites of each other are 
contradictories, meaning they never have the same truth-value. But two claims 
that cannot both be true but can both be false are not exact opposites: they are 
contraries. “None are carp” and “All are carp” are contraries, not contradictories.”  
 
Understanding “opposite” here demonstrates the semantic conflict between “all” 
and “no,” not a logical conflict. The antonymic contrast is obvious and the visitor’s 
conclusion is reasonable. The semantic contrast, however, does not noticeably 
manifest in truth-value differences to the uninitiated in syllogistic logic. The 
Curator’s response is contrived, unless it was Aristotle, as a normal locution would 
have been, “No, some are goldfish.” Furthermore, a real-world example of this 
from an article would have been helpful to justify that this kind of conversation 
takes place, not just simply in critical thinking and reasoning textbooks. The logical 
point stands as correct given the supposition of classical logical categories in 
syllogistic logic.   
 
The authors continue with a discussion of consistency and inconsistency 
(2015:232):  
 
“A group of statements is said to be consistent, if, and only if, it is possible that 
each and everyone of them is true at the same time. A group of statements is 
inconsistent if it is not possible for all of them to be true at the same time. (Given 
what was said in the last section we could also say that a group of beliefs is 
inconsistent if it contains beliefs that imply contraries or contradictories.)” 
 
The definitions of “consistent” and “inconsistent” are problematic. The notion of 
“possible” is wide-ranging and further adds to the confusion. Logically there are 
impossible worlds and possible worlds. In that sense, all sorts of statements in our 
physical world could be false but logically true in possible or impossible worlds. In 
short, this implies the thesis that all statements are true, or what is known as 
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“trivialism” (Priest 2006:56–71). So, all statements would be consistent if trivialism 
is true.  
 In the RZ argument, maybe she did commit suicide and was murdered, they 
strangled her at the same time she was hanging, so a dual cause of death while 
not likely, is possible. More so, the note “She saved him…” could have been 
written by both while he held her arm extended and they both went through 
constructing the letters. These events are logically possible, but they are not 
plausible given our ordinary understanding of the event. Moore and Parker’s 
definitions lead to obvious problems like these that would be rejected in ordinary 
reasoning contexts. 
 
“Consistency” and “inconsistency” are not about possibility in critical 
reasoning. The authors are constructing a hypothetical test for each concept, 
much like the concept of validity. In my estimation, any logical judgement of 
consistency or inconsistency only deals with known truth-values, not possible 
ones.  
 
Moore and Parker (2015:232) conclude their thoughts on inconsistency 
with the statement: 
 
“An inconsistent position cannot of course be accepted, but the position of an 
inconsistent person may well be, depending on its merits.”  
 
This fitting distinction between a position and a person and the distinction is right. 
Humans may be inconsistent in life, but that does not necessarily undermine the 
value of our position. However, the initial claim that an inconsistent position 
cannot be accepted is not true: quantum mechanics (Gibbins 1987:7), naïve set 
theory (Woods 2003:8), and natural language (Woods 2003:10), as examples, all 
contain inconsistencies, and they are not only accepted but are profitable in use. It 
is this kind of overstatement that undermines legitimate discussion and refined 
improvement of “inconsistency.” In fallacy terminology, it is poisoning the well 
about future thoughts on inconsistency. 
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Considering Moore and Parker’s thoughts on inconsistency, some general 
pedagogical issues arise. It is possible that students may end up confused about 
what “opposite” means in a normal context. This confusion is further motivated by 
the conflict between ordinary understanding of terms and their logical construction 
in syllogistic logic. Introducing a possibility element into the definitions 
“consistency” and “inconsistency” confuses students about the concepts, whether 
they are actual or hypothetical. The authors overstate that inconsistent positions 
cannot be accepted, in fact, we have good reasons – and it is rational -- to accept 
some, including our science and mathematics. Critical thinking textbook authors 
should reflect critically on all concepts taught to ensure students learn more than 
the standard interpretation of inconsistency and its hyperbole. 
 
6.7.1.1 Critical reflexion on Moore and Parker 
 
There are a few substantive differences between the semantic conception 
of inconsistency (SCI) and the views of Moore and Parker. SCI does not use the 
concept of possibility when assessing consistency or inconsistency. SCI uses 
plausibility judgement which is related to actual states of affairs. Consistency is 
about harmony and agreement among ideas, not truth-values for the SCI. 
Harmony, agreement and assertability comport with critical reasoning and its 
practical application being ingrained in changing lives. Truth is not always known 
but reasoning can still be informative and effective. In cases where the truth of a 
claim is known, the initial objection is not as strong due to the prior settling of the 
issue. Nevertheless, the contrast between a plausibility judgement and a 
possibility judgement demonstrates a connection to reality in the former but not 
necessarily in the latter. If reasoning about abstract situations is desired, and 
truth-values are known, there may be a case for Moore and Parker’s use of the 
terms. The question would then be, how often does this situation occur in critical 
reasoning contexts versus introduction to logic contexts? Its occurrence would be 
more likely in the latter and not in the former, making a case for its use in 
introduction to logic courses not in critical reasoning courses. 
 
Moore and Parker also use the classic Aristotelian categories – contrary 
and contradictory – to underlie their explanation in the carp example presented 
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above (2015:230). This focus on truth-values as the primary explanation for why 
the claims are different, contrasts with the ordinary understanding of “opposite.” 
The words “all” and “none” are opposites semantically. The priority of truth-values 
over semantic conflict may be largely due to logical history, but that is something 
that needs to be argued for, not simply taken for granted. The same criticism 
could be levelled at the SCI. However, the intuition supports them being 
semantically opposite versus a second level move to make them contraries based 
on truth-values. Which is more natural and productive? Which aligns with critical 
reasoning’s posits of natural language priority? An argument from what we do 
normally carries little weight unless it is effective. Our normal everyday reasoning 
practices are functional and result-producing. So, there is no obvious justification 
for adopting a two-step assessment model of semantics then truth-values, with 
truth-values taken as a priority.  
 
The final specific area of contention is that Moore and Parker do not have a 
detailed mechanism to resolve or handle inconsistencies. The general tone seems 
to be to avoid inconsistencies if one can and resolve them before an argument is 
schematised.124 The SCI has the concepts of SINCON and RATINCON nested 
into an argument model to enable resolution or action with inconsistencies. The 
argument model is effectively based on questions and answers, and using inquiry 
to generate reasons and conclusions. Whether this is the best argument model for 
doing this remains to be seen. But it is a move in the right direction, as it seeks 
resolution in a way that does not end in reasoning paralysis. 
 
6.7.2 Walton 
 
In his Fundamentals of Argumentation (2006), Walton lays out his basic 
thoughts on argument and related concepts for the masses. Walton takes 
inconsistency seriously (2006:44–45).  
 
                                                          
124 Moore and Parker (2015:231) use the concept of inconsistency in a dialogical form and the “flip-
flopping” is what someone assesses for believability based on its overall merit. This is consistent 
with the idea a person may be inconsistent. But it looks more like an ad hominem than a direct 
inconsistency problem. 
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Walton (2006:44) defines “inconsistency” by noting that “Two statements 
are inconsistent if it’s not logically possible for both to be true. By ‘inconsistent’ we 
mean logically inconsistent and not just practically or physically inconsistent.” 
Walton corrects the error of Moore and Parker by limiting the type of inconsistency 
to a logical one. In the context of a truth table, which is a logical diagram of all 
possible truth-value combinations, Walton’s view makes sense. However, the 
definition – as it is worded – is questionable in the following sense: two 
statements are inconsistent if they cannot possibly be true. But can two 
statements be inconsistent if they are both false? The basis for the question is 
semantic inconsistency. In the RZ argument “murder” and “suicide” are antonymic. 
Supposing the investigation went another direction and she died of natural 
causes, both original conclusions would be false. One might argue this third 
conclusion is implausible, but this is not a practical inconsistency. There is no 
logical necessity in either one of them being true. The point is that it not clear that 
his definition of “inconsistency” fits with semantic inconsistency in the argument. 
And, this is a general problem of defining “inconsistency” in terms of truth-values 
and not, at least in some degree, in terms of semantic conflict. 
 
Walton (2006:46) reiterates his thoughts on inconsistency in the context of 
what someone should respond when encountering inconsistency:  
 
“Although inconsistency can in many cases be understood and can be resolved, in 
general it is something that has to be addressed in argumentation once it has 
been discovered. The reason, once again, is that when you have an inconsistent 
set of statements, not all of them can be true.”  
 
To Walton’s benefit, he does not immediately discard the inconsistency as 
unintelligible. The advice he gives is appropriate: that inconsistencies should be 
resolved, when they can be. This thesis has proffered many thoughts on when 
they cannot, so its scope extends beyond what Walton has in mind. However, the 
last sentence of the quote is of particular importance: Walton uses another 
definition of “inconsistency” (2006:46). The qualifier of “possibly” is left out, and 
there is no hypothetical “if” (2006:46). This is a different definition and has a 
different meaning. Walton, himself, is thus inconsistent in what “inconsistency” 
means. The difference is substantive because truth-values are assumed in the 
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latter definition and are not in the former (2006:46). There is nothing hypothetical 
about the second formulation, whereas the first formulation is hypothetical.  
 
Later, Walton’s view of “inconsistency” seems to confuse a few concepts, 
he writes:  
 
“As shown... inconsistency is generally a bad thing in logic. If a set of statements 
is inconsistent, they cannot all be true. At least one must be false. Thus if an 
arguer tries to maintain a set of commitments that is inconsistent, it means that 
there is something not right in her position. Thus the other party can use such a 
finding of inconsistency as a criticism” (2006:181). 
 
 
Taking this quote at face value, it shows a conceptual confusion. “Inconsistency” 
is neither good nor bad in logic. Any normative evaluation of it is extrasystematic. 
His definition of “inconsistency” in this context of logic is fine and correct with the 
hypothetical. Yet, he then shifts from logic to argumentation about “… maintaining 
a set of commitments that is inconsistent …” I suspect we all maintain 
commitments that are inconsistent, some knowingly. Walton even admits this:  
 
“Also, in realistic everyday argumentation, it can be quite hard or even impossible 
to keep an exact record of all an arguer’s commitments she incurred in the past. 
Thus, as a matter of general policy, commitment sets do not always have to be 
consistent “(2006:182).  
 
Walton’s practical intuition is right, but his method is wrong. Relying on standard 
logical appraisal to make sense of inconsistency competes with the practical point 
made later. In an ideal circumstance, yes, something is not right in her position. 
However, human lives are not ideal and this is another conceptual carryover from 
the austere nature of formal logical evaluation. The purity and clarity of formal 
logic blinds many to practical reality but they rarely question the disconnect 
between the two. 
 
One final quote by Walton (2006:126) demonstrates his understanding of 
practical inconsistency. In the discussion of a circumstantial ad hominem, or tu 
quoque, he says:  
 
“Once the practical inconsistency is identified that is the focus of the attack, could 
it be resolved or explained by further dialogue, thus preserving the consistency of 
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the arguer’s commitments in the dialogue or showing that a’s inconsistent 
commitment does not support the claim that a lacks credibility?” (2006:126).  
 
Walton’s understanding is correct. The context and additional information can 
either resolve or explain someone’s inconsistency. In this sense, the inconsistency 
does not completely undermine the point being made, it just needs to be handled 
in a specific way. It is unfortunate that Walton’s views on logical inconsistency are 
supposed to relate to a productive understanding of practical inconsistency.  
 
Pedagogically, a student using this text may question the various 
definitions of “inconsistency” and wonder about the relationship of the logical 
definitions with the concept of practical inconsistency. The instructor would have 
to make sense of that for the student in a critical reasoning course, which may or 
may not be productive. In a previous chapter, the value of hypotheticals in critical 
reasoning was challenged. Walton’s definitions play into this use. Instead of 
hypotheticals and trying to assess truth-values in critical reasoning, a much better 
approach is warranted assertability, where students consider reasons and their 
value in contexts wherein truth-values may or may not be known. Walton’s 
general approach to analysing consistency and inconsistency in terms of truth-
values, sets aside the students’ common linguistic knowledge of semantic conflict, 
the source of practical inconsistency and even logical inconsistency, in some 
cases. A mixed approach is more likely to confuse students than enable 
understanding. Here, students need to understand two concepts versus one, and 
depending on how it is presented, the distinction may be too subtle or unclear. 
Many critical reasoning instructors forget what it is like to be a student studying 
this material for the first time. After teaching the material numerous times, due to 
familiarity, it is all very clear to the instructor, but not the students learning for the 
first time. Scholars like Walton and others (Wright 2001 & Dauer 1989) in my 
estimation, are guilty of this lack of educational empathy, except in rare cases 
where students are exceptionally well prepared.  
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6.7.2.1 Critical reflexion on Walton 
 
As with Moore and Parker, there are some areas of contention. However, in 
his case, a different tactic will be chosen. The idea of “educational empathy” 
should be considered with any textbook choice and resulting pedagogy. I 
remember when I was a teaching assistant for a critical reasoning course. The 
professor presented the material at a graduate level at times but it was rarely at a 
lower division undergraduate level. The fine-grained distinctions and the textbook 
chosen undermined the overall intelligibility in the course as evidence by students 
filling my office hours. I remember talking to other teaching assistants who said, “It 
is all so clear to him…but not to anyone else.” Whether that was a fair statement, I 
do not know. But what I do know is that there was little educational empathy for 
his students.  
 
Walton’s work strikes me in that way. It is written at a technical level that 
many undergraduates would have difficulty with, including his discussion of 
inconsistency and related concepts, some of which are noted above. There is so 
much material to unpack in what he is doing with inconsistency let alone argument 
formation. In contrast, teaching the ADM—analytical defeasible model of 
reasoning with questions and answers – and the SIC are relatively 
straightforward. Using questions and answers, inconsistent reasons and 
inconsistent conclusions are obvious due to conflicting semantic content. There 
are no possibility judgements, no necessary knowledge of truth-values, and 
students do not have to sift through a few different definitions of “inconsistency,” 
trying to figure out which one is right in the context. 
 
The objection from Walton’s side may be that students deserve detailed 
explanations, fine-grained distinctions, and an emphasis on truth. And, in principle 
I agree in an ideal world. Walton clearly understands inconsistency is of different 
forms and many issues surrounding it, as noted above. However, he does not 
take as seriously as he should the semantics involved with inconsistency and how 
that is prior to truth condition evaluation.  
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Pedagogically, students should be met where they are, and many must be 
brought up to a standard level. Given the rest of his text is similar in feel, time will 
be spent in other areas to ensure students have the basics, and inconsistency 
may not even be addressed except in passing. Complicated texts manifest in 
pedagogical choices being made and not all are made with student empathy in 
mind.  
 
One final objection from Walton might be that I have made too much of 
student empathy and that his text is friendly to students. In response, I would ask 
“which students?” If his book is a textbook for lower division undergraduate 
students, as Govier, and Moore and Parker are, relatively it does not impart the 
same sense of an introductory text. If Walton’s book is primarily a theory book and 
written for advanced undergraduates and graduate students, it is a better fit. 
There is an important distinction to be made: there is a difference between a book 
about arguments and a book that teaches argument skills. It seems Walton’s book 
emphasises the latter over the former; whereas, my work emphasises the former 
over the latter. Which is correct? It depends on the audience.  
 
6.7.3 Govier  
 
Govier’s A Practical Study of Argument (2009) is a comprehensive critical 
reasoning textbook. It is unique because of her discussion of conducive 
arguments, which do not fit the typical inductive and deductive models of 
reasoning (Govier 2009:353–373). Govier’s thoughts on inconsistency are a bit 
different, she (2009:146) defines “inconsistency” as: 
 
“Two statements are inconsistent with each other if, putting them together, we 
would arrive at a contradiction. A single statement is also inconsistent if it entails a 
contradiction. Such a statement is not acceptable because we know a priori that it 
is false. Explicit inconsistency occurs when the contradiction is apparent on the 
surface, in the way the statements are worded. Implicit inconsistency occurs when 
the meaning of the statements allows us to infer, by valid deduction, a further 
statement that is a contradiction.” 
 
Govier starts with inconsistency being an issue of logical form, that is, of two 
conflicting statements brought together (with a conjunction). She then shifts to a 
truth functional account, such that the false entails the false. She ends with 
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delineating two different types of inconsistency, explicit and implicit. ”Explicit 
inconsistency” comes from a particular grammatical form, to cite her example 
(2009:132): “... if one premise asserts, ‘All men are emotionally tough,’ and 
another asserts, ‘Some men are emotionally vulnerable,’ the argument has 
premises that explicitly contradict each other.”  “Implicit inconsistency” is 
semantically based and involves inference through valid deduction, as her 
example demonstrates (2009:133):  
 
“Her death was due to a traffic accident, an accident that can’t have been 
anyone’s fault. The stop sign was not clear because of snow piled up near the 
corner, and the streets were slippery. To make matters worse, the young driver of 
the other car had been drinking.” 
 
Govier (2009:133) says that by inference, the implicit contradiction that can be 
drawn “… can’t have been anyone’s fault” and the statement that the “… driver of 
the other car had been drinking” contradict due to responsibility or a lack of it. 
 
On the example of an explicit contradiction, there are two things to note. 
First, Govier uses the typical Aristotelian categories to generate the contradiction. 
She (2009:132) rightly comments: “As you might imagine, this sort of mistake is 
too obvious to occur frequently.” One might wonder then, why it is worth noting 
outside of contrasting with “implicit contradiction”? Second, her example uses a 
purported antonymic pairing of ‘tough’ and ‘vulnerable.’ An antonymic search on 
Synonym.com (2016a) for “tough” and on Synonym.com (2016b) for “vulnerable” 
reveals no pairing of these terms.  While the conceptual model supports non-
standard pairings, the way Govier needs these two terms to function in the 
Aristotelian category, is that one of them should function as negation and it is not 
obvious that “tough” sufficiently conflicts with “vulnerable” and vice-versa.  
 
On the example of the implicit contradiction, it is not obvious this set of 
claims generates a conflict about responsibility. Just because someone was 
drinking does not necessitate they were incapable of driving a car safely. If 
someone were intoxicated, then responsibility might be an issue. To determine 
responsibility, in this case, one would have to ask a few questions. If the 
conditions were such that the person had not been drinking, would the event not 
have happened? It is apparent there is not enough information to make that claim, 
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in fact, the environmental issues call into question how much alcohol consumption 
affected the accident. 
 
Pedagogically, it might seem petty to point out the problem with this 
example and both definitions. However, students may pick out poor examples like 
this, and, if the example becomes the contentious issue, the students will not 
learn the concept. A simple qualification that the person was inebriated and that 
an inebriated person should not be driving, brings home the “implicit 
inconsistency” in Govier’s terms. The “explicit inconsistency”, as mentioned, 
suffers from a semantic conflict, that while conflicting, is probably not formulated in 
a way to contain an obvious contradiction by her own definition. It is 
straightforward to think about a case where someone is tough and vulnerable at 
the same time, both are true, so it does not suffer from being false, which can 
imply a contradiction in her definition. Imagine a world-class boxer who by all 
accounts is one of the toughest human beings in the world but is fighting in a 
third-world country that is known for kidnapping famous people. The boxer would 
be tough and vulnerable at the same time. Students might be taught that a better 
contrast with “vulnerable” is “protected,” so the example would make the point 
about “contradiction.” 
 
Govier’s initial definitions “inconsistency” and “contradiction” are standard 
and demonstrate the influence of formal logical concepts on her critical reasoning 
(2009:146). Her move to antonymic pairing could have been exploited much 
stronger showing that semantic conflict is the initial judgement about 
inconsistency. Students need to be taught to critically reflect on examples and 
problems to determine if the concept is being applied properly or not. Students 
may dissect Govier’s “responsibility” example rather quickly because of their prior 
knowledge of antonymic pairings and semantic contrast and conflict.  
 
With Govier’s definitional idea that “A single statement is also inconsistent if 
it entails a contradiction. Such a statement is not acceptable because we know a 
priori that it is false” (Govier 2009:146), students may be challenged to determine 
what all of that means? Unless a student has had a logic course, it makes little 
sense. Govier (2009:132) uses “There was a time before time began” as an 
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example of inconsistent single statement that leads to the contradiction “time 
before time.” Students may not pick up on the false evaluation, but what they 
would understand is that the claim does not make much sense. But, even this 
“contradictory” statement could have a use at the beginning of a story for literary 
emphasis. More importantly, this example does not work. “Time” can be read in 
several ways. One way is that “time” is ambiguous, with the first meaning 
something like period length, and the second meaning something like sequential. 
Another way to read this is there was a single instance before the existence of a 
group. The statement does not say “There was time before time began,” which 
might bring across Govier’s point more effectively.  
 
6.7.3.1 Critical reflexion on Govier 
 
There are a few issues with Govier’s view in comparison to the SCI. The 
already discussed views in Moore and Parker relate to the Aristotelian and 
propositional concepts used by Govier, so they will not be revisited. Govier’s view 
of implicit contradictions is interesting because it is semantically based. It is an 
interesting use of the word “contradiction” due to it not being an issue of form like 
her use of “explicit contradiction.” Her view appears to be antonymic in principle, 
which is positive and shares a similarity with the SCI.  
 
SCI, by definition from chapter four, is about harmony and agreement 
among claims so inconsistency would be about a lack of harmony and 
disagreement among claims. The first definition that Govier (2009:146) uses, “Two 
statements are inconsistent with each other if, putting them together, we would 
arrive at a contradiction.” Consider two claims: Rebecca Zahau was murdered and 
Rebecca Zahau was not murdered. The conjunction of these two claims is a 
contradiction as Govier would support. But consider the conclusions of the 
argument previously put forth: Rebecca Zahau was murdered and Rebecca 
Zahau committed suicide, is not an obvious logical contradiction. There is no 
explicit negation of a claim. A two-step translation move could be made where 
“suicide” is translated into “not murdered” but that is not a natural move outside of 
logical training. However, the latter claims clearly disagree and are not in harmony 
with particular reasons in the argument. Thus, the SCI handles an inconsistency in 
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a straightforward manner where Govier’s own definition might not even find the 
claims to be inconsistent.  
 
By positing a single definition of “inconsistency” that is consistent with the 
overall theory, the SCI makes sense of inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Govier’s use of “implicit contradiction” would not match her own first definition in 
(2009:146) as the conjunction of the claims are not explicit negations, much like 
the example above from Rebecca Zahau’s argument. Pedagogically, this is 
potentially confusing to students because it is theoretically confusing – without 
justification – for why it is acceptable not to negate in one circumstance but having 
to in another. The SCI does not suffer these obvious confusions. It can be 
asserted that the SCI’s definition of inconsistency is wrong and weak, but that is a 
different argument to be made by a critic. The response to that would depend on 
the context of the criticism, especially where a weaker definition captures in some 
degree what a rigid definition would posit.  
 
Reflecting on these examples from the Rebecca Zahau case, and use of 
“inconsistency” by Govier and the SCI, one could object to the SCI that there is 
more to inconsistency than disharmony and disagreement, for example conflicting 
truth-values too. This could be a substantive objection if it assumed that the SCI 
was never concerned with truth-values. There is no problem adding truth-values, 
when known, after the semantic conflict is addressed and any problems with that 
conflict are noted. The beauty of warranted assertability is that it does not 
necessarily exclude the evaluation of truth-values and truth claims, instead, 
warranted assertability might be the best tool in context, especially when truth-
values are unknown. Truth is important and fundamental, but it must be known to 
be operative. 
 
Govier was correct to include conducive arguments in her text (2009:352–
366). These arguments include counter considerations and the premises do not 
necessarily have to be linked together (2009:375). This practical approach to 
argument focuses on the best reasons for a conclusion all other things being held 
the same, which as a “best reasons” approach appears to be a form of warranted 
assertability (2009:375). But, one might question, why is the substantive account 
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in chapter 12 (the last one before the appendix on fallacies)? Much of specific 
argument instruction in the text is spent on deductive and inductive arguments.125 
While conducive arguments are a move in the right direction, they fail to situate 
themselves in a question and answer context, which engages inquiry robustly. 
One naturally inquires with questions and answers, which the ADM exploits and 
positions in a straightforward argument form. It is a hard position to argue, for the 
critic, that questions and answers are not the basis of inquiry. If inquiry is one of 
the main concepts of critical reasoning, an argument model that integrates it 
should be considered before one that does not. Only in time will it be shown what 
alternative argument models will gain traction, maybe conducive arguments will 
along with the ADM and interrogative approach of Wright (2005:139–348). 
 
6.7.4 General criticism of changing the subject: critical reflexions 
 
In fairness to Moore and Parker, Govier, and Walton, the SCI can be 
viewed as simply changing the subject. They are nested in a tradition that is 
thousands of years old in part, where formal logic of various kinds, is the paradigm 
of rationality. The concepts of inconsistency from those traditions have upheld 
through the test of time and the attempt in this thesis just changes the subject with 
respect to rationality, argument, and inconsistency. From the dominant paradigm, 
that criticism is warranted. 
 
As Kuhn argued (1970:35–47), normal science is puzzling solving. Puzzle-
solving is an apt description of the current state of classical logic. There is a 
certain set of problems and rules that classical logicians engage and use. Those 
rules and problems are passed down to students. Aristotelian logic was the initial 
paradigm of logic and when the logic could not make sense of propositions, 
different connectives and their behaviour (the crisis), a new logic replaced it with 
propositional and quantified logic (Smith 2017). This new paradigm has existed for 
some one hundred plus years. While both Aristotelian and propositional logic are 
loosely considered classical logic, recent developments in non-classical logics are 
                                                          
125 In fairness to Govier, she does include some discussion of conducive arguments in earlier 
chapters (2009:90–91). 
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challenging that paradigm with new rules and puzzles. Maybe the crisis phase is 
developing, but only time will tell.  
 
The Kuhnian interpretation of the progression of logic, although simplistic, 
makes sense historically and conceptually. However, it is much harder to fit critical 
reasoning into that paradigm, especially in its modern form. From the perspective 
of this thesis, it is not even clear that critical reasoning has reached the normal 
science stage. There is not a clear set of puzzles, problems, and rules. In fact, it 
seems that the existing logical paradigm continues to overshadow critical 
reasoning. The textbooks such as Moore and Parker (2015), Govier (2009), and 
Walton (2006) demonstrate this lasting influence in different degrees. 
 
If the Kuhnian interpretation of logical history is correct, it is not clear that 
the SCI is changing the subject. It does not have the strength of a crisis, nor are 
the puzzles it seeks to solve with inconsistency even acknowledged given the 
past reliance on the existing logical paradigm. Hamblin (1970) in one sense 
started a modern turn (although fallacies have been around for thousands of 
years [see Aristotle 1955:17–45]), but the degree to which that new direction is 
acknowledged is questionable to the larger paradigm of reasoning. Critical 
reasoning as a discipline being in its infancy is still trying to find its own traction 
and maybe the SCI will aid in further traction.  
 
6.7.5 Inconsistency in critical reasoning texts: concluding thoughts 
 
Govier, Moore and Parker, and Walton, suffer from limited conceptual 
clarity on inconsistency and it unfortunately informs their pedagogical practices. 
From my perspective, as argued in this research, critical reasoning demands a 
subtle approach to inconsistency providing a way for students to appreciate the 
conceptual fecundity surrounding contrast, conflict, and contradiction. The SCI 
offers an alternative for critical reasoning courses compared to alternative views 
that are mostly recycled ideas from the history of logic assembled in new 
textbooks. Whether the SCI or other semantically based views gain traction for 
reasoning, the history of critical reasoning will bear that out, one way or another. 
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6.8 A critical reasoning pedagogical usage of inconsistencies in legal 
systems  
 
Studying legal codes is an effective pedagogical tool to help students 
understand the nature and consequence of inconsistency. The law is a natural 
extension of our human practices with real consequences involved. Choosing the 
appropriate inconsistencies helps relate the critical reasoning curriculum’s 
material directly to the students.  
 
In 1996, the State of California in the United States, voted on and approved 
Proposition 215, The Compassionate Use Act. California is one of the few states 
in the union of the United States that has direct democracy through the political 
processes of referendum, recall, and initiative (Ballotpedia 2017). The public can 
put measures on the ballot, vote and bring about sweeping changes, without 
being represented by an elected official as in a republic. The citizens of the State 
of California put Proposition 215 on the ballot and it passed. 
 
This proposition allows marijuana use for medical reasons as prescribed by 
medical doctors for many afflictions including glaucoma, pain from cancer, 
anxiety, back pain and several ailments. Among the consequences has become 
that marijuana production has been turned into a cottage industry for the 
marijuana production industry and marijuana doctors. To get a medical 
recommendation for the prescription of marijuana takes about fifteen minutes in 
person, online or on the phone speaking with a medical doctor. It is fair to say that 
for some citizens of the State, the law is being used illicitly for recreational 
purposes and not medical purposes. The State of California Department of Public 
Health law states (1996):  
 
“(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, 
relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to the 
patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the 
personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation 
or approval of a physician.”  
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Where Section 11357 considers the legal enforcement penalties for marijuana 
possession, production and consumption, the law does not apply to those with a 
medical marijuana recommendation in the State of California.  
 
However, the Federal government of the United States still criminalises all 
marijuana cultivation, use and possession. The White House under President 
Obama held the position that (2016):  
 
“Since 1996, 23 states and Washington, DC have passed laws allowing smoked 
marijuana to be used for a variety of medical conditions. It is important to 
recognise that these state marijuana laws do not change the fact that using 
marijuana continues to be a criminal offence under Federal law.  Nor do these 
state laws change the criteria or process for FDA approval of safe and effective 
medications.”  
 
So, there are two issues for the Federal government, possessing marijuana is a 
Federal offence and the Federal Drug Administration has not approved medical 
marijuana for treating maladies.  
 
With this topic, critical reasoning students recognise the legal inconsistency 
between the State of California and the Federal Government’s legal position on 
marijuana use for medical reasons. Students delineate two different 
inconsistencies: one on possession and use, and another on medical approval. 
Having the students articulate the inconsistencies, the result is: it is legal to use 
marijuana for medical reasons in California and it is illegal to use marijuana for 
medical reasons in the United States of America. Since California is in the United 
States of America, it is both legal and illegal to use marijuana for medical reasons.  
 
Moreover, students recognise the antonymic pair of “legal/illegal” 
demonstrating a strong inconsistency, although in different contexts. Additionally, 
students can infer that from this pair of statements – assuming the proper 
documentation and limited amounts of marijuana – they will not be subject to 
State law enforcement. However, if a Federal officer detains them, they may be 
subject to arrest, prosecution and fines. “Federal” and “State” are also antonymic 
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in this context, which furthers the potential understanding of the degree of 
conflict.126  
 
Another way inconsistencies in the law can be used is through the 
arbitrariness of sentencing. Consider the following information (Secret:2012):  
 
“In the Eastern District of New York, for example, the twenty-eight judges in the 
study delivered a median sentence of 24 months for drug cases in the past five 
years. But there were disparities: Judges Jack B. Weinstein and Kiyo A. 
Matsumoto gave median drug sentences of 12 months, while the median drug 
sentence for Judge Arthur D. Spatt was 64 months.”  
 
Supposing the drug cases are relatively similar, sentences ranged from 12 months 
to 64 months, with the median of 24 months. The range of sentencing is 
inconsistent, radically in some cases. Students also review TracReports (2012) on 
the same issue and compare and contrast different districts including North Texas, 
East Virginia, Minnesota, District of Columbia, North Illinois, and others to further 
ascertain if inconsistent sentencing is a local or national phenomenon. This allows 
them to note both internal and external consistencies and inconsistencies, giving 
more fodder for an informed evaluation of the sentencing issues. 
 
Students are asked to reflect on this range of sentences and ask further 
questions. Is there a difference in sentencing due to age, gender and/or race? So 
not only may there be inconsistencies in sentencing simpliciter, there may be 
inconsistencies in sentencing based on other factors. Students are then instructed 
to do some research on sentencing discrepancies and bring it back to the next 
class session. Using a group method, students initially share and compile their 
information in small groups. From there, the groups merge and compile their 
results and eventually, the class brings forth their collective thoughts on the why 
there might be disparity in sentencing. This group merging technique forces 
students to deal with potentially inconsistent information and either resolve it or 
accept it, both of which take justified reasons to do so. Students are also 
reminded to think and look for the “special reason” defeater. Typically, students 
come to the conclusions that some of the arbitrariness is race based, some of it is 
                                                          
126 One way to understand the contrast between the two is on a gradation scale based on the 
concept of government power and their exercise of control.  
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just random, and still yet, some of it is warranted given the nature of the case, for 
example, previous offences or the amount of contraband involved. At that point, 
the students are further questioned about the consistency of their results, which 
are conflicting. Are the conflicts legitimate or not? What should be done? 
 
The sentencing exercise exposes students to various inconsistencies, 
some of which are important and some are not. The dynamic nature of the issue 
demonstrates that the world is not black and white with respect to inconsistency 
and consistency. If the world is dynamic, and it seems to be so, students need to 
be immersed in issues that reflect our complex lives. This immersion puts critical 
reasoning at the forefront of understanding the importance of the issues(s) 
involved. It also teaches cooperation, listening skills, and a pragmatic attitude 
toward results. These skills all transfer to everyday life, employment, and even 
personal relationships. Reasoning is part of life and should be taught as such. 
 
6.9 Concluding thoughts 
 
Students need to be taught to rely on the natural language skills and 
trusting their intuitions about semantic conflict. In Govier’s presented example of 
“vulnerable” and “tough,” students may perceive the conflict and that should raise 
suspicions. Where they do not see the semantic conflict, students should be 
encouraged to read, and read more. Semantic conflict is difficult to understand in 
isolation. The more examples and in different contexts, the more likely someone 
will be able to recognise when a semantic inconsistency is important and when it 
is not.  
 
A natural means to achieve linguistic competency is through reading and 
improving one’s vocabulary. One way to encourage this is to have students keep 
a notebook of “new” words for them, and their definitions. By reading various 
materials that includes semantic conflict, students come to see patterns of the use 
of words. These patterns may pair up two words, in contrast, that the student does 
not know. They may not be canonical antonyms, nevertheless the context dictates 
they are conflicting. By reading diverse types of materials students benefit to this 
end. So, students should be encouraged to read as much as possible to improve 
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linguistic competency, which includes semantically conflicting words not in the 
standard antonym canon.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and implications 
 
 
 
The final research question is now considered: what is the best concept of 
inconsistency for critical reasoning and pedagogy? To answer this question, three 
aims were posited. In this chapter, and considering the material from the previous 
chapters, these aims will be discussed and the implications will be developed 
along with critical reflexions. 
 
7.1 First aim: to correct the identified flawed conception showing that 
critical reasoning in theory and practice is distinct from formal propositional 
deductive logic as an implicative system of rules, and critical reflexions on 
the first aim 
 
In chapter one, a historical tour of the history of philosophy revealed 
different conceptions of “inconsistency.”127 The consequence of these differing 
conceptions suggests that inconsistency is not a univocal concept. These many 
concepts set the context of the research question. In chapter two, a system of 
propositional logic was put forth along with the explosive conception of 
inconsistency.128 This conception manifests due to the implicative concepts of 
ECQ—from a contradiction, anything follows, and EFQ—from the false, anything 
follows. More so, the syntactic type of contradiction, with the form (P  ~P), is the 
modern paradigmatic form of inconsistency. In chapter three, the system of 
propositional logic was critiqued from various angles including articulating 
translation problems, a lack of correspondence between connective meaning and 
natural language meaning, and problems with the explosive conception of 
inconsistency.129 Those issues helped to demonstrate the overall problem where 
the implicative patterns of propositional logic are (mis)understood as principles of 
                                                          
127 In terms of the objectives of the thesis, Objective 1: to provide a limited relevant history of 
inconsistency. 
128 In terms of the objectives of the thesis, Objective 2: to accurately represent propositional logic. 
129 In terms of the objectives of the thesis, Objective 3: to accurately critique propositional logic as 
a system. 
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inference, especially ECQ. EFQ implicates as well through the logical assumption 
that anything follows from the false, and a contradiction is necessarily false on all 
rows by its truth table. Finally, in chapter five, the results of the previous chapters 
and additional information were used to critique the use of propositional logic in 
critical reasoning courses.130 
 
The intent of chapters two, three, and five was to set the conceptual 
foundations for divorcing specific logical contexts from normative ordinary 
reasoning practices. Those logical contexts are implicative, not inferential. An 
obvious objection challenges that what we do in practice is not what we “should” 
do in practice (Shapiro 2013). For that group, classical logic should be used as it 
eliminates vagueness and ambiguity, and gives a formal structure to reasoning 
(Shapiro 2013). In fairness, from the perspective of a classical logician, those 
merits may be true in the proper context. As they see it, adopting a translation 
project may make the natural language relations clearer by taking it from its 
original context, symbolising it, and clarifying the implication through rule use. For 
them, the unclear aspects of natural language have become clearer in the ways 
mentioned. I, however, have argued that it is not clearer as translation misses 
crucial elements that aid understanding including context and semantic relations. 
More so, the implicative patterns may or may not mirror what we do when we 
naturally reason. But if my criticism is right, implication has been confused for 
inference, derivation for argument, and our natural reasoning practices, by their 
very nature, are inferential. 
 
 One point at stake here is a judgement call about what is more important in 
natural reasoning: inference or implication. Inference is the substance of our 
natural reasoning practices; implication is not. The classical logician wants to 
replace in part, or in total, inference with implication.131 I have made a sustained 
argument that inference is more important that implication, especially in the 
context of critical reasoning. Nowhere have I argued that implication is not 
                                                          
130 In terms of the objectives of the thesis, Objective 5: to critique propositional logic as a system of 
critical reasoning. 
131 Shapiro (2013) in his discussion of various views implies this is true of philosophers like Quine 
and Frege. Neither is going to explicitly state they prefer implication because that is not a term they 
used. Their use of the formal apparatus demonstrates this and their preference for it. 
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important simpliciter, as it has fundamental applications in mathematical logic and 
mathematics in general. As well, I am biased toward inference for critical 
reasoning because it comports with human experience. Is this bias warranted? If 
the function of a critical reasoning course is to articulate and evaluate our natural 
reasoning practices that manifest in our everyday experience, then the bias may 
be warranted. 
 
 This tension between inference and implication, and preferring one over 
the other, leads to an epistemic choice: a presuppositional choice. There are 
some alternatives: inference over implication; implication over inference; and, 
choosing both for specific contexts. The argument here is that for critical 
reasoning, inference should be chosen over implication. Others such as Wallis 
(2017) and Poston (2012) chose both for critical reasoning, which seems to be 
relatively common during the syllabi review. But, the issue is, what justifies that 
choice and why? 
 
 It is difficult to find a definitive answer for settling the epistemic dispute 
other than the arguments provided in chapters four, five and six. One would have 
to believe that propositional logic adequately expresses our normal reasoning 
practices and/or should represent it. One would also have to believe that 
translation problems are not as problematic as argued in chapter three. In 
particular, someone would believe that the translation problems do not undermine 
their practical effectiveness. Finally, one would have to make sense of the 
gradations, contrast, and semantic relevance among natural language ideas 
through propositional language as demonstrated in chapter four, if they believe 
the language needs to comport in the same or very similar way. In my estimation, 
an acceptable handling of these problems would be extremely difficult as reducing 
a complex system of ideas to a simple system of ideas will undoubtedly leave 
something out that is relevant. These logicians leave out what I think is important 
and vice-versa. 
 
 Linked closely with implication is the notion of certainty. One can 
understand a preference for implication over inference, due to the result it 
provides epistemically. In an ideal world, implication would reveal necessary 
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relationships between claims demonstrating certainty. This is an admirable goal 
for any type of reasoning and maybe should be our goal. But we are left with the 
old “is” versus “ought” tension between our practices and our ideals. 
 
Presuppositions are deeply held commitments and holding presuppositions 
explains the divide between inference and implication. Explanations come to an 
end someplace, to paraphrase Wittgenstein (1973:§1), and it may be that deep 
disagreement – as Fogelin (1985:5) mentioned – is at the heart of not being able 
to determine which one is correct. As a student of reasoning, when competing 
presuppositions hold, reason can be impotent due to the emotional commitment to 
the presupposition. Thus, an impasse may result. 
 
7.2 Second aim: to develop and articulate a natural language account of 
semantic inconsistency that captures what we do in practice with 
inconsistency judgements in everyday reasoning, and critical reflexions on 
the second aim 
 
Inconsistency should not be that controversial of a topic in most instances. 
In everyday life, inconsistencies are noted rather quickly in obvious situations. A 
recent murder case in Orange County, California, U.S.A., has inconsistencies in 
the testimony of a suspect that eventually led to his arrest (Puente & Saavedra 
2018). A few to note: the suspect said he went to his girlfriend’s house but could 
not remember her address; the suspect had a girlfriend but did not know her last 
name; and the suspect was an Eagle Scout but is now charged with murder 
(Puente & Saavedra 2018). On an ordinary understanding of the claims being 
made, they are inconsistent: to drive to his girlfriend’s house he should know the 
address—and does not; he has a girlfriend and should know her last name—and 
does not; and finally, the character of an Eagle Scout is exemplary, which is not 
the same as a murderer’s character.132 This judgement for competent language 
users on the first two inconsistencies is immediate, based on semantic conflict. 
                                                          
132 An Eagle Scout is the highest rank that can be achieved in the Boy Scouts of America. Only 4% 
of all Boy Scouts earn the title. An Eagle Scout earns the honour through a number of 
competencies manifesting in a public service project 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eagle_Scout_(Boy_Scouts_of_America)). 
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The last one, however, is more complicated: the conceptual antonymic contrast 
between an Eagle Scout and a murderer. These are not mutually exclusive 
categories; however, they conflict in a way that shows the tension the authors 
wanted. The authors’ intent also shows these inconsistencies are substantive to 
assessing the suspect’s guilt. It is my position that the account of semantic 
inconsistency presented in this thesis, handles all three instances of these 
inconsistencies prima facie; whereas, the propositional account – based on form 
alone or truth-values alone – does not, especially the last inconsistency. 
 
 One of the more critical aspects of my account of inconsistency demands 
that the semantics of a claim take priority over the truth-values of a claim. The 
Orange County murder instance further typifies this because we do not know if 
these claims are true or false. We were not there when they were told to law 
enforcement; and we do not know the motivation of the suspect (e.g. maybe he is 
covering for another friend who is guilty). But we do know that based on semantic 
meaning these claims conflict and in the context of a murder investigation may be 
cause for alarm and further inquiry. Thus, even without knowing the truth-values, 
we know the inconsistency points to a problem with the suspect’s testimony. 
 
 The critic may respond that I have made an obvious point in the ordering of 
understanding. Semantic conflict leads to truth-value assessment. But the 
concern is not the conflict but determining the truth-values–after all, is that not 
what matters in testimony? I think inconsistency is a special case, not like normal 
claims where the truth is easier to determine because of the lack of conflict. In 
cases of inconsistent claims, much like the sceptics, there may be good reasons 
to believe the claims are both true and false. So semantic conflict can and should 
lead to truth-value assessment but the world is not that easily satisfied, which is 
one reason for the use of warranted assertability. 
 
The general aim is not obviously controversial; in fact, some may see it is 
as apparent. But philosophers and logicians like Quine and Frege (Shapiro 2013) 
may believe that I have not gone far enough. So, if natural language is 
inconsistent, what is the problem? From their perspective natural language can be 
improved upon by taking on some formal principles of symbol manipulation and 
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implication rules leading to a unique logical outcome. By embracing these results, 
the problem with inconsistency is clear: it leads to a result that anything follows 
from a contradiction. Consider the three inconsistencies in the suspect’s story. If 
we formalise them (or just one of them), the logical implication is that anything 
follows from them—which implies the suspect’s testimony has no value. This is 
the logical implication of form and implication rules (ECQ), or truth-values (EFQ), 
whichever one is prioritised. 
 
Should we not trust anything the suspect says? Of course not. One 
problem with ECQ and EFQ in this case, is that they prove too much. If the 
suspect confessed to the murder, would we prima facie reject that, too? The 
implication from the logical critics is that we should. However, none of us would do 
that without sufficient reason and context to warrant it. My theory of semantic 
inconsistency does not “over” prove anything. What it displays is that there is a 
conflict; in this case, three conflicts, which, in the context of a murder 
investigation, are telling. The context situates the importance and value of the 
inconsistencies.133 
 
The account of semantic inconsistency in this thesis is not without flaws. It 
relies on two fundamental notions: the general understanding of the way the world 
works and competency with a language. If either of those is lacking, discovering 
the inconsistency may be difficult or foreign to the person attempting to make the 
judgement. I purposely chose the murder story because it sets up this objection. If 
one does not know what an “Eagle Scout” is – and many unfamiliar with this 
American entity will not – the contrast, to decide the inconsistency, is lost. To 
counter this, reading the article in a charitable manner from the author’s 
perspective, displays some implied contrast in the syntax of the sentence. Without 
knowing the meaning of the words, the contrast is still there, albeit austere. This 
contrast is unusual because the reader does not know the contextual meaning of 
two of the words (i.e. “Eagle Scout”), but knows the other (“murderer”)—and yet 
still recognises there is some form of semantic conflict (inconsistency) between 
                                                          
133 Imagine the same murder account, but in fictional terms, here the conflicts do not mean the 
same thing in terms of practical effect and importance, e.g. there will be no further investigation 
into the murder. 
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them. It may be that in unusual cases like this, there is a syntax and semantic 
conflation, which may undermine my semantic basis for inconsistency in some 
cases. 
 
With the semantic and syntax conflation as a potential counterexample, 
does it undermine the semantic theory of inconsistency? No. Counterexamples 
function in several ways and in this instance, it demonstrates that the semantic 
theory is incomplete. However, counterexamples can be taken as devastating to a 
theory much like the property of explosiveness – one counterexample destroys a 
theory. To avoid this, the relative scope and frequency of the counterexample 
needs to be considered. In the austere case mentioned, the semantics still aid in 
the explanation even if the syntactic structure contributes as well. More so, the 
fact that the semantic theory makes sense of the three inconsistencies in the 
Orange County story shows it is a better theory than the theory of inconsistency 
from propositional logic that only makes sense of two of them, counterexample 
withstanding. 
 
The greater context of the general understanding of the way the world 
works is a necessary part of the way my account of semantic inconsistency 
functions. A semantic inconsistency can be obvious or not, depending on the 
linguistic capability of the person involved. Some may find this type of 
inconsistency difficult due to a lack of conceptual understanding and language 
skills. An austere account of inconsistency such as that offered by propositional 
logic, may be the straightforward way to initially understand inconsistency due to 
simplifying the concepts to syntactic contrast. While I have been hard on 
propositional logic and its concepts of inconsistency, the context will settle if it is 
the best way to understand inconsistency for those with a lack of general 
understanding of the way the world works and linguistic competency. Once the 
logical notion of inconsistency is understood, the semantic type can be introduced 
as direct canonical antonyms displaying the obvious contrast (e.g. black/white), 
and then as the skill develops, non-canonical ones introduced (e.g. 
murder/suicide). 
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In chapter four, the semantic theory of inconsistency related to the 
analytical defeasible model of argument (ADM).134 This model of argument uses 
semantic inconsistency in the reasons and conclusions, where conclusions are 
inconsistent with one another, and reasons may be specific to one conclusion but 
not to another. In the context of inquiry and asking questions, 
answers/conclusions are sought to close the inquiry or illustrate that more inquiry 
might be needed. This model was further detailed with a second direction, in 
inference to best explanation arguments and articulations. This novel approach 
from Wright (2001:Ch.5) has conclusions explaining some of the reasons. 
 
I attempted explaining how the analytical defeasible model of argument 
aligns with our natural reasoning practices through questions and answers and 
looking for reasons to support one answer over another. The Zahau case was 
used to illustrate this model. One criticism of this model might be that there are 
two main arguments and they should be schematised individually for clarity 
purposes with each set of reasons and their specific conclusion. More so, as 
individual arguments, whole arguments can be judged side by side to easily see 
the similarities and differences. For clarity’s sake that may be true and I offer no 
substantial rebuttal other than to say the relevance articulations sort out the top 
ranked conclusion (when the reasons support a single conclusion). The final 
ranking is clearer with a top ranked conclusion than with two arguments with two 
conclusions and no mechanism to judge which conclusion is most supported. The 
analytical defeasible model is goal based; the clarity concern does not offer a way 
to reach the goal, which is already built into the mechanism of the analytical 
defeasible model of argument (ADM). 
 
Chapter six developed the concepts of IRINCON (irrational inconsistency), 
RATINCON (rational inconsistency), and SINCON (single conclusion) to cover the 
conceptual landscape of inconsistency within the ADM. The ideal is SINCON 
where the reasons support a single conclusion as the answer to the context 
question. However, when reasons do not clearly support a single conclusion but 
                                                          
134 In terms of the objectives of the thesis, Objective 4: to use a contemporary antonym theory to 
make sense of semantic inconsistency judgements in ordinary language and arguments. 
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offer a rational basis for two conclusions, RATINCON is used. Finally, when there 
is no rational basis for two conclusions (or more) the argument is intractable and 
irrational, or IRINCON. 
 
It is important to grant that all three concepts work with the model of 
argument and are linked to it. Thus, using them outside of the ADM is not their 
intent. Of the three concepts, RATINCON is most interesting because it concedes 
that a semantic inconsistency is rational and still allows action. There is no halting 
effect to the inconsistency. More inquiry may be needed for resolution, if the 
context warrants it. 
 
However, one may argue against the very idea of a “rational inconsistency.” 
Inconsistencies, on this critical view, are irrational by their nature. They should not 
be accepted. More so, had the arguments been separated for clarity’s sake, there 
would be no inconsistency in the argument but inconsistency between two 
arguments. Choose the best argument of the two, and the inconsistency is gone 
according to the critic. So, in effect, the ADM model produces the idea of a 
rational inconsistency given, the same ranking of two conclusions. 
 
One problem with that criticism is that it is shortsighted and practically 
inadequate. It assumes that one will make the best choice between two (or more) 
arguments with no mechanism for that, other than personal preference. Resolving 
the inconsistency by separating arguments does not resolve the inconsistency; it 
only puts it into a different form that undermines taking it as seriously as it should 
be as a sum of all the reasons and conclusions. Applying relevance articulations 
gives a mechanism based on the relevance between a reason and conclusion(s) 
to determine what conclusion has the most support in contrast to the other 
conclusions. 
 
Another criticism of my view is that inconsistencies should not be 
schematised at all. The job of the person offering the argument is to resolve the 
inconsistency before, so that the argument is consistent from the outset. Let us 
consider that seriously. What mechanism and process does one adopt to do that? 
What are the standards for which one claim is dropped and another is not? These 
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are fundamental questions that must be answered if we are going to teach our 
students how to do it and why. More so, suppose that one does resolve the 
inconsistency in this manner, what does it say about the inconsistency? If the 
inconsistency can be solved before, it is not obvious the inconsistency was 
substantive at all or it was an ad hoc move based on personal preference and not 
some objective standard. Substantive inconsistencies are not so easily resolved. 
 
The other part of the criticism is more substantive about inconsistencies 
being rational. I believe that a categorical acceptance of inconsistencies being 
irrational is deeply flawed. If one holds this position (and I am not sure anyone 
does), quantum mechanics, naïve set theory, and even natural language with self-
referring predicates, are irrational. The critic must explain why their irrationality is 
problematic. The concern then becomes sorting out which inconsistencies are 
rational or irrational. It is in that spirit that the thoughts of this thesis were written 
and hopefully they have advanced that discussion toward sorting them out when 
needed. 
 
Theoretically, however, Cherniak (1981:161–183) sets some minimal 
consistency and minimal rationality conditions per previous chapters. We should 
seek to resolve inconsistencies where we can, and where we cannot, we need to 
adopt rational measures that will still allow action. The concept of RATINCON was 
developed with this in mind. The relationship between an inconsistency and 
paralysing action is not a necessary one, which is part of the conception that 
needs to be corrected. 
 
7.3 Third aim: to provide a novel account of how to handle semantic 
inconsistencies for pedagogical application in critical reasoning courses 
and, critical reflexions on the third aim 
 
 Pedagogical considerations are serious matters. Unlike the previous aims, 
this one affects students and their future. As educators we believe that what we 
teach students is valuable. The value can vary depending on the subject, 
sometimes it is theoretical, at others it is practical, and still, yet others, both. I 
would hope my account fits both theoretical coherence and practical concerns. As 
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this view arose in part from my own practical experiences as both a student and a 
teacher, it may have unduly influenced me in the practical direction. This bias, I 
believe, is well-founded. The concepts of natural language are sufficient to detail 
our reasoning practices. If one believes that another means must be used to detail 
our reasoning practices, it seems to me the burden is on them to demonstrate a 
better way to do it. I have contended for multiple reasons that propositional logic is 
not a better way, so a critic will have to look elsewhere for an improvement. Until 
that has been sufficiently articulated and demonstrated to capture our reasoning 
practices as robustly as natural language and human practice, a natural language 
account of reasoning practices is likely the best candidate. 
 
 I have strong views of how critical reasoning should be taught, which have 
motivated this thesis. Foundational to my view is that propositional logic has little 
value to critical reasoning and it has unnecessarily influenced how inconsistencies 
are thought of and handled. Pedagogically introducing propositional logic into 
critical reasoning courses creates a split course where natural language and 
formal language are taught. I have argued extensively that formal language use 
should be minimised in a critical reasoning course as it distracts and undermines 
the conceptual emphasis on natural language understanding and reasoning 
practices. 
 
 An educator who believes that critical reasoning should involve 
propositional logic likely believes that formalism, implication, and translation 
provide value issuing in clarity and precision. Without a doubt, propositional logic 
is clear and precise in the context of a formal language. But, what substantial 
commonality does a formal language have with natural language? These two 
languages are two different articulations of relations. A formal language can 
articulate general relations, but has difficulty with subtle relations like gradation, 
which natural language handles effectively. 
 
I also challenge the claim that natural language is not precise. In fact, the 
number of concepts in natural language is far greater than a formal language. 
Natural language can thus be clearer and more precise through careful 
delineation. One must acquire the vocabulary and use it effectively. If educators 
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focused on vocabulary improvement, especially about reasoning, student clarity 
and precision may improve in the right context. The result would be better 
reasoning through semantically specific premises and conclusions. 
 
 In chapter six I criticised the views of Moore and Parker, Walton, and 
Govier. I found their accounts of inconsistency lacking. Part of that criticism stems 
from their more or less traditional thoughts on inconsistency being truth-value 
based. To counter this in some detail, I adopted the notion of warranted 
assertability. Fundamental to my position is that critical reasoning does not have 
to rely on truth-values for intelligibility or assessment. In many arguments, the 
Zahau case for instance, or the Orange County murder inconsistency, the truth of 
claims is unknown and/or unsettled. When warranted assertability is applied to 
these claims, the best reasons stand as the evaluation tool. We should believe the 
best reasons until we have reason to believe otherwise. 
 
 As mentioned in chapter one, philosophers were focused on truth whereas 
Sophists were concerned with persuasion. One criticism of warranted assertability 
is that it denies the fundamental philosophical enterprise: truth seeking. More so, 
the best reasons still could be false, so the qualifying “best” is weak. If we are to 
take critical reasoning seriously, for the critic, truth must be at the heart of our 
practices including not accepting inconsistent conclusions and/or reasons in an 
argument and knowing the truth of reasons in an argument. 
 
 Although the focus of warranted assertability is not truth per se, it is not 
inconsistent with it. The best reasons can be replaced with true reasons if they are 
known to be true. Truth is still sought, but practically for many arguments the truth 
of the premises is unknown. I do not think we give up reasoning due to not 
knowing truth-values and my account allows for when truth-values are unknown. I 
think, however, there may be a deeper objection by philosophical purists, namely 
that the disregard for truth is more consistent with persuasion and Sophistry than 
philosophy. That is a fair objection as it demonstrates that the spirit of my view 
has been understood. The wedding of truth, logic, and argument, sets up a 
particular picture that alternative views are not philosophical or as philosophical. 
Maybe so, but critical reasoning is not an entirely pure philosophical discipline, 
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given its practical nature, linguistic basis, and emphasis on communicative 
measures. It seems to me that if this criticism is substantive, then mathematical 
logic would hold non-philosophical consequences as well, and would not be part 
of the purist’s view either. 
 
 One area that I touched on dealt with the education of critical reasoning 
teachers and some of its flaws. Knowing I have strong views on this, I have tried 
to be charitable. Part of my weakness, however, is that much of my view is 
anecdotal having taught for eighteen years on six campuses in two distinct 
geographical locations. I have been exposed to other teachers of critical 
reasoning who had different educational and social backgrounds. I have 
witnessed the rampant use of propositional logic in critical reasoning courses 
where it varied in application. Reviewing the syllabi mentioned in earlier chapters 
demonstrated an obvious pattern of many critical reasoning courses: some form of 
propositional logic, fallacies, some linguistic applications like ambiguity and 
vagueness, and some form of inductive logic. This pattern repeats itself in the 
textbooks reviewed as well. 
 
 The industry of critical reasoning supports the problem that I have struggled 
against in this thesis. Whether the textbook brings about the curriculum or the 
curriculum brings about the textbook, the problem is the unreflective nature of 
both.135 This is further compounded by schools who choose the textbook for the 
instructor based on their course objectives/content curriculum paperwork.136 I 
think part of the problem is that introduction to logic books typically share the 
same content but in different presentations. There is some uniformity to them 
conceptually. Critical reasoning textbooks, based on the logic textbook model, 
then have a similar uniformity. But, we should all be reflective of the material for 
our courses and not be constrained by textbook choices. Textbook authors 
choose material they believe is important and that can be in error. Current 
                                                          
135 As a former Curriculum Chair at my current school, it (was) is common for new courses to be 
based on the table of contents of textbooks. For some courses, it was a one-to-one 
correspondence.  
136 I once applied for a part time lecturer position at Victor Valley College, Victorville, California, 
U.S.A. They informed me that I had to use their textbook of choice and follow their general 
syllabus as well, which included propositional logic in a critical thinking course. I never taught there 
due to this lack of choice. 
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concerns about diversity in the curriculum are largely the result of a suppressive 
source choice or the “canon” in most disciplines. Why is Sartre more important in 
existentialism than De Beauvoir? Why is a two-valued logic more important than a 
Buddhist four-valued logic? Why is Westernised linear thinking prized over Native 
American circular thinking (Rose 2014)? The simple answer is that the former are 
all part of the canon, which is resistant to change. Textbooks reinforce that canon 
purposely or unwittingly, but the result is the same. 
 
 My challenge by means of this thesis is to critical reasoning educators. I 
want them to critically reflect on what they teach and why. Is the material choice 
because of what they were taught in graduate school? Is it what the textbook 
dictates? Is the material choice what the educator knows best and teaches to their 
strengths? Is the lack of reflexion because they have become intellectually 
lethargic? There are multiple reasons for this lack of cogitation. But as a model of 
critical reasoning, educators should employ critical reasoning to their own 
pedagogy and see if it meets the muster of what is best for their students. While 
my approach may not meet the muster for all, it is an attempt to do something 
valuable for students, to improve their critical reasoning skills and the ability to 
articulate the importance of reasoning in everyday life. 
 
7.4 Future considerations 
 
 While writing this thesis, additional questions arose that follow from the 
ideas put forth. There are two types of future considerations: negative and 
positive. The negative considerations relate to where the thesis fell short and 
needed areas of future research. The positive considerations are potential future 
extensions of the research. Each will be taken in turn. 
 
7.4.1 Negative considerations 
 
There are at least three areas where the thesis is lacking: a critical analysis 
of the conceptual antonym theory; a consideration of other methods of informal 
reasoning for use with the theory of semantic inconsistency; and, an analysis of 
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critical reasoning as a discipline–and if it is needed at all. I will start with the latter 
and move to the former. 
 
Given the recent history of critical reasoning and the informal logic 
movement, one could argue that formal logic and its use has been established as 
the paradigm. A thesis on semantic inconsistency is undermined by the history of 
philosophy given its reliance of Aristotelian, Stoic, and contemporary logic. 
Translation is part of the philosophical practice going back at least to Aristotle, 
where statement types were the form and content was instantiated into the forms. 
Arguments that met the logical form were valid and those that did not, were not 
valid (see the Posterior Analytics [1941:110–187]). Aristotle also wrote on 
persuasion and ordinary reasoning extensively in the Rhetoric (1941:1325–1454). 
As mentioned before, this content pattern fits the basic textbook and pedagogy of 
some current critical reasoning courses that include both a formal and informal 
component. The modern critical reasoning movement is just reinventing the 
proverbial wheel, as Aristotle articulated in detailed substantive conceptions of 
both components. 
  
 More so, psychology, English, speech, and communication courses cover 
this informal component through coursework and textbooks. Critical reasoning 
courses are not needed as they overlap extensively with these other areas. 
Hence, in my rejection of propositional logic as useful in reasoning, the result is 
admitting that I have changed the subject. The material from my book, and other 
critical reasoning texts could easily be incorporated into a critical writing course, 
for instance. If this is all correct, why should critical reasoning be a specific 
discipline and have its own courses? 
 
 I believe there is a negative argument and a positive argument for critical 
reasoning as a discipline. The negative argument posits that the movement would 
not have gotten traction had it not been relevant and needed. The fact that it 
exists, demonstrates that some philosophical need was not being met by the 
logical and reasoning teachings of the day. I also think that if someone holds the 
position that critical reasoning is not needed as a discipline, the same person 
needs to explain why non-standard logics were developed and are now in use. 
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Innovation leads to new disciplines. The positive argument for critical reasoning is 
that it is an active research area and fills a specific role in general education 
curricula. More time can be spent specifically on reasoning related concepts than 
in courses where critical reasoning is part of the course but not the topic of the 
course. To justify this, however, is another area of weakness. No studies have 
been done that I can find that demonstrate that student reasoning has improved 
since the mid-1970’s when the critical reasoning movement started coming to 
fruition. Ultimately, if a study were done, I conjecture that critical reasoning as a 
discipline may be justified by success rates, demonstrating improvement in 
practical reasoning, in critical reasoning courses, over and above that same 
reasoning in introduction to logic courses. 
 
 Not considering other methods of informal reasoning is the second 
negative consideration. One of the most prominent methods is the use of 
argument diagramming. Groarke and Tindale (2013:108–166) and Van den Berg 
(2010:57–71) use the method of argument diagramming to show the relationships 
between reasons and a conclusion. The practice goes back to Beardsley (1950) 
and reached popularity through the widespread reasoning texts of Toulmin (1958) 
and later through Scriven (1976). Argument diagramming, thus has a history of 
expressing inferential and implicative relations. 
 
 One positive of argument diagramming is that it provides a visual diagram 
of relations that may aid in understanding. This is especially helpful when a 
source has multiple independent reasons that are not congruous in a text or other 
media source. More so, when arguments have dependent nested, or sub 
arguments supporting a main argument, diagramming may help expose these 
complicated relations. Diagramming arguments has some use where a visual 
representation of complicated relations is needed. 
 
 Another positive of argument diagramming is that it does not have to use 
the formal concepts of deductive validity and soundness. The diagram can 
demonstrate inferential relationships without supposing implicative relationships. 
This fits well with critical reasoning courses, but it is also a skill that could be 
carried over to introduction to logic courses. In this latter case, the method could 
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be used in both courses, which would make it a wise pedagogical choice if one 
were having to teach both courses. Both implication and inference could be 
demonstrated with argument diagramming showing its effectiveness to reasoning 
on a whole. 
 
 Argument diagramming could be modified to handle inconsistencies 
relatively easily. Instead of using just circles for reasons, a different shape could 
be used showing the two reasons that have inconsistent content. As well, the 
diagram could be modified to display competing conclusions and related reasons 
to those particular conclusions. Finally, one could introduce a context question as 
a distinct box that would show the relationship between the question and the 
competing conclusions. Thus, the argument diagramming approach is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the ADM.137 
 
 Pedagogically, however, argument diagramming may introduce another 
level of complexity and translation. Students are required to learn a new set of 
symbols and the process of representing relationships accurately. It is a type of 
reductive formalism and translation. The semantic content is set aside to analyse 
relations, which seems to undermine the very reason to do it. You must 
understand the semantic relations to diagram correctly, so it may be redundant. 
Semantic relations should be a priority in critical reasoning courses, as those 
relations come before any truth-value determination and assessment. 
 
 As this thesis used a single antonym theory and only briefly mentioned 
another, an objection looms over that choice and use. The canonical model of 
antonym theory (lexical-categorical theory) based on opposition in the corpus is 
dominant. This theory is somewhat static and involves word pairs that 
semantically conflict, such as black/white, dead/alive, and true/false. While there 
is little doubt that word pairs function in this way, the conceptual model articulates 
additional ways based on context, such as murder/suicide. The worry with the 
conceptual model is that it pairs words that are not pairs, and the process become 
                                                          
137 Thomas (1997) does something similar in Chs. 1-4 showing how among other things, reasons 
counting for or against a specific conclusion by adopting a dotted line instead of a solid one for the 
“against” aspect. 
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arbitrary. The canonical model does not have this same sense of arbitrariness due 
to historical contrasting word use and exceptions through indirect antonym 
conflict. 
 
 This thesis did not consider in detail the psycholinguistic research on 
antonymy. There is research that demonstrates that direct canonical antonyms 
are more easily recalled and semantically prime contrast more than the 
conceptual model where indirect antonyms have the additional element of context 
(Jones, Murphy, Paradis & Willners 2012:13–14). This positions the conceptual 
model to be weaker in application and may indicate problems for recognising 
semantic conflict, especially with limited time to make judgements. 
 
 Since the conceptual model is embedded in a theory of reasoning (the 
ADM), there may be further complications. While direct canonical antonyms do not 
rely on a specific context, the indirect antonyms in the conceptual model do. 
There is indirect contrast that must be acknowledged and that contrast is a part of 
inference to a conclusion(s) in an argument. The implication is that processing 
times may be even slower and affect the use of the argument model negatively. 
 
 The research that would have to be done to justify the argument model 
combined with the conceptual model would have to include total processing times 
for argument schematisation. This research would also have to evaluate the 
contrast to argument schematisation in other models including those that require 
translation and then the schematisation. If it could be shown that, for instance, 
propositional logic or argument diagramming were able to schematise the contrast 
and improve processing times, there is a scientific basis for rejecting the ADM. 
Contrastively, were the ADM more efficient and had that research been done, 
there would be a scientific basis for its choice as a theory of reasoning. Until more 
research is done, the effect of argument models on processing speeds will be 
unknown.   
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7.4.2 Positive considerations 
 
There are five significant areas of future research that may be worthwhile to 
pursue: simplifying a paraconsistent logic for formalism purposes, contextual 
analysis for conceptual antonym pairs, empirical translation studies, the 
development of better ways to teach reasoning about inconsistencies through 
real-world examples, and the application of the theory to assessing inconsistent 
testimony and evidence in the legal system. 
 
 Paraconsistent logic is a formalisation of an inconsistency tolerant logic as 
detailed in chapter one. It might be prudent to try to devise a system of 
paraconsistent logic that is minimal and is able to handle inconsistencies in a 
straightforward manner. By moving in this direction, an alternative is constructed 
for those who want to reason formally with inconsistencies, something not offered 
by this thesis. If this logic could be achieved where one desires, maybe the 
incorporation of paraconsistent logic could replace classical propositional logic in 
critical reasoning textbooks that want some kind of formal approach. One benefit 
of this is that ECQ is not taught and students do not learn the explosiveness 
property of a contradiction. Another benefit is that students do not poison the well 
against inconsistency unnecessarily. This psychological aspect encourages 
students to seek out substantive inconsistencies and set aside those that lack 
substance. The weakness of this, however, is that adopting this paraconsistent 
version still would not solve the translation issues. Thus, its value might be limited 
but still in the right direction. 
 
Another area of interest that might be fruitful is analysing the contexts of 
antonymic patterns to understand how non-canonical or indirect conceptual 
antonyms contrast. The inconsistent claim of an Eagle Scout accused of murder is 
one of value, where someone has a notable character that is violated by a 
heinous act. Using the conceptual antonym theory, especially the notion of 
gradation, where does the contrast begin and end in this kind of case? If it were 
merely theft would the contrast still hold? Also, gradation itself is subject to 
vagueness claims. Does vagueness undermine the necessary contrast for a pair 
to be antonymic in one context but not another? These are important questions 
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because the desire for a semantic theory of inconsistency should be as 
comprehensive as it can be, so making sense of as many examples as possible. 
This thesis does not explore these ideas in sufficient detail, as it is a preliminary 
work. The concept of “gradation” alone could be the subject of doctoral thesis. 
This thesis gestures toward its importance for future research. 
  
 In chapters three, five and six, translation concerns were articulated. One 
area, in particular, was found to be completely deficient in research: logical 
translation for primary and second-language learners. This thesis opens a whole 
area for empirical research on the similarities and differences for primary and 
second-language learners, and their respective issues for logical translation 
success. Anecdotal evidence was substituted for devised studies, which are likely 
much more the domain of a linguistics’ thesis than a philosophy thesis. 
Nevertheless, valuable information could be gained by carefully formulated 
studies that may or may not support the translation project.  
 
Imagine it was demonstrated that second-language learners have more 
conceptual problems with translation than primary language learners. This would 
require a rethinking of the curricula for logic and mathematics courses. Imagine, 
as well, that primary language learners are at a disadvantage for translation 
exercises due to only being skilled in one language. This would also require a 
rethinking of the curricula for logic and mathematics courses, where translation is 
an integral part of both subjects. But I do not think it stops there, as a larger issue 
looms. 
 
 Considered cross culturally as an example, Native American students, may 
have different epistemological commitments. As Hester and Cheney (2001:324) 
write: 
 
“Ceremonial worlds place communication and reciprocity with natural environments—
rather than the desire to dominate those environments or to establish ‘truth claims’ about 
them—at the very heart of the production of knowledge and wisdom. Ethical maturity 
rather than true belief is the goal.” 
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Particular to Native Americans versus the dominant American culture is the notion 
of reciprocity. Finding out the “truth” of the environment is not a goal, nor is 
manipulating the environment. Instead, living with the environment requires an 
ethical commitment to not see it as distinct, but as something compatible with 
humanity. As the quote reveals, truth is not the goal. 
 
Imagine a student with those beliefs being taught that natural language 
aligns with formal language, and truth is obtained when they align or correspond. 
If the student were confused, it would understandable. The approach of this 
thesis, using natural language and warranted assertability, would allow the 
student to remain within their own paradigm of understanding yet reasoning 
effectively. So, the consequence of exploring primary versus second-language 
users and their translation problems is also highlighted by potential world view 
problems that would have to be accounted for with any study. I fear that 
delineating the concepts accordingly to set up a study may be next to impossible 
due to the number of cultures that may have language and worldviews that are 
not strictly or loosely compatible with propositional logic. 
 
 Another area of interest involves a reorientation of critical reasoning 
pedagogy by teaching from examples to theory. Given my interest in sustaining 
reasoning in ordinary contexts, real-world examples set the stage for a theory to 
be implemented. This approach is intuitive, as the example provides the 
grounding for understanding the theory. The ADM is natural, in the sense that it is 
based on questions and answers. With the right real-world examples, the 
reasoning is already present but it needs to be articulated though schematisation. 
The hope of this extension is for students to see enough examples where 
reasoning exists, that when they come across new examples, the reasoning 
pattern comports from the previous examples used and can be applied much 
easier. I have done some of this in my courses already and for the students it is 
more intuitive than taking a theoretical concept and hoping they can map it on to 
the real-world example. The bigger project is teaching theory through examples. 
Philosophy can be difficult, given its abstractness, and this pedagogical technique 
might be very useful to aid student understanding. 
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 The final area of interest is the potential application of the theory of 
semantic inconsistency to legal reasoning in assessing testimony and evidence. 
In the field of law, the concept of “reasonable doubt” is at the forefront. The 
degree to which this is completely understood is questionable by juries and even 
scholars due to a lack of clear definition (Dlamini 1998). Semantic and logical 
inconsistencies arise in testimony, which may or may not affect the application of 
the reasonable doubt criteria. This problem is further muddled when considering 
the application from the attorneys’ perspectives or from the perspective of the 
jurors. An attorney may consider the inconsistency something that undermines 
reasonable doubt, yet the jury does not. And the opposite is as likely, depending 
on the complexity of the testimony and evidence. Part of this is a lack of 
understanding of the concept of reasonable doubt but the other rests on 
understanding, if the inconsistency is substantive or not. One area that might be 
fruitful in solving semantic inconsistencies, in this sense, is the use of prior and 
posterior probability judgements, where the degree of understanding affects the 
acceptance of the inconsistency or not. To do this, however, would require a 
contextual change for the ADM to setting probable conditions as a structural guide 
and a reliance on specific understanding of the context. What this may imply is 
that juries may need to be educated in more complex matters if they are to make 
the correct judgement about reasonable doubt, and its relation to testimonial and 
evidentiary inconsistencies. 
 
7.5 Final thoughts 
 
Semantic inconsistency is an exciting topic that has many facets. In this 
thesis some of those were presented. Inconsistency in general is interesting 
because it not only guides thought, it guides behaviour as well. In some instances, 
inconsistency of any type is clear and straightforward. It can be determined rather 
easily. In other instances, inconsistency is not so clear and needs further 
articulation to assess its significance. This thesis is an attempt to provide that 
articulation and assessment. While I have no doubt that it may fall short in some 
areas, I believe it is in the right direction to give attention to when inconsistencies 
matter and when they do not. Thus, returning to the research question set out at 
the beginning of this thesis, I have argued that the best concept of inconsistency 
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for critical reasoning theory and pedagogy is the semantic one, as the other 
schemes fall short in numerous ways. 
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